


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ANALYSIS OF BHAKTI

BY

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Before proceeding to bring out the difference between emotional and formal aspects of *Bhakti*, we propose to preface the present article with a short analysis of *Bhakti*. First of all, the cult of *Bhakti* seems to be of great antiquity in this proverbial land of religions. Evidence as to the progress of *Bhakti* movement can be traced in the philosophical discourses of the Upaniṣads. The Mahābhārata in its main feature is a record of this movement. The cult of *Bhakti* bears a purely Indian character and might be claimed as a genuine product of India's spiritual culture. We have, therefore, little regard for those who have discovered distinct influence of Christianity over the *Bhakti*-cult of India.

An instinct of reverence and devotion to the Highest and the Greatest or, more properly, faith in the goodness of God, is supposed to have inspired the performance of sacrifices and rituals among the primitive people. All forms of religious worship and sacred communion with God were prompted by a devotional impulse. *Bhakti* occupies a unique place in the sacred path of *sādhana*; it is required to be cultivated by all seekers after God, by all mystics and devotees. Without *Bhakti* one cannot aspire to rise to the lofty plane of Brahmayidyā and thus attain the illuminating

knowledge of the Supreme Being. It is truly observed by the ancient *seers* :

यस्य देवे परा भक्तियथा देवे तथा गुरौ ।

तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः ॥

Svetāśvatara, 6. 23.

Bhakti, *jñāna* and *karma* are the three distinct paths of spiritual discipline practised in India from time beyond recollection. *Bhakti*, as we generally know, has its germs embedded in the human heart. It is a sacred impulse that rises from within, nourished by closer and closer association with God and terminates finally in total self-effacement.

What, then, is *Bhakti*? Let us start with those treatises which have attempted to interpret the doctrine of *Bhakti*. *Bhakti* has been defined in the *Bhakti-Mināṃsū* as 'extreme devotion to God.'

सा परानुरक्तिरीश्वरे । Sāṇḍilya-sūtra.

The word devotion (*anurāga*) is here used with the implication of selfless attachment to the Highest or, to one's loving object of adoration. Devotion carried to its extreme form is often attended with total absorption and self-annihilation. *Bhakti* is, therefore, strictly divine and brings with it eternal flow of joy. We are said to be devoted to our wives and children, but this devotion is so grossly selfish and secular that it does not exhibit any ennobling features of *Bhakti*; worldly attachment is embittered by selfish considerations and is shorn of all sweetness that makes *Bhakti* so agreeable. Affection or devotion may develop into *Bhakti* only if it is fortunately turned to God, the be-all and end-all of life. The aphorism quoted above makes it perfectly clear that *Bhakti* by its very nature comprehends God as the supreme object of love and regard.

Nārada defines *Bhakti* as 'intense love towards God.'

सा त्वस्मिन् परमप्रेमरूपा ।

Nārada-Bhakti-sūtra, 2.

As is quite clear, the two definitions speak in the same strain by laying emphasis upon the intensity of devotion as the salient feature of *Bhakti*. By using the word *preman* instead of *anurāga*, Nārada has indirectly shown the climax to which devotion may ultimately reach. Devotion or attachment culminates in the long run in Love. This is quite in accord with the course of development pointed out in the *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu*. Rūpa Gosvāmin, in his analysis of *Bhakti*, has beautifully shown the gradual stages through which faith passes and finally manifests itself in the shape of *preman* (love). We must remember that unshaking faith in God is the first and foremost condition of *Bhakti*. No faith, no devotion. This is also true of knowledge. Aspirants after knowledge cannot also do away with faith :

अज्ञावान् लभते ज्ञानं तत्परः संयतेन्द्रियः ।

—Gītā.

That *śraddhā* has to be cultivated prior to the development of *Bhakti*, as an indispensable accompaniment of it, has been repeatedly stated in the Gītā :

मय्यावेश्य मनो ये मां नित्ययुक्ता उपासते ।

अथवा परयोपेतास्ते मे युक्ततमा मताः ॥

As to the real nature of *Bhakti*, it is held that absolute devotion to God is in itself a source of perpetual joy. Nārada has characterised *Bhakti* as *amṛta* (nectar) with a view to impress the fact that 'devotion to God' leads naturally to a state of immortality by removing all kinds of pains consequent upon births and deaths. A true devotee knows no pains but lives in a world of perfect joy and enjoys celestial bliss in

the kingdom of God. All his longings and hankerings are satisfied once for all by the ambrosial touch of *Bhakti*.

The definition of *Bhakti* suggested by Rūpa Gosvāmin is also worthy of notice, though it is more or less sectarian on the very face of it.* By the highest form of *Bhakti* he understands only devotion to Kṛṣṇa and makes *Bhakti* entirely detached from, and independent of, knowledge and action.

अन्याभिलाषिताशून्यं ज्ञानकर्माद्यनाहतम् ।

आनुकूल्येन कृष्णानुशीलनं भक्तिरुत्तमा ॥

The author of the *Bhakti-rasāyana* has dealt with the problem of *Bhakti* from a purely philosophical point of view. He is, we must remember, the same as the author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, a celebrated work on the *Advaita* school of Vedānta. It is curious enough that an ardent advocate of Advaitism, like Madhusūdana, could have come forward with his intellectual equipment to defend *Bhakti* as the highest desideratum of life and to bring home the equality of *Bhakti* with knowledge. To this dialectician *Bhakti* is a kind of mental state (*vṛtti*) in which the mind, moved by an ecstasy of love, assumes the shape of God.

द्रव्यभावपूर्विका हि मनसो भगवदाकारता सावकल्पकवृत्तिर्या
भक्तिः ।

His definition of *Bhakti* runs as follows :

द्रुतस्य भगवद्वर्थादारावाहिकतां गता ।

सर्व्वेये मनसो वृत्तिर्भक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ॥

It means that *Bhakti* arises when the mind is so trained as to be constantly fixed upon the Lord. *Bhakti* is thus a continual and undisturbed flow of the mind—a sacred current always running to the 'Ocean of Joy.' The Bhāgavata has

compared the never-failing flow of *Bhakti* with the currents of the Ganges.

मनोगतिरविच्छिन्ना यथा गङ्गाश्रसोऽम्बुधौ ।

सच्चवं भक्तियोगस्य निर्गमस्य हृदाहृतम् ॥

Constancy of meditation is the seed out of which grows *Bhakti*.

Madhusūdana has also shown how the mind of a devotee is softened or melted under the influence of *Bhakti*. Intensity of devotion serves to soften and expand the heart. *Bhakti* acts like a magician's wand which, by its mysterious touch, removes all hardness, moves the heart in divine joy and transforms cruelty into melting tenderness.

The most authoritative works on the subject of *Bhakti* are the Gita and the Bhāgavata. All later treatises dealing with *Bhakti* have largely drawn upon them. The Gītā has not only one chapter under the caption *Bhakti-yoga*, but is permeated all throughout by the great ideal of *Bhakti*. 'Devotion and self-surrender to the Lord' is the keynote of the Gītā. It has particularly shown that four classes of people are found to adore God. And among the votaries of *Bhakti* those constitute the best type who dedicate everything to God.

The Gītā makes no secret when it postulates the supremacy of *Bhakti*. It is held that the study of the Vedas and the practice of asceticism cannot place within our reach those things that are attainable by pure devotion alone. Concentrated devotion is said to be the only thing that is necessary for having a positive vision of the Lord.

भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्यः अहमेवंविधोऽर्जन ।

आर्तुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परममपि ॥

Gītā XI. 54.

Śaṅkara explains *ananyā bhakti* as that form of deep devotion

which never turns towards anything but God. An ideal devotee, according to Saṃkara, is one who by all his sense-organs realises only one thing, *viz.*, God.

सर्वैरपि करणैर्वासुदेवादित्यनोपलभ्यते यथा सा चनन्या भक्तिः ।

The last verse of the eleventh chapter has been interpreted by Saṃkara as one that gives the substance of the whole Gītā in a nut-shell, *viz.*, the means of getting final liberation (अधुना सर्वस्य गीताशास्त्रस्य सारभूतोऽर्थः निःश्रेयसार्थोऽनुष्ठेयत्वेन समुच्चित्य उच्यते).

मत्कर्मकृत्परमो मदभक्तः सङ्गवर्जितः ।

निर्वैरः सर्वभूतेषु यः स मामेति पाण्डव ॥

It is quite evident from the above verse that one is directed to cultivate selfless devotion to God for the sake of reaching the highest goal of life's journey. The expressions *matkarmakṛt*, etc., should be treated as natural attributes that go to qualify a *bhakta*. It is a *bhakta* and no other type of religious aspirant who attains the Lord in 'the true sense of the term. A devotee of God is said to be one who adores God with all his heart and attention (मदभक्तः मामेव सर्वप्रकारैः सर्वात्मना सर्वोत्साहेन भजते—शाङ्करभाष्य).

The Bhāgavata gives us an elaborate interpretation of *Bhakti*. *Bhakti* is here spoken of as a natural or spontaneous attitude of the mind that grows without any cause (*animitta*) or preconceived motive (Bhāg. 3. 2. 5. 32-33). 'Devotion to Kṛṣṇa without any motive whatsoever' is here held up to be the best form of religion.

स वे पंसां परो धर्मो यतो भक्तिरधोक्षजे ।

अहेतुव्यप्रतिष्ठा ययात्मा सुप्रसीदति ॥

The Bhāgavata has all along attempted to bring home the superiority of devotional attachment specially as was exhibited by the milkmaids of Vṛndāvana. Their love was

so pure and intense that the Lord had to belittle Himself before it.

न पारयेऽहं निरवयवसंयुजां स्वसाधुजन्यं विदुषायुषापि वा ।

या माऽभजन् दुर्ज्वरगीहृन्मूला संवृत्तः तदः प्रतियातु साधुना ॥

This was in all vividness the triumph of Love. It transcends the bounds of knowledge. In the Bhāgavata, *Bhakti* has been accorded a more sublime place than knowledge. It is emphatically stated that God is attainable by *Bhakti* more easily than by knowledge.

नायं सुखापो भगवान् देहिनां देवकोसुतः ।

ज्ञानिनां चात्मभूतानां यथा भक्तिमतामिह ॥

Rāmānuja, as he has revealed himself in the Śrībhāṣya, seems to have been a devotee of the *vaidhī* path. Though a Vedāntin of great reputation, he was an ardent advocate of *Bhakti*. To him *Bhakti* was the best part of knowledge.

Love and devotion are found to have the same connotation in *Bhakti* literature. Things to which we are devoted are really worthy of love. In the following verse of the Viṣṇupurāṇa the word *prīti* is substituted for *Bhakti* :

या प्रीतिरद्विकानां विषयेष्वनपायिनी ।

त्वामनुस्मरतः सा मे हृदयान्नापसर्पतु ॥

It is held that there can be no *Bhakti* without devotion and no spiritual enjoyment without love. Devotion ultimately manifests itself in the shape of Divine Love (*preman*) which is the highest desideratum of one that cultivates *Bhakti* in preference to *jñāna* and *karman*. Neither the knowledge of God nor the performance of pious acts can bestow this blessing upon a devotee. Easier is the path of *Bhakti* ; it brings a devotee into closer relationship with God.

We are often confronted with the puzzling question : do knowledge and devotion conflict with each other ?

Our answer will be in the negative. There is, to speak the truth, interrelation between the two, one supplementing the other. Though knowledge has been emphatically proclaimed to be the direct cause of liberation from the coil of mortality, *Bhakti*, as we find, is not at all antagonistic to knowledge. There are some who maintain their mutual dependence (बुद्धिश्चैव मित्येके). Both lead to the same destination. A state of perpetual joy is attainable by following either of the two paths. The *Bhakti-sūtras* and the *Vedānta-sūtras* are in agreement so far as the ultimate object of devotion and knowledge is concerned (*cf.* 'तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात्' and 'तत्संस्थस्यामृतत्वोपदेशात्').

Though Śaṅkara unfavourably criticised the doctrine held by the Bhāgavatas, he was at heart not opposed to *Bhakti*. This will be quite clear from a study of the hymns he addressed to Gaṅgā and Śrīvidyā. Moreover, he had genuine belief in the grace of God. (यत्प्रसादाच्च योगिनामप्यतीतानागतविषयं प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमिच्छन्ति—under *Ved.sūtra*, 1. 1. 5.)

Now we turn to the classification of *Bhakti*. The Bhāgavata has spoken of nine different forms of *Bhakti* :

श्रवणं कीर्तनं विष्णोः स्मरणं पादसेवनम् ।

पञ्चनं वन्दनं दास्यं सख्यमात्मनिवेदनम् ॥

इति पञ्चापि विष्णौ भक्तिश्चेन्नवसङ्ख्या ।

All these, on minute analysis, are reducible to one, *viz.*, self-abnegation (*ātmanivedana*). Intensive devotion demands that a devotee should surrender himself completely to the mercy of God. A true devotee loses himself entirely in the intensity of his love. To love God without any earthly motive is the highest form of devotion. Selfless devotion to Viṣṇu is said to be so powerful a thing as to render a devotee competent to attain *nirvāṇa*.

प्राप्नोत्वाराधिते विष्णौ निर्व्याप्तमपि चोत्तमम् ।

Viṣṇupurāṇa.

Jivagosvāmin in his *Bhaktisandarbhā* has made, in pursuance of the *Bhaktivāda*, a comprehensive and minute analysis of *Bhakti*. He starts with the proposition that *Bhakti* constitutes the main thing to be cultivated by a devotee. A devotee is called upon to get himself completely devoted to Hari by giving up all kinds of religious practices.

त्यक्त्वा स्वधर्मं चरणांभुजं हरे-
भजन्मपक्वोऽयं पतेत्ततो यदि ।

The path of *Bhakti* is pure and simple. It has also been shown how *Bhakti* brings with it a good deal of satisfaction to the mind. This is why *Bhakti* is so earnestly cultivated by those who are sincerely attached to Vāsudeva.

अतो वे कवयो नित्यं भक्तिं परमया मुदा ।
वासुदेवे भगवति कुर्वन्स्थात्मप्रसादनीम् ॥

It is further stated that the cultivation of *Bhakti* is not as painful and thankless a task as the performance of ordinary works of life ; it is always accompanied by pure and heavenly joy. This leads us to the conclusion that one should exclusively cultivate *Bhakti* even by relinquishing religious actions, knowledge and aversion to all earthly attachment.

तदेवं कर्मज्ञानवेराग्ययत्नपरित्यागेन भगवद्भक्तिरेव कर्त्तव्येति मतम् ।

Jivagosvāmin seems to have faithfully reproduced the view inculcated by the *Bhāgavata* when he attempts to impress upon us the domination or supremacy of *Bhakti* over knowledge and action. Knowledge and action are said to be of no use, if they are not conducive to *Bhakti*. Knowledge loses all its charm, if it is not accompanied by sincere devotion to God.

तदेवं ज्ञानस्य भक्तिसंसर्गं विना कर्मणश्च तदुपपादकत्वं विना व्यर्थत्वं
व्यक्तम् ।

The author of the *Bhaktisandarbha* has given us several classifications of *Bhakti*, namely, *śuddhā*, *antaraṅgā*, *jñānamīśrā*, *vaidhī*, *rāgānugā*, *sādhanātmikā*, etc. . Again, it is said that all kinds of *Bhakti* fall under two classes, namely, *śuddhā* and *aśuddhā*.

सुद्धासां भक्तीनां शुद्धाशुद्धभेदेन द्विविधो हि भेदः सन्मतः ।

Śuddhā is the purest form of devotion attended with the observance of sacred rituals. *Bhakti* is called *antaraṅgā* when it enables a devotee to realise the existence of God (Kṛṣṇa) in all things. *Jñānamīśrā* is cultivated by one who strives after final emancipation (*kaivalya*) ; and *karmamīśrā* by a spiritual aspirant who seeks to attain *Bhakti* alone by his actions. There is another kind of *Bhakti* known as *karma-jñānamīśrā* which comprehends both knowledge and action. Then we come to the main divisions of *Bhakti*, namely, *vaidhī* and *rāgānugā*. While the former is generally inspired by scriptural injunctions or knowledge, the latter is characterised by a deep devotion to the Lord.

भक्तिर्द्विविधा वैधौ. रागानुगा चेति । तत्र वैधौ शास्त्रोक्तविधिना प्रवर्त्तिता ।
.....तत्र विषयिणः स्वाभाविको विषयसंसर्गच्छातिशयमयः प्रेमा रागः ।

Rāga or deep devotion manifests itself in various forms. It is said to be infinitely superior to all varieties of *Bhakti* we have referred to above.

रागानुगाया एव साधकतमत्वं व्यञ्जितम् । विध्यनधीना रागात्मिकैव विराजते ।

Rāgānugā Bhakti has been accorded a unique place in the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism. Jīvagosvāmin, a resourceful representative of that school, has not only strongly advocated the cause of *rāgānugā Bhakti* but has laid great emphasis upon its supremacy. He has even gone to the length of saying that one should pursue this type of *Bhakti* being

regardless of either knowledge or ignorance. Gokula, the mystic land, is held to be the only spot under the Sun where the purest form of devotional love made its appearance with all its divine charm and joy.

अतएव ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरनादरेण केवलानुरागाया एवानुष्ठितिः प्रशस्ता ।
श्रीगोकुले एव रागात्मिकायाः शुद्धत्वात्तदनुगा भक्तिरेव मुख्यतमेति ।

The author concludes his lengthly dissertation on *Bhakti* with the significant remark that a true votary of Love should never disclose the secrets of his *sādhana* which he might have received from his *Guru* as a matter of grace.

श्रीगुरोः श्रीभगवतो वा प्रसादलब्धं साध्यसाधनगतं स्वीयसर्वस्वभूतं यत्
किमपि रहस्यं तत्तु न कश्चैचित् प्रकाशनीयम् ।

One should not, however, think that it was only the Vaiṣṇavas who maintained the supremacy of *Bhakti* in all matters spiritual. The Śaivas as well as the Śāktas were equally alive to the importance and usefulness of *Bhakti*. To the worshippers of शक्ति, *Bhakti* is one of the three paths, nay the surest path, that leads to the final liberation of the soul.

मार्गस्त्रयो मे विख्याता मोक्षप्राप्तौ नराधिप ।

कर्मयोगो ज्ञानयोगो भक्तियोगश्च सत्तम ॥

Devībhāgavata, VII. 37.

The Devībhāgavata has shown how *Bhakti* might be divided into three categories, namely, *sāttviki*, *rājasi* and *tāmasi* and touched upon the main teaching of भक्तियोग by stating clearly that a true devotee gets himself naturally attached to God without having any ulterior motive. Regardless of *mukti* as he is, such a devotee does never hanker after anything but voluntary submission to God. He rests satisfied only with the pious service he is called upon to render to his most beloved one,

मत्सेवातोऽधिकं किञ्चिद्वैव जानाति कश्चित् ।

सेव्यसेवकताभावात्तत्र मोक्षं न वाञ्छति ॥

Devibhāgavata.

A Rāmaprasāda or a Kamalākānta was not a lesser type of *Bhakta* than the Vaiṣṇavas. In the simple but soul-inspiring songs of Rāmaprasāda one will find the beautiful expression of a heart moved by deep devotion to the Great Mother.

In the later phase of Vaiṣṇavism we come across two kinds of *Bhakti*, namely, emotional or erotic and ritualistic or formular (*vaidhī*). *Vaidhī* is characterised by strict observance of prescribed rites and pursuance of a path sanctioned by popular usages and *Śāstras*, while *rāgānugā* does not at all depend upon religious formulas but consists of intense love that knows no laws and barriers. Devotion in its emotional form is a genuine outburst of the inner self which does not allow itself to be fettered by the shackles of rigid rules and customs. This intense form of love found its expression in the simple-hearted cowherd-maidens of Vṛndāvana. One who has dedicated all his actions and thoughts to God does not necessarily stand in need of observing any rules of human society. The celebrated sage Nārada, Dhruva and others are said to have been the followers of the *vaidhī* path of devotion.

The practice of *rāgamārga* is beset with many difficulties. Very few of the devotees are allowed to pursue this exceedingly delicate path. One cannot take to this path without having a good deal of religious merit either in this or previous state of existence. We can hardly conceive of the intensity of love that prompted Jayadeva and Caṇḍīdāsa to follow this type of devotion for the purpose of satisfying their burning passion for God.

It is, however, often alleged that Gopīs, who cultivated *rāgānugā Bhakti* to its highest pitch, were absolutely devoid

of knowledge, that is to say, their love to Kṛṣṇa was not accompanied by a true knowledge of the Divinity to whom they were passionately attached. Their attachment was pure and simple, unstinted by any speculations, moral or religious. Some even have gone so far as to bring a more defamatory charge against them.

All these allegations and charges are absolutely futile. They cannot stand. Want of knowledge could not minimise Gopī's ardour of love but helped to intensify it infinitely. What counts much in the supreme region of Love is the warmth of passion and not intellectualism. It is the nature of love that it always subordinates intellect to devotion. By the aphorism 'अतएव तदभावाद् वल्लवीनाम्' Śaṇḍilya has explicitly stated that the milkmaids of Vṛndāvana had all their objects fulfilled even though they were destitute of knowledge. They knew the Lord to be their playful consort—the source of all joy and happiness—but had no idea of the fact that Kṛṣṇa was the same as the Supreme Brahman.

कृष्णं विदुः परं कान्तं न च ब्रह्मतया मुने ।

Bhāgavata.

To sum up. *Bhakti*, so far as it rests on faith and purity of the heart, implies a state of the mind. It takes its rise from faith in the goodness of God and is nourished by an ever-growing desire to be in union with the loving object of life. Extreme devotion to God does neither arise all on a sudden nor does it blossom through mere lifeless religious practice. It comes as the grace of God. *Bhakti* is, therefore, divine and presupposes *vairāgya* (aversion to earthly enjoyments). One cannot aspire to be a *bhakta* unless he can rise above all earthly attachments and ignoble personal considerations.

DOHAKOSA

WITH NOTES AND TRANSLATIONS

BY

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PREFACE

Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasad Sāstrī was the first to discover and publish the Buddhist Dohās. But he failed to recognise its language as Apabhraṃśa and as his manuscript (or copy?) of the text was very corrupt he was not able to give a critical edition of the text. He published two collections of Dohās : one of Saraha and the other of Kṛṣṇācāryapāda. It was left to Dr. Shahidullah to handle the texts more critically. In an admirable work, *Les Chants Mystiques de Kāṇha et de Saraha*, he has compared the Apabhraṃśa verses with their Tibetan translation, settled their meaning and made a detailed study of their language.

During my last stay in Nepal in 1929 I came upon an old manuscript of the Dohākoṣa in the collection of the Exalted Rājaguru Hemarāja Sarmā and another fragmentary MS. of Dohākoṣa in the Darbar Library. The former MS. belongs to the 13th century and contains two collections, the Dohākoṣa of Tillopāda and that of Sarahapāda. The former is entirely new whereas the second is a very correct and more complete copy of the Dohākoṣa of Saraha already known. The fragmentary MS. of the Darbar Library is dated 221 N. S. (1101 A. D.). It is therefore the oldest MS. of any Dohākoṣa hitherto known and contains fragments of two new Dohākoṣas of Saraha and a portion of the Dohākoṣa of Saraha already known. My edition therefore includes :

- (i) The Dohākoṣa of Tillopāda. The Tibetan translation of its Apabhraṃśa portion is found in Bstan ḥgyur, Narthang edition, Vol. XLVI, pp. 135a-137a.

(ii) Two fragments of new Dohākoṣas of Saraha.

(iii) The Dohākoṣa of Saraha—MSS. A.—the text published by Śāstrī ; B.—the MS. in the collection of the Rājaguru ; C.—the MS. in the Darbar Library. The work of Dr. Shahidullah along with his collation of two editions of the Tibetan translations have also been utilised.

(iv) The Dohākoṣa of Kṛṣṇa.

(v) The Dohās of Saraha quoted in various texts printed or in MSS.


(vi) Apabhraṁśa verses quoted in various texts printed or in MSS.

I have been obliged to bring out this work in an incomplete form, for various reasons. But from the portion of my study which it has been possible to bring out it will be seen that I had the intention to make as much detailed study of the text as possible and to bring together all parallel texts available at this stage for elucidating the meaning. A new form of mysticism is contained in these texts and we cannot possibly interpret it without referring to other texts of the same school. The plan of my work is therefore different from that of Dr. Shahidullah and it is my intention to insist on those aspects which he has not treated.


This work was sent to the Press five years ago. My studies in the meantime have helped me not only in improving the text but also in throwing new light on many of the obscure points. These have been included in my complete work which has been undertaken for publication by the *Calcutta Sanskrit Series* and will come out in course of a year.

September, 1935

P. C. BAGCHI



MS. B. [Tillopāda]—leaves 2^a (=p. 41), 5^b (=p. 43), 17^b (=p. 51)



MS. B. [Saraḥapāda]—leaves 18^a (= p. 52), 20^b (= p. 54), 102^b (= p. 120)



MS. C [Sarabhapāda]—leaves 2^b (= p. 6), 2^b (= p. 8)

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SOME CORRECTIONS.

| PAGE | VERSE | INCORRECT | CORRECT |
|------|-------|---------------|---------------|
| 1 | 6 | अहम | अहम |
| 3 | 28 | दिट | दिट |
| 3 | 26 | धिर म | विरम |
| 3 | 28 | खण | खण |
| 3 | 28 | जन्महि | जन्महि |
| 4 | 33 | तैहि . | तहिँ |
| 5 | 4 | चक | चक |
| 12 | 24 | सिजभइ | सिजभइ |
| 17 | 61 | भक्ति | भन्ति |
| 20 | 87 | अहिणमइ तिहु . | अहिमणइ तिहुअण |
| 22 | 99 | परस महासुह | परम महासुह |
| 22 | 103 | घरहि | घरहि |
| 23 | 111 | खणू | खणू |
| 23 | 111 | त्यजहु | त्यजहु |
| 24 | 5 | पपो | पत्त |
| 25 | 6 | जानई | जानई |

AFABHRAMSA TEXTS

तिल्लोपाटस्य दोहाकोषः



कन्ध [भूअ] आअत्तण इन्दौ ।
सहज सहावेँ सअल विवन्दौ ॥१॥
सहजेँ भावाभाव ण पुच्छह ।
सुअ करुण तहि समरस इच्छिअ ॥२॥
मारह चित्तणिव्वाणेँ हणिआ ।
तिहुअण सुअ णिरञ्जण पलिआ ॥३॥
अमणसिआर म दूसह मिच्छे ।
अप्पाणुवन्ध म करहु रे इच्छेँ ॥४॥
चित्त खसम जहि समसुह पइठ्ठइ ।
[इन्दौअ विसअ तहि मत्त]ण दीसइ ॥५॥
आइरहिअ एहु अन्तरहिअ ।
वरगुरुपाअ अ[द्वअ कहिअ] ॥६॥

तु मरइ जहि पवण तहि लौणो होइ णिरास ।
सअ[संवेअण तत्तफ़लु] स कहिज्जइ कौस ॥७॥
वढ अणँ लोअअगोअर तत्त पण्डिअलोअ अगम्भ ।
जो गुरुपा[अपसअ तँहि कि चित्त अगम्भ] ॥८॥

सअसवेअण तत्तफल तीलपाअःभणन्ति ।

[जो मणगोअर पइठठइ सो परमत्थ ण होन्ति]॥६॥

सहजेँ चित्त विसोहहु चङ्ग ।

इह जन्महि सिद्धि [मोक्ख भङ्ग] ॥१०॥

जहि जाइ चित्त तहि सुणहु अचित्त ।

समरसँ [णिम्मल भावाभावरहिअ] ॥११॥

अहअ चित्ततरुअर गउ तिहुअण वित्थार ।

करुणा फुलिअ फलधर णउ परत उअर ॥१२॥

पर अप्पाण म भन्ति करु सअल णिरन्तर बुद्ध ।

तिहुअण णिम्मल परमपउ चित्त सहावेँ सुद्ध ॥१३॥

सचल णिचल जो सअलाचार ।

सुस णिरञ्जण म करु विअर ॥१४॥

एहुसे अप्पा एहु जगु जो परिभावइ ।

[णिम्मल चित्तसहाव सो कि वुज्झइ] ॥१५॥

हँउ जगु हँउ बुद्ध हँउ णिरञ्जण ।

[हँउ अमणसिअर भवभञ्जण] ॥१६॥

मणह [भअवा] खसम भअवइ ।

[दिवारान्ति सहजे राहिअइ] ॥१७॥

जन्म मरण मा करहु रे भन्ति ।

[णिअचित्त तहिँ णिरन्तर होन्ति] ॥१८॥

तित्थ तपोवण म करहु सेवा ।

[देहसुचिहि ण स्सन्ति पावा] ॥१९॥

वम्हा विहणु महेसुर देवा ।

[वोहिसत्त्व म करहु सेवा] ॥२०॥

देव म पूजहु ति[त्य] ण जावा ।

देवपूजाहि ण मोक्ख पावा ॥२१॥

बुद्ध आराहहु अविकलचित्ते ।

[भवणिव्वाणे म करहु रे थित्ते ॥] २२॥

पग्गोपाअ समाहि लग्गहु ।

जहि तहि दिठ कर अणुत्तर सिद्धइ ॥२३॥

जिम विस भक्खइ विसहि पलुत्ता ।

[तिम भव भुञ्जइ भवहि ण जुत्ता] ॥२४॥

कम्म मुद्द म दूसह जोइ ।

[खण आणन्द भेउ जाणिज्जइ] ॥२५॥

लेहु रे परम धिर म विआरी ।

णिउणो वर गुरु चरण आराही ॥२६॥

[परम आणन्द भेउ जो जाणइ ।

खणहि सोवि सहज बुज्झइ] ॥२७॥

खण आणन्द भेउ जो जाणइ ।

सो इह जन्महि जोइ भणिज्जइ ॥२८॥

गुण दोस रहिअ एहु परमत्य ।

सअसंवेअण केवि णत्य ॥२९॥

चित्ताचित्त वि वज्जहु णित्त ।

सहज सरुएँ करहु रे थित्त ॥३०॥

आवइ जाइ कहवि ण णइ ।

गुरुउवणसेँ हिअहि समाइ ॥३१॥

वस वि वज्जइ आकिइ विहुसा ।

सव्वाआरे सो संपसा ॥३२॥

ए मण मारहु [लहु चित्ते] णिम्मूल ।

[तँहि महामुद्द तिहुअणेँ णिम्मल] ॥३३॥

हउ सुस जगु.सुस तिहुअण सुस ।

[णिम्मल सहजे ण पाप ण पुस] ॥३४॥

जहि इच्छइ तहि जाउ मण एत्थु ण किज्जइ भन्ति ।

अध उघाडि आलोअणेँ ज्झाणेँ होइरे थित्ति ॥

सर-पादीय-दोहा

*

*

*

*

[2^a] रा गिच्चलउ भावहु अप्प रा इच्छ ॥१॥

अलिओ धम्म महासुह पइसइ ।

लवणो जिम पाणीहि विलिज्जइ ॥२॥

सरह भणइ जिणगुणगण एत्तवि ।

पत्था एहुसो एहु परमत्यवि ॥३॥

गित्तरङ्ग चक्ख विफल आसेँ ।

पवण वितुट्ठइ गिअमण गासेँ ॥४॥

चित्त वि गइ अचित्त उएसहि ।

सङ्गुरु वअणेँ फुड़ पड़िहासहि ॥५॥

मन्तह मन्ते स्सन्ति रा होइ ।

पड़िलभित्ति कि उट्ठिअ होइ ॥६॥

तरुफल दरिसणे सउ अग्घाइ ।

वेज्ज देखि किँ रोग पलाइ ॥७॥

जाव रा अप्पा जाणिज्जइ ताव रा सिस्स करेइ ।

अन्धँ अन्ध कढ़ाव तिम वेस वि कूव पड़ेइ ॥८॥

एहु सम्वित्तिअ हिअहि पइस्सइ ।

भवदालिहअ वस्स विणासइ ॥९॥

सन्न संवि[2^b]ठा तत्तफ़लु सरह पात्र भणन्ति ।
 जो मणगोन्नर पाठिअइ सो परमत्य ग होन्ति ॥१०॥
 अक्खअ अच्चेय परमँ पहु खसम महासुह गाह ।
 जो आवाअ अचित्त वि तस्स चक्खु करेह ॥११॥
 जोहि विण्ठठ पण्ठठ पउ सो हिअअत्य द्वत्य ।
 सरपाअकिअ दोहतिउ सो सङ्गहिअो एत्य¹ ॥

— — —

¹ Colophon :—समन्तो जहालद्धो दोहाकोसो एसो सङ्गहिअो
 परत्यकामेण पण्डित-सिरि-दिवाअरचन्देणेत्ति । सम्मत् २२१ आवणशुक्त-
 पूर्णमासां । औनोग्बलके परमोपासक श्रीरामवर्भणः पुस्तकोयं । यथा दृष्टं
 तथा ग्राह्यभिच्छुस्सविर-पथमगुत्तेन लिखितव्यम् ।

सरःपादस्य दोहाकोषः



वम्हयोहि म जाणन्त हि भेउ ।
एवइ पढिअउ ए चउ वेउ ॥१॥
मट्टी [पाणी कुस लइ पढ़न्त ।
घरहिँ वइसी] अगिं हुणन्त ॥
कज्जे ~~हिअवेइ~~ हुअवह होमै ।
अक्खि डहाविअ कडुएँ धुमै ॥२॥
एक दण्डि चिदण्डी भअववेसै ।
विणुआ होइअइ हंस उएसै ॥
मिच्छेहिँ जगःवाहिअ भुल्लै ।
धन्दाधन्दा य ~~जाणोइ~~ तुल्लै ॥३॥
अइरिएहिँ उट्टलिअ च्छारै ।
सीससु वाहिअ ए जइभारै ॥
घरही वइसी दीवा जाली ।
कोणहिँ वइसी घण्डा चाली ॥४॥
अक्खि णिवेसी आसण वन्धी ।
कसोहिँ खुसुखुसाइ जण धन्धी ॥

रण्डी मुण्डी अस्स वि वेसँ ।
 िक्खिज्जइ दक्खिण उदेसँ ॥५॥
 दीहणक्ख जइ मलियेँ वेसँ ।
 णग्गल होइ उपाडिअ केसँ ॥
 खवणेहि जाण विडंविअ वेसँ ।
 अप्पण वाहिअ मोक्ख उवेसँ ॥६॥

जइ णग्गल विअ होइ मुत्ति ता सुणह सिअलह ।
 लोमुपाडयेँ अत्थि सिद्धि ता जुवइ णिअम्बह ॥७॥
 पिच्छीगहणे दिट्ठ मोक्ख [ता मोरह चमरह] ।
 उच्छेँ भोअयेँ होइ जाण ता करिह तुरङ्गह ॥८॥
 सरह भणइ एवणाण मोक्ख महु किम्पि ण भावइ ।
 तत्तरहिअ काआ ण ताव पर केवल साहइ ॥९॥

चेसू भिक्खु जे त्यविर उदेसँ ।
 वन्देहिँ अ पव्वज्जिउ वेसँ ॥
 कोइ सुतणत वक्खाण वइट्ठो ।
 कोवि चिण्ते कर सोसइ दिट्ठो ॥१०॥
 अस्स तहि महजाणहिँ धा[इ]

* * * ॥११॥

* * * ॥१२॥

[सहज छडि जो णिव्वाण भाविउ]
 णउ परमत्य एक तेँ साहिउ ॥१३॥

जो जसु जेण होइ संतुष्टो ।
 मोक्ष कि लभइ ज्माण पविटो ।
 दोहो दीवै किन्तह निवेज्ज ।
 किन्तह किज्जइ मनतह सेव्व ॥१४॥
 किन्तह तिथ तपोवण जाइ ।
 मोक्ष कि लभइ पाणी क्काइ ॥१५॥
 आलीकावन्धा ।
 सो मुच्चहु जो अक्खहु धन्धा ॥
 तसु परिआणै अण ण कोइ ।
 अवरे गणे सव्ववि सोइ ॥१६॥
 सोवि पट्टिज्जइ सोवि गुणिज्जइ ।
 सत्य-पुराणे वक्खाणिज्जइ ॥
 गाहि सो दिट्ठि जो ताउ ण लक्खइ ।
 एके वर-[गुरुपात्र पेक्खइ] ॥१७॥
 जइ गुरु वुत्तउ हिअइ पइसइ
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 अइस धम्मैँ सिज्जइ परलोअह ।
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 एहु तिहुअण सअल महाराएँ एकु करु वस] ॥२६॥
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 अग्गेँ पच्छेँ [दहदिहहि जो जो दीसइ तत्त सोइ ।
 अज्जहि तइसो भन्ति मुक्क एव्वेँ मा पुच्छ कोइ] ॥२८॥
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 भावाभाव सुगति रे [वढ़] वन्धा ॥
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 णिअ सहाव गाउ लक्खइ कोअ ॥२५॥
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 तहिँ जीवइ विलअ जाइ वसिअउ तहि फुडँ एय्य ॥२६॥
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 चित्तरुअ संसारह भङ्गे ॥२७॥
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सण्ड-पुअणि-दल-कमल-गन्ध-केसर-वरणालेँ ।
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 कप्परहिअ सुह-ठाणु वरजणु उअज्जइ तत्थु ॥५२॥
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भवहि उअज्जइ खअहि णिवज्जइ ।
 भाव-रहिअ पुणु कहि उवज्जइ ॥
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गुरु उवएसेँ अमिअ-रसु धावहि ण पौअउ जेहि ।
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अक्खरवसो परमगुण रहिजे ।
 भणइ ण जाणइ एअइ कहिअजे ॥
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 अप्पहिँ अप्पा वुज्झसि तव्वा ॥६०॥
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 भणइ सरह भत्ति एत विमत्तजे ।
 अरे णिकोली वुज्झह परमत्तजे ॥६१॥
 घरेँ अच्छइ वाहिरे पुच्छइ ।
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 सरह भणइ वढ जाणउ अप्पा ।
 णउ सो धेअ ण धारण जप्पा ॥६२॥
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 देस भमइ हव्वासेँ लइजे ।
 सहज ण वुज्झइ पापेँ गाहिजे ॥६३॥
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ਐਮਡੁ ਜੀਡੁ ਮੂਲੁ ਸਰਨ੍ਤੋ ।

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ਦੇਵ ਪਿਛਡੁ ਲਕਖੁ ਵਿ ਦੀਸਡੁ ।

ਅਘ੍ਧੁ ਮਾਰੀਡੁ ਸ ਕਿ ਕਰਿਅਡੁ ॥

ਤੋਵਿ ਣਾ ਹੁਟੁਡੁ ਏਹੁ ਸੰਸਾਰ ।

ਵਿਣੁ ਆਅਸੈਂ ਣਾਹਿ ਣਿਸਾਰ ॥ ੬੫॥

ਅਣਿਮਿਸਲੋਅਣ ਚਿਤੁ ਣਿਰੋਹੈਂ ।

ਪਵਣ ਣਿਰੁਹਡੁ ਸਿਰਿਗੁਰੁਵੋਹੈਂ ॥

ਪਵਣ ਵਹਡੁ ਸੋ ਣਿਚਲੁ ਜਞ੍ਵੈਂ ।

ਜੀਡੁ ਕਾਲੁ 'ਕਰਡੁ ਕਿ ਰੇ ਤਞ੍ਵੈਂ ॥ ੬੬॥

ਜਾਤੁ ਣਾ ਭੁਨ੍ਦੀਅਵਿਸਅ-ਗਾਮ ।

ਤਾਵਡੁ ਵਿ ਫੁਰਡੁ ਅਕਾਮ ॥

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ਜੋ ਜਹਿੰ ਅਤ੍ਧਿ ਣਾਤੁ ਜਾਵ ਣਾ ਦੀਸਡੁ ॥ ੬੭॥

ਪਣਿਡੁ ਅ ਸਅਲੁ ਸਤ੍ਧਿ ਵਕ੍ਖਾਣਡੁ ।

ਦੇਹਹਿੰ ਬੁਢੁ ਵਸਨ੍ਤੁ ਣਾ ਜਾਣਡੁ ॥

ਅਵਣਾਗਮਣ ਣਾ ਤੇਣ ਵਿਖਣਿਡੁ ਅ ।

ਤੋਵਿ ਣਿਲਜੁ ਭਣਡੁ ਹਤੁ ਪਣਿਡੁ ਅ ॥ ੬੮॥

ਜੀਵਨ੍ਤੁ ਜੋ ਣਾਤੁ ਜਰਡੁ ਸੋ ਅਜਰਾਮਰੁ ਹੋਡੁ ।

ਗੁਰੁ-ਭਵਣੈਂ ਵਿਮਲਮਡੁ ਸੋ ਪਰੁ ਧਯੋ ਕੀਡੁ ॥ ੬੯॥

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ਭੁਠੀ ਵੋਹਿਅ ਕਾਤੁ ਜਿਮ ਪ੍ਰਾਪ੍ਤੁ ਤਹੁ ਵਿ ਪਡੇਡੁ ॥ ੭੦॥

विसत्रासत्ति म वन्ध करु अरे वढ सरहेँ वुत्त ।
 मीण पअङ्कम करि भमर पेक्खह हरिणह जुत्त ॥७१॥
 जत्त वि चित्तहि वेणुसइ तत्त वि णाह सइअ ।
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 अक्कट पण्डिअ भन्तिअ णासिअ ।
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 सो वि मणु तहि अमणु करिज्जइ ।
 सहज-सहावेँ सो परु रज्जइ ॥७७॥
 घरे घरे कहिअइ सोज्झुक कहाण ।
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 सरह भणइ जगचित्तेँ वाहिअ ।
 सो अचित्त णउ केणवि गाहिअ ॥७८॥

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 अप्पणु इच्छेँ फुड़ पड़िहासइ ॥७६॥
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 घरेँ घरेँ सोअ सिद्धन्त पसिद्धो ॥
 एकु खाइ अवर अस वि पोड़इ ।
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आवन्त ग दीसइ जन्त गहि अच्छन्त ग मुणिअइ ।
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 इअ दिवस गिसहि अहिणमइ तिहु जासु गिमाण ।
 सो चित्तसिद्धि जोइणि सहजसम्बर जाण ॥८४॥

अक्खर वाढ़ा सअल जगु णाहि शिरक्खर कोइ ।
ताव से अक्खर घोलिआ जाव शिरक्खर होइ ॥८८॥

जिम वाहिर तिम अब्भन्तरु ।
चउदह भुवणें ठिअउ शिरन्तरु ॥
असरिर [कोइ] सरोरहि लुको ।
जो तहि जाणइ सो तहि मुको ॥८९॥
सिद्धिरत्यु मइ पढ़मे पढ़िअउ ।
मण्ड पिवन्ते विसरअ एमइ उ ॥
अक्खरमेक्क एत्य मइ जाणिउ ।
ताहर णाम ण जाणमि ए सइउ ॥९०॥
रुअणें सअल वि जोहि णउ गाहइ ।
कुन्दुरु-खणहि महासुहे साहइ ॥
जिम तिसिअो मिअ तिसिणें धावइ ।
मरइ सो सोसहिँ णभजलु कहिँ पावइ ॥९१॥

कन्ध-भूअ-आअत्तण-इन्दौविसअ-विआरु अप हुअ ।
णउ णउ दोहाच्छहे ण कहवि किम्पि गोप्प ॥९२॥
पण्डिअ लोअहु खमहु महु एत्यु ण किअइ विअप्पु ।
जो गुरुवअणें मइ सुअउ तहि किं कहमि सुगोप्पु ॥९३॥
कमलकुलिस वैवि मज्झठिउ जो सो सुरअ-विलास ।
को त रमइ णह तिहुअणें हि कस्स ण पूरइ आस ॥९४॥
खण उवाअ सुह अहवा अहवा वेस्मि वि सोवि ।
गुरुपाअ-पसाएँ पुस जइ विरला जाणइ कोवि ॥९५॥

गम्भीरइ उआहरयोँ राउ पर राउ अप्पाण ।
 सहजाणन्दे चउट्ट क्खण गिअ सम्वेअण जाण ॥८६॥
 घोरेन्धारेँ चन्दमणि जिम उज्जीअ करेइ ।
 परममहाइह एकुखणे दुरिआसेस हरेइ ॥८७॥
 दुक्ख-दिवाअर अत्यगउ ऊवइ तरावइ सुक ।
 ठिअ-णिम्मायोँ णिम्मिअउ तेणवि मण्डल-चक्क ॥८८॥
 चित्तहिँ चित्त णिहालु वढ सअल विमुच्च कुदिट्ठि ।
 परसमहासुहे सोज्ज्म परु तसु आअत्ता सिद्धि ॥८९॥
 मुक्कउ चित्तगणन्द करु एत्थ विअप्प ण पुच्छ ।
 गअण गिरौ राइजल पिअउ तहिँ तड़ वसउ सइच्छ ॥९०॥
 विसअ-गणन्देँ-करेँ गहिअ जिम मारइ पड़िहाइ ।
 जोइ कवडिआर जिम तिम तहो णिस्सरि जाइ ॥९१॥
 जो भव सो णिव्वाण खलु स उण मंसाहु अण ।
 एक सहवेँ विरहिअ णिम्मल मइँ पड़िवस ॥९२॥
 धरहि म थक्कु म जाहि वणे जहि तहि मण परिआण ।
 सअलु णिरन्तर वोहि-ठिअ कहिँ भव कहिँ णिव्वाण ॥९३॥
 राउ घरे राउ वणेँ वोहि ठिउ एहु परिआणहु भेउ ।
 णिम्मल-चित्त-सहावता करहु अविकल सेउ ॥९४॥
 एहु सो अप्पा एहु परु जो परिभावइ कोवि ।
 तेँ विणु वन्धे वेट्ठि किउ अप्प विमुक्कउ तोवि ॥९५॥
 पर अप्पाण म भन्ति करु सअल णिरन्तर बुद्ध ।
 एहु से णिम्मल परमपउ चित्त-सहावेँ सुद्ध ॥९६॥

अहं चित्त-तरुअरह गउ तिहुवणे^० वित्थार ।
 करुणा फुल्लौफल धरदु गणउ परत्त जअर ॥१०७॥
 सुख तरुवर णिअउ करुणा विविह विचित्त ।
 अण्णा भोअ परत्तफलु एहु सोक्ख पर चित्त ॥१०८॥
 सुख तरुवर णिकरुण जहि पुणु मूल ण साह ।
 तहि आल मूल जो करदु तसु पडिभज्जाइ वाह ॥१०९॥
 एक्केम्वी एक्केवि तरु ते^० कारणे फल एक ।
 ए अभिण्णा जो मुण्ड मो भवणिज्वाण विमुक्क ॥११०॥
 जो अत्थी अण ठौअज सो जइ जाइ णिरास ।
 खसु सरावे^० भिक्ख वरु त्यजहु ए गिहवास ॥१११॥
 पर जअर ण किअज अत्थि ण दौअउ दाण ।
 एहु संसारे कवण फलु वरु छडुहु अप्पाण ॥११२॥

काण्हपादस्य दोहाकोषः



लोअह गव्व समुव्वहइ हउं परमत्ये पवीण ।
कोडिह मअंतेँ एकु जइ होइ गिरञ्जण-लीण ॥१॥
आगम-वेअ-पुराणेँ पण्डिआ माण वहन्ति ।
पक्क सिरिफलेँ अलिअ जिम वाहेरिअ भमन्ति ॥२॥
वोहिचिअ रअभूसिअ अकोहेहिँ सिट्ठओ ।
पोक्खरविअ सहाव सुहं गिअ-देहहि दिट्ठओ ॥३॥
गअण गौर अमिआह पाँक मूल वज्ज भाविअइ ।
अवधूइ किअ मूलणाल हंकारो वि जाअइ ॥४॥
ललणा रसणा रवि ससि तुडिअ वंअ वि पासे ।
पओ-चउट्ठ चउमूणाल ठिअ महासुह वासे ॥५॥
एवं-कार विअ लइअ कुसुमिअ-अरविन्दए ।
महुअर-रूएँ सुरअ-वीर जीअइ मअरन्दए ॥६॥
पञ्च महाभूआ विअ लइ सामगिए जइअ ।
पूहवि अवं तेअ गंधवह गअण सञ्जइअ ॥७॥
गअण-समीरण-सुहवासे पञ्चेहिँ पण्डिआए ।
सअल सुरासुर एहु उअत्ति वट्ठिए एहु सो सुअए ॥८॥
खिनि जल जलण पवण गअण वि माणह ।
मण्डल-चक्क विसअवुद्धि लइ परिमाणह ॥९॥

शित्तरङ्ग सम सहज-रूअ सञ्जल-कलुस-विरहिए ।
 पाप-पुस-रहिए कुच्छ गाहि काण्हु फुड कहिए ॥१०॥
 वहिखिकलिया कलिया सुखासुख पइट्ट ।
 सुखासुख वेखि मज्जे रे वढ़ किम्पि ण दिट्ठ ॥११॥
 सहज एकु पर अत्थि तहि फुड काण्हु परिजाणइ ।
 सत्थागम वहु पढ़इ सुणइ वढ़ किम्पि ण जाणइ ॥१२॥

अह ण गमइ जह ण जाइ ।

वेणि-रहिअ तसु शिचल ठाइ ॥

भणइ काण्ह मण कहवि ण फुट्टइ ।

शिचल पवण घरिणि घरे वट्टइ ॥१३॥

वरगिरि-कन्दर गुहिर जगु तहि सञ्जल वि वुट्टइ ।
 विमल सलिल सोस जाइ जइ कालाग्नि पइट्टइ ॥१४॥
 एहु सो उद्धमेरु धरणिधर सम विसम-उत्तार ण पावइ ।
 भणइ काण्ह दुल्लख दुरववाह को मणे परिभावइ ॥१५॥
 जो संवेअइ मण रअण अहरह सहज फरन्त ।
 सो पर जानइ धम्म-गइ अण कि मुणइ कहन्त ॥१६॥
 पहं वहन्ते शिअ-मण वन्धण किअउ जेण ।
 तिहुअण सञ्जल विफारिआ पुणु संहारिअ तेण ॥१७॥
 काहिं तथागत लभए देवी कोह-गणहि ।
 मण्डल-चक्क-विमुक्क अच्छउं सहज-खणेहि ॥१८॥
 सहजे शिचल जेण किअ समरसें शिअमण-राअ ।
 सिद्धो सो पुण तक्खणे णउ जरामरणह भाअ ॥१९॥

णिच्चल णिच्चिअप्प णिच्चिआर ।

उअअ-अथमण-रहिअ सुसार ॥

अइसो सो णिव्वाण भणिज्जइ ।

जहिँ मण माणस किम्पि ण किज्जइ ॥२०॥

एवंकारे जे वुज्झिअ ते वुज्झिअ सअल असेस ।

धम्म-करण्हो सोहू रे णिअ-पहुधर-वेस ॥२१॥

जइ पवण-गमण-दुआरे दिइ ताला वि दिज्जइ ।

जइ तसु घोराब्धारँ मण दिवहो किज्जइ ॥

जिण-रअण उअरँ जइ सो वरु अम्वरु कुप्पइ ।

भणइ काण्ह भव भुक्कन्ते णिव्वाणो वि सिज्जइ ॥२२॥

जो णत्थु णिच्चल किअउ मण सो धम्मक्खर पास ।

पवणहो वज्जइ तक्खणे विसआ होन्ति णिरास ॥२३॥

परम त्रिरम जहिँ वेणि उएक्खइ ।

तहिँ धम्मक्खर मज्जे लक्खइ ॥

अइस उएसे जइ फुड़ सिज्जइ ।

पवण घरिणि तहि णिच्चल वज्जइ ॥२४॥

वर-गिरि-सिहर उतुल्ल मुणि सवरँ जहिँ किअ वास ।

णउ सो लंघिअ पञ्चाणणेहि करिवर दुरिअ आस ॥२५॥

एहु सो गिरिवर कहिअ मइँ एहुमो महासुह-ठाव ।

एकु रअणि सहज खण लभइ महासुह जाव ॥२६॥

सव जगु काअ-वाअ मण मिलि विफुरइ तहिसो दुरे ।

सो एहु भल्ले महासुह णिव्वाण एकु रे ॥२७॥

एकु ण किज्जइ मन्त ण तन्त ।
 णिअ घरिणि लइ कैलि करन्त ॥
 णिअ घरे घरिणि जाव ण मज्जइ ।
 ताव कि पञ्चवस विहरिज्जइ ॥२५॥
 एसो जप-होमे मण्डल-कम्मे ।
 अणुदिण अच्छसि काहिउ धम्मे ॥
 तो विणु तरुणि णिरन्तर गेहे ।
 वोहि कि लब्भइ एण वि देहे ॥२६॥

जे बुद्धिअ विरल सहजखण काहिँ वेअ-पुराण ।
 तेँ तुडिअ विसअ-विअप्प जगु रे असेस परिमाण ॥२७॥
 जेँ किअ णिच्चल मण-रअण णिअ घरिणि लइ एत्थ ।
 सोह वाजिर णाहु रे मयिँ वुत्तो परमत्थ ॥२८॥
 जिम लोण विलिज्जइ पाणिणहि तिम घरिणि लइ चित्त ।
 समरस जाइ तक्खणे जइ पुण ते सम णित्त ॥२९॥

— — —

सरहपादीय-दोहासंग्रहः

I

णउ तम्वाअहि गुरु कहइ णउ तम्बुज्जइ सौस ।
सहजावयो अमिअ रस कासु कहिज्जइ कीस ॥

II

को पत्तिज्जइ कासु कहमि अज्ज कड़ाइअ आउ ।
पियदंसणे हले ण टलेसि संसार फुड़ जाउ ॥

III

जं दिट चिअ विलोअ टाउ पवने समरस होही ।
इन्दि पअ अउआ सन्धिअ अन्ने कि समे संवोहि ॥

I. The *dohā* is quoted in the *Kriyāsamuccaya* (fol 155^b) as a citation from *Sarahapāda* (*Sarahapādairapi-uktam*) in a very corrupt form: नतुवाए गुरु कहइ नन्तं बुझाइ शेष । सहजावयो अमिअ रस कासु कहिज्जउ कोशः ॥ It occurs in our fragment No. II *Saraha*, verse 7, where the beginning of the second line is a little different: सहजामिअ रसु सअल जगु कासु... (*ante* p. 7). It is partly quoted in the commentary on the *Caryās* (*Sāstrī*, p. 62) “नतं वाए गुरु कहइ”. It is also attributed to *Saraha* where. See also the notes.

II. It is quoted in the commentary of the *Caryās* (*Sāstrī*, p. 35) from *Saraha* (*tathā ca Sarahapādāḥ*). The text is corrupt—को पत्तिज्जइ कासु कहमि अज्ज कत्ताइ अ आउ । पियदंसणे हले ण टलेसि संसारफुड़ जाउ ।

III. It is quoted in the commentary of the *Caryās* (*Sāstrī*, p. 68) from *Sarahapāda* (*tathā ca Sarahapādāḥ*) :

IV

करुणा छडि जो सुखहिँ लग्गु ।
 णउ सो पावइ उत्तिम मग्गु ॥
 अहवा करुणा केवल भावइ ।
 जन्म-सहस्रहि मोक्ख ण पावइ ॥

V

सुख करुण जइ जोउणु सकइ ।
 णउ भवे णउ णिव्वाणेँ थकइ ॥

VI

एव्व पेम्म सुमरन्ति ।
 एत्ति मिलिअ जइ पुण हन्ति ॥

IV. This verse and the following, attributed to Saraha, occur along with a few other in the *Subhāṣita-saṅgraha*. Bendall has studied these verses with due reference to their Tibetan translation (*Muscon*, 1905). I have here collected those verses only which do not occur elsewhere. For IV and V see Bendall, pp. 32 and 75; Bendall's corrections करुणं, जु, मोक्ख for करुणा, जो, मोक्ख of the text are unnecessary. He restores the first word in line 2 as नाइसो which should be णउ सो.

V. Bendall's correction of णिव्वाणे of the text into णिव्वाणहि is unnecessary. These two verses, IV and V, occur in the Tibetan translation of the *Dohakoṣa* of Saraha. See the notes.

VI. Bendall, pp. 36 and 77.

VII

चन्द सुज्ज घसि घोलिअ घोट्टइ ।
 पाव पुअ तवेँ ता खणे तुट्टइ ॥
 अइसो करण करह विवरीर ।
 तेँ अजरामर होइ सरीर ॥

VIII

जेँ किअ णिच्चल मण-रअण पवण घरिणि लइ एत्थे ।
 सोसो घालिअ णाज्जरे वुत्तो मइ परमत्थे ॥

IX

कुलिस-सरोरुह जोएँ जोइउ ।
 णिम्मल-परममहासुह वोहिउ ॥
 खणेँ आणन्द-भेउ तहिँ जाणह ।
 लक्ख-लक्खस-हीण परिआणह ॥

X

आइरिउ सअल परिहरइ गच्छन्तो णउ वन्धइ भार ।
 अइसो जोइ-अङ्ग पडिहासइ तइसो लंघइ पार ॥

VII. Bendall, pp. 36 and 79. Text, खणोचट्टइ which Bendall corrects as खणे ते अट्टइ.

VIII. Bendall, pp. 36 and 80 ; text, निच्चल, सो सो घा जिअ ।

IX. *Ibid*, pp. 36 and 80, text, निम्मल, भेअ which Bendall retains.

X. *Ibid*, pp. 36, 81. Text, सअण and संग for सअल and अङ्ग which Bendall retains.

XI

पवण धरइ मण एकु ण चलइ ।
 कालागिणि सो.हेले^१ पेसइ ।
 सरह भणइ विवरौर पअट्टह ।
 चन्द[सुज्ज वे]णि घोलिअ घोट्टह ॥

XII

†आअकं रुकु मारअ करहु वारु तिट्ठा रुहोह्हु ।
 लइअ पुरावउ परिणमहु जेँ अजरामर होह्हु ॥

XIII

जइ विसअहि ण गुल्लन्ति अइ तमु बुद्ध तुमु केवँ ।
 सेउ-रहिअ णउ अङ्गुरहि तरुसम्पत्ति ण जेवँ ॥*

XI. *Ibid*, pp. 36, 84, text, चसइ, पेसइ, सो for सो, नि for णि,

XII. *Ibid*, pp. 36 and 81, text लइअ, which I have corrected as लइअ ।

XIII. *Ibid*, pp. 56 and 85 ; In the text it is said to be a quotation from the *Prabandha* of Sarahapāda. Text, विसअहि ।

* Besides these verses a number of other *dohās* attributed to Saraha are partially quoted in different places of the commentary on the *Caryā*, edited by Sāstri.

(Page 43) चित्ते शयहर—

(„ 48) चिन्ताचिन्त परिहर—

(„ 50) अहो गट—

(„ 55) अङ्गे पच्छे—

(„ 71) महामाया देवि—

(„ 72) घर अच्छन्ते मा जाङ्ग वण—

(„ 72) मनमर—

(„ 74) जथे तथे च—

(„ 75) यामइ—

सङ्कीर्ण-दोहासंग्रहः

I

†गुहो सिहो चन्द्रो सुजो एक येसां सापड़ ।
रुटेस काल कि करइ सो वापड़ ॥

II

†तं कुरु कुलारूप करिये ह्यग्र ।
अहणिसि तौअ हन्ते देह्यग्र ॥
गुरुवअणे दिढ करि माणहु ।
भणअ सवर-पा विसडा करे हाणहु ॥

III

†हले सहि विअसिअ कमलु पवोहिउ वज्जे ।
अललललहो महासुहेण आरोहिउ णच्चे ॥
रविकिरणे पफुल्लिउ कमलु महासुहेण ।
अललललहो महासुहेण आरोहिउ णच्चे ॥

I. *Sādhana-māla*, edited by B. Bhattacharyya II, p. 371, *Sādhana* No. 180 of *Sukla Kurukullā*. *Var. lect.* मिहो for सिहो, एकडांसां for एक येसां, पुटेस for रुटेस, कालि for काल ।

II. *Ibid* II, p. 387, *Sādhana* No. 185 of the goddess *Sukla Kunkullā*. The author of the *Sādhana* is *Siddha Sabarapāda*.

III. *Ibid*, II, p. 460 and 466 ; *Sādhana*s 239 and 240 of *Mahāmāya*. The second *Sādhana* is attributed to the authorship of *Kurukuripāda*. In both the *Sādhana*s the verses are called *Vajragiti* and are to be sung. *Var. lect.* पड़ोहिउ for पवोहिउ ;

IV

किञ्चे णिच्च उ वेसाण उ लोअ सिमन्तिअ काइँ ।
 तह वत्ता ण जइ सम्भरसि उट्ठहिँ सम्भल विसाइँ ॥
 कज्ज अप्पाण वि करिअ पिअ मा करसु विअवि चित्त ॥
 भवभअ गच्छेअ सम्भल जणु उट्ठहि जोइ मित्त ॥
 पूर्वपइज्जइ सम्भरसि मा कर कज्ज विसाउ ।
 तइ अयमिअे सम्भल जणु प रेअवज्ज गउसाउ ॥
 मिअ्हेँ माण वि मा करहि पिअ उट्ठइ सुअसहाव ।
 कामहि जोइणि विन्द तुहु किट्ठउ अहवा भाव ॥

V

खिति जल पवण हुतासन [सुअ] डाइणि देवि ।
 सुअहु पच्चमि तत्तु केहु जो ण जाणइ कोवि ॥

on p. 466 where the same verse occurs we have नृत्येँ for णञ्जेँ in both the lines, 2 and 4 ; and पफुल्लिअ for पफुल्लिउ । On *Vajragiti* see the notes. On p. 431, in *Sādhana* No. 248 of Heruka according to the *Mahāmāyā-Tantra* we have the first three lines of the same verse with the reading नृत्येँ for णञ्जेँ ।

IV. *Ibid* II, p. 501, No. 254 *Buddha-kapālasya-sādhanaṃ*. This is a song to be sung in the secret *sādhana* of the four Yoginis (चतुर्योगिन्योऽभ्यन्तरसाधने). *Var. lect.* तहववज्जइ for तहवत्ता । विवाअ for विसाइँ ; साकर सुअ for मा करसु ; विसाइे for विसाउ ; अय मिअे for अयमिअे, अच्छहि for पिअ, जोइणि for जोइणि, तुइँ for तुइ ।

V. *Hevajra-Tantra*, Ch. IV (XIV) ; the text has been established from three Mss.—(i) in my possession—P ; (ii) in

VI

धुमइ गरल भक्खयोहि जो णिव्वेअणलोअ ।
मोह विवज्जिअ तन्त मन्त तसु-पर तुट्टइ सोअ ॥

VII

उट्ट भराडो करुणामन्त पुक्खसि महु परिताहिं ।
महासुह-जोए काममहु इच्छ तहि सुख-समाहि ॥
तोन्हा-विहुयो मरमि हउं उट्टेहि तुहुं हेवज्ज ।
छडुहि सुखसहावता सवरि सिक्कउ कज्ज ॥

Prof. Tucci's possession—T ; (iii) in the Nepal Darbar Library, —D.—*Var. lect.* D. चिति ; P. पवन ; D. हुतासन, T. हुतासान, P. हुताअ ; The word after हुतासन is left out P. and wrongly copied as हणवे (D) and हतुअ (T) ; The Chinese translation requires सुख (see notes). T. भाइणि, P. भाइणि ; D. पवच्च, P. पवच्चामि, P. पवेच्चमि, D. तत्त, P. T. महु, T. ख जाअई, D. अनज्जानइ, P. न जाणइ ।

VI. *Hevajra-Tantra*, loc. cit. ; the verse is partly quoted in the commentary of the *Caryācārya-vinīścaya* (H. P. Sāstri) p. 56—धुमइ गरलह भक्खणे ; *var. lect.* P. घस्मइ गरलह भक्खणं हि ये निच्च अनलाय । मोह विवर्ज्जिअ तथं मन्ततसु पर तुटाइ सोअ ॥ D. घ्रमइ गल उत्तुखणहि जोन्तिच्छेअनलोअ । मोहविवर्ज्जिअ नत्तो मणतसुपरे तुट्टइ साआ ॥ T. घस्मइ गरलह भक्खी णहि जो णिव्वे अणलोअ । मोह वैवर्ज्जिता ततु-मणल तत्वपर तुट्टअ सोअ ॥ Cf. also the *Buddhakapāla-Tantra-ṭikā* by Abhyākara Gupta, Ms in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, (No. 3827), fol. 24^b धुम्नोय गरल भक्खणं जो णिव्वेअण लोअ । मोह विवज्जिअ तसुपर तुट्टइ सोअ ॥

VII. *Hevajra Tantra*, loc. cit. *Var. lect.*—P. उठ, D. उणठ, P. भलाडो, करुणमन्द, T. करुणमनु, P. डुमडु, D. परिनाउ, D. महसुअ,

लोअ णिमन्तिअ सुर अपहु सुख अच्छसि कीस ।
 हउं चण्डालि विख नमि तइ विणु उहमि न दीस ॥
 इन्दीआली उट्ट तुहुं हउं जाणनि तुहुं चित्त ।
 अन्हे डोम्बी च्छेमन्त मा कर करुण विच्छित्त ॥

VIII

आइ ण अन्त ण मभु ण णउ भद णउ णिव्वाण ।
 एहसो परम मंहासुह णउ पर णउ अप्पाण ॥

P. जायं, P. काम मइ, T. °महुं, इच्छ तुहि सन्न अहाव, T. च्छुभुहिं सुख
 समाहि, P. च्छुतहि सुख समाहि, D. तोज विहुण मरमिह वउण्ठहि तु जुहु
 हेवज्ज, T. तोह्मा विहुसे मरमिह हुं उट्टेहिं तुहुं हेवज्ज, P. तोसु विहुणं
 मरहिमि उठहि तु हवज, D. छादहि सुन्न सहावता शवरी सिभउ कज,
 T. च्छुण्डाहि सुखसहावता शवरिअ सिह्मा उकज्ज, P. च्छुतहि सुणं सहावज्जा
 सवरिसिम उक्कवज्ज, D. लोअनिमत्ति सुर अपहु सुखं अहसिकिसु, T. लोअ
 निमन्तिअ सुर अपहु सुख अच्छसि कीस, P. लाय णिमन्ती सुल यपहु सुणं
 अच्छसि कीस, D. उट्टं चण्डारी विखं वमितइ विणु उहसिर दीस, P. हउ
 चण्डाली विणं ममितइ विणु उहसि न दिस, T. हउं चण्डालि विख नमिताइ
 विख उहमि न दास ।

D. इन्दीआली उट्ट तुहुं हउ जाणनि हु चित्त, T. इन्दीआलो उट्टे तुहुं
 हसु जानमि तुह चित्त । P. इन्दी आलो उट्ट तु हुउं पाणमि तुहु चित्त,
 D. अन्हे डोम्बी च्छेमण मा करुणा विच्छित्तं, T. अन्हे डोम्बी च्छेमण मा
 कर करुण विच्छित्त, P. अन्हे डोम्बी मा करुण विच्छित्ता ।

VIII. *Hevajrā Tantra*, Pāṭala. V (=XV). The same verse
 occurs in the *Kriyā-samuccaya* (fol. 155a) as quotation from the
Hevajra (तदुक्तं हेवजे). Var. lect. D. आइ न अओ न मणं तहो नउ
 नउ भव निर्व्याण नहि, T. आईन अओ त मउभ तहिं नउ भव नउ निर्व्याण,

कोल्लारे ठिअ वीला मुन्नायेरे कक्कोला ।
 वण किविड हो वाज्जइ करुणेकि अइ न रोला ॥
 तहि वल खज्जइ गाढ़े मअणा पिजिअ ।
 हले कालिञ्जर पणेल्ले दुहु रु वज्जिअइ ॥
 चउसम कस्तुरि सिद्धा कर्पर लाइअइ ।
 मालइ इन्धन सालितहि भरु खाइअइ ॥
 प्रेङ्कणा खेट करन्ते सुद्धासुद्ध ण मत्तयेअइ ।
 निरंसुअ अल्ल चडाविअइ जल्ले पणिअइ ॥
 मलअज कुन्दुरु वटइ, डिण्डिम तहिं ण वज्जिअइ ॥

P. आइ ण अन्त न मभं नउ नउ भव नउ निर्वाण । *Kriyā*.—आइ ण अन्त
 च मुजा नहिं णउ भव णउ निर्वाणा ।

D. एहु खे परम महासुहोउ नौ पर नौ अप्पान, T. एहु सो परम महासुह
 णउ पर णउ अप्पण, P. एहु सो परम महासुहो खौ पर खौ अप्पणा, *Kriyā*.
 एहु सो परम महासुहो खौ पर खौ अप्पाना ।

See also *Sādhana-mālā* II, p. 383, *Sādhana* of *Kurukullā*.
 The goddess is to be invoked by this *gāthā* in the state of
 ecstasy (इमं गाथां च स्मरेत्).

IX. *Hevajra Tantra*, Paṭ. IV (=XIV); *Kriyāsamuccaya*, 17b;
Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. VI, p. 394. D. कल्लहले,
 T. कोल्लयिरे; D. किविडि, P. किविड; D. वाज्जइ, T. वाज्जइ; P. वेज्जइ;
 D. अइन लोला, T. अनरोला, D.P. वल, T. वलु; T. खोज्जइ; D.P.
 पिजिअइ, T. पिज्जइ ।

D. हरि; D. कालिञ्जल; D. पणेल्ले; P.T. दुन्दुर; D. वल न अइ,
 P. वज्जिअइ; D. omits कर्पर, T. कर्परक; E. इजइ, P. लाइअइ ।

X

सुख शिरञ्जण परम-महासुखेण ताव मात्र सहाव ।
 भावह चौन्नसहाव ताव तामि ताव जाव ॥१॥
 ताव भव ताव सिक्खाण तँहि एहु सो महासुख वाज्ज ।
 जो भावइ मणो-भावणेहि सो पारइ काज्ज ॥२॥
 अक्खर मन्त विवज्जिओ ताव सो विन्दु ता चित ।
 एहु सो परम महासुखो ताव फेडिअ ता खित ॥३॥
 जिम पडिविस्व सहावे भाति ता भाविज्जइ भाव ।
 सुख शिरञ्जण परममहासुखे तँहि पूख ता पाव ॥४॥
 जिम जल माना चन्द सहि ताव सो सा सुणमौच्छ ।
 ताव सो मण्डलचक्क भाति सुख-सहावे स्वच्छ ॥५॥

D. मालतो इन्धन, T. मालेइन्धन ; D. सारिनहि, F. सालिभतहि, P. सालिंतहि ; D. प्रखन, प्रेखन, P. प्रेखून, Chinese प्रेखण ; D. खेरन ; T. खेट ; P. खेट ; D.T. शुद्धाशुद्ध ; D. न मनेइ, T. न सुणिअइ, P. न मासिअइ ; D. न मनेइ, T. न सुणिअइ, P. न मासिअइ ; D. निरंशुकां ; P. निरंशुह, D. अग, D. चडावीतहि ; T. चपवीसुइ, P. चडावितहि, D. जसनाविपणोअइ, T. जसरावपणिअइ, P. जसरावि ; D. मलजे, T. मलयाजं, D. वाटइ, T. वाट्टेइ, P. वतइ ; D. लहि, T. जहिँ, P. तहि, वज्जुअइ, T. वज्जिअइ, P. वजीअइ ।

X. These verse are quoted in the *Kriyāsamuccaya*, fol. 19^a (of my copy). They are described as the *Mahāsamaya-gītikā* to be sung in the accompaniment of dance by the Vajrayāna priests. The five verses invoke respectively the five goddesses : Nairātmya Yoginī, Locanā, Māmakṣā (called Māmaki in the *Hevajra*), Pāṇḍurā (called Cundā in the *Hevajra*) and Tārā—the

सा वित्ती किम्पि जलं यत्तु विसेसें गौरवं लहेइ ।
अहिमुह पडिअ गरलं छिप्पि मुढानं कुणेइ ॥

energies of the five *dhyānī* Buddhas. The text is very corrupt and the reconstruction is in many parts problematic. Ms.—

(१) सुणं निरञ्जन परम पडु मइ ये माय सहाव । भावहचोय सहावह ती णासि नइ जाव ॥ (२) नौ भव नौ निर्व्वीण ताहि एहु सो महासुह वाज्ज । जो भावइ मणो भावणेहि सो परइ काज्ज ॥ (३) अक्षर मन्त्र विवर्ज्जित णो सौ विन्दु ण चित्त । एहु सो परम महासुहो णेहि णो होइअ णो मित । (४) जिम पडिविम्ब सँहाव भाति म भाविर्जइ भाव । सुणं निरञ्जन परमहु णो तहि पुणं ण पाउ ॥ (५) जिम जल माभ चन्द सहि णउ सो सा चुणमीच्छ । निमसो मण्डल चाकभात णडासँहावे सुइ ॥ The third verse is quoted in the *Sāadhanamālā* II, p. 382, *Sādhana* No. 183 of the goddess Kurukullā. Text as established 'by Dr. Bhattacharyya is: अक्षरमन्त्र विवर्ज्जियओ णउ सो विन्दु ण वित्त । एसो परममहासुहओ णउ फेडिअ णउ खिओ । The variants in other manuscripts compared by him are: मन्त्रं for मन्त, विवर्ज्ज for विवर्ज्जियओ, भोउ for णउ, सुहो for सुहओ, णउ वित्त for णउ खिओ । The first line of the 5th verse is quoted in the commentary of the *Caryās* (*Carāyācarya-viniścaya* p. 70) as a citation from the *Āgama*:—जिम जल मभे चंद स हि नोस— ।

XI. See the commentary on the *Caryās*, (Śāstri, p. 21), It is a quotation from the *Bahiṣsāstra* ; Text शा, जलं, विशेषेण, गौरवं, गरलं, सुतानं ।

TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES

तिल्लोपादस्य दोहाकोषः

[2^a] * * * *

तिल्लोपादस्य दोहायां क्रियते सारार्थपञ्जिका ॥

इह खलु महायोगीश्वरस्तिष्ठो[पा]दो महाकरुणायमानः सत्त्वार्थं स्वाधिगतमर्थं प्रतिपादयितुकाम आह ॥१॥

कन्ध [भूअ] आअत्तण इन्दौ ।

5

सहज-सहावेँ सअल विवन्दौ ॥१॥

ऐहिकस्कन्धादीनां पारत्रिकस्कन्धादिहेतु[भूता]नां सहजेन शोधनं प्रथमत आह । स्कन्धेत्यादि । स्कन्धाः पञ्च रूप-वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कार-विज्ञान-लक्षणाः । भूताः पञ्च पृथिवी-आप-तेज-वायु-आकाश-लक्षणाः । आयतनैन्द्रियाणि [2^b] चक्षुः-श्रोत्र-घ्राण-जिह्वा-काय-मनो नक्षणानि । एतानि सह[जा]नि सहजस्वभावेन [बध्यन्ते] । किं सहजो भावस्वभावो वा भवेदभावस्वभावो वा । यदि भाव-स्वभावस्तदा संसार एव । यदि अभावस्वभावः तदा उच्छेदः—सोऽपि नष्ट एव इत्याशङ्कयामाह—

सहजेँ भा[वा]भाव ण पच्छह ।

सुख करुण तहि समरस इच्छिअ ॥ इति ॥

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सहजे भावाभावौ संसार[र]निर्व्याण स्वभावौ [न] पृच्छते । यतः शून्यता-करणे तत्र सहजे समरसे इच्छते । आशु[3^a][तोऽ]सौ आनन्दरूपः परमसुखः संकल्पमात्र इति । तस्मात् संकल्पाभिनिवेशेन [सहजा]त्मनः संसारबन्धनं मा कुरु इति । कथं तर्हि संकल्पाभिनिविष्टं चित्तं शो[धयितव्यमित्याह]—

मारह चित्त शिवाणे हणिआ ।

तिहुअण सुख शिरञ्जण पलिआ ॥ इति ॥

- संकल्पाभिनिविष्टचित्तं निर्व्याणिन शून्यतालक्षणेन हत्वा मार्यतां । मारयित्वा च [त्रिभुव]न-शून्य-निरञ्जनज्ञानं प्रवेश्यतां—अयमत्र समुदायार्थः । सर्वप्रपञ्च-
5 गोचरे [सहजज्ञानो][^{3b}]च्छेदापातदोषभयात् । अप्रतिष्ठितरूपोऽपि सहज इत्यते ।
तथा चोक्तं—न ससा...णे अस्थिताय नमोऽस्तु ते इति ॥

अमनसिकार-स्वभावतत्त्वद्रूपकं कश्चित् निराकर्त्तमा[ह] ॥२॥

अमनसिआर म दूसह मिच्छे ।

अप्पाणुवन्ध म करहु रे इच्छे ॥ इत्यादि ॥

- 10 न [म]नसि क्रियत इति अमनसिकारः निर्विकल्पकं सहजज्ञानं तं मा
द्रूपय सहज[स्वभा]वाभिनिवेशेन । तथा चोक्तं—यावान् कश्चिद्विकल्पः यः भवति
मनसि [त्याज्य]रूपो[हि] तावान् इति । सहज[^{4b}]ज्ञानेन चित्तं विशोध्यं
निर्विकल्पसहजज्ञाने चित्तं रिखीयेयत्ता इति । [चि]त्तप्रवेशनोपायमाह—

चित्त खसम जहि समसुह पडूठइ ।

- 15 इ[न्दीअ-विसअ तहि मत्त]ण दीसइ ॥ इति ॥

चित्तमासङ्गलक्षणं । खसमेन शून्यताज्ञाने[न] समसुखे प्रविशति । तत्क्षणं
च इन्द्रियैर्विषया न दृश्यन्ते । विक[ल्पा]नामुपसंहारमाह—

आइ-रहिअ एहु अन्त-रहिअ ।

वररुपाअ अ[हअ कहिअ] ॥

- 20 [^{4b}] शाश्वतान्ताभावात् आदिरहितमेतत् समसुखं । उच्छेदान्ताभावात्
अन्त[रहितं] । गुरुपादेनाहयं कथितम् यद्देश[ना]रूपेण न तु वाचा कथयितुं
शक्यते ।

तु मरइ जहि पवण तहि लीणो होइ गिरास ।

सअ[संवेअण तत्तफल]स कहिज्जइ कीस ॥ इति ॥

यत्तु विकल्पचित्तं म्रियते पवनश्च [लोने] भवति । तत् स्वसंवेद्य-लक्षणं तत्त्वं कस्म कथ्यते केन । स्वसंवेदनम् [तत्त्वफलं] [5^a] साधारणमित्याह ।

वढ्ठ अणँलोअ-अगोअर' तत्त पण्डिअ लोअ अगम्म ।

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जोगुरुपा[अपसस तहिँ कि चित्त अगम्म] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

मूर्खजनगोचरं [तत्त्वं] बहुशास्त्राभिनिविष्टपण्डितलोकस्य चागम्यं । यः पुण्यवान् गुरुपादप्रसन्नः तस्य तत्त्वं गम्यं ज्ञातुं शक्यं तदेव व्यक्तीकर्तृमाह—

सअसंवेअण तत्तफल तौलपाअ'भणन्ति ॥

इत्यादि । स्वसंवेदनं फलं तत्त्वं ये मनोगोचरप्राप्ताः पदार्थास्ते परमार्था 10 न भवन्तीति । तिलोपादा भणन्ति । यत् स्वयं [5^b] भूयमानं निर्विकल्पः । महासुखं तदेव तत्त्वं नान्यविकल्पविषयाभावा इति संक्षेपार्थः । [विकल्प-नाशनोपायमाह—

सहजे चौअ विसोहहु चङ्ग ।

इह जन्महि सिद्धि [मोक्ख भङ्गं] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

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स[ह]जेन चित्तं विकल्पज्ञानं शोध्यतां चङ्गं अतिशयेन । तदा इह जन्मनि सिद्धयो हि [लो]काः शान्तिकादयो भवन्ति । मोक्षश्च प्राप्त्यसि अनेन शरीरेण । चित्तशोधन-फलं पुनरप्याह ॥८॥

जहि जाइ चित्त तहि सुणहु अचित्त ।

समरसं [णिम्मल भावाभावरहिअ] ॥

इत्यादि । सहज...[6^a]...दावे वा परिभावनयागन्तुकमलावृता न बुद्धाका 20 परिभावयति । एवं इयरहित[समरस]ः सेव निर्मलं परमं चित्तं स्वभावतः शुद्धबोधिरूपं सर्वभावग्रहरहितं ।

अद्वयचित्ततरुञ्जर गउ तिहुञ्जण वित्थार ।

करुणा फुलिञ्ज फलधर [गउ] परत उञ्जार ॥

- इति उक्ते सति परोपकारं सूचयति । यत् अद्वयचित्त-योगे[न] [दू]रं तरुवर[ः]
 गजः । कल्पवृक्षमिव स च गतः त्रिभुवने विस्तर[तां.....]म्यरमादृश.....
 5 [6^b] इदमात्मा[न]मिदं परः । येन केनचित् विपरिभाषितं तेन वि[कल्प]-
 बन्धनेनात्मन[ः सहजस्वभाव] विफलीकृतं । मुक्तोऽपि स्वभावया तदा न मुक्तः ।
 तस्मात् स्वपरविभागं [न कुरु] ते यावत् । तदाह—

पर अप्पाण म भन्ति करु सञ्जल णिरन्तर बुद्ध ।

तिहुञ्जण णिम्मल परमपउ चित्त सहावे^० सुद्ध ।

- 10 इति । परञ्चात्मानञ्च एकस्वभावं [मा सहज]रूपेण भ्रान्तिं कुरु । किन्तर्हि ।
 सकलसत्त्वधातु-निरन्तरादावेव स्वभावेन यदा [7^a] तदा बुद्धो भवतीति भावः ।
 तदा जगदर्थः कथमित्याह—

सचल णिचल जो सञ्जलाचार ।

सुख णिरञ्जण म करु विञ्जार ॥ इति ॥

- 15 सचलं सत्त्वलोकः निश्चलं भाजनलोकः । यः सकलस्य लोकस्याचारो व्यवहार-
 स्तस्मात्त्रित्वावेचारितैकरमणीयत्वेन जगदर्थः प्रवर्तत इति भावः । शून्यं सकल-
 विकल्परहितं निरञ्जनं सवासनक्लेशजालकलङ्कविकलं तत्त्वज्ञानं । तत्र
 विचारो मा क्रियतां । यथा [विचारोऽपि चिन्तामणिर्यथाश[क्त]] [7^b]
 जगदर्थं करोति । तथाविकल्पकमपि ज्ञानं प्रणिधानवेधात् सत्त्वानां पुण्याधि-
 20 पत्यादिनाभागेन जगदर्थं करोतीति समुदायार्थाः । आत्मात्मीयप्रः दूषण-
 माह ॥१२॥

एहसे अप्पा एहु जगु जो परिभावइ ।

[णिम्मल-चित्तसहाव सो कि वुञ्जइ] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

एष आत्मा एतत् जगदिति यः कोऽपि परिभावयति निर्मलचित्तस्वभावतां कथं सोऽपि बुध्यति । आत्मात्मीयग्रहावेशात् न तत्त्वं बुध्यतीत्यर्थः । तत्त्वभावकस्य योगिनः सर्वव्यापक[४^a]त्वं आह ॥१३॥

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हँउ जगु हँउ वुद्ध [हँउ] गिरञ्जण ।

[हँउ अमणसिआर भवभञ्जण] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

अहमेव जगत् अहमे[व बुद्धः] अहमेव निरञ्जनः अमनसिकारश्चाहमेव । भवः संसारस्तस्य भञ्जनो [भञ्ज]कः । इत्येवं तत्त्वाभिन्नमानसो योगी तत्त्वमयं जगदिति अहर्निशं भा[वयति] ।

10

[मङ्गवा] हि जगत् सर्वं मङ्गवं भुवनत्रयं ।

मया व्याप्तमिदं सर्वं नान्यमयं दृश्यते जगत् ॥

एवं मत्वा तु वै योगी योऽभ्यसेत् सुसमाहितः ।

स सिध्यति न सन्देहो मन्दपुण्योऽपि [मानवः ॥ इ]ति ॥

भगवत् भगवतीभावना च तत्त्वेन शोधनीया इत्याह—

15

मणह [भअवा] खसम भअवइ । [४^b]

[दिवारात्ति सहजे राहिअइ] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

मनो बोधिचित्तं भगवान् खसमं तद्वापकं महासुखं भगवती । तथा च [अहिक्क]राजतन्त्रे—शुक्लाकारो भवेद्भगवान् तत्सुखं कामिनी स्मृतमिति । अथवा.....[क]रुणा भगवान् । खसमशून्यता सा भगवती । शून्यता-करुणाभिन्नज्ञानं भगवती भगवान् । भगवती च नान्या । इत्येवं अहर्निशं सहजेन चित्तं योजयितव्यं । तथा चोक्तं सम्पुटे—नदीस्रोतः प्रवाहेन दीपज्योतिः[ः]-प्रबन्धवत् ॥

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[१^a] [सहजत]त्त्वयोगिनः स्थातव्यं चाहर्निशमिति । जन्ममरणविकल्पस्य योगिना न कर्त्तव्य इति.....।

जम्भ मरण मा करहुरे भन्ति ।

[णिअचित्त तहिँ णिरन्तर होन्ति] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

जम्भ उत्पादः मरणम्विना.....[अ]यमपि विकल्पमात्रमेव न तत्र भ्रान्तिः कर्त्तव्याः । तथा चोक्तं—मृत्युर्नाम विकल्प.....नीयते खेचरीपदमिति । पुनरुक्तं—प्रणिधानावेध सामर्थ्यात् सत्त्वानां पुण्य.....। उत्पादस्तत्त्वरूपेण नान्यरूपेण विद्यत इति । तस्मादात्म्यं चित्तं निरन्तरे स्थितं भवति [9^b]—न विद्यते अन्तरं व्यवयोऽस्मिन्निति निरन्तरं । शून्यताकरुणाभिन्न..... [अह]निर्गुणं स्थातव्यमिति भावः । तत्त्वभावकस्य योगिनो हितार्थतया [तपो]वन-से[वन]माह—

10

तित्थ तपोवणं म करहु सेवा ।

[देहसुचिहि ण ससन्ति पावा] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

बाह्यतीर्थतपोवनसेवां मा [कुरु] । [जल] स्नानेन बाह्यरूपेण मोक्षं न प्राप्स्यति । अयमत्र समुदायार्थः । महा[यानमेव] तीर्थं । तदुद्भव-ज्ञानधारया सकल-विकल्पमलं प्रक्षाल्य मोक्षं प्राप्यते । [बाह्य] [10^a] तीर्थादिजलस्नानेति । तत्त्व-भावकेन योगिना लौकिकदेवताऽर्चनं न कर्त्तव्यं इति [प्रतिपा]दयति ।

15

वप्त्ता विहणु महेसुर देवा ।

[बोहिसत्त्व म करहु सेवा] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

ब्रह्मा विष्णु महेश्वरश्च त्रयो [देवा बो]धिसत्त्वेन सर्वथा न नमस्कर्त्तव्याः अधममार्गे व्यवस्थितत्वात् । तथा चोक्तं [अष्टसा]हस्रिकायां प्रज्ञापारमितायां—नान्येभ्यो देवेभ्यः पुष्पम् वा धूपदीपं दातव्यं [अथ]वाग्यान् देवान् न उपासते इति । तदेवाह—

20

देव म पूजहु तित्य ण जावा ।

[देवपूजाहि ण मोक्ख पावा] ॥ इति

[10^b] प्रस्तरादं देः पूजा न कर्त्तव्याः । बाह्यतीर्थगमनञ्च न कर्त्तव्यं ।
बाह्यदेशताराधनेन तीर्थस्नानेनाधिमोक्षं न प्राप्यते ।

बुद्ध आराहहु अविकलचित्ते ।

5

[भवणिव्वाणे म कग्गु रे थित्ते] ॥ इत्यादि ॥

[अ]द्वयज्ञानं प्रज्ञापारमिता च सोऽभिधीयते । तथाचोक्तं दिग्मागपादेः—
प्रज्ञापा[रमि]ताज्ञानं अद्वयं । सा तथागत इति । . आराध्यतां सेव्यतां
अविकलेन [दृढेन] चित्तेन । भवसंसारे निर्वाणे उच्छेदे च स्थितिर्मा कुतः ।
तदेव पुनः प्रतिपादयति—

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[11^a] पग्गोपाअ-समाहि लगाहु ।

जहि तहि दिदु कर अणुत्तर सिद्धइ ॥ इति ॥

[प्रज्ञोपायस]माधिः शून्यताकरुणाद्वयसमाधिः । तत्र लग्नो भव । यदि तत्र
[चित्तं दृढोक्तिर्य]ते तदानुत्तरं बुद्धज्ञानं सिध्यति नात्र संदेहः । तत्त्वपरिज्ञाने...

जिम विस भक्खइ विसहि पलुत्ता ।

15

[तिम भव भुञ्जइ भवहि ण जुत्ता] ॥

यथा विषं भक्षयति वि[षतत्त्वज्ञः तस्य]विषेण मरणं न भवति तथा भवं
संसारसुखं विषयादिकं भुंक्ते योगी । न[तु तस्य यो] [11^b] गिनो विषयेण
संसारबन्धनं भवति । तथा चोक्तम् हेदज्जे—

येनैव विष[खण्डेन मृत्यन्ते सर्वजन्तवः] ।

20

तेनैव विषतत्त्वज्ञो विषेण स्फोटयेद्विषं ॥

येन येन हि बध्यन्ते जन्तवो ...।

[उ]पायेन तु तेनैव मुच्यन्ते भवबन्धनात् ॥ इति

कर्त्तव्यमुद्रां विना ये गत्वा [.....प्रतिपाद]यितुमाह—

कम्भमुद्ग म दूसह जोद्

[खण आणन्द भेउ जाणिज्जिदू॥] इत्यादि ।

.....[च]त्वारः क्षणाः । चत्वारश्चानन्दास्तथैव परिज्ञायन्ते । तथा चोक्तं

ह्रिवज्ज—

5

[एकाराकृति यत् दिव्य'] [12^a] मध्ये वंकारभूषितं ।

आलयः सर्वसौख्यानां बुद्धरत्नकरण्डकं ॥

आनन्दास्तत्र जायन्ते क्ष[ण]भेदेन भेदिताः ।

क्षणज्ञानात् सुखज्ञानं एवंका[र]प्रतिष्ठितं ॥

विचित्रञ्च विपाकञ्च वि[म]र्द्दञ्च विलक्षणं ।

10

चतुःक्षणं समागम्य एवं जानन्ति योगिनः ॥

विचित्रं विविधं [ख्या]तं आलिङ्गनचुम्बनादिकं ।

विपाकं तद्विपर्यासं सुखं ज्ञानस्य भुञ्जनं ॥

विमर्द्द[मा]लोचनं प्रोक्तं सुखं भूतमयैतिव ।

विलक्षणं त्रिभ्योऽन्यतरागारागविवर्जितं ॥

15

[12^b][विचि]त्रे प्रथमानन्द परमानन्द विपाकके ।

विरमानन्दो विमर्द्दे च सहजानन्द विलक्षणे ॥ इत्यादि ।

क्षणभेद आनन्दभेदश्च कथं परिज्ञायते कम्भमुद्रा विना । तस्मात् [कम्भ]मुद्रा न दूषयितव्या । मयैव लक्ष्यलक्षणहीनं तत्त्वं परिज्ञायते । परमा[नन्द]श्चा नयोर्मध्ये लक्ष्य' वीक्ष्य दृढीकुरु इति वचनात् । तदेव प्रतिपादयति—

20

लेहुरे [प]रमधिर म विआरौ ।

णिउणो वरगुरु चरण आराहौ ॥

निपुणेन वरगुरुचरण [13^{a-b}] * * *

[14^a]पाययेत् तासां स्वयञ्चैव पिबेत् व्रती ।

पश्चादनुरागयेत् मुद्रां स्वपरायप्रसिद्धये ।

ककोले वोलकं क्षिप्त्वा कुन्दुर्बं कुररी प्रतो ।
तस्मिन्योगसमुद्भूतं कर्पूरं सहजं स्मृतं ॥ इति ।

तदेव पुनः स्फुटयति—

खण-आणन्द-भेज जो जाणइ ।

सो इह जन्महि जोइ भणिज्जइ । इति ।

5

क्षणाणामानन्दानाञ्च भेदं यो जा[ना]ति स एव इह जन्मनि योगी इति भण्यते
तत्त्वोपायपरिज्ञा[ना]त् । तत्त्वस्य स्वरूपमाह—

गुण-दोस-रहिअ एहु परमत्थ ।

सन्नसंवेअण केवि णत्थ ॥

गुण[14^b]दोषैः रहित एव परमार्थः । स्वसम्बन्धेन केनापि नार्थः प्रयोजनं । 10
नहि गुणास्तत्वारोपयितव्याः । दोषास्तस्मादपनेतव्याः । तथा चोक्तं—

नापनेयमतः किञ्चित् प्रक्षेप्तव्यं न किञ्चन ।

द्रष्टव्यं भूततो भूतं भूतदर्शी विमुच्यते । इति ।

अभ्यासे दृढतामाह—

चित्ताचित्त वि वज्जहु णित्तं ।

15

सहज-सरुएँ करहु रे धित्त । इति ।

चित्तान्तरं (नित्यं) परित्यज्य देवतामूर्तिं चेतसा ।

दिनमेकमविच्छिन्नं भावयित्वा परीक्ष्य ॥

नान्योपायोऽस्ति संसारे नपरार्थप्राप्तये ।

सकृदभ्यासि...[15^a]याः त्वयकारेणौ ॥ इति ।

20

तत्त्वस्य गमनागमनरहिततामाह—

आवइ जाइ कहवि ण ण[इ]

गुरुउवणसेँ हिअहि समाइ ॥ इति ।

तत्त्वं न कुतश्चित् आयाति, न कुतश्चित् याति । न कस्मिन्नपि स्थाने तिष्ठति ।
 तथाचोक्तं अत्राचलित्वं—न हि कुलपुत्रं तथता आगच्छति [न] गच्छति वा
 अचलिता तथता । एवमेव कुलपुत्र तथागतस्यागमनं वा गमनं वा न प्र[जा]यत
 इत्यादिविस्तरः । एवंभूतमपि तत्त्वं गुरुपदेशेन हृदये संयाति । तत्त्वस्य
 5 वर्षा[वर्ण] [15^b]रहिततामाह—

वस वि वज्जइ आकिइ विहुसा
 सव्वाआरे सो संपुसा ॥

वर्णितम्...दिना वर्जितः । उक्तञ्च परमार्थस्तोत्रे—

न रक्तो हरितो माञ्जिष्ठो वर्णस्तेनोपलभ्यते ।

10

न पीतः कृष्णः श्लो वा अवर्णाय नमोऽस्तु ते ॥ इति ।

आकृत्या च भुजमुखादिना विज्ञे[नः] । उक्तञ्च—

न महानापि ज्ञस्योऽपि न दोषः परिमण्डलः ।

अप्रमाणगतिं प्राप्याप्रमाणाय नमोऽस्तु ते ॥ इति ।

तथापि स सर्व्वेराकारः संपूर्णः सर्व्वकारवरोपेता शून्यतायै...[16^a] मता
 15 इति वचनात् । इदानीं तद्विषयक्षये यत्नः करणीय इत्याह—

ए मण मारहु [लहु चित्ते] णिम्मूल इत्यादि

एतत् मनः विकल्पभूतं संसारकारणं लघु शोघं मारय । कथं भू[तं] इत्याह ।

अशेषचिन्ताया अविद्यायाश्च मूलं प्रधानं कारणं । तथाचोक्तं—

न विकल्प... । तेनापेत विकल्प...तिरिति ।

20

त[हिँ महामु]ह इत्यादि ।

एतैश्चतुःकायैः निर्मार्ण.....[16^b].....कर्मधर्म (?) ज्ञान महामुद्राः प्राप्यन्ते
 योगि.....विषयाणां शुद्धभावत्वात् । स्व.....सुखं ।.....येऽपि अन्ये
 प्रतिभासन्ते हि योगिनः । सर्व्वे ते शुद्धभाव हि । यस्मात् बुद्धमय ज[गदो]ति ।
 तिल्लोपाद आत्मनोऽनुभवम् भणति—

हउ सुख जगु सुख तिहुअ[ण] सुख
[णिम्मल सहजे ण पाप ण पुस] ॥ इत्यादि ।

अहमपि शून्यं विकल्पमाचरत्वात् । जगदपि शून्यं विकल्पमात्र[मेव] ।
[17"] त्रिभुवनमपि शून्यं । निर्मल भलरहिते सहजे महासुखं । न पापं न पुण्यं
सम्भवति । तथाचोक्तं—

5

अनाविलमहाज्ञानं ज्योतीरूपप्रभाखरे ।
पापपुण्यकथा कुत्र विकल्पागोचरे शुभे ॥

जहि इच्छइ तहि जाउ मण एतु ण किज्जइ भन्ति ।
अथ उघाड्धि आलोअणेँ ज्भाणेँ होइ रे थित्ति ॥ इति ।

यत्र इच्छति तत्र मनो यातु । अत्र भ्रान्तिर्मा क्रियतां । मनोगमनमार्ग- 10
माह । अधः स्थितं निर्ममाणचक्रात् [उद्भूतं] [17"] अवधुतीमार्गं उद्घाट्य मुक्ती-
कृत्य आलोकेन चण्डाग्निज्ञानोक्तया ध्यानेन महासुखस्य स्थितिर्भवति । अयमत्र
संक्षेपार्थः । चण्डालीयोगभावनया, महासुखचक्रे चित्त[स्थि]रोकरणं हि सहज-
स्फुटीकरणं कारणमिति श्रीमहायोगेश्वर-तिल्लोपादस्य दोहाकोषपञ्जिका सारार्थ-
पञ्जिकानाम समाप्ता ॥

15

सरज्जपादस्य दोहाकोषः

नमः श्रीवज्रसत्त्वाय ।

नमस्कृत्य जगन्नाथान् गुरुन् सततमादरात् ।
लिख्यते दोहाकोषस्य सहजान्नायपञ्चिका ॥
[18^a] सरोजवज्रपादैश्च कृतं तदागमानुगं ।
न किञ्चापूर्वमुद्दिष्टं भगवता कथितं पुरा ॥
षड्दर्शनेषु यत्तत्त्वं न जानन्ति तदाश्रिताः ।
जातिवादादिमाश्रित्य ब्राह्मणादिनिरर्थकाः ।
भ्रमन्ति षड्गतौ भ्रष्टा मोक्षा मोक्षात्मगर्हिताः ।
प्रत्यक्षज्ञानुमानञ्च प्रमाणद्वयवाञ्छकाः ॥
सम्यग्मार्गविरहाच्चैव पापमित्रेषु सङ्गताः ।
तस्माद् गुर्वाराधनं यत् क्रियते साधुभिः सदा ॥
तस्य तुष्ट्या भवेत्क्षुत्तिरिह लोके परत्र च ।
ददाति सर्वसद्भावं तथागतात्तमादरात् ॥

[18^b] अत्र तावत् षड् दर्शनानि उच्यन्ते । ब्रह्म-ईश्वर-अर्हन्त-बौद्ध-लोकायत-
सांख्याश्च । एतेषां क्रमव्यतिक्रमेण ग्रन्थकार आह । वस्तुतोहिमित्यादि
ण जाणिअ तुल्लेमिति पर्थ्यन्तं ।

A. Text as printed by late MM. Haraprasād Sāstri. B. Manuscript in the possession of Rājaguru Hemraj Sarmā—the basis of the present edition. C. Fragmentary manuscript of the Darbar Library. HS: corrections made by H. P. Sāstri in his text. MS. : Restorations made by M. Shahidullah ; Tib.—Tibetan.

2. B. दोहाकोषस्य । 3. B. तदागमानुगं । 4. A. भगवता कथितं—HS. corrects: भगवत् कथितं । B. भगवान् कथिता । 5. A. यत्तत्त्वं । B. आस्त्य; 6. B. निरर्थकः । 7. A. मोक्षालोक्षात्मगर्हिताः । 9. A. विरहाच्चैव ; B. विरहाच्चैव । B. संयज्ञाः । 11. B. तुहा ; 12. B. तथागतोक्तमादरादिभिः । 14. A. सांख्या ; A. ग्रन्थकारा आह ; B. ग्रन्थकारमाह ; HS. corrects: ग्रन्थकार आह । A. °मित्यादिना ; HS. °मित्यादिना । 15. A. पर्थ्यन्तं ।

ब्राह्मणस्य निरासार्थमुच्यते तत्र—

वक्तुं यो हि म जानन्त हि भेद इति ।

ब्राह्मणा न जानन्ति भेदं प्रभेदश्चेति । तत् कथं भेदकस्य भेद इत्याह । तत्र प्रथमतः जातिभेदः । तेषां वाक्यं यतः चतुर्वर्णानामुत्तमो ब्राह्मणवर्णः । तन्निषिध्यते प्रमाणागम-युक्त्या च । तर्हि यदि [19¹] तावत् जात्या ब्राह्मणः । ब्राह्मणो मुखमासीदिति वचनात् । तदा तस्मिन् काले ब्राह्मणोच्यते—अयमेव स्यात् । तत् कथं । इह प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाणेतरयोनिसम्भवमेवेति । पूर्वभाव-स्तस्मात् एकाभावे अनेकपर्यालोचित-वस्तु न स्यात् । तेषामपि यत् मुखमासीदिति मृषेव वचनं धूर्त्तरचनादिति । अथवा संस्कारेण ब्राह्मणस्तदेवं न भवति । कथन्न भवति—आह । अन्यजस्यापि संस्कारः क्रियते । स कथं न ब्राह्मणः स्यात् । तस्मात् न सिध्यति जातिः । 'तत् कथं जात्यभावेन [19^b] वेदः स्वयम्भूः । आह—

एवम् पट्टिअउ ए चउ वेउ इति । जातिभेदजानद्विरेवम्पठितास्तुर्वेदाः । ऋक्सामयजुष्वर्वाश्च । एतच्चान्यजानां न विरुध्यते । पाठाधिकरणश्चेति । इयोर्नावबोधात् । अथ शब्दमात्रं चावबोध । तदा सर्वेषामपि साधारणत्व-मायाति । यथा व्याकरणमध्ये वेदान्तस्य शब्दः साध्यते । तदेव शब्दमात्रं लोकातिलक्षणं । न पुनः परमार्थः कश्चित् । शब्दश्च नित्यरूपकं न नित्यं भवति स्वयम्भूश्चेति । कथमुच्यते नित्यम् इति । यथा लोकस्य [20^a] सप्ता

2. A. न जानन्त ; A. भेद ; MS. restores as भेद । 3. A. प्रभेदश्चेति । A. भेदस्य ; A. भेदमुक्ते—HS. भेद उच्यते । 4. A. प्रथमतो जातिभेदः । A. वाक्यं । It is better to correct तन्निषिध्यते as तत् न सिध्यति । 5. A. प्रमाणागमार्था युक्त्या । 6. A. ब्राह्मणो मुखमासीत्, HS. ब्राह्मणो मुखमासीत् । A. तस्मिन्नेव काले । A. °णोऽन्यस्यात् । B. ब्राह्मणोच्यतेमेव स्यात् । HS. °नोऽन्यस्यात् । 7. A. °प्रमाणात् योनिसम्भव चेति ; HS. प्रमाणात् योनिसम्भवश्चेति । 8. A. अनेक पर्यालोचितं । 9. A. यत् मुखमासीदिति । A. धूर्त्तवचनादिति । 10. A. °स्तदेव न भवति । 11. A. कथं आह ; HS. कथमाह । 12. A. तस्मान्निषिध्यते जातिः । 13. A. B. पट्टिअउ, MS. restores पट्टिअउ । A. ए चउवेअ MS. ए चउवेउ । 14. A. °अथर्व्याः । A. एतत्, B. एतच्च (?) । A. वान्यजाना ; HS. वान्यजानां । 15. A. चावबोधः । 16. A. वेदात् तत्र । 17. A. पुनः HS. पुन । A. कश्चित् ; B. किञ्चित् । A. शब्दो वानित्य-रूपको ; HS. शब्दो वानित्यरूपको । 18. A. नित्य ।

- नास्ति अनित्यत्वादिति । तथा तद्विलीनं वेदेषु प्रामाण्यं नास्ति । कारकाभावात् विरोधः । ग्रामो नास्ति कुतः सोमा । तत् कथं कारकं नास्ति आह स्वयमेव सिद्धत्वात् पुरुषकारकरूपं तच्च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि स्कन्धानां विनाशोऽस्तीति । प्रतीत्य-समुत्पादत्वात् । पूर्वाभावात् परस्य सत्ता नास्ति मायावद्रूपदर्शनात् । संयोग-
 5 मात्रमेवेति । भ्रान्त्या सम्भवात् । एवं सर्वसंसारं भ्रान्तिमात्रतया अजानानाः षड्गतौ भ्रमन्ति । तन्निरोधात् सर्वं सुस्थं भवतीति । अनेनापि वेदः क्रियामा[20^b]त्रं तन्न भवति । ७ कारणाभावे कार्यस्योपचरणं । अलोकमेवेति विस्तरः । तस्मात् अविप्रमाणत्वे सर्वं क्रियते । स चाह—

मट्टे^१ अग्निहोत्रान्तमिति । किन्तेन अग्निहोत्रेण च ।

- 10 कज्जे विरहिञ्च हुअवह होमे^२ इति । कार्यविरहितेनाग्निहोत्रेण । घृतादिहोमं नास्ति । कथं परमार्थमजानताच्च फलन्न भवति । तदा अन्त्यजस्यापि तादृशं भवेत् निष्केवलं ।

- अक्खि उहाविञ्च कडु^३ एं धूमे^४ इति । अत्यन्तकटुधूमेन चक्षुषि दाहं करोति । यया रोगपीडा भविष्यति । तहि [21^a—21^b] कथं । तेषां
 15 तत्त्वमाह । परब्रह्ममिति । तच्च नानाप्रकारं वदन्ति । ब्रह्मज्ञानमित्यादि । तत्र परब्रह्ममिति । याज्ञिकवचनहोमेन ब्रह्मत्वं यान्ति । तच्च स्वर्गकामोपभोग-

1. A. अनित्यत्वादिति ; HS. अनित्यत्वादिति । A. प्रमाणं ; HS. प्रमाणं । A. कारकाभावात् ; HS. कारकाभावान्न ; 2. A. सिमा, HS. सीमा । A. नास्ति, HS. नास्ति । 3. A. सिद्धत्वात् । पुरुष—B. सिद्धत्वाद्दृष्टपुरुष—(?) । A. कर्मणा विनाशो अस्तीति ; HS. कर्मणा विनाशोऽस्तीति । 4. A. पूर्वाभावात् ; HS. पूर्वाभावात् । A. संयोग- HS. संयोग- । 5. A. सम्भवात् ; HS. सम्भवात् । A. अजानानाः ; 6. A. तं निरोधात् HS. तन्निरोधात् । A. भवति । 7. A. क्रियामात्रं न—A. कारणाभावः HS. कारणाभावः ; A. कार्यस्योपचरणमलौकिक—A. अविप्रमाणत्वे 8. HS. अविप्रमाणत्वे, broken in B ; 9. A. अग्निहोत्रान्तेति । MS. अग्नि हुणन्ति । MS. reconstructs the stanza thus : मट्टे [पाणी कुश लङ् पटन्ति । घरहिं वडसी] अग्नि हुणन्ति । 10. A. वृभमवहइति ; MS. वहन्ति होमे । 11. A. फलं भवति । A. अन्त्यजस्य ; HS. अन्त्यजस्य । 12. A. तादृशं तादृशं । A. निष्केवलं, HS. निष्केवल्यं । 13. A. कडु ए धूमेमिति ; MS. कडु ए धूमे^५ ; B. कटुधूमेण, fol 21^{a-b} missing in B. 14. A. तेषां, HS. तेषां ; 16. A. ब्रह्मल HS. ब्रह्मत्वं ; A. भोगफल ; HS. भोगफलं ।

फलं तेषामभिलषितञ्च । तथा श्वेतच्छागनिपातनया नरकादिदुःखमनुभवन्ति ।
सन्धाभाषमजानानत्वात् च । तस्मात् ब्रह्मब्रह्महत्या वेत्यापादि ।

सर्वं ब्रह्ममिति वचनात् । एवं ब्रह्मज्ञानमिति । तदपि न सिध्यति । कुतो
यश्चतुर्थवेदार्थव्युत्पत्तेन च तेषां योगाचारदर्शनं स न वेति । वेदत्रयेषु पाठमात्रमपि न
सिद्धं । तदा सत्यविच्छिन्नं मृषैव वचनं । अथ तत्रोक्तं सर्वं नास्ति ब्रह्मज्ञानं । 5
तदा वेदत्रयस्य प्रामाण्यं नास्ति तथा निषेधात् । चतुर्थस्याथर्वणस्य स नास्ति,
अन्योन्यविरोधात् । तस्मात् हि आगमेषु कथं ब्रह्मज्ञानं सिध्यति । असिद्ध-
मेवेति । अथवा यद्यनुभवं भवति । तदात्यन्तमृषा वचनं । कुतः । यत् सर्वं
शून्यमिति । वस्तुन उपलब्धिर्नास्ति । कुतस्तज्ज्ञानं भवति । अनुभवश्च
साकारत्वेनोपलब्धिस्तदाज्ञानमेवेत्येते । सर्ववस्तुनो अनुपल[22^a]भादिति । 10
वस्तु च लोककल्पितमज्ञानस्वभावं । न पुनः परमार्थः स्यादिति । परमार्थस्यास्म-
द्दर्शने सदगुरोर्मखात् लभ्यत इति ।

एवं ब्राह्मणस्य पुनरपि चत्वारो भेदाः । ब्रह्मचारो वानस्पत्य गार्हपत्य
यतिश्च । तदप्यसङ्गतं । कुतः यतः बालत्वे नास्ति निश्चयः । रक्षणभक्षणदि-
भावेषु । तथा ब्रह्मचारित्वं सर्वदर्शनानां दृढप्रतिज्ञायैव क्रियते । आजीवं 15
यावत् । न तेषां निश्चयः । पुनरपि विवाहादिना गार्हपत्यमाश्रयन्ति । तत्रापि
च न निश्चयः । वानस्पत्य [22^b]त्वमाश्रयन्ति ध्यानमन्त्रजपादिकारणेन । तत्र

2. A. सन्धाभाषमजानानत्वा च ; HS. °जानानत्वात् च । A. ब्रह्महत्या HS. ब्रह्महत्या । 3. A.
सर्वं ब्रह्ममिति ; HS. सर्वं ब्रह्ममिति । 4. A. यश्चतुर्थं HS. यश्चतुर्थं । A. वेदार्थव्युत्पत्तेन—printing
mistake for वेदार्थव्युत्पत्तेन । A. योगाचारदर्शनं HS. योगाचारदर्शनं । 5. A. मृषैववचनं HS.
मृषैववचनं । 8. A. वचनं HS. वचनं ; 9. A. शून्यमिति ; HS. शून्यमिति । 11. A. परमार्थः स्यादिति
occurs twice. A. परमार्थस्यास्माद्दर्शने HS. °स्याद्दर्शने । 13. A. वेदाः ; 14. A. यतिश्च ;
HS. यतिश्च । A. तदप्यसङ्गतं HS. तदप्यसङ्गतं A. यतो ; 15. A. दृढ-प्रतिव HS. दृढप्रतिवचनः ;
A. आजीवं ; HS. आजीवं ; 16. A. तेषां ; H. तेषां । A. न पुनरपि, A. विवाहादिना ;
B. विवाहादिना ; A. 17. B. वानस्पत्यल- A. -जाप-

च न निश्चयः यदि यतित्वमभिलषति । सव्ययज्ञोपवीतादीनां धारणात्
भक्षणात् नास्ति ब्राह्मणचण्डालयोर्भेदः । प्रस्तावतश्चण्डालत्वमेवेति । सत्यं कुतो
यतः ब्राह्मणो चोरचण्डालादेव भ्रंशं करोति । तदा ब्राह्मणो वेद
मालोचयति । तेन तस्या ब्राह्मण्याः दृढयोनिकरणात् शुद्धिः स्यादिति ।

5 तस्मात् सर्वं चण्डालकर्म वेति । पुनरपि यतेरपि त्रयः प्रभेदाः—दण्डि इत्यादि ।

एकं दण्डि त्रिदण्डौ भगववसे

विष्णुआ होइअइ हंस उएसे ॥ इति ॥

एकदण्डौ त्रिदण्डौति भगववेशं भवति । एवं वेशेन विहरति । पुनरप्ये-
तद्वत् त्यज्यं करोति । अन्यमाश्रयति । एतदेवाह—विष्णु[आ होइ]अइ
हंस उएसे इति । यावन्न परमहंसवेशं भवति तावत् ज्ञानं न लभ्यते, सर्व-
10 सन्यासत्वात् । तदपि च न भवति । कुतः[?] अविद्यावासनाग्रहगृहीत्वात् ।
प्रत्यक्षं दृश्यते । गार्हपत्यत्यागकाले सर्वं यत्किञ्चित् द्रविणादि वस्तु साधितं
तत्सर्वं पुनः[23^b]पौत्रादिभ्यो दत्तं न सर्वसत्त्वेषु साधारणं करोति । न केवलं
जातिमवरोपणं करोति मदीयकुलाविनष्टत्वात् । तस्मात्—

नष्टास्ते मूर्खदेहिनोऽसत्कर्मवादिनः सदा ।

न जानन्त्येव सत्तत्त्वं मोहिताः पूर्वकर्मतः ॥

तथा च स्वयं नष्टाः परानपि नाशयन्ति । एतदेवाह—मिच्छेहीत्यादि ।

1. A. यदित्वम—; HS. यतित्वम—; A. यज्ञोपवीता दिना— 2. A. प्रस्तावतो चाण्डालत्वमेवेति ;
HS. एतावता० ; A. चौरचण्डालादिना ; HS. चौरचण्डालादिना । A. चौरचण्डालादिना ; HS. चौर-
चण्डालादिना ; 4. A. आलोकयति, HS. आलोचयति । B. तस्य, 5. A. यत्रेनापि B. यतेरपि ।
6. A. एव, HS. एक, MS. एक ; A. त्रिदण्डि, A. वेशं, 7. B. विष्णुपा ;
A. होइअ ; A. हंस, A. उवसे । MS. restores विष्णुआ होइअ हंसउ
वेशं । 8. A. एकदण्डि, A. त्रिदण्डौ, HS. त्रिदण्डि ; A. वेशं ; HS. वेशं A. एव ;
HS. एवं ; 9. A. त्यज्यं ; आश्रयति । A. विष्णुआ होइअ हंस उवसे 11. A. तावत्ज्ञानं
13. A. पुत्र पुत्रादि० ; A. साधारण, HS. साधारणं, A. केवल, HS. केवलं, 14. A. जातिमवरोपन,
HS. ०रोपनं । A. ०कुलाकुलानष्टत्वात्, 16. A. जानन्त्येव HS. जानन्त्येव A. सत्तत्त्वं 17. A.
has ते before तथा and has no च after it. A. मिच्छेहीत्यादि ।

मिच्छेहिँ जग वाहिअ भूलेँ इति । मृषावाक्येन समस्तजगत्
मूर्खलोकाः कुमार्गेषु बाहिनः । इदं च—

धम्माधम्म ण जाणिअ तुलेँ इति । इह धर्माः सर्वपदार्थाः
सत्त्वनि[24^a] कायादिरूपाः करुणाविषयाश्च तद्रहिता अन्येऽधर्माः कायादिलक्षणाः
ताभ्यां तुल्यमद्वयं न जानन्ति विशिष्टमार्गमिति सिद्धान्तः । संचेपतो विस्तरोऽन्यत्रा- 5
वसेयः । न पुनः पुण्यपापदितुल्यमिति ।

इदानोमोश्चराश्रितानासुचते । अइरि इत्यादि दक्खिणँ उहेसेँ इति ।
अत्र—

अइरिण्हिँ उहूलिअ च्छारँ इति । अयिरोति उहूलितं च्छारेण ।
एवं बाह्यभस्मना स्रक्षितमङ्गानि भगवेषु निश्चयमतत्वात् । पुनरपि— 10

सौससु वाहिअ ए जडभारँ इति । शिरसि[24^b] नानाकेशकृतं
जटाभारं वहन्ति । अन्यच्च—

घरही वडूसी दौवा जाली इति । लोकस्य कुहनया स्वस्थानेषु प्रदीपं
प्रज्वाल्य स्थितत्वात् च ।

कोणहिँ वडूसी घण्डा चाली इति । ईशानकोणमाश्रित्य घण्टां 15
चालयति । पुनरत्रैव—

अक्खि णिवेसौ आसन वन्धी इति । एतच्च कुहनया मूललक्षणं ।
चक्षुर्निमेषोन्मेषाभ्यां कृतं । आसनं पर्यङ्कं वा निबन्धनं कृत्वा तदनु—

1. A. भूलेँ 2. A. समस्तं जगत् A. कुमार्गे । HS. takes इद['] च as a part of the
dohā by mistake ; 3. A. धर्माधर्मा A. तुल्ये 4. A. तत्रहिता A. °धर्मकायादि°
5. B. विस्तरोऽन्यत्रावसेयं 7. A. दक्षिण, B. दक्षिणँ ; MS. restores दक्खिण A. उवेसे
9. A. अइरिण्हिँ, B. उहूलिड(?) ; A. अइरीणि 10. A. स्रक्षितमङ्गानि A. भगवेषु
A. निश्चयमज्ञानात्, 11. A. बाहिय । 12. A. जटाभार, HS. जटाभारं । 13. B. घरही ;
B. वडूसी, 14. A has no च after स्थितत्वात् । 15. A. कोनेहिँ B. घण्टा,
A. घण्टा HS. घण्टा ; 17. A. अक्खि ; A. कुहनया— 18. B. चक्षुर्निमेषोन्मेषाभ्यां कृतं ।
A. पञ्चासनं पर्यङ्कनिबन्धनं ।

कस्मेहिँ खुसुखुसाइ जन धन्वी । एवं पूर्वोक्तं अयिरिकस्य लक्षणं
दृष्ट्वा धन्वजनानां[25^a] ह्योपादेयमजानताश्च कर्णाभ्यां खुसुखुसायति । अन्योऽ-
न्यमालोचयन्ति—इदं विशिष्टमार्गं तत्राहं लग्नोऽस्मि शृणुत जनाः ।

रण्डि मुण्डो अस्स वि वेसेँ इति । रण्डोति स्वामिरहिता । मुण्डोति
5 मासिकोपवासोक्ती या । अन्याः पुनर्नानाविशधारिण्यो व्रतिन्यः । ताभिस्तस्य
मार्गमग्नाभिः इति । एवं किम् विशिष्टोऽस्य गुरुरित्यत आह । [निष्केवलं
तर्हि ।

दिक्खिज्जइ इति । विम्बकं दृश्यते । किन्तत् गुरु —

दक्खिण उहेसेँ इति । दक्षिणोद्देशमात्रेण स्वार्थहेतुना सत्वान्
10 [25^b] क्लेशेषु निपातयन्ति । स्वयमजानताश्च । किञ्चित्(त्) चेतदेवाह ।] सर्व-
मौश्वरमिति चेत् न भवति । कथं न भवतीत्याह प्रमाणागमयुक्त्या च । तर्हि
इह संक्षेपत उच्यते इह हि सर्व्वं नाम न किञ्चिदसु अस्ति । कथं तत् यस्मात्
पृथिव्यादिधातवः सर्व्वं पिण्डपरमाणवो रूपकायाश्च परमाणवश्च षड्भागभेदेन
नोपलभ्यन्ते । तदा वस्तु न वस्तु । कथमौश्वर इत्यत आसिद्धत्वाच्च । व्यापका-
15 भावे व्याप्यस्योपलब्धिर्नास्ति । अथवा कर्त्तृत्वं वदन्ति इति चेत् । तदा उच्यते
[26^a] तन्न कथं क्रमेण च युगपद्वा न नित्येनार्थः क्रियते ।

1. A. कस्मेहिँ A. जनवन्धी; A. खुसुखुसाइ A. अयिरिकस्य; 2. A. खुस-
खुसायति । 3. A. तत्राह, HS. तत्राहं; शृणु च 4. A. अण्य A. रण्डो, 5. A. मासिकोप-
वासीक्ती; B. अन्या; A. व्रतिन्यस्मास्य मार्गे सम्प्रदा । 6. A. एवं विशिष्टस्य गुरोरित्यत ।
[] The portion within brackets (lines 6-10) is omitted in A. 8. A. MS.
restores this *pāda* as [दिक्खा देइ] दक्खिण उवेसे । 11. A. सर्व्वमौश्वरमय[मि]ति
चेत् तन्न भवति । A. प्रमाणागमाभ्यां युक्त्या; 12. A. स्फूर्ति instead of अस्ति । 13.
A. रूपकाश्च; A. षड्भाग भेदेनोपलभ्यन्ते; 14. A. has च after तदा; A. तेष्व-
सिद्धत्वाच्च; B. इत्यत आसिद्धत्वाच्च । 15. B. व्यापस्यो^० । 16. A. has no च after कथं,
B. क्रमेण ; A. युगपद्वा न नित्येनार्थः क्रियते ।

तस्मात् नास्त्येव तस्य बहिर्वस्तु अध्यात्मकल्पितं वा । एतदेवाह । शक्त्येत् किन्देशकालादिरपेक्षेत । तस्मात् युगपत् न स्यात् । किं तत् सृजत् । असौ अपेक्षतस्यान्यां । वस्तु न नित्यो नापि शक्तिर्भवति । भावस्तु नित्यो नास्ति । कुतः । भावश्च क्षणिकः सर्वकालतः अन्यच्च विषयविषयिभ्यां नेष्यते । कुतः । यतश्चक्षुभ्यां रूपादीन् दृश्यते । भ्रान्तिमात्रतः । विचारेणापि यत् घटपटादि न दृ[26^b]श्यते तत् पूर्वाभावात् कथं परमाण्वादौ उक्तलक्षणतया विषयीभवति । यथा स्कन्धादीनां लक्षणं न पिण्डपरमाण्वो बाह्यकं इति । अथ यदि नीलपीत्याद्याभासस्य ख्यातिस्तदपि न भवति । प्रत्यक्षविरोधेन नात्मनस्तस्य सत्ता नास्ति । तत् कथं चक्षुर्विज्ञानादिषु ग्राह्यग्राहकभावेन प्रवृत्तिः । सति भ्रान्तिमेवेति बालजनैः कल्पितमिदं श्वेतमिदं पीतमित्यादि ।

10

पुनरेवाह—अपोतमपि नाभ्यस्तं गच्छत्यप्ययत्नं पुनः । तस्य किन्नाम यवधाराबा[27^a]हिनी विज्ञप्तिर्न भवति । तदा कथं न विस्मर्यते । अन्यच्च वैषम्यशैलजातानामपि महोदधर्मनात्यन्तं तथा सूक्ष्माणुपरिमाणानां को वा कुर्यात् तदकर्मकः । करोति वा बलशालित्वादिति चेत् । स एवोन्मत्तवत् भवति । नाशकाले अममात्मनः कथं नाशयेदिति । अथवाशक्तमेव क्रियते । 15 अयस्कान्तोपलादीनाञ्च वस्त्राद्याकर्षणं प्रतिनिषिध्यते । तत् पुनर्विज्ञानागमे निषिद्धः । कायानुसृत्युपस्था[नाद्यस्था]नत्वात् कायं पुनः [27^b] कुक्षितपञ्जरं विचारादवस्तु । एतदाह—

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1. A. तर्हि instead of बहि ; A. अध्यात्मकल्पित HS -कल्पितं । 2. A. किदेश-
कालादपेक्षेत HS किन्देशकाला° ; 3. A. अपेक्षतस्यान्यवस्तून् । A. शक्तिर्भवति ; HS. शक्ति-
र्भवति । A. भाववस्तु instead of भावस्तु ; 4. A. भावः ; A. क्षणिकः 5. A. रूपादि दृश्यते ।
6. A. पूर्वाभात् HS. पूर्वाभावात् । 7. A. स्कन्धादीना ; HS. °दीना । A. पिण्डपरमाणु-
बाह्यकं । A. नीलपीताम्भा भासस्य ख्याति[:] तदपि—A. भ्रान्तिमात्रमेवेति । 10. A. पीतमिति ।
11. A. अपोतमपि ; B. न भ्यस्तं ; A. गच्छत्यप्ययत्नं ; 13. A. वैषम्य ; HS. वैषम्य ; A.
महोदधर्मना° ; A. सूक्ष्माणुपरिमाणानां ; HS. सूक्ष्मानां- ; 14. A. बलशालित्वादिति ;
A. एवोन्मत्तो भवति ; 16. A. वस्त्राद्याकर्षण HS. वस्त्राद्याकर्षणं ; A. न सिध्यति ।
17. The portion within the brackets added in the margin of B.

अस्थिपञ्जरतो मांसं प्रज्ञाशस्त्रेण मोचयेत् ।

अस्थीन्यपि पृथक्कृत्वा पश्य मज्जानमन्ततः ॥

किमत्र सारमस्तीति स्वयमेव विचारितं ।

लालामूत्रपूरीषवाध्यरुधिरस्वेदान्त्वमेदोवसा—

5

पूर्णः कायकलिः सदा व्रणमुखैः प्रस्यन्दते चाशुचि इति ।

तस्मात् न विज्ञानस्य स्थानमस्ति वासनामात्रमेवेति । तच्चाविद्यावशाज्जायते ।
तः सर्वे दोषाः सम्भवन्ति । तथाचोक्तं—सत्यात्मनि परसंज्ञा स्वपर[28^a]विभागात्
परिग्रहहेतौ—

अनयोः संप्रतिबद्धाः सर्वे दोषोः प्रजायन्ते इति ।

10

तस्मात् प्रसिद्धं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादलक्षणमिति । यदि वा अवलम्बते किञ्चित्
देवतात्मशरीरं तन्न भवति । कुतः यदोश्चरं नास्ति तथा रहितं किमन्यं
देवतां साधयति । तन्नयमिति वचनात् । तस्मात् न भवति । अथ युगपदनुभवं
साध्यते । तदपि न भवति । पूर्वोऽनुमानस्य सत्ताऽसिद्धाः । यदि वा धुनन-
कम्पनद्यावेशं कुरुते । तदा कुहिकार सत्यसाक्षात् अनुभवेयुः । निरुपलभ्यत्वात् ।

15

त [28^b]दपि प्रत्यात्मवेदके न भवति । एतदेवाह—

प्रत्यात्मवेदता तस्य कीदृशी नाम कथ्यतां ।

प्रत्यात्मवेद्यं वदतां वस्तुत्वं तस्य चेष्टितं ॥

इदं तदिति तद्वत्तं तदशक्यमिति चोद्यते ।

स्वनिश्चयं तदन्येषां निश्चयोत्पादनाय तु ॥

1. A. पञ्जरतो ; A. मोचय(येत्) ; B. मोचयये । 2. A. मज्जानमन्ततः ; HS. °न्ततः ।
3. A. विचारय । 4. A. °वसा ; HS. वसा । A. कायकले A. व्रणमुखे ; 5. A. has no
इति after चाशुचि । 6. B. original विज्ञानमस्ति corrected in the margin as विज्ञास्य
स्थानमस्ति which is to be restored as विज्ञानस्य—, 7. A. ते । 9. A. प्रजायन्त
10. A. अवलम्बयते । 11. A. देवता° । A. तथा रहितं किमन्यदेव तां साधयति । B. तथा रहित
किमन्यं देवता साधयति । 12. A. तन्न यतिवचनात् । 13. A. सत्ता निषिद्धा । 17. B. प्रत्यात्मवेद्य ।
A. चेष्टितं, 18. A. has वस्तुत्व['] instead of तद्वत्तं A. चोद्यते । 19. A. स्वनिश्चयवदन्येषां ।

साधवस्तु प्रवर्त्तन्ते नित्यमव्यभिचारिणः ॥

वेदकस्य यद्देयं वेद्याभावे न वेदकः ।

वेद्यवेदकयोरेवं अभावतः किञ्च नैष्यते ॥ इति ।

तस्मात् प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादमेवेति ईश्वराश्रितं निरस्तः । इदानीं क्षणकानामुच्यते ।
तत्र दीहणक्ख जइ इत्यादि ता[वपर] केवल[29^a] साहइ इति 5
पर्यन्तेन । एवं—

दीहणक्ख जइ मलिणो वेसे इति । अर्हन्ताश्रित एव देहिनः
सर्वलोकाः कपटकुहनत्वेन भक्षिताः । मलिनवेशधारिणः स्वयं तत्त्वमजाननाश्च-
पुनरपि स्वशरीरेषु दुःखदायकाः । तमाह—

गागल होइ उपाडिअ केसे इति । नग्नेन प्राप्तं केशानामुत्पाटनेन 10
कर्म्मणा न परमार्थः कश्चित् । एवमुक्तेन किं स्यात् ।

खवणेहि जाण विडि[वि]अ वेसे इति । क्षणकेन मार्गविडम्बितं
यादृशं तादृशं न भवति । कुतः । नित्यानित्यव्यवहार[29^b]त्वात् तन्मार्गमजाननाश्च
तेषां यमाश्रयं कुर्वन्ति तैः ।

अप्पण वाहिअ मोक्ख उवेसे इति । आत्मनो कुकर्म्मकुमार्गेषु 15
बाह्विं मोक्षोद्देशेन तच्च मोक्षं न सिध्यते । वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्—

जइ गागा विअ होइ मुत्ति ता इति । यदि नग्नानां भवति
मुक्तिस्तदा—मुनह सिअलह इति । श्वानशृगालादीनां किं न भवति
मुक्तिः । अथ—

2. A. वेदकस्य यद्देयं HS. वेदकस्य च यद्देयं ; B. वेदकस्य यद्देयं 3. A. वेद,
HS. वेद्य । A. अभावः ; A. किञ्च 4. A. ईश्वराश्रितः[.] 5. A. दीहणक्ख ;
A. साह इति, 7. A. दोहणक्खज्जे, MS. दीहणक्ख जे ; B. दीहणक्खज्जेइ
10. A. होइअ । A. उपाडिअ । 11. B. परमार्थं किञ्चित् । 12. A. खवनं हि जान,
13. A. यादृश, HS. यादृशं । A. तन्मार्गमजानताश्च ते पापमाश्रयं कुर्वन्ती तैः ; HS.
तन्मार्गमजानताश्च— 15. A. अप्पणु, A. उवेसे, HS. आत्मनः, A. बाह्विं,
16. A. has दृश्यते instead of सिध्यते । 17. A. गग्ना A. नग्नानां, HS. नग्नानां,
18. A. मुनह, A. शिअलह, A. श्वशृगाला 19. A. मुक्ति, HS. मुक्तिः ।

लोमुपाङ्गणे अथि सिद्धि ता इति । लोमोत्पाटनेन सिद्धिरस्ति
यदि तदा—जुवद् गिअम्बह इति । [30^{a-b}] युवतिस्त्रीणां नित्यरोमोत्-
पाटनकर्म्म । तासां नितम्बस्य किञ्च मुक्तिः स्यात् । अथवा—

पिच्छीगहणे दिट्ठ मोक्ख इति । क्षपणकेन मयूरपिच्छिकाग्रहणेन
5 यदि मोक्षो दृष्टः—ता करिह तुरङ्गह इति । तदा हस्त्यश्वानां गूढपक्षेषु
मयूरपिच्छिकाभरणमालया मोक्षः भवति । न भवतीति यावत् । अन्यच्च—

उब्बे भोअणे होइ जाण इति । उब्धितभोजनेन यदि भवति
ज्ञानं ता करिह इत्यादि पूर्ववत् एव—

सरह भणइ खवणाण मोक्ख महु किम्पि ण भावइ इति ।
10 सरोरुहवज्रपादेनोक्तं क्षपणकानां यन्मोक्षं तन्मम किञ्चिन्मात्रं न प्रतिभासते ।
कुत इति चेत् आह—

तत्तरहिअ काआ ण ताव पर केवल साह[इ] इति । तत्त्वरहितं
किमन्यत् तावत् आत्मनाऽज्ञानता परेऽपि लोकाः केवलमनर्थकपाते । यदा तेषां
सिद्धान्तः यद्बीजनिकायादिलक्षणमनित्यं पुनरपि यत्तेषां वचनमस्ति तत् वनस्य
15 पत्तीनां जीवमिति । तत्र भवति कस्मान्न भवति इत्याह । स्कन्धादीनां विनाशो
भवति यदा तदाऽनित्य एवमेको जीवनिकायः द्वितीय वनस्पतयः तृणवन-
कानना[31^a]दि ।

1. A. त, HS. ता । A. लोमोत्पाटनेन । 2. A. यदा । A. गित्यम्बह ।

Folio 30^{a-b} is missing in B.

4. A. दिट्ठि MS. corrects as दिट्ठ । 5. करिह तुरङ्गह can not be taken
as the last part of the *pāda*. MS. reconstructs from Tib. मोरह चमरह ।

7. A. उवेभं MS. corrects as उब्ब । 8. करिअ should करिह । HS. takes
एव as a part of the *dobā* through mistake. 9. A. खवनान should be खवणाण ।

A. मोक्ष MS corrects as मोक्ख, 12. साह should be restored as साहइ ।

तृतीयं पृथिव्यादि चतुर्धातवश्च । एवं षड्जीवनिकायाः । एतत् सर्वं न भवति । कुतः । यतः सर्वं जडधातवः । तेषां कुत्र जीवमुपलभ्यते । न लभ्यते इति यावत् । अथ पुरुषायत्तं जीवं । तत् पूर्वं ईश्वरनिराकरणे निरस्तं । एतदुक्तेन किं स्यात् । सर्वमेवानित्यरूपं स्यात् । कथं तर्हि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वं । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादश्च भ्रान्तिरूपं । लोकस्य स्थिरत्वाभावात् ।

इहलोकं विहाय स्वर्गादिगमनं करोति । बौधानामपि तादृशमिह जन्मना सत्त्वार्थं कृत्वा [31^b] तदा स्कन्धपरिणामेन अन्यलोकं गत्वा सत्त्वार्थं निष्पाद्य पुनरपि तत्परित्यागात् स्कन्धादिग्रहणं कुर्वन्ति इति । सर्वकालतः अस्मात्-चक्रवत् । [पूर्वकरुणा प्रणिधानाच्च । किन्तु विशेष आयावत् न सत्यं न मृषा च लोकरूप्या पुन नित्यरूपमिति सिद्धं । नार्हन्तावत् ।] किन्तु तेषां 10 नित्यरूपमोक्षं तत्र भवति । कुतः यतस्तेषां वचनं त्रैधातुधातुकस्योपरि कृत्वाकारं मोक्षं । तच्च षड्शोतिसहस्रयोजनानां प्रमाणं । एतदेव न सिध्यति । यतः त्रैधातुकस्य विना[32^a]शोऽस्ति कृतं कुत्र स्थाने तिष्ठति । तस्मात् मोक्ष-नित्यरूपं न भवति । अनित्यमेवेति स्यात् । इति संक्षेपतः विस्तरेणान्यत्रावसेयं ।

इदानीं श्रमणानामुच्यते । तत्र चेत्लू इत्यादि नउ परमत्य एक ते 15 साहिउ पर्यन्तं ।

चेत्लू भिक्षु जे त्यविर उदेसे ।

वन्देहिँ अ [पव्वज्जिउ] वेसे ॥ इति ।

1. A. °निकायास्तु । 2. A. कुतो instead of कुत्र । 4. A. किं ; HS. किं । A. कथ, HS. कथं । A. तर्हि ससत्पन्नत्वं । 5. A. प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादश्च । A. B. भ्रान्तिरूपं । B. लोकाय । A. स्वर्गादिगमन- HS. °गमनं । A. बौधानामिति । 6. A. जन्मनि 8. B. कुर्वन्ति इति broken in B. B. अस्मात्चक्रवत् । 9-10. The portion within brackets is omitted in A. 11. A. नित्यरूपं मोक्षं । A. यतस्तेषां, HS. °क्षेपां । 13. A. मोक्षनित्यभूयं । 14. B. विस्तरेणान्यत्रावसेयं ।

15. B. इदानीं श्रवणा° । A. वेलु । A. परमच्छ एक ते साहिउ । 16. A. पर्यन्ते । A. वेत्तु । 17. A. भिक्षु । A. थविर, उदेसे MS. restores: थविरउ वेसे । 18. A. वन्देहिँ अ यज्जइ उएसे । In B the portion —अ यज्जइ is broken ; MS. corrects A: वन्देहिँ अ पव्वज्जिउ एसे । A has no इति ।

- चेक्षः दशशिष्वापदी । भिक्षु कोटिशिष्वापदी । स्थविरो यो दशवर्षोपपन्नः ।
 ते सर्वे कार्पायधरवत्तारूपमात्रं प्रव्रज्यां गृह्णन्ति । तेन देशनभिच्छणशीलत्व-
 क्षमात्माचरन्ति । [32^b] न तत्त्वतः तत्त्वम् जानन्ति । शठकपटरूपेण सत्त्वान्
 विह्वेठयन्ति । यदुक्तं भगवता पश्चिमे काले पश्चिमे समये मयि परिनिवृत्ते
 5 पञ्चकषायकाले च ये भिक्षवः मम शासने भविष्यन्ति । ते सर्वे शठकपटरता
 भविष्यन्ति । तथा गृहहारभ्ये सति कृषिवाणिज्यादिरताः सर्व्वपापकर्मणि
 करिष्यन्ति । शासने विडम्बकाः यत् पूर्वे मारकायिकाः तत् सर्व्वे ते
 अमरणरूपेणावतरिष्यन्ति । तत्र मध्ये संघस्थविरास्ते सांघिकोपभोगं हरिष्यन्ति
 इत्यादि विस्तरः । न तेषां [33^a] बोधिस्तत् कथं । ये आवकयानमाश्रितास्तेषां
 10 उत्तलक्षणैर्भङ्गः । भङ्गात् पुनर्नरकं यान्ति । अथ शिञ्चारक्षणमात्रेण
 विनयोत्तलक्षणयायाः स्वर्गोपभोगमात्रं भवति । न पुनर्बोधिरुत्तमा कुतः यदा
 स्थविरार्थानन्दः परिनिवृत्तस्तदा तेन न कस्यचित् समर्पितं । आवकबोधिरुपदेशं
 स स्यात् ।

- अथ महायानमाश्रयन्ति । तत्रापि निश्चयं न भवति । कुतः यतः पूर्व्वमार-
 15 कायिकत्वात् । यदि वा सुस्थितं तदपि अनिश्चितं एतदेवाह—

कोइ सुतण्त वक्खाण वइट्ठो-इ [33^b] ति । क्वचित् भिक्षुः
 तत्त्वव्याख्यानं करोति । पूर्व्वेणाश्रुततया स पुनर्नरकादिगमनं करोति—द्रव्यादि-
 लोभेन च ।

1. A, वेक्षः [ः] दशशिष [ः] यदा । A. कोटिशिष्या यदा । A. यो दशवर्षोपपन्नः ।
 2. B. कार्पायधरवत्त्व (१) । B. रूपमात्रां (?) । A. तेनोदेशनभिच्छणशील क्षमा [ः]
 चरन्ति । B. तेन देशनभिच्छण शीलत्वक्ष.....न्ति । 3. A. तथा । B. तत्त्वतः ।
 5. A. भिक्षवो । 6. A. कृषिवाणिज्यरता । 7. A. शासनविडम्बकाः । A. ये
 B. यत् । A. सर्व्वे । B. तत् सर्व्वे ते । 8. A. भोग HS. भोगं 11. A. यतः
 for यदा । 12. A. समर्पितः । A. आवक बोधिरुपदेश स्यात् । 16. A. स्वतत्त्व,
 MS. सुतन्त । A. वोइट्ठो । B. वइ[ट्ठे], the last letter is broken.

कोवि चिण्ते कर सोसइ दिट्ठो इति क्वचित् वै चित्ता सर्वधर्मा
क्रियते वदन्ति पुनः आगमपुस्तकाक्षरविचिन्तमान तस्माधर्मे करोति द्रष्टव्यं तत् ।
पाठानवबोधोपात्त अपायगतिं यास्यति । एवं चिन्तयापि चित्तशोधं च करोति ।
ते रोगा बभूवुः ।

अस्य तहि महजाणहिँ धा[इ]—[34^{a-b}] * * *

[35^a]-गंगमिथ्यन्ति । भ्रातृया च तेन भ्रातृया अपायगमनं करोति । तस्मात्
भ्रान्तिर्नाम विकल्पः । [भ्रान्ति]वर्जनात् मुक्तिः । एवं—

णउ परमत्य एक तेँ साहिउ इति । तेन अमणादिना युक्त्या
विचार्यमानेन आवकादि परमार्थमेकं साधितं । निष्कवलं व्रतचर्यादिना
जीविकाहेतुना प्रवृत्तिरिति । तत्र समुदायार्थमाह—

जो जसु जेण होइ संत्तुटो ।

मोक्ष किं लब्धम् ज्जाण[प]विट्ठो इति—यो येन दृष्टेन भवति
सन्तुष्टं तस्य मार्गमात्रं आवकयानादि भगवता सन्दर्शितं [35^b] तत्र यानेषु प्रविष्टा
मोक्षं लभन्ति । वाचाचकलक्षणा न भवतीति यावत् । स क्रियते ।
तावत् दुष्प्राप्यमिति । एवं तत्स्वरहितया तीर्थिकादिना च समुदायेनाह—

किन्तह दौवेँ किन्तह गिवेज्जँ इत्यादि । किन्दर्शनेन किन्तत्
नमस्कारेण ।

किन्तह किज्जइ मन्तह सेव्वँ । किन्तेन कर्त्तव्यं मन्त्रसेवनया ।
अथवा किं प्रदीपेन किं नैवेद्येन [ज्ञा]न-पद्धत्या न किञ्चित् कार्यमस्ति । तथा—

1. A. को विचित्तँ A.B. कर सोसइ MS. करइ सोस । A. क्वचित्
वैचित्र्य['] सर्वधर्माणा['] करोति । 2. A. °पुस्तकाक्षरा विचिन्तेन । A. तत् शोधनं A. रत्नं
for द्रष्टव्यं 3. A. चित्त शोधं । HS. चित्त शोधं । 4. B. ते रोगा । 5. A. अस्यति ***
34^{a-b} of B. is missing. The portion (p. 65, l. 5—p. 66, l. 15) from अस्य
to सहजनेवेति is missing in A. 8. B. लउ (?) for णउ B. एकत्तँ for एक तेँ
MS. restores the preceding line as : सहज णउ जँ निव्वाण भाविउ ।

किन्तु तित्थ तपोवण जाइ इति । किं तत्र तीर्थ ... [36^a] स्यादि ।
किन्तेन तपोवने गमनया ।

मोक्ख कि लवभइ पाणी ऋइ इति । अननोक्तेन तीर्थाश्रये[न]
पानीयस्नानपवित्रेण किं मोक्खो लभ्यते । न लभ्यते इति यावत् ।

- 5 च्छुहुरे आलीकावन्धा इति । हेयपुरुषा मिथ्याबन्धनं कल्याणमित्रोक्तं
तीर्थादिकं त्यजेथ । येन नरकादिं यास्यथ । लोकायमतादिनाञ्च । नास्ति
दत्तं नास्ति हुतं न सन्ति श्रमणाः नास्ति ब्राह्मणः । नास्ति [प]रलोकः ।
यावत् जीवेत् सुखं जीवेत् तावत् मृत्योरगोचरः । भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य
पुनरा[ग]मनं [36^b] [कुतः] इति । उच्छेद[~~प्राप्त्य~~] । अथवा सांख्या[ः]
10 वदन्ति । सांख्या प्रधानमिच्छन्ति नित्यं लोकस्य कारणीत्यादिना शाश्वतः । तेन
किं क्रियते न कल्याणमिति चेत् ।

- सो मुच्चहु जो अच्छहु धन्धा इत्यादि । समुदायार्थेन विशिष्टचर्या
सूचयन्नाह । सन्मार्गेषु अधिमोचं कुरु । येन कृते सति स्वार्थं करिष्यसि ।
अयुक्तमार्गे मुञ्चसि त्यज—येन धन्धतायां स्थितिर्न करिष्यसि । सन्मार्गेण निर्द्वन्द्वं
15 यास्यसि । सहजमेवेति नान्यः । एवं—

तसु परिआणोँ अस्स ण कोइ इति । तस्य स[37^a]हजस्य
परिज्ञाने अन्यं मोचं न किञ्चिदस्ति ।

- अवरें गणोँ सव्वं वि सोइ ॥ अन्यैः सर्व्वैर्भोक्षसमूहं यत् परिकल्पितं
पृथक् पृथक् तत् सर्व्वं सहजमेवेति नान्यत् । किन्तत् सहजमजानानाञ्च भ्रमन्ति
20 संसारे घटोयन्ववत् । स च सदगुरु पर्य्यपान्त्रितेनोपलभ्यते । तत्र सहजे
वाच्यवाचकौ न लभ्यते ।

15. A. नाञ्च । 16. A. has no इति after the *pāda*. 18. A. अवरें अपि
सज्जइ सोइ, MS. अवचेअणे सव्वोइ सोइ—19. A. सर्व्वं सहजे— A. सहजमजानानो ।
20. A. संसारे, HS. संसारे । 21. A. लभ्येते ।

वाच्यवाचकसम्बन्धात् न विद्येत् सहजं त्रिषु ।
 देशनापदयोगेन ख्यापितं भगवता क्वचित् ॥
 पुस्तके दृश्यमाने च सत्त्वार्थाय न संविदात् ।
 यत् यत् द्रक्ष्यति वस्तुष्व भ्रान्तिरूपादिकल्पना ।
 तत्तद्वस्तु न दृश्येत भ्रान्तिः[३७^b]न्तं गुरुपर्वण्या ॥ इति तस्मात्—

5

सोवि पट्टिज्जइ इत्यादि । पाठस्वाध्यायादि यत्किञ्चित् क्रियते लोकोत्तरं
 सहजमयं यान्ति । न केवलं लोकोत्तरं लौकिकमप्याह —

सत्य पुराणे [वक्खाणिज्जइ] इति । यत्किञ्चित् शास्त्रपुराणादि-
 व्याख्यानं क्रियते तत् सर्वं सहजस्यैव नान्यस्य । तदाह—

णाहि मो दिट्ठि जो ताउ ण लक्खंइ इति । एवं सहजोक्तक्रमात् 10
 यावत् पुरुषैर्न लिखितं तावत्तेन मोक्षं न दृष्टं । येन क्षेत्रज्ञं तत्क्षणात् करोति ।
 कथं दृश्यतेत्याह—

एक्के वर इत्यादि । एते[३८^a]न निस्केवलेन वरप्रवरगुरुपादापेक्षितेन
 लक्ष्यते । एवं स्पष्टार्थमाह—

जइ गुरु वुत्तउ हिअइ पइसइ इति । यत् गुरुत्तमार्गं हृदयगतं
 भवति । तदा—

15

1. A. °सम्बन्धा न सन्ति सहजे वयः । 2. A. भगवान् । 3. B. दृष्टमाने । 4. A. संविधात् ।
 4. A. यद्रक्षति for यत् यत्° । A. वस्तुसंज्ञा for वस्तुष्व । 6. A. पत्रिज सोवि—
 MS. supplies the second part of the pāda: सोवि गुणिज्जइ । 8. A. गच्छ
 for सत्य । B. वक्खाणिज्जइ indistinct. 10. A. दिट्ठि MS. दिट्ठि ।
 A. लक्खाइ । 11. A. पुरुषे न- HS. पुरुषेण न ।

14. MS. restores the whole pāda as एक्कु परं गुरुपात्रा पेक्खइ । 14. A.
 एव HS. °व B. प्रार्थनम्— 15. A. गुरुवुत्तवो । हिअहि पइसइ A. गुरुत्त-
 मार्ग— B. गुरोत्तमार्ग । A. हृदयगतं HS. हृदयगत ।

णिच्चिन्न हत्येठ विन्न उदोसइ । यथा क्वचित् पुरुषेण चिन्तामणिं
प्राप्यते तदा निश्चितं तदुद्देशेन दानादि क्रियते । तेनेहापि सहजस्वरूपे प्राप्ते
सति चिन्तामणिवत् सर्व्वसत्त्वान् तन्मयं करोति । सर्व्वस्वं द्रविणादि त्याज्यं
करोति । ईदृशं मार्गमजाननात् । अन्यकारः सरह इत्यादिना परिदेवनां
5 करो[38^b]ति ।

जग वाहिन्न आलेँ इति । सर्व्वं जगत् पालेन तीर्थिकादिना
बाह्मितमिति ।

णिन्न सहाव णउ लक्खिउ वालेँ इति । तैर्बाह्यजातौयै निर्जस्वरूपं
सहजभावमिदं न लक्षितं । न सदगुरवः आराधिताः । तदा ते षड्गत्त्वादिदुःख-
10 मनुभवन्ति । एतदेव न केवलं तीर्थिकस्य अमणेषु आह ॥१८

भाणहीण पव्वजेँ रहिन्नउ इति । यदा तेन अमणेन सम्यग्ज्ञान-
हीनेन प्रव्रज्यागृहीतविनयादिलक्षणं शिच्चारक्षणं कृतं वा तेषां फलं न
भव[39^a]ति ।

कुत आह—घरहि वसन्तेँ भज्जे सहिन्नउ । यदा गृहहारभादि
15 आश्रमं न करोति तदा व्रतभङ्गस्तेन सर्व्वेषु चर्यादीनां भङ्गः । एक प्रतिष्ठाभङ्गेन
च सर्व्वेषां भङ्गः । यथा एकेन पुरुषेण विषभक्षणेन सर्व्वेषु जन्तु[षु] भङ्गं जायते ।
तच्च एके न्नियमाणे सर्व्वेषां न भक्षितेऽपि विषमरणभयं जायते । तदा यत्किञ्चित्

1. A. णिच्चिन्न । A. हत्येठ, Ms. reconstructs the whole *pāda*: णिहिन
हत्येठिष विष उ दीसइ, A. चिन्तामणिः । 2. A. तदुद्देशे । 4. A. ईदृशस्य मार्गस्याजाननात् ।
MS. restores the word after सरह as भणइ । 7. B. बाह्मित इति । 8. A. लक्षित
A. निजस्वरूपं । 9. A. सदगुरु । B. has तदासाङ्गत्यादि for तदाते षड्गत्त्वादि—
The number 10 refers to the stanza following.

11. A. भाणहीण । A. पव्वज्जे । A. विनयादिलक्षण— 14. A. वसन्ते ।
15. B. आश्रयणकरोति । B. सर्व्वेषुचर्यादीना । 16. A. विषभक्षितेन । 17. A. तन्मयके ।

भक्षितं तत् सर्वं सुपरीक्षितेन भक्षणं करोति । विषयत्वं वा अभ्यस्यति ।
तच्चा[दा]वेव सुनिश्चिततया नो चेत् भङ्गः जायते । एवं यत्किञ्चित् व्रतचर्यादि
गृह्यते तत् [39^b] सर्वं दृढप्रतिष्ठायेति । तस्य च—

जइ भिड़ि विसअ रमन्त ण मुच्चइ ।

यदि च दृढविषयसेवारतिं न त्यजति । तदा अन्यकारिण—

5

परिआण कि मुच्चइ इति । तदा अन्यपरिज्ञानेन किमुक्तेन क्षणिक-
सुखात्यागात् । येन दुःखमनुभवन्ति । अथ विषयसेवापञ्चकामादिना न
मुच्यन्ते सति परिज्ञाने । तदा अन्ये शुष्कपरिज्ञाने वाच्ये उक्ते किं न मुच्यते
इति यावत् ।

जइ पच्चक्ख कि भाणैँ कौअअ ।

10

जइ परोक्ख अन्धार म धौअअ ॥

यदि प्रत्यक्षं तदा ध्यानेन किं क्रिय[40^a]ते । यदा इदं परोक्षं न दृष्टं
अन्धकारमध्ये किं दृश्यते । अनेन किमुक्तं स्यात् । सर्वाणि प्रव्रज्यादीनि व्रतानि किं
क्रियन्ते । अन्धकारमध्ये च परलोकफलं अदृष्टत्वात् । अनुमानहेतुना च ।
किं तत् प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमाह—सरहँ इत्यादि । कट्टिउ राव । गुप्तं
न ज्ञातं सर्व्वलोकेषु मयातिथ्यक्तेन महानादोच्चरितं । किं तत् ।
सहजं सहाव ण भावाभाव इति । अत्र भावसंक्षुब्धालोकेन यद्वसु मनः
परिकल्पनया च । तत्र कुतः । यतः सर्व्वं सहजस्वभावेन वसु विश्वमुत्पादितं
[40^b] तदेवभूतपरिकल्पनया मुच्यते । तथा चोक्तं—

15

1. B. अभ्यस्यते । 2. B. सुनिश्चितं तया । A. भङ्गः । 3. A. B. विषय रमन्तन—
A. उच्चइ । 6. MS. restores the first part of the pāda as सरह भणइ ।
A. अन्यपरिज्ञाने । 8. A. अन्येन सुख परिज्ञानेन । A. मुच्यते । 10. A. पच्चक्ख
भाणैँ कि कौयः MS.—भाणैँ कि कौअइ । 11. A. सुत्वा रम
वीअअ MS. अन्धार मवीअइ । 12. A. ज्ञानेन for ध्यानेन । 13. A. has no कि
after व्रतानि । 14. A. °फलस्य 15. A. has सरहँ । MS. restores the word after
सरहँ as निप्त । A. कट्टिउ for कट्टिउ । 17. A. °संक्षुब्धरादि । B. °लोकैर्न (?)

नापनेयमतः किञ्चित् प्रक्षेप्तव्यं न किञ्चन ।

द्रष्टव्यं भूततो भूतं भूतदर्शी विसृज्यते । इति ।

तत् कथं युक्तिराह । इदं तद्विपदाः सुखेनोत्पन्नाः । सुखमिच्छन्तश्च मातृपितृ-
संयोगाज्जायन्ते । तत् प्रत्यात्मवेद्यतया नाभावः । कुतः तन्मयत्वेनावाच्यत्वात् च ।
5 सैव मरणान्तिकं सुखमिति भावः । अतएव—

जल्लङ् मरद् उवज्जङ् वज्जङ्

तल्लङ् परम महासुह सिज्जङ् ॥ इति

येन सुखेन म्रियन्ते तेनैवोत्पद्यन्ते उत्प[41^१]न्नाश्च तस्मिन्नेव बध्यन्ते ।
प्राकृत[सुख] कल्पनया च । स च तेनैव सम्यक् गुरु[पदेशं] परिधाय गृह्यत्वा
10 परममहासुखं सिध्यतीति भावः । एवं सरह इत्यादि सुबोधं । अस्य प्रति-
निर्देशमाह—

भाणरहिअ कि कौअद् भाणैँ ।

जो अवाअ तहिँ काहि वखाणैँ ॥ इति ।

अत्र प्रथमं तावज्ज्ञानं वाच्यवाचकलक्षणादिरहितं । तत् किमिदं सहजं ज्ञानं
कल्पिततया किं क्रियते । हेतुरहितत्वेन फलव्यवस्था नास्ति । तस्मात् यदवाच्यं
15 तत्र किं व्याख्यानं क्रियत इति यावत् । तथाचोक्तं—

1. A. नापनेयं च यत् । B. प्रक्षेप्तं न (?) 2. B. भूततोभूतं । B. विसृज्यते ।
3. A. तदा तद्विपदादायः । B. सुखमिच्छता च । A. मातापितृ- । 4. B. जायते ।
A. न भावः । A. has no of after वाच्यत्वात् ।

6. A. has no वज्जङ् after उवज्जङ् । 9. B. omits सुख after प्राकृत and उपदेशं
after गुरु । MS. restores the last two pādas as :

सरहँ गहण गुहिर भास कहिअ ।

पसुलोअ निव्वोह जिम रहिअ ॥

13. A. अवाच for अवाअ । A. काह for काहि । A. वखाणैँ । 15. A. हेतु-
रहितेन । B. यस्मात् for तस्मात् ।

इति तावत् सृषा सर्व्वं [यावद्] [41^b] यावद्विकल्प्यते ।
तत् सत्त्वं [तत्] तथाभूतं तत्त्वं यच्च विकल्प्यते ॥ इति

किन्तद् भवतीति पुनरप्याह—

रूपमस्य मतं स्वच्छं निराकारं निरञ्जनं ।

शक्यञ्च नहि तज्ज्ञातुमबुद्धेषु कथञ्चन ॥

5

बुद्धोऽपि न तथा वेत्ति यथायमितरो जनः ।

प्रतीत्य तां तु तस्यैव तां जानाति स एव हि ॥ इति

तस्मादज्ञानवृत्तैर्न लक्षितं तत्त्वं । किमप्यद्वैतादेत्याह—

भव मुद्दे सञ्चल हि जग वाहिउ

शिञ्ज सहाव णउ केणवि साहिउ ॥ इति ॥

10

भवमुद्रया सकल जगद्वाहितं । भवमुद्राङ्गेनाकल्पमद्वयया सत्त्ववशिका
[42^a] च । तथा जगद्वासोक्तं यदिच्छति प्राणातिपातादि तत् सर्व्वं कामलोभेन
कारयति । तथा च कृतमुत्पत्तवत् । तस्मात् निजस्वभावं सम्यक्तत्त्वं न केनचित्
साधितं भवति । अन्यच्च मन्वृतन्वादिदेशनया द्रव्यलोभेन जगद्वाहितं ।
तमाह—

15

मन्त ण तन्त ण धेअ ण धारण इति । एतेन ग्रन्थकारेण कर्तृणाव-
शादुक्तं मन्वृतन्वेण रहिततया मोक्षं न लभ्यते । तैः

सर्व्ववि रे वद्ध विव्वमकारण ॥ इति हे मूढ सर्व्वभवेषु विभव-
कारणं सम्पत्तिकारणं—विभ्रमं । येन भ्रान्त्या दुःखमनुभवन्ति [42^b] तस्मात् ।

1. A. सृषावचन HS. सृषावाक्यं for सृषा सर्व्वं । B. omits one यावत् । 2. B. तत् effaced
in B. B. तत्त्वं । A. विकल्प्यते । 4. A. शक्यं for स्वच्छं । 5. A. ज्ञातुमबुद्धेन ।
6. A. नरः for जनः । 7. B. प्रतीत ।

8. A. तस्मादज्ञानवृत्तेन । 9. A. मुद्दे । A. no हि after सञ्चल, 10. A. केण
विगाहिउ । 11. B. जगद्वाहितं । B. मुद्राङ्गेन— A. no च after सत्त्ववशिका ।

13. A. निजस्वभाव-सम्यक्तत्त्वं । 16. A. no इति after धारण । 18. MS. corrects
वट as वद्ध । A. विव्वमकारणं, 19. A. विभ्रमः ।

असमल चित्त म भाणो खरडह इति निम्नलिखितं मा अज्ञानेन
तोवच्छीकुरु । कथं तन्निम्नलमुच्यते । चित्तसंज्ञा द्विविधा लौकिकी लोकोत्तरा
च । यल्लौकिकं तद्विकल्पलक्षणं पूर्वं निराकृतं । यल्लोकोत्तरं निम्नल धर्माकाय-
लक्षणं सहजस्वरूपं वा । अतएव आह—

5

सुह अक्कन्त म अप्पणु भागडह इति ।

एतेन निर्विकल्पसुखरूपं सर्व्वं त्रैधातुकं व्यवस्थितं । तदा न पृथक्त्वेनात्मनो
परामर्शो कुरु । तदा सुखमयत्वेन इदं कुरु । किं तदाह—

खाअन्ते^१ इत्यादि च [43^a] उभय लोअह पर्यन्तमिति । एतेन च
सप्रपञ्चचर्यापि सूचिता भवति यदा इन्द्रभूतिपादेन कृता । खाने पाने न
10 पञ्चकामोपभोगेषु सुरतक्रीडा । पुनरपि पद्मभाजनादिना गृहीत्वा बलिं दास्यति ।
महाचक्रदेवतारूपेण स्थास्यति । एतेन भव्यलोकानां ज्ञानसिद्धिर्महामुद्रा-
सिद्धिर्भविष्यति । तैश्च तीर्थिकादीनां । बहुभयभवलोको मस्तकेषु पादन्यासं
करोति । वैनयं करोति । एतेन महामुद्रा या साध्यते तस्याः किमुद्देश-
मित्याह—

1. A. भाणइ खरतह MS. भाणहि खरडह । 2. A. गवच्छीकुरु । 3. A. पूर्वं ।

4. A. सहजस्वरूपत्वा[त्] ।

5. A. अप्पणु MS. अप्पणु । 6. A. जगतह MS. जगडह । A. no इति
at the end of the pāda. A. सुखस्वरूपं । A. त्रैधातुकं—

8. A. खायन्ते^१ । A. भय ; B. उभय (१) । MS. restores the whole
stanza as :

खायन्ते [पिवन्ते^२ सुह रमन्ते^३
नित्त पुण पुण चक्क वि भरन्ते^४
अइस धम्मो^५ सिज्झइ परलोअह
नाह पाए^६ दलिअ] भय लोअह ।

10. A. पञ्चकामोपभोगसुरतक्रीडा । 11. A. has च after एतेन । 13. A. has no वा
after महामुद्रा ।

जहि मण पवण ण सच्चरद् रवि ससि णा[43^b]ह पवेस ।

तहि उड्ढ चित्त विमाम करु सरहेँ कहिअ उएस । इति

यत्र सर्वजन्तुषु स्वरूपं स्वसंवेदनतया गुरोरादेशात् । नैस्थितेष्वपि चित्त-
विश्रामं कुरु यत्र महत्त्वं प्राप्नोति । तस्मिन् स्थाने मनसः पवनस्य च सञ्चारो
न भवति । तत्रैव रविशशिनीः प्रवेशनिष्काशी न स्तः । नतु कल्पनामात्रं 5
तत् तु सर्वं निरुद्धा भवन्ति । यथा बालैः सन्धाभाषमजानद्विर्मनपवननादि-
निरोधमाश्रयः कल्पितः तत्र कथमिहोच्यते । निरोधो नाम निषेधवाचो । किन्तेन
कष्टचर्यया । यावच्छरीरं वायुादि [44^a] वाहनं भवति तावत् वायुनिरोधेन
शरीरं निरोध्यते म्रियते वा । तस्मात् सद्गुरुपदेशात् बोद्धव्यं । सरहेत्यादि
सुबोधं । किन्तु पवनरूपं बोधिचित्तं । तदामृतं मनः सुखरूपं एवं रविशशि- 10
रागविरागोऽनयोः कल्पितसहजा यत्र न भवति ग्राह्यः एवमुपदेशे प्राप्ते सति ।

एकु करु इत्यादि फुड् पुच्छहि गुरु पावा इति पर्यन्तं सुबोधं ।

1. A. मन, पवन, न, शसि, नाहु, पवेश, MS. नाहि for नाह । 2. A. सरहे,
A. उवेश, B. उएश । The verse is quoted also in the commentary of the
Caryās, HS. p. 15. 3. A. स्वरूप— A. चित्तविश्रामं । 4. A. पवनस्य सञ्चारो ।
5. A. रविशशि । A. has नाह पवेस इति after रविशशि । A. कल्पनामात्र
सर्व्वे । 6. A. सन्धाभाष- 7. A. निरोधमाश्रयः । 8. A. वायुादिवाहनं HS. वायुादिवाहनं ।
9. A. तस्मात् गुरुपदेशात् । 11. A. रागविरागेण यो HS. विरागेण यः । A. कल्पित सहजः स
यत्र । B. कल्पितसहज जायय । A. न भवति स ग्राह्यः । 12. A. फुत for फुड् ।
A. has याव after गुरुपाव which seems to be a repetition of the mis-
reading of पावा । Four stanzas are omitted here which MS. reconstructs :

एकु करु[रे मा करु वेन्नि जाने न करह विण्ण ।
एहु तिहुअण सञ्चल महाराएँ एकु करु वण्ण ॥
तहिँ आइ न मज्झ न अन्त नउ भव नउ निव्वाण ।
एहु रे परम महासुहे नउ पर नउ अप्पाण ॥
अग्गेँ पच्छेँ [दह दिहहि जो जो दीसइ तत्त सोइ ।
अज्जहि तइसो भन्ति सुक्क एव्वे मा पुच्छ कोइ ॥
इन्दिअ जग्गु विलीअ गउ [तुट्ठिअउ णिअ सहाव ।
तयु रे सहि सहज काअ] फुड् पुच्छहि गुरुपाव ॥

किन्तु सव्यमुपदेशैर्व्याप्तं । तेन तत् कुर्यात् सर्व्वं तन्मयितिभावः । यदि भ्रान्ति-
मस्ति कदाचित् तदा पुनरपि [44^b] गुरुपादस्यान्तिकं स्फुटतरत्वेन पृच्छां कुरु येन
निर्भ्रान्तो भविष्यसि । तदा तेनापि स उपदेशो दीयते । तमाह जहि मण
इत्यादि ।

- 5 जहि मण मरइ पवण हो व्वअ जाइ । इति यत्र हि मनो
म्रियते पवनञ्च क्षयं याति । न केवलं तद्वयं अन्यच्च ।

एहु से परममहासुह रहिअ कहिमि ण जाइ । इतीदं
वचनात् साधितं । परममहासुखसमापत्या येन प्राप्तञ्च । तदपि रहितं सम्यक्
गुरुपदेशं विना । [45^a] वाच्यवाचकाभावं तस्य कथं तत्वेपि न किञ्चिद्भवति ।

- 10 किन्तु रहिअ इति न स्थितं । कहिमि ण जाइ न गतं कचित् । वचनं
वचनगम्यं न भवतीतिभावः । तथाचोक्तं—

बुद्धेरगोचरतया न गिरां प्रचारोद्धारं गुरुप्रथित वस्तु कथावतारः ।

तत्तु क्रमेण करुणादिगुणावदाते श्रद्धावतां हृदि पदं स्वयमादधाति ॥

अत्रैव—सअसम्मिच्छि म करँहु रे धन्वा

- 15 भावाभाव सुगति रे वन्धा ॥ इति ।

1. B. उपदेशैर्व्याप्तं । A. भ्रान्तिरस्ति । 2. A. omits कदाचित् । A. °भक्तिके ।
3. A. निर्भ्रान्ता HS. निर्भ्रान्तो । A. भविष्यति HS. भविष्यसि । A. तेनाप्ययमुपदेशो
HS. तेनाप्ययमुप° । A. मन ; 5. A. चत्त for यत्त ।

7. A. B. apparently takes this to be the second pāda of the verse
beginning with जहिमण मरइ etc. MS. shows from Tib. that this should
form a second verse which he reconstructs as :

एहु से परम महासुह रहिअ

[सरहँ कहिअउ] कहिमिण जाइ ।

9. A. गुरुपदेशं यदि करिष्यसि for गुरुपदेशं विना । B. वाच्यवाचकाभाव । 10. B. कहिमि
A. न A. न गमनं for न गतं । 11. A. तथाचोक्तं । 12. A. प्रचारोद्धार HS.
प्रचारोद्धारो । 13. A. श्रद्धावता ; HS. श्रद्धावतो । 14. A. सह सम्मिच्छि । 15. A.
सुगतिरेव, MS. सुगतिचेव ।

स्वसंवित्तिमनादिकल्पनया सुखं मा करिष्यसि । यदि करिष्यसि धन्यतां यास्यसि । तस्माद् भावं वा उक्तलक्षणं अभावं वापि मुगति[45^b]र्वा विकल्पितं हे मूढ सर्वं तत् बुद्धत्वं न सम्भवति । नास्ति सुवर्णलोहनिगडयोर्भेदः तस्मात् त्याज्यमेवेति । तथाचोक्तं—

परमार्थविकल्पेऽपि नावलीयेत पण्डितः ।

5

को हि भेदो विकल्पस्य शुभेवाप्य शुभेऽपि वा ॥

नाधारभेदात् भेदोऽस्ति वैदिकदृष्ट्या प्रति ।

सृश्यमानो दहत्येव चन्दनैर्ज्वलितोऽयसौ ॥

एतेन किं क्रियतां इत्याह—

गिरा मण मुणहुरे गिराणे जोइ

10

जिम जल जलहि मिलन्ते सोइ ॥ इति ।

निपुणं मनो नम्रं भावाभा[46^a]वरहितं प्रभास्वरमयं वा द्रष्टव्यम् । हे युयं योगिनः निपुणेन योगेन च योगञ्च चित्तवृत्तेरकाग्रलक्षणं ज्ञानज्ञेयलक्षणं वा स च यादृशं जलस्य जलं मिश्रितं तादृशं स भवति योगं भवति चेत् ।

भाणे मोकख कि चाहुरे आले

15

माआजाल कि लेहुरे कोले इति ।

अलीकेन ध्यानेन केशोष्णकाद्याभासेन हे मूढपुरुष कि मोक्षमधिगच्छसि । तस्मात् तं तयो दुरतिक्रमं । कुतः । मायाजालं समस्तं त्रिभूवनं किं गृह्यते स्वाप्नोत्सङ्गेषु । न पार्थयते इति[46^b]यावत् । किन्तु—

3. A. तदन्वयं भवति for तत् बुद्धत्वं न सम्भवति । 5. B. नावलीयेत् । 5. B. पृथग्मानो ।

B. चन्दने ज्वलित्येवसाविति । 9. A. क्रियते । 11. A. जलहि MS. जलहि । A.

मिलन्ते MS. मिलन्ते होइ । 12. A. द्रष्टव्यम् । 13. B. त्वया योगिनः (?) for युयं

योगिनः । 14. A. omits योगं भवति which B adds in a marginal note. 15. A.

भाणे A. राहुरे । 17. A. केशोष्णकाद्याकारेण । 18. A. omits तं तयो ।

A. दुरतिक्रम ।

वरगुरु-वञ्चणे पडिज्जहु सच्चे

सरह भणइ मइ कहिअउ वाँचे ॥ इति ।

यदि तावत् गुरुवचनस्य सत्यतास्ति । तदा मया सरोरुहप्रवरगुरुवचनेन कथित-
मिदं दोहाकोषादिम् ।

5

पढमेँ जइ आआस विसुद्धो इति ।

एवं गुरुवचनस्य प्रतीतिरुक्ते सति यः सव्यभावायासः स विशुद्धो भवति । कुतः—

चाहन्ते चाहन्ते दिट्ठि निरुद्धो ।

- यथा दृष्टा चक्षुषा व्यवलोकनेन निमेषोन्मेषनिरोधेन च यत् दूरतः मरीचिकादि
पानीय[47^a]स्य दर्शननिरोधो भवति । तथैव इहापि विचार्यमानेन सर्वं तन्मयी
10 भवति । नान्यथा किं विचार्यत इति । गुरुपदेशामुखोभावसहितः प्रवन्धतः ।
स च न विकल्पभावनाजालादिवत् यदि वा तेनैव बुद्धत्वं तदा प्रतीत्य तां
जनयति । स चान्यकाराभावादालोकवत् क्षयाभावादातपवत् विशिष्टं निर्माणा-
कायोऽत्र जायते । मनोनिरोधेन तु विशिष्टधर्मकायस्वभावं भवति । स च
सर्वमयमिति भावार्थः । न पुनर्मन इति । न किञ्चित् स्यादिति । तत् प्रतीतिं
15 जनयति । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादत्वाच्च । एवमजान[47^a]तामाह—

1. B. वरु । A. वरगुरुवञ्चणे । A. पत्तिजह । A. मथेँ which
MS. corrects as सच्चे । 4. A. दोहाकोषादिना । 5. A. पउमे for पढमे । A.
विशुद्धो । 6. B. सर्वभवा विशुद्धो । A. सर्वभावायासः स(श) विशुद्धो । 7. MS.
corrects चाहँते चाहँते । A. दिट्ठि निरुद्धो । 8. A. मरीचिजालादि ।

9. A. तथा इहापि । 10. A. °मुखीभावं सदिति (?) which HS. corrects as °मुखीभावं
सदिति । 12. B. सचान्यकाराभावालोकवत् । 13. A. कायस्वभावं HS. कायस्वभावो । 14. B. न
पुनर्मनः । A. किञ्चित्वादिति HS. किञ्चित्वादिति । 15. A. प्रतीतिश्च । A. °समुत्पादाच्च ।

एसें जइ आआस विकालो ।

निअमण दोसें ण बुझइ वालो । इति ।

ईदृशं यदि आयासानं विकालो नोत्पादकालः सर्वेषां संहारकालमितिभावः । तदा णिअमण भावासक्तदोषतया न विदन्ति । बालजातीयाः तीर्थिकाद्याश्च । एतदाह—तेनेह सह वेदान्तेनैव सांख्याः क्षपणका मता विप्रलब्धा बुद्धयो विदिताः 5 विदितपरमार्थदृढचित्तं प्रपिण्डैरकात्मदृष्ट्याभिनिविष्टाः । अप्राप्तविनयकालतया च महाकारुणिकैरप्युपेक्षिताः भूयः संसारग्रन्थिमेव दृ[48^a]ढयन्तोऽनुकम्पनीया एव । करुणाशालिनां विपदि वर्त्तमाना इति न हेषाह्वीः । ये तु सौगतनेत्रिकाः तेषु वस्तुधियः(?) सांसारिकनैर्वाणिकपक्षावबोधपटवो न स्वाख्यातसिद्धान्तानुगबुद्धिभिः 10 प्रतार्थयन्त इति विस्तरः । तस्मात्—

अहिमाणदोसें ण लक्खिअ तत्त । इति ।

मिथ्याज्ञानाभिमानदोषैस्तत्त्वं न विज्ञातं ।

तेण दूसइ सअल जाणु सो देत्त । इति ।

सदोषतया दूषितं भवति सकलं यानं मार्गश्च तैः । आदैत्यपुरुषवत् [48^a] अनेन...

भाणे मोहिअ सअल वि लोअ इति । सर्वलोकः स्वस्वयानं 15 तीर्थिकादीनां यानमेवेति । इदं—

णिअ सहाव णउ लक्खइ कोअ इति । निजस्वभावं सहजसर्वकाल-मवस्थानात् । स न लक्षितः केनचित् लोकेनाज्ञानावृत्तेनेति ग्रन्थकारः परिदेवनां करोति । पुनः—

1. A. एसे । A. विकालो । 2. A. दोष । 3. A. संहारिका- HS.

संहारकाल- 4. A. निअमण HS. नियमेन । B. नियमेन । 5. A. शाख्या HS. शाख्याः । A.

मतविप्रलब्ध- 6. A. प्रपिण्डैरकात्म- 7. A. *पेक्षिता । A. ग्रन्थमेव । 9. A. वस्तुधियः B.

चक्षुधियः (?) A. omits नैर्वाणिक । 10. A. पर्यन्त, HS. पर्यन्त for प्रतार्थयन्त ।

A. तस्मात् । 11. A. दोषे । A. लक्खिउ तत्त्वं । 13. A. जानइ MS.

जनइ । A. दत्त । 14. A. तैश्च (च) दैत्यपुरुषवत्— 15. A. स्वयानं । 18. B. लक्षितं ।

चित्तह मूल ण लक्खिअउ सहजेँ तिस्र वि तथ्य ।

तहिँ जीवइ विलअ जाइ वसिअउ तहि फुड़ एथ्य ॥

इति । अनेन स्थिरमुपदेशं दृढापयति । चित्तह इति चिन्ताया उपदेश[49^a]
 स्यैकं । तथा मूलं न लक्षितं यद् गुरुणां वचने न स्थापितं द्वितीयं । सहजस्य
 5 स्वभावरूपं लक्षकेण लक्षितं । एवं तत्त्वत्रयं लक्ष्यलक्षणलक्षकं वितथं अतथ्यं ।
 यदि गृह्यते तदा सर्वं चित्तवैतन्यरूपका भवन्ति । एतेनोपदेशस्य सत्ता न
 स्यात् । तस्मिन् स्थाने वीरपुरुषा जीवन्तः सूर्याः विरला योगिनः जायन्ते ।
 तस्मात् हे पुत्र ईदृशेषु स्थानेषु वसितव्यं । तस्मिन् सर्वधर्मा निलीनाः कार्याः
 स परमार्थ इत्युच्यते । तदेवाह—

10 जयति सुखराज एकः कारणर[49^b]रहितः सदोदितो जगतां ।
 यस्य च निगदनसमये वचनदरिद्रो बभूव सर्वज्ञ ।

इति एवं—

मूलरहिअ जो चिन्तइ तत्त ।

गुरुउवएसेँ एत्त विअत्त । इति ।

15 यः कश्चित् मूलरहितं तत्त्वं चिन्तयति । गुरुपदेशेनैतत् पुरुषरत्नेर्विदितं
 तत्त्वमिति । विदितं गुरुपदेशं अस्तव्यस्तमार्गयानि सिद्धं ।

1. A. न, तिव्र । 2. B. जइ । A. तहि हत ग्रन्थ—MS. तहिँ हे

पुत्त । B. has तहि फुड़ (?) एथ्य, but फुड़ may be read as फुत ।

3. B. उपदेशास्यैक- 5. A. omits लक्ष्य- 7. A. गुराः । A. has कश्चित् before
 विरला । A. योगिनो । 13. A. चित्तइ which HS. corrects as चिन्तइ ।

A. 14. एत विअत्त । 15. A. मूलरहितं HS. मूलरहितं । A. चिन्तयति HS. चिन्तयति ।

B. गुरुपदेशे नैतत् । A. न विदितं for विदितं । 16. A. अस्तव्यस्तेपि मार्गयानि सिद्धं,
 HS. -मार्गयानि- ।

सरह भणइ वढ जाणहु चंगे ।

चित्तरुअ संसारह भङ्गे । इति ।

एतेन ग्रन्थकारः स्पष्टार्थं वदति । यः कश्चित् चित्तरूपभावना सा संसारस्य भयहेतुका भवेत् । तदा उक्तः । [50^a] गुरुपदेशेन तत्त्वं लक्ष्यते दृढनिश्चयेन यः चित्तरूपः । संसारश्चित्तमयो वा तस्य भग्नो सम्भवतोति भावः । 5 तस्मात् तत्तत्त्वं—

णिअ-सहाव णउ कहिअउ अणेँ ॥ इति ।

निजस्वभावं स्वयम्भूस्वरूपं नान्येन कथितं तोर्थिकादिना । तदा केन सदगुरुणेत्याह ।

दौसइ गुरु-उवएमेँ ण अणेँ ॥ इति । 10

मया सरहेण दृष्टं सदगुरुपदेशेन सीगताश्रयेन नान्यनेति । गुरुपदेश-चक्षुषावगतं । परिभाषितं यत् तन्मूकोऽस्मिन्निति । ईदृशं यस्यास्ति तस्य गुणमाह—

णउ तसु दो[50^b]सजे एकवि ठठाइ ।

न तस्य दोषस्य एकं स्थानमस्ति । येन— 15

धम्माधम्म सो सोहिअ खाइ । इति ।

गुरुपदेशेन धर्माधर्मं पूर्वात्तलक्षणं शोधनीयत्वात् च । शोधितं भक्षणं करोति । अस्यैवोपचारमाह—

1. B. जाहु for जाणहु । 2. A. has no इति at the end of the *pāda*. 3. B. स for सा- A. संसारभय- । 4. B. लक्ष्यति । 5. A. ये चित्तरूपाः । A. संसार चित्त[] माया । A. has तस्य न for तस्य भग्नो । 10. A. उअएमेँ न अणेँ । 11. A has no दृष्टं after सरहेण । 12. A. -चक्षुषावगत परिचितं for -चक्षुषावगतं परिभाषितं । A. मूकोऽस्मि मिति, HS. मूकोऽस्मि इति । 14. A. ठाइ for ठठाइ । 15. A. दोषस्य स्थानमस्ति । 17. B. सोमोतिहअ (?) for सोहिअ MS. सो सोहिअ । A. शोधनीयत्वात् शोधितं ।

सरहपादस्य

णिञमण सव्वे^० सोहिञ जव्वे^० । इति ।

एवं अमनसर्वधर्माः स्वभावोत्पन्ना नोत्पादिताः केनचित् । यथा दृष्यवनगुल्मादयः स्वभावेनोत्पन्ना विलयं यान्ति तद्वदिह द्विपदचतुष्पदादयः स्वभावेनोत्पन्ना निर्मन्ना विलयं यान्ति हि न केनचिदुत्पादिता भवन्ति । तत्कथं [51^a] दृश्यते ।
5 उत्पन्नादादि मया कृता इमं रूपादयः । भ्रान्त्याऽज्ञानिनां वचनमेतत् । तत्पारित्यागाः यस्मिन् क्षणे तस्मिन्नेव क्षणे सर्वधर्मशोधनं । तन्नयत्वाच्च भवितं भवति—

गुरुगुण हिञ्अए^० पइसइ तव्वे^० ॥ इति ।

गुरुणा दत्तोपदेशगुणश्च स्वहृदये प्रविष्टं तत्र शोधनभक्षादिकालेषु कायादि
10 सर्वं ददातीति प्रत्ययात् । न पुनर्गुरुपदेशं विवदन्ति न किञ्चित् ददाति ग्रहरूपत्वात् न वेत्तीति भावः ।

एवं मणो मुणि सरहे^० गाहिउ ॥ इति ।

ईदृशं मनसालक्षितं मनलक्षितं । [51^b] अथवा एवमनेन मुनिर्भगवान् परमार्थरूपकं सरोत्पद्यमानं देनोक्तं । धर्मधातुलक्षणं न पुनः शशविषाणवत् न
15 निश्चेदमनं । तथाचोक्तं—

सावस्था काप्यविज्ञेया मादृशां शून्यतोच्यते ।

न पुन लोकरूढेव नास्तिक्वार्थानुपातिनो ॥

नास्तितारूपमेवास्य व्यवहारार्थमस्तिता ।

निःस्वभावेषु धर्मेषु कस्य चास्तित्वनास्तिता ॥

1. A. सवे, जवे^०, MS. सव्वे, जव्वे^० । 2. A. अमनः सर्वधर्माः । A. केनचित् for केनचित् । 3. A. has हि after यान्ति । A. निर्मन्ना for निर्मन्ना । 5. A. omits इमं । 8. A. दियए, HS. हियए । A. तवे^०, MS. तव्वे^० । 9. A. दत्तोपदेशगुणश्च । A. हृदये for स्वहृदये । 10. B. विदन्ति for विवदन्ति । 12. A. एवममणे MS. एव अमणे । 14. A. परमार्थरूपकः । 15. A. किञ्चिदमनं । 16. A. मादृशा । 17. A. लोकरूढेव HS. लौकिकारूढेव । A. अनुपातिनौ । 18. A. नास्ति [स्व]रूपमेवास्य । 19. A. नास्तितामस्तिता ।

न स्मर्त्तव्यं त्वयेत्युक्ते स्मरत्येव निषेधितं ।
यथा तथैवासच्छब्दात् सोत्तरं प्रतिपद्यति ।

इति विस्तरः । अथवा यदि वदन्ति अभ्यासात् [52^{a-b}] क्लेशाद्वृत्तमनोविरोधेन
विशिष्टं मनो बुद्धत्वरूपं जायते । तदा कथमनेनोक्तेन किञ्चित् स्यात् । सिद्धं
परमार्थं मम सर्वेषु तदाश्रिता चेति । तन्न भवति कथं तदित्याह —

5

तन्त मन्त णउ एकवि चाहिउ इति । तन्त्रः बहुप्रकारः तन्त्रोक्ता
मन्त्रास्तेषु सिद्धान्तं नाना स्वपरकल्पितं । मया एकमात्रं न प्रेक्षितं भाष्यभाष-
कादिलक्षणं । कुतस्तैर्लोकानां वैनेयमात्रं न पुनर्विशिष्टफलं ततो जायते ।
तथाचोक्तं—

(?) आस्थिमाभ्यासयोगिन आदिशुद्धा स्वभाविका ।

10

प्रकृत्यैव हि सः सिद्धा तथता न विकल्पजा ॥

अभाव लक्षणाद्धोधिः सर्वधर्माश्च तन्मयाः ।

अतस्तत् प्रार्थयेच्चर्यां निजस्कन्धप्लवोपमां ॥ इति

तस्मात्—वज्रभाट्ट कर्मणेण उणां कम्मविमुक्केण होइ मणमोक्खं
इति । येन कर्मणा जन्तवो विबध्यन्ते तत्परित्यागाधिमोक्षेण च भवति 15
मनोमोक्षं । मोक्षश्चात्मात्मीयविकल्परहिततया मिथ्याभावनया मनः संग्रैव
बन्धनात् तस्य निरोधः । एवं परिज्ञाने युगपत् मनोमोक्षेति भावार्थश्चाह—

मणमोक्खेण अणूणां पाविज्जइ परमणिव्वाणं इति । मन [53^a]
मोक्षेति । मनश्च मोक्षं च अनयोरन्योन्यं निश्चितं परस्पररहितं परमनिर्वानलक्षणं
प्राप्तिः ।

20

1. B. स्मरत्येव । A. सात्तर HS. सोत्तरं । Fol. 52^{a-b} lost in B.

5. A. आश्रिता । 14. MS. wrongly reads मणमोक्खम् । 18. A. मन HS. मनो ;

19. A. मनश्च । A. अनयोरन्योन्य— । B. अनयोरण्य— ।

चित्तेक सञ्जलवीथं भवणिष्वाणो वि जस्स विस्फुरन्ति इति ।
एवं उक्तनिर्वाणं प्राप्ते सति तदा कः चित्ते बद्धे सति चित्तात् सकलमविद्यावीजं
भवनिर्वाणात्मका च अशक्या विस्फुरन्ति । ते भवस्थायिका च न भवतीति
यावत् । तस्मात्—

- 5 तं चिन्तामणिरुत्थं पणमह इच्छाफलं देन्ति इति । परम-
निर्वाणस्य विशेषणं । स चिन्तामणिरूपस्तस्य प्रणामं कुरुत । कुत
इ[53¹]च्छाफलं ददाति इति हेतुना । इच्छा च महाकरुणा जगदर्थामिका तां
वाञ्छाफलं येन पूरितमनाभोगतः सैव गुरुस्तस्येति चिन्तामणिस्तथा । एवं—

- चित्ते^१ वज्जे^२ वज्जइ मुक्के^३ मुक्केइ णत्थि सन्देहा इति । चित्तेन
10 बद्धेन विकल्पादिना बध्यन्ति । पुनरपि तत्परिज्ञानात् मुक्तिं लप्स्यन्ति । एवं
त्रितयः बन्धमुक्त मुक्तबन्धेषु तत्र मुक्तिः । अद्ययेनेति नास्ति सन्देहः । एवमपरि-
ज्ञानात् संसारे विभ्रमन्ति बालजातीयाः पण्डिताः मुच्यन्ते ।

- वज्जति जे[54¹]ण वि जड़ा लहु परिमुच्चन्ति तेण वि बुद्धा ।
इति । येनैव पञ्चकामोपभोगादिना मूर्खलोका बध्यन्ते तेनैव सति परिज्ञाने
15 गुरोरादेशात् पण्डिता लघु शीघ्रतः संसारात् मुक्ता भवन्ति । तथाचोक्तं—

1. A. वीज्जस्स MS. विजंसि । A. विस्फुरन्ति । 2. A. [व]द्धे नति, HS. [व]द्धे सति । In B the portion which contains चित्तात् is broken but there is no space for more than one letter which might have been हि । 3. B. one may read : तं चिन्तामणि रुत्थं, पणमह इच्छाफलं । 4. A. विशेषण । A. चिन्तामणिरूपस्तस्य । 5. A. तेन for इति । 6. A. तदाञ्छाफलं । A. येण HS. takes एवं as a part of the *pāḍa* through mistake. 7. A. वज्जइ । A. मुक्कइ मुक्केइ । A. सन्देहो MS. सन्देहो but rhyme requires सन्देहा । 8. A. एव [नव]न्ति । 9. B. बालजातीयां (?) 10. A. वज्जति । A. लघु । A. परिमुच्चन्ति । A. तेनवि बुद्धा B. तेनवि बुद्धा ।

येनैव विषखण्डेन मृत्यन्ते सर्वजन्तवः ।

तेनैव विषतस्वप्नो विषेण स्फोटयेद्दिषं । इति तथा

पुनः—

वद्धो धावद् दहदिहहिं भुक्तो निचल ठाड् इति । यथा
पुरुष आत्मात्मोयविकल्पेन बध्यमानो दशदिशि धावति षड्गतिसंसारे विभ्रमति 5
तथा स एव पुरु[51^b]षः सम्यक् मार्गात् मुक्तः तदा निश्चलेनात्मपरिमुक्ते स्थाने
स्थितत्वात् धर्मकायात्मकः इति भावः ।

एमद् करहा पेक्खु सहि विवरिअ महु पडिहाड् इति ।
समुदायतोऽत्र यथा करभ उद्गः महाभारेण बद्धस्तदा वेगेन धावति धारयितु-
मशक्तः । स एव भारत्यागात् मुक्तः क्षणे निश्चल एकस्थाने स्थितस्तथा ईदृशं 10
करभमिव स्वकीयं चित्तं साक्षात् विहरति । तादृशं मम प्रतिभासते
व्यपदेशार्थोक्तलक्षणात् इति ।

इदानीमस्य कार्य्यमाह—

पवणरहिअ [55^a] अप्पाण म चिन्तह ।

कठ्ठ जोड् णासग्ग म वंदह ॥ इति ।

15

1. A. मृत्यन्ते HS. मृत्यन्ते । 2. A. स्फोटयेत् । 4. A. दिहहिं MS. दिहहिं ।
A. निचल HS. निचल । A. ठाड् । 5. B. आत्मीय— B. दशदिशे (?)
B. विभ्रमन्ति ?) 6. A. B. निश्चलेनात्मपरिमुक्ते HS. निश्चलेनात्म^o । 7. A. स्थितं for स्थितत्वात् ।
A. धर्मकायात्मकम् । 8. A. विवरिअ HS. विहरिअ । A. पडिहाड् । 9. A.
यदा for यथा । A. करह for करभ । 10. A. अशक्तः for अशक्तः । A. निच[ल]येक-
स्थाने । B. ईदृश । 11. A. स्वकीय । A. विहरन्ति । 12. A. व्यपदेशार्थाः ।
A. omits इति । Fol. 55^a-62^b of B. are lost, From the *pāda* छड्डहु
वेणि- (infra) I have C, 14. A. अध्याण HS. अप्याण MS. अप्याण,
15. A. कटूजोड्णा सग्ग ; MS. restores: कठ्ठ जोड् ! णासग्ग after the
Tibetan translation.

पवनेति वायु नासिकास्वासोत्स्वासलक्षणं तद्रहिततया आत्मानं न द्रक्ष्यति ।
कुतः । यावत् वायुश्रितं शरीरं तद्रहितेन शरीरस्य कुतः स्थानमस्ति । एवं
गुरुपदेशात् वायुस्तन्मयं कृत्वा कुत्रात्मानो न लभ्यन्ते । तस्मात् त्यज कष्टेन
योगेन विकल्पात्मकेन तस्याः संगं न क्रियतामिति निश्चयं । किं क्रियते इत्याह—

5

अरे वट् सहजे सद् पररज्जह ।

मा भवगन्धवन्ध पङ्क्तिञ्जह । इति

हे भूढ पुरुष अल्पाशयं त्यजसि महाशयं कुरुष्व किन्तत् सहजं गवेषय । तत्
प्रवेशे महार्थतया शक्तिं कुरु । मा भवगन्धेति भवस्य गन्ध गन्धर्वसत्त्वतया
गत्यागतिभावात् यैर्भवबन्धनमलातचक्रवत् भवति तस्मिन् मा त्वं सक्तिं कुरु ।

10

एह मण मेल्लह पवण तुरङ्ग सुचञ्चल ।

सहज सहावे स वसद् होद् निञ्चल ॥ इति

इदं मनः पवनञ्च सुष्ठु चञ्चलमिव तुरङ्गं यथाऽस्य निरन्तरत्वात् तत् त्यज्यं कुरु ।
इदं ग्राहयिष्यसि । किन्तत् सहजस्वभावस्थानं गुरुपदेशः तेनाश्रितेन साक्षा-
न्निश्चलं भविष्यति । आत्मना ज्ञायते पुण्यादिति वचनात् । अस्य विशेषणमाह—

15

जव्वे मण अत्यमण जाद् तणु तुट्टुद् वन्धण ।

तव्वे समरस सहजे वज्जद् णउ सुद् ण व्हण ॥ इति

यस्मिन् क्षणे विकल्पमनः अस्तमितं भवति तस्मिन् सर्व्वबन्धनं विनश्यति । न
केवलमात्मनो बन्धनमात्रं विशेषेण तस्मिन् काले समरस सहजं वर्जनं सर्व्व लोकानां

1. A, नासिका । 3. A, लभ्यते, HS, लभ्यन्ते । 5. A, वट्, MS, वट् । A, शद्
MS, सद् । 6. A, पङ्क्तिञ्जह MS, परिचञ्जह । 11. MS, [बुज्भह] सी
वि सद् for स वसद् । 12. A, यथाऽस्य HS, यथाऽस्य । 15. A, अच्चमण MS,
अत्यमण । 17. विनश्यति ।

करोति । तया न शूद्रं ब्राह्मणादि जातिविशेषं भवति सिद्धं । सर्वे लोका एकजातिनिबद्धाश्च सहजमेवेति भावः । तस्यैवानुसंसामाह—नास्ति सहजात् परं सिद्धान्तमिति । एवं—

एत्यु से सुरसरि जमुणा एत्यु से गङ्गा-साञ्जरु ।

एत्यु पञ्चाग वणारसि एत्यु से चन्द्र दिवाञ्जरु ॥ इति 5

एवमस्ति सुष्ठु क्रीडा कुतोऽस्ति स्वपराङ्म-सहजेन अविच्छिन्नप्रवाहादिति । सैव यमुनागङ्गादिनामा च न पुनः पानीयस्नानाधारतया किन्तु यमुना सर्व्वयान-तदाश्रया च । गङ्गा तत्परिगमनशोला सागरञ्च सर्व्वसमाध्यपदेशसमुद्रत्वं प्रयागञ्च अहयत्वात् वाराणसो चाहयहयनिवारणात् चन्द्रदिवाकरौ च राहुग्रहण-तया उपदेशाग्निना सर्व्वं भक्षयेदिति । न केवलं तीर्थादि सहजपीठोपपीठादिषु 10 च । तमाह—

खेत्तु पौठ उपपौठ एत्यु इति । एवं चेतोपचेत्वादि सर्व्वं हि चतुर्विंशति स्थानानि । स बाह्यभ्रमणकार्य्यमस्ति । स च—मदू भमदू परिठठओ इति । मया परिभ्रमणस्थापित-योगिन्युपदेशात् बाह्याध्यात्मिकं विश्वं सुखमयमेवेति भावार्थः । एतेन किमुक्तं स्यात् । स्वशरीरं सुखरूपं तस्य 15 धातुः पीठादिरूपतया बाह्येषु प्रवृत्तिः । तेनाह—

देहा-सरिसञ्ज तित्य मदू सुह अस्स ण दीठठओ ॥

इति । देहा शरीरसदृशं तीर्थं सुखरूपं यदि भवति तदा सुखं । यदा शरीरसदृशं तीर्थं मया सुखं नष्टमिति तस्मादभिन्नेन विहर्त्तव्यं योगिनेति । एवं पुनराध्यात्मिकेषु पीठादिषु च सञ्चारादिनावगन्तव्यं तेषु च सुखमयेन सञ्चारं न 20 वायुमात्रेणेति । तस्मात् धर्ममहासुखमयं पीठादि सिद्धं । इत्यमाध्यात्मिक-पीठादिदेवताघिष्ठानवतो निष्पन्नयोगिनो बाह्यपीठादिभ्रमणमनर्थकं । यथोक्तं—

12. MS. खेत्तु । 13. A. मइ MS. मदू, 14. A. परिठठवो, 17. A. माइ, MS. मदू । A. सुहअ ण MS. सुह अस्स ण ।

चतुर्विंशति भेदेन पीठायैव संस्थितं ।
 अतस्तत्प्रहणार्थं न खेदः कार्यो न तात्त्विकैः ॥
 यदि तत्त्वविज्ञानस्य भ्रान्त्याविशान् किञ्चन ।
 अथ तत्रोपेतास्ते स्यभ्रान्त्या तेषां न किञ्चन ॥ इति

5 तस्मादभिन्नरूपमिति निश्चयः । तमाह—

सण्ड-पुञ्जि-दल-कमलगन्ध-केशर-वरणाले इति । दृष्टान्तेन
 पद्मस्य पृथग्भावं त्यज । स न च एकैकस्य पर्यायस्य सण्ड यथा पुञ्जि पद्मपत्रं
 दलञ्च कमलञ्च गन्धकेशरञ्च वरमुत्कृष्टं नालञ्च । एवं—

कड्डु वेणिम ण करडु सोसं ण लग्गडु वटु आले ॥ हे
 10 पशुपुरुष उक्तपद्मस्य पृथग्भावं त्यजत । एकैकस्य पर्यायस्य चित्तशेषं कुरु ।
 तस्मादीदृशस्याज्ञानवाक्यस्य नानाशास्त्रोपचारात् सुखवाह्ये मा लग्नसि । तथा—

काम तथ खञ्ज जाडु पुच्छह कुलहीणओ ।

वम्ह विटु तेलोअ सञ्जल जहि णिलीणओ ॥

किं मन्त्रशास्त्रेण सहजवाह्येण पृच्छां कुरु तैर्विना सर्वमन्त्रशास्त्रं क्षयं याति ।
 15 यथा कुलहीनेन पुत्रेणासारेण च पितुरभावात् सर्वं यत् किञ्चित् द्रविणादिक्षयं
 याति सर्वं राजादिना गृह्यते । एवं तत्त्वहीनेन सर्वमन्त्रशास्त्रं धर्मं वा
 अविद्यागृहीतैः क्षयं याति एवं समुदायार्थः । सहजाकाशवत् त्यक्त्वा विकल्पनां
 ज्ञानाश्रयात् नामधेयमात्रं न लभते तथागतोऽन्यथ । तस्मिन् सर्वं क्षयं याति ।

9. A. कड्डु MS. कड्डु । A. वेणि म करडु HS. वेणि मण करडु ।

A. वट । C. [व]ट, MS. वट । 12. A. खय, MS. खय, C. खञ्ज ।

A. C. जाड, MS. जड । 13. C. विस्सडु विटु for वम्ह विटु । A. तहिं त

लोअ सहजहि णिलीणओ, MS. तेलोअ सञ्जल सह जहिं णिलीणओ, C. तहि

लोअ सञ्जल जहिअ इविण.....(?)

एव कुलपञ्चतथागतादि सर्व्वं हीना भवन्ति । यस्मिन् स्थाने अन्ये च ब्रह्मा-
विष्णुमहेश्वरादीनि तस्मिन् सकललोका लीना लम्ना न किञ्चित्तत्त्वविदो भवन्ति ।
तस्मात् सर्व्वशास्त्रतत्त्ववेदिनस्तेर्विना निष्फला इति । तथाचोक्तं—

चतुराशीति साहस्रे धर्मस्त्वन्ये महासुनेः ।

तत्त्वं ये वै न जानन्ति सर्व्वं ते निष्फला । इति ।

5

अत आह—

अरे पुत्तो वोज्झु रसरसण सुसण्ठिअ अवेज्ज ।

वक्खाण पढन्तेहि जगहि ण जाणिउ सोज्झ ॥ इति

हे पुत्र त्वया रसरसायनसाधनकाले स्पृष्टतरशुद्धिमज्जानानो यथा नष्टः तथा
रागादिशुद्धिमज्जानानो नष्टः । त्वमीदृशं मा कुरु । रागादभिलषितधर्मादिषु 10
क्रीडा या सा तत्स्वरहिततया सुष्ठुसंगृह्यता अविद्येवेति । न केवलं तत्त्वं प्रति ।
अन्ये च लोकाः व्याख्यानं कुर्वन्ति पठन्ति च । तेषां सर्व्वं निष्फलं भवति ।
कुतः । जगत् संसारस्य अज्ञानात् । यः पुनर्जानाति । तस्योच्यते—

अरे पुत्तो तत्तो विचित्त रस कहण ण सकइ वत्यु ।

कप्परहिअ सुह-ठाणु वरजगु उअज्जइ तत्यु ॥ इति ।

15

हे शिष्य पुत्र यत् तत्त्वं विचिन्तितं तस्य रसं स्वानुभवकथनं न शक्यते ।
इदं वसुरूपं नीलपीताद्याकारं तद्वत् किं तत् स्वसंबेद्यं यतः “तां जानाति स एव
हि” ॥ तस्मात् कल्परहितं सुखस्थानं यस्माच्छ्रेष्ठजगतत्स्वरूपमिति भावः । एवं

7. A. यरे HS. अरे । A. वोज्जु, C. वोज्ज, MS. वोज्झु । A.
सुसंठिअ, C. सुसण्ठिअ । 8. C. पढन्तेहि । A. सोज्झ, MS.
C. सेज्झ which is also supported by the rhyme. 14. A. तत्त विचित्त रस
कहण ण सकइ वत्यु, MS.—वत्यु । 15. A. वरु जग । A. उअज्जइ ।
A. तत्यु, MS. तत्यु । 16. A. सिष्य । A. तत्त्वं विचिन्तितं HS. तत्त्वं विचिन्तितं ।

ध्यानेन नोपलभ्यते स्वभावसिद्धत्वात् गुरुपरिज्ञानमात्रेणोपलभ्यते नाभिमाना-
दिना । तदाह—

बुद्धिं विणासइ मण मरइ जहि [तुट्टइ] अहिमाण ।

सो मात्रामअ परम-कलु तहिँ किम्वज्जइ भाण ॥ इति ।

- 5 एवं गुरुणा दत्त सहजामुखोकरणात् यत्किञ्चित् कल्पितां बुद्धिं विनाशयति
विस्मरणं करोति विकल्पमनो म्रियते बाह्यादिवस्तुलक्षणकं न भवति । तस्मिन्
स्थाने अभिमानता अहंकार आत्मात्मोपकल्पना त्यजति क्षयं याति । यस्मात्
स मायामयपरमकलारूपकं कलेति षोडशो कलेव नार्थं करोति किञ्चित् ।
तदिह हि ध्यानबन्धनेन किं कार्यमस्ति । मनः परिकल्पिततया नास्तीति
10 यावत् । तस्य विशेषणमाह—

भवहि उअज्जइ खअहि णिवज्जइ ।

भावरहिअ पुणु कहि उवज्जइ ॥ इति ।

- यस्मिन् स्थाने भवभक्तिं पुनरप्यत्रैव क्षयविवर्जितं । एवं भावाभावरहितः ।
भूयः कस्मिन्नप्युत्पादो नोपपद्यते इति यावत् । एतदुक्तेन नास्तिकं न भवतीति ।
15 कुतः । यतः बुद्धादिलक्षणं सर्वं मायावत् भावाभावमिति प्रसङ्गः । किन्तर्हि
कल्पन-योगात् तत् तथोक्तः । एवं पुनः

विण विवज्जिअ जोउ वज्जइ ।

अच्छह सिरिगुरुणाह कहिज्जइ ॥ इति ।

- इयवर्जितेषु इयेषु योगं मध्यमोपलब्धिविवर्जिभिः परमविरमयोर्मध्य-
मेनोपलभ्यते इत्याशयः । सर्वमहयमेवेति । तदपि वर्जनात् तां स्थितिं कुरु ।
20 यत्र अगुरुणा शिरसा कथनं कुरु । अत्याश्चर्यरूपा श्रेयसादयमेवेति ।
तस्मादनेन न्यायेन इदं विहरणं कुरु ।

3. A. जहि MS. जहिँ ; MS. तुट्टइ अहिमान from Tibetan.
A. अहिमान । 4. A. मायामय । A. तहि MS. तहिँ । A. किम्वज्जइ ।
11. A. खअहि C. क्षहि (?) 12. A. कहि उवज्जइ । 17. A. MS. विण ।
C. वेन्ति (?) A. जोओ । 18. A. अच्छहि । A. C. शाह, MS. शह ।

देवसुहृ सुणहृ परीसहृ खाहृ ।

जिग्घहृ भमहृ वडूठ उठ्ठाहृ ॥ इत्यादि ।

अत्र यत्किञ्चिच्चक्षुषा द्रव्यसि कर्णाभ्यां शब्दं शृणुति परिधानं वस्त्रादि शरीरं गवच्छसि च सुखेन भक्षणं कुरुवन्ति नाशया सुगन्धं दुर्गन्धं वा जिघ्रसि भ्रमणं वा चक्रमणं वा करोषि आसने निषस्योसि उत्तिष्ठसि वा—

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आलमाल व्यवहारे^१ पेल्हहृ ।

मण च्छडु, एकाकार म चल्हहृ ॥ इति ।

आलमाल क्रयविक्रयादि तैर्व्यवहारेण कालं कुरुष्व । मनस्येतद्व्ययोगात् न चलं तु अन्यमनपृष्टा कारणकर्त्तादिना एकाकारस्वभावेन परिभ्रमणं मा करिष्यसि । ते नरकादिदुःखमनुभवन्ति । तस्मात् सदगुरुपदेशस्मरणं कुरु । 10 तमाह—

गुरु उवएसे^२ अमिअ-रसु धावहि ण पौअउ जेहि ।

वहु सत्यत्य मरुत्यलिहिं^३ तिसिए म^[63^m]रिअउ तेहि ॥

गुरुपदेशममृतरमं महावेगेन परिधाविततया यैः कायुरूपैः न पीतं तेन विश्वसत्त्वार्थं भग्नं । यथा मरुस्थलीषु बहुसंघातद्वषितं पानोयरहिततया तत्र 15 सार्थवाहकेन क्वचित् शोथस्थानेषु पानीयं दृष्टं तेन कोषदायार्पिता इति मत्वा

1. C. सुणहृ परीसहृ । 2. A. जिघाहृ MS. जिघाहृ । A. उठ्ठाहृ ।
5. A. व्यवहारे MS. व्यवहारे । A. MS. पेल्हहृ, C. वोल्हहृ (?) 6. A. MS. एकाकार । A. चल्हहृ MS. चल्हहृ, C. चालहृ । 12. A. उव एसे MS. उवएसहृ । A. हवहिं । 13. A. सत्यत्य MS. सत्यत्य । A. मरुत्यलिहिं MS. मरुत्यलिहिं । A. MS. तिसिए । A. मरिअउ MS. मरिअउ C. मरिअउ (?) 14. A. पीतं HS. पीतं ।

15. A. बहुसंघातं द्वषितं HS. °द्वषितं । 16. B. सार्थवाहकेन । A. सीवस्थानेषु । कोशोदाया° । A. इतिला[त्] ।

सार्धैरज्ञाता तेषु नोक्ततया सर्वं संवाधितं भवति । एवं परम्पराया सर्वसत्त्वा
विनाशिता भवन्ति । उपदेशस्य रहस्यलक्षणम्—

चित्ताचित्त विपरिहरह्यु तिम अच्छह्यु जिम वालु ।

गुरुव[63^b]अण्यो दिदृभक्ति करु होइ जइ सहज उलालु ॥

- 5 चित्ता ज्ञानज्ञेयादि । अचित्तो निःस्वभावादि । ताभ्यां परिहारं कुर्यात् ।
बालमिव स्थितिं कुरु । निष्कवलं गुरुपदेशस्य दृढभक्तिं करोसि । येन
सहजस्योपलक्षणं भवति । उपलक्षणं च निरन्तराभ्यासेन तन्मयं यास्यति । तन्मयश्च
सर्वोपरणरहितमवास्थं चेत्याह—

अखरवस्त्रो परमगुण रहिजे ।

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भणइ ण जाणइ एमइ कहिअजे ॥

इत्यक्षरवर्णाभ्यां स च नोपलभ्यते । अथवाऽक्षरेति परमाक्षरं तस्य वर्णदं
सुखमयाऽग्राह्यस्थानं । एवं उपमारहितवचनपरम्पराया न जानोतं [64^a] स
ईदृशः मया सरोरुहेनोक्तं । तथाचोक्तं—

यावान् कश्चिद्विकल्पः प्रभवति मनसि त्याज्यरूपः स सर्वः ।

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योऽसावानन्दरूपः हृदयसुखकरः सोऽपि संकल्पमात्रः ।

1. A. -नैरज्ञातालेषु HS. -नैरज्ञातजलेषु । A. नोक्तं । A. संवाधितं HS. संवाधितं । A.
परम्परायातरहिततया । 3. C. चित्ताचित्त MS. चिन्ताचिन्ता । A. यच्छह्यु C.
अच्छह्यु । 4. A. दिदृ भक्ति MS. दिदृ भक्ति । C. दिदृ भक्ति । A. करु हइ
हइ MS. करु जइ होइ C. करु होइ हइ । A. उलालु C. उलालु । 5. A.
चिन्ता । A. अचिन्ता । A. कुर्यात् HS. कुर्यात् । 6. A. बालमेव । A. कुरु । 7. A.
सहजस्य लोपी न । उलालनं । 9. वर्णो MS. वस्त्रो C. वर्णो । A. परगुण, C.
परगुण । A. रहिजे MS. रहिये, C. रहिषो । 10. C. भणइ ण जाइ for
भमइण जाणइ । A. सोमाइ, MS. सोमइ, C. से एमइ । A. कहिजे MS.
कहिये, C. कहिषो । 11. A. वर्णोद[य] । 12. A. एवं परमा रहित—HS. एवं प्रमा—
for एवं उपमा ; Fol. 64^a—65^b B. lost.

यद्वा वैराग्यहेतोस्तदपि यदुभयन्तर्भवस्याग्रहेतुः ।

निर्व्याणं नान्यदस्ति कचिदपि विषये निर्विकल्पात्मभावात् ॥

इति तस्मात्—

सो परमेसरु कामु कहिज्जइ ।

सुरअ कुमारो जिम पडिज्जइ ॥ इति

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भ्रान्त्या यावत् सत्त्वनिकायः स्थितेऽपि स परमतत्त्वं परमेसरोऽन्यसिद्धान्तभावात् कस्य पृथक्जनावस्थितस्य कथयामि हि तत् । कथनमात्रेण तेषु प्रवृत्तिः । किन्तु हिं यथा कुमार्यः सुखोभ्यामालोचयन्ति । आलोचयन्ति प्रत्ययं कुर्वन्ति । प्रथमतः त्वया स्वामिने गत्वा सुखमनुभूतं । तन्मयि साक्षाद्दसि निश्चितमेतत् । गत्वा सा पुनरस्य गृहादागत्य सखिना च पृच्छति पूर्वोक्तं कीदृशमिति । ता ऊचुः । 10 त्वया साक्षात् स्वामिना सहानुभवकाले ज्ञेयमिति । सुखोत्पादं न किञ्चित् साक्षात् ते वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् । तमिव गुरूपदेशन्न पुनः कुमारोसुखमिति वस्तुरूपं तिपादयते । एतदेवाह—

भावाभावे जो परहीणो

तहिँ जग सअलसेस विलीणो । इति

15

यदि चिन्त्यं परमं तत्त्वं । भावाभावयोः कारणशून्यतादयत्वात् रहितो तस्मिन् जगत् सकलाशेषबुद्धवज्रधरादिकल्पितात्मकं विलीनं तन्मयेन निरुपलम्भात् ।

जव्वेँ तहिँ मण णिच्चल थकइ ।

तव्वेँ भवसंसारह मुकइ ॥ इति

4. A. परमेसरु MS. परमेसरु C. परमेसर । 5. A. जिमइ पडिज्जइ,

C. जिम उपज्जइ । 14. A. भावाभावे, C. भावाभावेँ । A. परहीणो,

C. परिहीणेँ । 15. A. सअलसेस विलीनो, C. सअल असेष विलीणणो (?)

18. A. जव्वेँ हि मण MS. जव्वेँहि मण, C. जव्वेँ तहि मण ।

19. A. तव्व MS. तव्वेँ, C. तव्वेँ । A. संसारह, C. संसार हि ।

उक्तक्रमेण यदि तत्र मनो निश्चलत्वेन स्थितं आत्मात्मीयादिकल्पनारहित्वात्
तस्मिन् काले भवात् षड्गतिसंसारदोषात् मुक्तो भवति ।

अनया कृते सति दोषान्याह—

जाव ण अप्पहिँ परं परिआणसि

5

ताव किं देहाणुत्तर पावसि ॥ इति

यावन्नात्मानं परमोत्कृष्टं तत्स्वरूपं परिजानासि तावत् किं देहस्य शरीरस्य
निर्माणकायात्मकस्य व्यापकस्य च अनुत्तरं तत्त्वं तद्व्यापकत्वात् प्राप्स्यसि ।
यस्मादेकानेकत्वमायाति तस्मादात्मग्रहविपर्ययात् सर्वेषां तादृशं भवति ।
कस्मादनुत्तरतत्त्वप्रसङ्गादिति ।

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एमइ क^[66^a]हिजे भन्ति ण कव्वा ।

अप्पहि अप्पा वुज्झसि तव्वा ।

इदृशं मया सरोरुहेनोक्तं तस्य भ्रान्तिं न कदाचित् कुरु । तथा भ्रान्त्या च
आत्मनात्मां तदा जानासि । इदं त्यक्त्वा नान्यत् किञ्चिदस्ति । तेनाह—

णउ अणु णउ परमाणु विचिन्तजे ।

15

अणवर भावहि फुरइ सुरत्तजे ॥ इति ।

न अणुपरमाणवः भावनया चिन्तिताः । अनवरतयोगादिभावने विस्फुरितं वा
यदि क्रियते ।

4. अप्पहिँ, C. अप्पहु । 10. C. कहिओ for कहिजे । A. भति ण कहा

11. A. अप्पहि अप्पा MS. अप्पहि अप्पा, C. अप्पहि अप्पा । A. वुज्झसि

MS. वुज्झसि, C. वुज्झसि । MS. तव्वेँ C. तव्वा । 12. B. भान्ति ।

14. A. विचित्तजे MS. वि चिन्तये । 15. A. स्फुरइ MS. फुरइ । MS.

सुरत्तये । 16. A. चिन्तितः HS. चिन्तिताः । A. विस्फुरितं ।

भणद् सरह भन्ति एत विमत्तजे । इति ।

एतद्धि मा[66^b]त् कल्पनात्मकं ज्ञानं । एतेन योगेन विमतिर्भवति । न सम्यक्त्वं हि मया कथितं ।

अरे णिकोली वुज्जह परमत्यजे ॥ इति

अरे मूढ पुरुष निकोली निर्मूलो अकुली च । सर्ववोजाधारादिरहितस्तत् परमार्थं वदस्व तमाह--

5

निर्मूला परचेतन्मा (?) निर्मूला भावनात्मका ।

निर्मूलं ज्ञेयसे तत्त्वं अकुला हि तथागता । इति

तस्मात् स्वरूपेण स्फुरते नेच्छया तदासङ्गात् सुरतमिति एवमर्थ--

घरे^९ अच्छद् वाहिरे पुच्छद् ।

पद्[67^a]देक्खद् पडिवेसी पुच्छद् । इति ।

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यथा कश्चित् योगिनीनां स्वगृहे स्वजनमस्ति बहिः पृच्छति कुत्र स्थितः पुनः प्रियं स्वामिनं पश्यति समीपस्थं गृहे पृच्छति कुत्र स्थित इति । तथा स्वदेहे तत्त्वं व्यवस्थितं बहिरन्यत् ज्ञानं पृच्छति । अज्ञानमेवेति । पुनः स्वानुभवं गुरोरादेशात् पश्यति अनुभवति । तदा समीपवर्त्ती यः कश्चित् कथं तत्त्वमिति पृच्छति । तेनाज्ञानमेवेति । यदज्ञानं तत् ग्राहणीयं । यतो सर्वभावा असंस्कृतास्तत् किं ज्ञायते । एवं [67^b] पुनर्दृष्टापयति । सरहेत्यादि--

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1. भन्ति । MS. एतवि मत्तए । 4. A. णिकोली MS. णिकोलि MS. परमत्यजे, 5. the portion निकोली...अकुली broken in B. A. -रहितसम्परमार्थं, 7. the portion निर्मूला परचेतन्मा broken in B ; A. भावनाशका । 9. A omits एवमर्थ । 10. A. घरे अच्छ घरे अच्छद् MS. घरे अच्छद् । A. वाहिरे कुद् पुच्छद् MS. वाहिरे गद् पेक्खद् । 11. A. MS. पडिवेसी । 12. A. अथ for यथा । A. स्वजनोक्ति । 13. A. पश्यति । 14. A. अज्ञान सेवेति । 15. A. गुरुपदेशात् । B. पश्यत्पश्यत्यनुभवति (?) 16. A. तेनाज्ञातमेवेति । B. स ग्राहणीयं (?)

सरह भणइ वढ जाणउ अप्पा ।

णउ सो धेअ ण धारण जप्पा ॥ इति ।

उक्ततत्त्वं तत् सर्वमात्मनैवात्मनि जानीत । स पुन स तत्त्व धेयधारणादिरूपेण जल्पितं ।

5

जइ गुरु कहइ कि सव्व वि जाणी ।

मोक्ख कि लब्भइ सअल विणु जाणी ॥ इति ।

केनचिदुक्तं भवतोदं यद्गुरुणा कथितं सर्वं न तत् सर्वं जानीयते । यदात्मन-
मृते तदा तद्वत्सुरूपमाख्याति । किमशक्यं तस्योत्तरं मोक्षं किं लभ्यते गुरुणा
उक्तं तथा व्यतिक्रमेण [68^a] तमजानानतया न जानातीति यावत् । तत् कथं

10 विज्ञेयादभ्यासादिति स चाभ्यासमात्रेणात्मग्रहात् । तमाह—

देस भमइ हव्वासेँ लइजे ।

सहज ण वुज्झई पापेँ गाहिजे । इति ।

इह कापुरुषयोगिनां दोषमस्ति । स्वस्थानं त्यक्त्वा सर्वदेशेषु भ्रमणं कुर्वन्ति ।
भक्ताभक्तादिहेतुना तथा कायक्लेशक्लमयं (?) न जानन्ति । कुतोऽभ्यासादिति ।
15 तदिदमनुत्तर-सहजं न जानाति न व्यक्तीकरोति । कुतः पापेन गृहीतत्वात् ।
तत् भक्ष्यादित्यादिति । अभ्यासरहित इति भा[68^b]वः ।

1. A. mixes up the two pādas as जानउ अप्पा णउ सो विष्णधारणजन्या
—MS. reconstructs the first pāda as सरह भणइ वढ जाणउ अप्पा । 3. B.
जानात्, A. न पुनस्तत्त्वं धेयधारणादिरूपेण— 5. A. जानी, 6. A. लव्वइ
MS. लव्भइ । A. सअल वि जाणी MS. सअल विजाणी । 7. A. जानीते,
B. जानीयते । A. यदा यदात्मना मृष्यते । 8. A. तद्वत् आख्याति । A. किमशक्यं
HS. (किमशक्यं) । A. तस्यत्तरं (HS. तस्योत्तरं) । 9. A. तस्य A. व्यतिक्रमे तमजाना-
नतया, B. व्यतिक्रमेण तमजनाया । 10. A. विज्ञेयमभ्यासा— A. चाभ्यासमात्रेणात्मग्रहात् ।
11. A. MS. देश । A. भमइ इह व्वासे MS. भमइ अवभासे । A. लइजे
MS. लइये । 12. A. पाप राहिजे MS. पाप लाहिजे । 13. A. दोषोऽस्ति ।
A. सर्वे देशेषु । 14. A. तेन कायक्लेशद (श्ल)मयं न जानाति । 15. A. नो जानाति
16. HS. भक्ष्यादित्यादिति ।

तथाचोक्तं—

यथाग्निर्दाहमध्यस्थो नोत्तिष्ठेन्नयनां ना ।

तथाभ्यासाद्विना बोधिर्जायते नेहजन्मनि । इति ।

अनया यदि तावदभ्यासं क्रियते तदा कथं भावनादीनां परिहारं उक्तं भवतीति आशङ्क्यत् कस्यचित् स्यात् । तदाह—

5

विसन्नं रमन्तं वा विसन्नं विलिप्सु ।

जन्नं हरदं वा पाणी छिप्सु ॥ इति ।

यथा पाणीयमध्ये क्लेशं दृश्यते न पाणीयं गृह्यते हस्तस्पर्शाच्च एवं तथा सति परिज्ञाने विषयाणां क्रीडां करोति पञ्चकामादिना तैर्देवैर्न गृह्यते । [69^a-70^a] पुनर्यथा पद्मपत्रे जलतरङ्गं गृह्येत्वा तत् पानीयैर्न लिप्यते । तदोत्पन्ना च पद्मपत्राभोवदिति वचनात् । एवमभ्यासो योगिनश्च ।

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एमदु जोई मूल सरन्तो ।

विसहि न वाहदं विसन्नं रमन्तो ॥ इति

ईदृशेन योगिना मूलं गुरुपदेशसरितोऽभ्यासात् सरन्तो जानन्तो तद्विषयेन बाधितो यत्किञ्चित् योगिनां विषयादिरूपं तत् सर्वं न जातु तस्य बाह्यका भवन्ति । किं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं ज्ञापकश्च तत्प्रभवादिति । तस्मात् सर्वविषयाणां रमणात् न बाध्यत इति यावत् । तथाचोक्तं—

15

बाह्यं यत् तदसत् स्वभावविरहात् ज्ञानश्च बाह्यार्थवत् ।

शून्यं यत् यदकल्पितञ्च विदुषा तत् तदप्यशून्यं मतम् ।

इत्येवं परिभाष्य भावविभवैर्निश्चित्य तत्त्वैकधोः ।

मायानाटक[नाट]नैकनिपुणो योगीश्वर क्रीडति । इति

2. A. नोत्तिष्ठेत्— HS. नोत्तिष्ठेत्— 3. B. omits इति । 4. A. अभ्यासः । 5. A. आशङ्क्य । 6. A. विषय MS. विसन्न । A. विसन्न । विलिप्सु MS. विलिप्सु । 7. हरदं effaced in B. A. लिप्सु MS. छिप्सु । 8. A. क्लेश । 9. 69^a -71^b of B lost.

देव पिच्छइ लक्ख वि दौसइ

अप्यणु मारीइ स कि करिअइ । इति

यदि तावदेवतारूपेणोत्पत्तिस्तत्क्षणं साक्षाद्दृश्यते इति तदा आत्मा म्रियते । सा देवता किं करिष्यति । न किञ्चिदिति यावत् । तस्मात्—

5

तोवि ण तुट्टइ एहु संसार ।

विणु आआसेँ णाहि णिसार ॥ इति

देवताकारं यद्यात्मानं भवति तदपोदं संसारं न नश्यति । कुतः यतः सर्वेषां सत्त्वानां पञ्चोपादानस्कन्धाद्यभावात् । आलयविज्ञाने या प्रवृत्तिः सा च गन्धर्व्व-सत्त्वात्मकं । सेव पुनरागतिः पूर्व्वीद्युपलम्भात् । देवता च तादृशविज्ञानेनोप-
 10 लम्भात् । तस्मात् न नश्यति संसारः । मिथ्याघटोयन्त्रवत् परिभ्रमतीतिभावः । किन्तु तेनैव सति परिज्ञाने तदभ्यासेन विना संसारेषु नास्ति निस्सारः । एत-
 देवोक्तेन देवताभावेन तावन्न भवति गुरुपदेशं । यस्मादभ्यासः क्रियते । ततो नास्त्यभावस्य विशेषस्तन्न भवति । सम्यग् गुरुपदेशस्य त्वया वार्त्तामात्रं न न श्रुतं किन्तदाह—

15

अणिमिसंलोअण चित्त णिरोहेँ ।

पवण णिरुहइ सिरिगुरुवोहेँ । इति ।

अनेन यत् कल्पितं कुधियैः कल्पनात्मकं गुरुपदेशं तन्न भवति । यथा-
 निरोहलोचनैश्चित्तं आकाशादिषु निलीनं करोति तेन वायु निरो[71]धितं
 भवति । ओगुर्व्वादेशत इत्यादि न भवति । कुत एवमाह—

20

पवण वहइ सो णिच्चलु जव्वेँ ।

जोइ कालु करइ कि रे तव्वेँ ॥ इति ।

1. A. पिच्छइ, A. लक्ख, 2. A. अप्यणु, A. मारीइ, 5. A. तुट्टइ, 6. A. आयासेँ, HS. आभासेँ, 15. A. अणिमिष- A. णिरोधेँ, 20. A. निच्चलु ।

यस्मिन् क्षणे वायुवाहनतया योगी प्राणं निश्चलं करोति किमत्र तस्मिन् क्षणे हे मूढपुरुष कालं मरणं करोति । तस्मात् न भवति । कस्मान्न भवतीत्याह—

जाउ रा इन्दीअ-विसअ-गाम ।

तावहि विफुरइ अकाम ॥ इति ।

5

यावन्नेन्द्रियविषयग्रामः ताभ्यामासक्तिं करोति योगिनस्तावत् न गुरुपदेशं वेत्ति । आस[71^b]क्तिश्च विचारागमयुक्त्या लभ्यते । स चात्मादिवस्तुरूपं न दृश्यते परमार्थादिभेदेन तत् कथं प्रत्यक्षेषु दृश्यते । भ्रान्त्या च भ्रान्तिर्नामालोकं । तच्च सम्यक्सत्यदर्शनात् मायावत् प्रतिभासते । एवं मायोपमं त्रैधातुकं विश्वं । ततः केन आग्रहः क्रियते । न क्रियत इति यावत् । विशेषेण च योगीन्द्रस्य नेच्छया अपरिभाषितेन च गुरुपदेशं स्मरते तस्यैवाभ्यासेन स्मरणात् क्षपयतीति निश्चयः ।

10

अइसेँ विसम सन्धि को पइसइ ।

जो जहिँ अत्थि राउ जाव रा दीसइ ।

इदृशी उक्तलक्षणाया विषमसंसन्धिवचनेषु को पुरुषः प्रवेशं करोति । किमर्थं । यो वस्तु यस्मिन् गुरुपदेशस्य नास्ति यावन्न दृश्यते आत्मादिभावं तावत् किं सा भविष्यति । संचेपतः न भाव्यभावकवस्तुरस्ति ।

15

न भाव्यं भावकं वाऽस्ति भावं नास्त्येव सर्व्वतः ।

भाव्यभावकभावेन जायते विज्ञताकृतिः ।

तत्त्यागो न तु निर्व्वानं नेच्छयापि च जायते ।

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यथा सिंहस्यैतत् ध्यानं नेच्छया दृश्यते क्षयात् । इति

1. A. वायुवाहनतया B. वायुवाहनाया । 2. A. मरणं करिष्यति HS. मरणं करिष्यति । B. कस्मात् and omits the न after it. 4. B. इन्दीअ । 5. A. तासहिँ फुरइ । A. omits अकाम । 7. B. स चात्मादि- । 9. A. प्रतिग्राह्यते for प्रतिभासते । 13. A. सन्धि । 14. जइ । 15. A. इतीदृश्या । A. सन्धि, HS. संनि- । A. करोति for क्रियते । 15. A. आत्मादि तावत् का सा भवति । 17. B. भावा- । 19. A. जायतेति कृताकृतिः । 21. A. सिंहस्य तत् ।

एवमजानतामाह—

[62^b] पण्डितं सञ्जलं सत्यं वक्त्वाण्डू ।

देहहिं बुद्धं वसन्तं न जानदू ।

अवणागमणं गणं तेणं विखण्डितं ।

5 तोवि णिलज्जं भणदू हउ पण्डितं । इति ।

पण्डितैर्नानाशास्त्रेषु व्याख्यानं कुर्वन्ति । वाग्जालमात्रमेव निष्केवलं नरकगमनहेतुं द्रव्यार्थितया । देहस्थितं बुद्धत्वं सद्गुरुपदेशमजाननात् न जानन्ति हि । अक्षरमात्रमाश्रित्य स्वरमजाननात् गुर्वान्नायविमा व्याख्यानं कुर्वन्ति । ते स्वयं नष्टाः परानपि नाशयन्ति । कुतः । अनेकज[73^a]नपरम्परया संसारे
10 गमनागमनहेतुत्वात् न विनाशितः । पुनरपि स महानरकादिरूपसंसारे संसरतीति चेत् । तथापि पुनरेतदर्थं कम्बलाचार्येणोक्तमाह—

वर्णाः पदानि वाक्यानि लिङ्गानि वचनानि च ।

क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धात् वितथत्वादवाचकाः ॥

श्लोको हि पञ्चभिः पादैः स्त्रिभिर्वाक्यानुनीयते ।

15 वाक्यस्य वाचतन्त्रत्वात् डाकिनोसमयो भवेत् ॥

गृहीतव्येषु धर्मेषु विश्वं शून्येषु पुरातनैः ।

पातितः किमसौ लोकः शब्दसं[73^b]सारसङ्कटे ॥

एसा नासैति वक्तव्यं पृष्ठः को नाम दर्शयेत् ।

शिरः प्रदक्षिणावर्त्तं भङ्गुरेणैह पाणिना ॥

20 शिलापीडकदृष्टान्ते लाघवं गमितं स्वयं ।

शब्दैरात्मा च लोकश्च शब्ददुद्धरराशिभिः ॥

3. A. देहेहि । 4. A. अमणा । A. तेन । 5. A. णिलज्जइ । 6. A. पण्डिता । 7. A. हेतुः । A. -मजानात् । 8. A. -माश्रित्य । A. -मायं । 9. B. तेः । 10. A. -रूपे । 11. A. तथातोपि for तथापि । 12. A. वर्णापरदानि । 13. A. सम्बन्धाः ; वितथत्वाद- । 14. A. श्लोकैः च ; -वाक्यो न नीयते । 15. A. वाचकत्वात् । 16. B. विश्वं for विश्वं । 20. A. शिलापीड- । 21. -दुद्धर ।

इत्यादि विस्तरः । ततो हि पुनरपि निर्लज्जया भाषितं । अहं पण्डितो मूर्ख एवेति ।

जीवन्तह जो णउ जरइ सो अजरामर होइ ॥

अनेनोक्तमर्थस्य दृष्टान्तः । यदि तावत् क्वचित् पुरुषस्य आजीवमरण-
पर्यन्तेन यदि जरादिना न गृह्यते तदाऽसौ अजरामरत्वं याति । [74^a] एवं 5
न दृश्यते क्वचित् ।

दृश्यते पुनः सर्वेषां जन्तवानां ज्वरादिना गृहीतत्वात् मरणान्तं हि जीवितं
इत्येकं । द्वितीयं यथा रस जाति-मारित-जारितमात्रेणाष्टलोहान् विन्यति यावत्
नातिरसं तथा सत्वात् मरणकालेऽमृतं न जरति यैरजरामरं करोति । आदावेव
निर्मलमतिर्भक्षणादिना यावत् जरति योगी । केनाजरामरं यातीत्याह— 10

गुरु-उवएसेँ विमलमइ सो पर धूमो कोइ ॥ इति ।

यः सद्गुरुपदेशात् विमलमतिना साधि[74^b]तमजरामरत्वं धर्मसम्भोग-
निर्माणमहासुखायचतुष्टयभेदेन सर्वसाश्रवाणां निरोधः कृतः । तेन क्रियते
नान्येनेति । तस्मात् स पुरुषः धन्यः श्रेष्ठ इति भावः ।

विसअ-विसुद्धेँ णउ रमइ केवल सुख चरेइ ।

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उड्डौ वोहिय काउ जिम पलुटिअ तहवि पड़ेइ ॥ इति ।

विशुद्धविषयेषु यः कश्चित् गुरोराज्ञया पञ्चकामोपभोगादिना न रमति
येनानुत्तरं प्राप्नोति । तद्विरहान्निष्केवलं विषयोपसेवामात्रया शून्यार्थं [75^a]
चरति । अथ शून्यमात्रं चरति न किञ्चिदेव साधयति । काकमिव वोहित-
माक्रम्य समुद्रमध्यगत उड्डोयमानस्तत्रोत्तिष्ठति अन्यमाश्रयमपश्यन् पुनः 20

1. A. निर्लज्जतया । 3. A. नउ । 4. A. अन्योक्तम् ; दृष्टान्तं ; आजीवन- । 5. A.
तदाहुजारितः सो for तदाऽसौ । 7. A. जन्तूनां ; जरादिना । B. गृहीतेषु । 8. A. omits
रस । A. सारित after जारित । 9. A. omits यावत् नातिरसं । A. -ऽमृतं न करोति यै-
रजरामर । 10. A. याली- । 11. A. धूमो । 12. A. धन्य- । 13. B. तेन for -भेदेन ।
14. A. नान्यमिति । 15. A. विसुद्धे । B. णो for णउ । 16. MS. वोहित्य ।
A. पलुटिअ तहिँ । A. पतेइ । 17. A. गुर्वाश्रया । 18. A. has सुख चरेइ इति
after निष्केवलं । A. शून्यार्थश्च । 9. A. has यथा before काक— । 19. A. omits अथ
to चरति । 20. B. उत्तरीये मनया तस्मात् तिष्ठति ।

तत्रैव पतति । एवं बालजातीयाः संसारकर्माणां संसारे पतन्ति । अन्यः शून्य-
दर्शनात् तत्राश्रयणादिति तस्मात्—

विसन्नासति म बन्ध करु अरे वटु सरहँ वुत्त ।

मौण पन्नङ्गम करि भमर पेक्खह हरिणह जुत्त । इति ।

- 5 विषयासक्तिं पञ्चका[75^b]मोपभोगादिना मा बन्धं कुरु । मया सरहेण
यत्नेनोक्तं । यदि करोसि तदा मीनो मत्स्यो अशक्ताकामोदकमिच्छता प्रलयः ।
एवं पतङ्गो रूपाशक्तः प्रदीपेन प्रलयः । करिणः स्पर्शेण प्रलयः । भ्रमरस्य गन्धेन
प्रलयः । तथा मृगयूथस्य शब्देन प्रलयः । स्वयं प्रेक्षतां । किन्तु सर्वेषां राग-
पूर्वङ्गमेनोत्पत्तितया ।

- 10 जत्त वि चित्तिहि विप्फुरइ तत्त वि णाह सरुअ ।

तेषां यत्र चित्ते विस्फुरितं गमनं भक्षणादि कार्यं चिन्तितं [76^a] तत्र
नास्ति स्वरूपः । अज्ञातत्वादिति । कुतः । लुब्धककैवर्त्तादीनां विसंवादानात्
एव कामिकपुरुषाणामज्ञानात् यमकिङ्करादिना मारिता भवन्ति । पुनरपि
अन्यकारेणातिकरुणावशादुक्तं—

- 15 अस्स तरङ्ग कि अस्स जलु भवसम खसम सरुअ । इति ।

यथा नद्यां जलं सैव तरङ्गो नान्यः तथा भवसमावशुद्धित्वात् शान्तिरूपमेव
खसमरूपं नान्यः । एतेन किमुक्तं स्यात् । यो भवः सैव निर्व्वाणं सम्यग् गुरुप-
[76^b]देशादिति ज्ञानिनां । अज्ञानं न जानन्ति विषयं यान्ति । ईदृशं ज्ञानं—

कासु कहिज्जइ को सुणइ एत्थु कज्जसु लौण ।

दुट्ठ सुरुङ्गाधूलि जिम हिअ-जाअ हिअहि लौण ॥

- 20

3. A. विषया-; वट; सरहँ । 4. A. पयगम; भमर । 5. B. सरहेण ।
6. A. रसासक्तमाकाशोदकमिच्छति । 7. B. भमरः । 8. A. प्रेक्षता । 9. A. -पूर्वगमनोत्- ।
10. विस्फुरइ; सरुव । 12. A. लुवइ for लुब्धक । A. विसंवाद । 13. B. किङ्करा-
दिका । 16. A. नद्या जलतरङ्गो नान्यथा भवः शमविशुद्धि-; 17. A. नान्यथा । 18. A. omits
ज्ञानिनां । अज्ञानं न । A. ज्ञानि नाम for A. विषयं । 20. A. हिअ जातहिअ व-लौण ।

इति । परमगम्भीरं मार्गं कस्याज्ञानिनः कथ्यते । क्व इह स पुरुषः कथन-
योग्यः को वाऽस्मिन् कार्येषु लीनो निपुण गृहीत्वा तत् पदं याति न क्वचित्तयो
पात्रमेवेति । विरलाः ते पुरुषपुङ्गवाः सुपात्राः । यथा क्वचिद्गुर्गभञ्जनाय भूम्यधो
दूरतश्च सु[77^a]रङ्गा दीयते । तत् सुरुङ्गिकानां गम्यं नान्येषु । कुतः तत्र सङ्कट-
खननाय अत्यन्तदुष्टधूलिर्भवति । यैस्तत्क्षणात् मरणं भवति स्वल्पहृदयानां । 5
सुरुङ्गिकानाञ्च दृढतरङ्गदयत्वात् तेषां सा धूलिस्तद्वृद्धये लीनो भवति । मृत्तिका
च भूम्यां लीयते । प्रथमारम्भे किञ्चिद्वाह्यं त्यक्त्वादिति । एवं पूर्वजन्माभ्यासिकानां
तेषां महासंसारे च बोधिः सहृदयार्थमेवेति भावार्थः । तद् गुणाख्याह—

जत्त वि पइसइ जलहि जलु तत्तइ समरस होइ ।

दोसरु[77^b]णाअर चित्ततहा वढ् परिवक्ख ण कोइ ॥

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यथा यत्र समुद्रेषु जले जलमिश्रितं भवति तत्र समरसतां याति । एवं
संसारादिदोषगुणाश्च चिन्तिताः सपरिज्ञानस्य महर्षिकस्य पुरुषस्य प्रतिपत्ता न
भवन्ति । कुतो दोषाश्च पञ्चकामादिगुणाः । तद्विशुद्धिकरणं नानागुरुवाक्यं
[निरन्तरस्मरणात् । यथा नद्या जलं] निरन्तरप्रवाहात् । पुनरस्य स्पष्टतामाह—

सुण्हिँ सङ्ग म करहि तुहु जहिँ तहिँ सम चिन्तस्स ।

15

तिल-तुस-मत्त वि सल्लता वेअणु करइ अवस्स । इति ।

[78^a] निष्कवलं शून्यतासङ्गं मा करिष्यसि येनोच्छेदं भवति । त्वया यत्र
तत्र स्वभावेषु वस्तुषु समतां चिन्तय नात्मन्येव । एवं आत्मानञ्च [परञ्च] विश्व-
संग्रहमेकतां नाप्यसि [नानात्वाभावात्] । यदि करोसि आदोषं भवति । यथा
तेऽप्येवमपि वस्तुनान्तर्गतं । तस्य तुष [मध्ये कुकलङ्गभवति] । तत् सल्यं 20

1. A. क for क्व । 2. A. निपुणं ; कश्चित् तस्य- । 5. A. अल्पहृदयानां । 6. A. -हृदयात् ।
B. भवन्ति । 7. A. त्यक्त्वादिति । 8. B. सुपात्रमेवेति for सहृदयार्थ- । 9. A. पइसइ ।
10. A. दोषगुणा अर चिर तत्ता वट- । 11. A. समरसता ; omits याति । 14. B.
omits the portion within brackets. 15. A. चित्तस्स । 16. A. तिल तु
समत्त वि सल्लता...अवस । 17. A. -च्छेदी । 19. A. omits -मेकतां नाप्यसि ।
20. A. omits तस्य । 17-20. B. omits the portions within brackets. .

भवति । तेन वेदनामवश्यं करोति । एवं योगीन्द्रस्य शून्यता चित्तमात्रेण शून्यं भवति । न सर्वाङ्गेषु सुस्थितां प्राप्यते । यदि तावत् शून्यमशून्यं इयमव्ययत्वा न भाव्यते [78^b] तदा कीदृशं भाव्यतेत्याह—

अइसेँ सोपर होइ ण अइसोँ ।

5

जिम चिन्तामणि कज्ज सरौसोँ ॥ इति ।

ईदृशं नीलपीताद्याकारमनुभवरूपम्वा उपलक्षणं भवति । [न तादृशं सोपलम्भनिरूपलम्भचित्ताचित्तकल्याणाय सर्वसाश्रयवीजाधाररहितरूपत्वात् कथं ज्ञायते इति चेत् ।] चिन्तामणिरिव कार्यसदृशं भवति । यथा चिन्तामणिः सर्वं वस्तु न दृश्यते क्वचित् । पुनस्तेन हस्तगतं सर्वकार्येषु चिन्तां करोति जडभावाच्च । तथा यो[79^a]गिनामपि गुरुपदेशः हस्तगतमणिमिव नेच्छया बुद्धत्वादि साध्यतीति भावार्थः । एवमजानानां पण्डितानां विहरणमाह—

अकट पण्डित भन्ति णासिअ ।

सअसम्बित्ति महासुह वासिअ ॥ इति ।

अकट इत्याश्रयं पण्डितः वर्णमात्रमाश्रित्य भ्रान्त्या विनाशितो । न विनाशितेति यावत् । कुतः । यतः स्वसंवेदनं सर्वभावान्तर्गतं समोपलभ्यते । असंवेदनेति यावत् । तथा भ्रान्त्या अनेन व्याख्यातेन चित्ताचित्तभावेन इदं स्वसंवित्तिलक्षणं महासुखेषु बाह्याङ्गनास्पर्शेषु भाषितं । पुनरपि तस्यैव बाह्यमहा-सुखस्य दृढतया व्याख्यानमुचुः—

सव्व रुअ तहिँ खसम करिज्जइ ।

खसम सहावेँ मण वि धरिज्जइ ॥ इति ।

2. A. प्राप्नोति । 4. A. ताइसो for अइसोँ । 5. A. कज सरौसो । 6. B. -मनुभवरूपलक्षणं ; the portion within brackets omitted in A. 8. A. कार्यैः for कार्यं । 9. B. पुनस्तथा हस्तेन । 10. A. -मणिरिव । 11. A. साधयतीति ; विदरण माह । 12. A. भन्ति णासिअ । 14. A. इत्याश्रयं पण्डितैः । A. भ्रान्तिर्नासिता । A. विनाशितेति । A. -गीतसामाय लभ्यते । A. अनभ्याख्यानेन । A. तस्यैव । A. स्फुटतरतय for दृढतया ।

सर्व्वरूपादि विषयं यत् तस्मिन् खसमं क्रियते । मनश्च खसमस्वभावेन धार्य्यते । तत्कृते—

सोवि मणु तहि अमणु करिज्जइ ॥

सहज-सहावेँ सो परु रज्जइ ॥ इति ।

तथा सोऽपि खसमस्वरूपं मनं तस्मिन्ननं क्रियते । एवं य करोति स उत्तम-
पुरु[80^a]षः सहज स्वभावेषु रज्यते क्रीडत इति यावत् । एवं

5

घरे घरे कहिअइ सोज्झुँक कहाणा ।

णउ परि सुणिअइ महासुह ठाणा ॥

इतीदं कुत्सितधीयैः । गृहे गृहेषु सत्ववृद्धनाय वदन्ति । ईदृशं शुद्ध-
व्याख्यानं येन कथनेन त्वयाद्यप्रभृति शुद्धं भवति । तस्मादन्यदेव-तद्वादिकमपरं
श्रेष्ठव्याख्यानं महासुखस्थायित्वमधिगमं कुरुष्व । तस्मात् भङ्गापुराणमेवेति—
तथाचोक्तं—

10

जलप्रपातानि पदानि पश्यतः

खपुष्पमाला रचनाञ्च[80^b] कुर्व्वतः ।

असूत्रकं चापि पठं प्रतन्वतः ।

कथं हि लोकस्य न जायते त्रपा ॥ इति ।

15

कुत्सितानां दोषतया परिदेवनया सरहेत्यादि ग्रन्थकार आह—

सरह भणइ जगचित्तेँ वाहिअ ।

सो अचित्त णउ केणवि गाहिअ ॥ इति ।

1. A. lacuna for यत् तस्मिन् । B. मनश्च । 3. A. lacuna for सोवि मणु तहि ; MS. reconstructs as जो तहिँ सो मण । 4. A. स्वभावेँ । 5. A. मनरुस्मिन् मनः । 7. A. कहिअइ ; कहाणा । 8. A. णौ पर सुणिअ । 9. A. इदं ; कुत्सितधीभिः ; कौटुशं for ईदृशं ; तत्त्व for शुद्ध । 10. A. सुद्धं ; -तद्वाहिक- । 11. B. महासुखस्थानीयत्वयानादिगम- । A. भङ्गापुराण- । 13. B. प्रजातानि for प्रपातानि । 14. A. पश्यतः for कुर्व्वतः । 15. A. प्रवन्नतः । 16. A. जनायते for न जायते । 17. A. दोषं दृष्टान्तेन for दोषतया ।

मूढपण्डितैः समस्तजगत्सूर्खलोकं चित्ताचित्तबहुप्रकारेणोक्तलक्षणया बाह्यतं दासीकृतं मदीयोपदेशेन तच्चित्तं त्यजसि [अचित्तरूपं प्राप्स्यसि]। न ह्येतत् भवति। कुतः। स अचित्तलक्षणं न केन चित्तविधिना ग्राहितं भवति। कस्मात् [81^a] तर्हि कस्मात् अचित्तरूपस्य काष्ठपाषाणादिषु किं स्वसंवेदनं 5 भवति। एवमचित्तरूपं किं लक्ष्यते। न लक्ष्यते इति यावत्। आदावेव तत् स्वभावत्वात् स च—

एकु देव वहु आगम दीसइ ।

अप्पणु इच्छेँ फुड़ पड़िहासइ ॥ इति ।

एकदेवताकारं संज्ञामात्रेण स ब्रह्मागमेषु स्वस्वदर्शनेषु च पश्यामः। सव 10 चात्मनैवेच्छया स्फुटं प्रतिभासते। नान्यः। तथाचोक्तं श्रीमद्भेवञ्जे—
स्वयं भर्ता स्वयं हर्ता स्वयं राजा स्वयं प्रभूः इत्यादि। स च—

[81^b] अप्पणु णाहो अस्स वि रुद्धो ।

घरेँ घरेँ सोअ सिद्धन्त पसिद्धो ॥ इति ।

आत्मात्मीयं नेच्छन्तीति विनाशो कुतस्सितकल्पनाग्रहात्। पुनरप्यन्येषां 15 भावानां निरोधकत्वात् विरोधोऽयं न स्यात्। स घरे घरे अयं सिद्धान्तं प्रसिद्धं। कुतः। उत्पन्नप्रलयत्वात्। यदि तावत् प्रलयं कस्योत्पादः। अथचोत्पादः किं प्रलयं तस्माद्द्वयोरसत्यं। तेन तत् तथोक्तं। ईदृशं विशिष्टयोगिनामाशयं भवति। कुतस्सितं भगवत्यात्मनस्यैवं ज्ञानं गुरुरूप[82^a]दिशात्। यस्य नास्ति

1. A. लक्षणम्। 2. B. omits the portion within brackets. A. न हि तद् for न ह्येतत्। 3. A. omits स। 4. A. यस्य चित्तरूपस्य for कस्मात् अचित्तरूपस्य। 7. A. एकु ; अङ्गम for आगम। 8. A. अप्पणु। 9. A. स्वस्वदर्शनेषु ; सेव। 10. A. प्रतिभासते नाम। 12. A. अप्पणु ; नाहो। 13. सिद्धान्त। 14. A. नेच्छतीति ; विनाशो ; कुच्छित। 15. A. निरोध- for विरोध-। A. omits अयं। 18. तत्स्थितानां भवत्यात्मन एवं ज्ञानं for कुतस्सितं etc.

गुरुपदेशं तस्य न भवति । न हि [82^a] एतद्बुद्धिबोधिसत्त्वानां सम्मतः । तेषां भगवतोक्तं बुद्धि —

मङ्गवा हि जगत् सर्वं मङ्गवं भुवनत्रयं ।

मया व्याप्तमिदं सर्वं नान्यमयं दृश्यते जगत् इति ।

इदं कुत्सितानां दृष्टान्तमाह—

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एकु खाइ अवर अस्स वि पोइइ ।

वाहिरे^१ गइ भत्तारह लोइइ । इति ।

यदा कश्चित् अन्नाद्यभक्षणं करोति । एकमन्यस्तस्मिन् अन्नाद्यं प्रलयं कुर्वन्ति असाधारणत्वात् । तथा योगिनः एकपुरुषः भक्षयति । [82^b] अन्यः पुनः भोक्तुमिच्छतां प्रलापेनापि वक्ष्यति । पुनरपि घराणि स्वसामिनं त्यक्त्वा गृहाद्याह्नां 10 गत्वा भर्तारं प्रेक्षत इति । अन्यो बहुचित्तत्वात् ज्ञानाकारिणिकीभावादिति । नेदृशी अज्ञानिना । एकैकं सन्तुष्टिं करोति एकमात्रं जानाति न व्यापकः कुधिया-मपि तादृशं चित्तं तेन नष्टाः ।

आवन्त ण दीस्सइ जन्त णहि अच्छन्त ण मुण्णिअइ ।

णित्तरङ्ग परमेसुरु णिकलङ्ग धाहिज्जइ ॥ इति ।

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एतत् पूर्वोक्तगाहानुसारेण सुधियामपि ईदृशमाशयः कथ्यते । यथा च[83^a]रिणि स्वगृहे भर्तारं भोजयति अन्यस्यापि भर्तृभक्तादिं शोधयति स्वगृहा-न्निष्क्रम्य भर्तारं परीक्षयति तस्मात् आवन्तोऽपि न पश्यति गतोऽपि न च द्रक्ष्यति

1. A. सत्वाना ; A. सम्मत ; 4. B. नान्यं for नान्यमयं ; 5. B. कुत्सितानां । 6. A. क्वाइ । A. योजइ, MS. पोइइ । 7. A. वाहिरे, A. लोजइ, MS. लोअइ । 8. B. यथा कश्चित् अन्नाद्या- ; 9. A. एकपुरुषं ; 10. A. -मिच्छता ; वीक्षति ; 11. A. बहु-विततत्वात् । 12. B. ईदृशी अज्ञानिनां । 13. A. तादृश, ते । 14. A. आवन्त दिस्सइ, जओवाह अच्छन्त ण मुण्णिअइ । 15. -सर, वोहि- for धाहि । 16. A. ईदृशः मायामयः, B. ईदृशमाशयः ; 17. A. भोजनं करोति after भोजयति ; A. घराणि ।

स्वगृहे स्थितोऽपि न लक्षयति । ईदृशं ज्ञानं' निस्तरङ्गं' स्वेच्छया परमेश्वरं
निष्कलङ्कं सर्व्यायासरहितं तस्य ग्रहणं करोति । अनेनोक्तेन किं स्यात् । इह
क्षेत्रजादियोगिनोनां स्वाभाविकं ज्ञानं उत्पद्यते । सा च न किञ्चिदेति ।
तन्मयात्मना पश्यति । मया कृतं मयैवोत्पादितमित्यादि विस्तरः । एवमे[83^b]व

5 गुरुपदेष्वात् अवगन्तव्यं । पुनरपि—

आवद् जादु रा च्छुद् तावहु ।

काहिँ अपुव्व-विलासिणि पावहु । इति ।

आवन्ति गच्छन्ति न सा कुलवरिणी त्यजन्ति । एतत् प्रसिद्धं कामरूप-
पौठादिषु—यथा कश्चित् पुरुषः गृहे स्थित्वा तदन्यस्थानं गमयति अर्द्धमार्गात्
10 पुनरागच्छति । तद्वत् योगिनोज्ञानप्रभावादिति । किमेतत् करोति कथ्यते ।
गच्छतोऽपि कस्मिन् स्थाने तत्रापूर्वविलासिनीसह सङ्गं प्राप्नोति । तदा
मायया चित्तक्षतिं तेन करोति । या कुत्रापूर्वविलासिनी [84^a] न प्राप्नोतीति
यावत् । किं युक्तं इत्याह—

सोहद् चित्त गिरालं दिमा ।

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अएण-रुअ म देखह भिमा । इति ।

तथा यागिनीभिः सुखचित्तं शोभनीयं ललाटस्थाने दत्तमणिच्छाया गृहं
त्रेया विज्ञानमभिवरूपतां यानि शरीरसुखयोरद्वयता भवति । एकरूपेति

2. A. सर्व्यापाय(स)रहितं; A. ज्ञानं for ग्रहणं । 4. A. मयैवे(वो)त्यादि । 7. A.
अपुव्व; A. यावहु for पावहु । 8. A. गच्छति । 10. A. पुनर्गच्छति । 11. A.
-विलासिनी । 12. B. चित्तक्षति for चित्तक्षति; A. तथा भर्त्ता- for या कुत्रा- । 13. A. त for
किं युक्तं । 14. A. लिरारे, MS. लिरारे for गिरालं । 15. A. भिमा ।
16. A. ताभिः for तथा; A. दत्तमणिच्छाया । 17. A. याति; A. शरीरसुख- ।

यावत् । अतएव वक्ष्यति । यथा—अउनरूपं नेवादि पृथक्त्वेन स्थितं तथा स्थितेऽपि न पृथक् रूपं द्रक्ष्यसि । कुतः । यस्मात् सूत्रवन्धनादि एकरूपत्वं भवति तस्मात् स्त्रीपुमान् रूपं [84^b] पृथग् ज्ञानेनाविष्टं सूत्रवदपृथग् भवति । एवमेव योगिनां ज्ञानं स्वभावात्स्थितञ्च । न तथा कर्तति । तैश्च सर्वकार्यकारणं नेच्छया साधितं भवति । स च—

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काञ्च-वाञ्च-मणु जाव ण भिज्जइ ।

सहज सहवि ताव ण रज्जइ ॥ इति ।

अनेनैव ज्ञानं यावन्न पृथग् जनानां काय-वाङ्मनो भिद्यते द्रवीभवति गुरु-प्रसादतः साश्रवधम्नाणामस्तमन न भवतीति । तावत् तेषु सहजस्वभावेषु रज्यन्ति । येन योगिनोनयमनुत्तरं प्राप्यते । तत् किं योगिनोनयमित्याह— 10

घरवइ खज्जइ घरणि-एहि ज[85^a]हिँ

देसहि अविचार । इति ।

घरपति यत्र देशे भक्षणं क्रियते । स्वघरणी च कृतमेतस्मिन् देशे पीठादिषु पश्यामः । ईदृशमविचारितं पृथगजनैरेतत् परिकल्पितं न योगीन्द्रैस्तेषां भावमाह—

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माइए पर तहिँ कि उवरइ विसरिअ

जोइणिचार ॥ इति ।

1. A. नेवादि, HS. नेवादि । 2. A. तथा, HS. तथा ; A. पृथक्त्वं ; A. द्रव्यति ; A. omits कुतः ; A. सूत्रवन्धादि । 4. A. तथा HS. तथा ; सर्वकार्यकारणच्छया, HS. -स्नेच्छया । 6. B. कायवाञ्चमणु, A. कायवाकमन, HS. काय-वाक्-मन ; A. विभज्जइ । 7. A. सहवि । 8. A. विद्रवी- । 9. A. मने । 10. A. has न before रज्यन्ति । 11. A. घरणि एहि, MS. घरणिएहि ; A. जहि । 12. A. देशहि अविचार, MS. देशहि अविचार । 13. A. घरवइ पति अय ; A. भक्षण ; A. स्वघरणी । 14. A. -विचारं । 16. A. माइरे, MS. माइ रे ; A. परतहि ; MS. उवरइ ; B. विसरिस । 17. A. जोइणि चार ।

यत्र घरपति मारितं तत्र परस्य नास्ति उपचारः । किन्तु परत्रेषु कृतं
उपचार परतरः योगिनौज्ञानरूपात्मकमतत् । परैः कुत्सितैर्मारितं भक्षितं
दृष्टं । चर्मचक्षुषा योगिन्या च न मारितं न भ[85^b]क्षितं । अपि सहजमयं
सहजात्मकं सहजे निलीनं कृतमिति भावः । तस्मात् विसदृशं सर्वशास्त्रेषु
5 लोकव्यवहारेषु योगिनीनामाचारः । एतदेव स्पष्टयन्नाह—

घरवद् खज्जद् सहजे रज्जद् किज्जद् रात्र विरात्र ।

णित्र पास वट्टठी चित्ते भट्टठी जोइणि महु पडिहात्र ॥ इति ।

घरपति भक्षितं सति सहजस्वभावेन रज्यते पुनरपि रागविरागं
करोति अन्यभर्त्तारमाश्रयति रागविरागश्च रुदति । पूर्वभर्त्तारं शोचयति ।
10 निरस्य स्वप्रियस्य [86^a] पार्श्वस्थितेन च । एवं सा योगिनौ चित्ते भ्रष्टा
अचित्तमिव मम योगेन्द्रस्य वा प्रतिभासते । एवं समुदायो योगिनौज्ञानम-
हितोयत्वात् न क्रियाकर्मतया प्रतिभासं करोति । कर्माकर्मायत्नेन न
बाध्यते । सा पृथक्जनानां आभासमात्रमेवेति । अन्यश्च सर्वं चित्तोद्धृतं
विक्षेपमनया स घरपति स्वचित्तायत्तः शरीरः स भक्षितः । चित्तं शरीरं
15 पीठोपपीठादिरूपं । योगिभ्यः प्रकृतयः । तन्निरोधात् प्रकृतीनां निरोधः ।
तदा किमुपलभ्यते । गुरुपदेशाज्जा[86^b]नीयादिति । एवं विधायेदं
परिभास्यते ।

खज्जद् पिज्जद् ण विचिन्तेज्जद् चित्ते पडिहात्र ।

मणुवाहिरे दुल्लखहरे विसरिस जोइणि-मात्र ॥ इति

2. B. वरतरः । 4. A. भावं । 5. A. वा after -व्यवहारेषु । 6. A. सहजे ; A.
रसद् for रज्जद्, A. omits किज्जद्, MS. reconstructs it as णट्टो ;
7. A. णिल ; A. वट्टठी, चित्ते, भट्टो । 8. B. रक्षिते for भक्षिते । 9. A.
-विरागश्च । 10. B. निजस्य for निरस्य । 11. B. मया । 12. B. -कर्माकर्मायत्नेन ; A.
परिभाषये । A. न ; A. चिन्तेज्जद्, MS. निश्चिन्ते जद् ; A. पडिहाद् ; A.
-वाहिष ; A. C. -हले ; A. विसरिष ।

यत् किञ्चित् खादयन्ति पिवन्तीत्यादि कर्म क्रियते स च यं यं चित्तेन प्रतिभासते तं तं कुर्यात् किन्तु मनवाहि न क्रियते। किं युक्तिं दुर्लक्षेण योगिनौज्ञानवन्तस्य लौनं पूर्ववत्। विसदृशयोगिणीमागस्तदानीन्तेन सर्वं सुखं भवतीति नान्यथा। पुनराह—

इअ दिवस णिसहि अहिमणइ[87^{a-b}]तिहुअण जासु णिमाण ।

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सो चित्तसिद्धि जोइणि सहजसम्बर जाण ॥ इति।

एवं यः दिवसं जानाति रात्रिषु अभिज्ञानमयं त्रिभुवनं यस्य निर्माणं सो चित्तसिद्धिः योगिनिसहजसम्बरज्ञानं भवति साक्षात् करोति वा। एवम-जानानामाह—

अक्खर वाढा सअल जगु णाहि णिरक्खर कोइ ।

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ताव सेँ अक्खर घोलिआ जाव णिरक्खर होइ ॥

इति अक्षरेषु सकलजग बाध्यते। इदं त्वया इदं मया अथवा इदं लटं इदं पटं पण्डितैरुक्तं। यावज्जीवं क्रियते न परमार्थं न किञ्चित् साध्यते। निरक्षरः [कोऽत्र विद्यते येन बुद्धत्वं साध्यते]। तावत् सैवाक्षरं घोलितं परिभावनाया वाग्जालं समस्तमर्हितं अलीककृतं यावत् निरक्षरत्वं याति। यावत् नेवं कृतं यावत् किं परमपदं प्राप्नोति। किं तदाह—

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जिम वाहिर तिम अवभन्तरु ।

चउदह भुवणोँ ठिअउ णिरन्तरु ॥ इति ।

From the last verse till the end of the Text I have MS. C. for the verses. 3. -ज्ञानन्तस्य; A. -सदाश्रितेन; B. साद्यश्रितेन। 5. A. C. दिवस; A. तिहुमण, णिमाण; MS. तिहुमण। 6. B. चित्त; A. वंसर, HS. संवर; B. जाणु। 11. A. घोलिजा; C. घोलिअइ; A. णिरक्षर। 12. A. has अति after इति; B. जगं। 14. A. omits portion within brackets; 17. A. वाहिर; अवभन्तरु; C. अवभन्तकरु; 18. A. चउजइ, णिरन्तरु।

योगेन्द्राणां यादृशं बाह्यं तादृशमभ्यन्तरं । किं तर्हि ज्ञानाकारत्वात् ।
तैश्चतुर्दशभुवनेषु निरन्तरावरायेण स्थितं परमकलाभावात् । स च योगी
अभावास्यान्तेन चन्द्रकलामिवाशरीरत्वात् । तेनाह—[88^{a-b}]

असरिर [कोइ] सरौरहि लुको ।

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जो तहि जाणइ सो तहि मुको ॥ इति ।

अशरीरं सत्त्वं साक्षादस्मितं भवति लुको स येन ज्ञानं सो तस्मिन्
मुकोभवति । कुतः । यतः प्रत्यात्मवेदको लोकः । वेद्यज्ञादावेव नीतृपन्न-
शरीरत्वात् । निराकारं ज्ञानमेतत् । तस्य संज्ञा सुखप्रवृत्तिः । तदमृतं
सहजमिति । पुरुषपुद्गलानां सहजात् पूर्वीत्पादविनाशकाले तत्रैव लीनः
10 सुखस्य स्थिति नास्ति अस्थानत्वात् । तस्मात् पूर्वभावं निराकारं ज्ञानं
तस्यैव धर्मधातुरिति आदिसंज्ञा । एवं यो जाताति गुरुपदेशात् स इहैव
जन्मनि अनेनैव शरीरेण मुक्तो भवति नान्यथेति । अनेनोक्ते सति ग्रन्थकारस्य
तत्परिणामतया स्वपरवस्तु न पश्यति तेनेदमुदौरयन्नाह

सिद्धिरित्यु मइ पढमे पढिअउ ।

15

मण्ड पिवन्ते विसरअ एमइउ ॥

अक्खरमेक्क एत्थ मइ जाणउ ।

ताहर याम य जाणउः ए सइउ ॥ इति ।

2. B. निरन्तरा अनेवरायेण ; सरौर ; 88^{a-b} of B. missing, A. omits कोइ ;
MS. असरीर सरौरहि [णाहि] लुको । 3. A. सरौरत्वात् । 15. A. पिवन्ते ,
A. विश्रमइ which MS. restores as विसरिअउ मइ ; C. सरिअ ;
16. A. अक्खर- ; जाणउ ; जाणउ ; A. एसहि ; MS. ए सहि ।

यथा बालत्वे त्वादावेवा[89^a]क्षरशिक्षणायोपाध्यायस्याग्रे फलकेषु
सिद्धिरस्तु इत्यादिना यावत्सूत्रधात्वाद्विधाकरणपर्यन्तं तर्कमीमांसादि सर्वं
पठितं तदा सर्वाक्षरेषु न किञ्चित् फलं दृष्टमज्ञानत्वात् । पुनरपि सुकल्याण-
मित्राराधनायां सत्यां परिज्ञानेन विचारितं यः प्रथमं वाक्यं सिद्धिरस्वीति स
सत्यं तत्परं यत् मया पठितमन्याक्षरमभारं । यथा भक्तान्वनायां सारं 5
गृहीतं मण्डं समयी पीत्वा शेषमसारमण्डमेव सारं तं पीत्वान्यं वि[89^b]क्षरं
गृहीतः सिद्धिरस्त्विति । एतदेवाक्षरमेकं पूर्वोक्तज्ञानमिह मया ज्ञातं । तस्मिन्
वामस्य नामं न जानामि कीदृशमिति श्रवाच्यत्वात् । यथा बालत्वे नार्थस्वेति
सिद्धिरस्तु च । तथाप्यमौ प्रौढत्वेऽपि च । नास्ति नामवर्नादिख्यातिः ।
अन्ये कुक्षियाः न जानन्ति तेषां आह

10

रुअणोँ सअल वि जोहि णाएँ गाहइ ।

कुन्दुरु-खणहि महासुहे साहइ ॥ इति ।

महजरूपेण सकलत्रिभूवनपतितं न याहितं स्वर्गभुजानाकारेण च
श्रवाच्य[90^a]नामेव वा । तदा पुनरपि स्वयं नष्टा परानपि बन्धायन्ति ।
किं तत् । कुन्दुरुक्षणेऽपि महासुखं साधयतीति । तस्मात् ते मूर्खदेहिनाः । 15
पुनरप्याह-

जिम तिसिओ मिस्र तिसिओँ धावइ ।

मरइ सोसोसहिँ णभजलु कहिँ पावइ ॥

-
2. A. -धातु व्याकरणः । 3. सुकल्याणः । 4. A. -मित्राधारणायां ; A. विचारितयः । 6. A.
गृहीतमण्डसमयी, HS. गृहीतमण्डं रसमयी, A. तं पीत्वा अन्यत् । 7. A. गृहीत । 8. A.
अन्वस्यनाम for वामस्य नाम 10 A रक्तधियो न जानन्ति B. कुक्षियैः न जानन्ति ।
11. A. रुअणे ; A. वि जो णट । 12. A. कुदुरु-क्षणइ । 13. A. त्रिभुवनं ।
17. A. तिसि तिसिअणे यावइ, MS. तिसिअ तिसिओणे । C. तिसिणे ;
18. A. मर सोसेन भजलु कहि— MS. मर सोसे ।

यथा दृष्टान्तः अतिदृष्टया अन्धत्वेन पानीयं दृष्ट्वा धावति तदा चक्षुषा
नीहारमात्रं न पाणोयं तदार्ततया सोसेन मृत्यते। आकाशजलं कुतः
प्राप्यते न प्राप्यते इति यावत्। एवमिव कुन्दुर्यागेन [90^b] तत्त्वं न प्राप्यते।
मूढलोकोरेवं तत्त्वं कः ज्ञेयं किं युक्तिर्वा एतदेवाह—

5

कन्ध-भूत्र-आत्रत्तण-इन्दौविसन्न-विआरु अप हुअ ।

णउ णउ दोहाच्छेदे ण कहवि किम्पि गोप्प ॥ इति ।

स्कन्धधात्वायतनेन्द्रियविषयविकल्पविभ्रमरूपं पश्यति। यत्र लक्ष्यं
लक्षणञ्च न विद्यते तेषु सर्वथा मरौचिजलवद्विश्रमुदकसंज्ञा प्रतीयते।
उदकभावञ्च नास्त्येव मरौच्याभाससंज्ञया। मरौचिभ्रान्तिमेव हि उदकस्या-
भासं प्रतीयते इति। तस्मात् [91^a] नवनवान्यान्य दोहाशब्देन तत्त्वं दर्शितं।
तस्मिन् दोहामध्ये कस्मिन् दोहेषु किञ्चित् गुप्तं न कृतं गुरुपदेशं न
विनाशितं स्यादिति। एतदर्थं सर्वेषां पण्डितानां क्षमापयतोत्याह—

पण्डित्थ लोअहु खमहु महु एत्थु ण किअइ विअप्पु ॥

जो गुरुवअणो मइ सुअउ ताह किं कहमि सुगोप्पु ॥ इति ।

15

इ पण्डितलोक ईदृशं ज्ञानं गुप्तगुप्तं मया कथितं तथा मम क्षमां
कुर्वन्ति। कुतः। यतः सुगुप्तस्थाने न गुप्तोक्तं तथा गुप्तस्थाने प्रकाशितं
सत्लोपकार[91^b]चेतसा तनेदं विकल्पं न कार्यमेवञ्च सम्मतं। ममंकाकिनस्य
न भवति। कुतः। यतः ममापि स्वगुरोः सकाशात् यदचनमीदृशं श्रुतं तत्
किं करोति सुगुप्तं प्रकटञ्च। एवमुक्तेन किं स्यात्। भव्यसत्त्वेषु गुप्तमिति।
एतदेवाह—

1. B. अतिदृष्टया; B. दृष्टं। 2. A. पायं; B. आर्तया, B. सोसे; B. कुतः। 3. B. omits न प्राप्यते; A. योगे। 4. A. आत्रतन इदी, B. विआमेरु। A. अ पडुअ; 6. A. -च्छेदे, MS. सहेन; B. कह; किंपि। 7. A. लक्षं। 8. B. विद्येत्; A. मरौचिजल-। 9. A. आकिरेव। 10. A. भासः। 11. A. गुरुपदेशेन। 13. A. एत्थु; 16. A. करीषि; A. -प्रकाशित। 17. A. विकल्प; A. एकाकिनो; 18. खगुरुः। C. omits the last two verses.

कमलकुलिस वेवि मज्झठिउ जो सो सुरअ-विलास ।

को त रमइ णह तिहुअणे हि कस्स ण पूरइ आस ॥ इति ;

अनेनात्यन्तादिकर्मिकाणां सृद्योगिनां वा रागासक्तानाञ्च महाराग-
क्री[92^a]ङ्गैव बुद्धत्वमुपाय इति दर्शितं भगवता । तथा इह मया अवतारितं
कमलकुलिशद्वयेषु यत् सुरतविलासं को वीरपुरुषस्तत्र रमति । तेन 5
त्रिभुवने कस्य न पुरित आसः । सर्व्वेषां तन्मयत्वेन तत्सम्भावतया सर्व्वीसां
महामुद्रा-सिद्धिः पूरिता भवति । महाकरुणाया आमुखीकरणादिति नियमः ।
किन्तु अधिमात्रेन्द्रियाणां नेदृशः । किं तदाह—यदि कमलकुलिशेन तत्त्वं तदा
आत्मना सुखमुत्पाद्य परस्य सुखानुभवं विना गते [92^b] न सर्व्वत्रिभुवनस्य
सा पूरिता भवति । बुद्धज्ञानमेवेति । तस्मान्न तादृशं बुद्धज्ञानैकक्षणे 10
अभिसम्बोधिः सर्व्वेषां समानकालत्वात् संचेपतः ।

खण उवाअ सुह अहवा अहवा वेसि वि सोवि ।

गुरुपाअ-पसाएँ पुस जइ विरला जाणइ कोवि ॥

क्षणञ्चैदं सुखस्य चतुःक्षणमेदात् । अथवा अभिन्नेऽपि क्षणे तत्त्वमुपलक्षयेत् ।
स च परमविरमयोर्मध्ये अभिन्नमेव । प्रथमारम्भे विचित्रादिक्षणे उत्पाद- 15
नायाऽभि[93^a]न्ने सहजभावं सैव गुरुपादप्रसादेन पुण्यवशात् । यः कश्चित्
तत्त्वविरलो लोकः जानाति क्वचिदिति न सर्व्वसत्त्वेषु साधारणत्वं भवति ।
तेनेदं मया सद्गुरुपदेशेन व्यक्तीकृतं पूर्व्वोक्तन्यायात् । सर्व्वजनेषु साधारणमिति ।
एवञ्च—

1. A. कुलिश ; व्यवि ; 2. C. तेँ ; A. रमइण, B. रमइणँ, C. रमइ
णह ; B. तिहुवणे ; A. omits हि ; C. तिहुवणहि ; A. पूरअ, C. पूरिअ ;
4. A. बुद्धलोपाय ; A. has भवति after दर्शितं ; 5. HS. inserts न before रमति ; 9. B.
सुखोत्पाय ; B. सर्व्वे ; 10. B. भवन्ति ; 12. A. खणउ वाअ ; A. omits one
अहवा ; A. वेसि, सोवि ; 13. C. गुरुअ पसाएँ HS. गुरुह- ; A. जानइ
कोइ ; 14. B. क्षणद्यायं । 15. B. इति भिन्नमेव । 17. B. विरला ; A. सारत्वं for
साधारणत्वं ।

गम्भीरद उग्रारहणेणं णउ पर णउ अप्पाण ।

सहाजन्दे चउट्टक्खण णिअ सम्वेअण जाण ॥ इति ।

- यत् पुण्येषु विरला लोका जानन्ति तत् गम्भीरस्य विचारवलेन निरन्तर-
स्मरणतया पक्षापक्षं निरुध्यते । [93^b] परमगम्भीरे तत्र न परं नात्मनः
5 किञ्चिदस्ति । आदावेव रहितत्वात् । ईदृशं सहजानन्देन चतुर्थक्षणे लोक
कल्पितमध्ये निजसंवेदनं जानासि । पुनरपि तां जानाति स एव हि ।
अस्यानुशंसामाह—

घोरान्धारे चन्दमणि जिम उज्जोअ करेइ ।

परममहासुख एकुखणे दुरिआसेस हरेइ ॥ इति ।

- 10 इह घोरान्धकारमध्ये चन्द्रकान्तमणिरुद्योतनं करोति । यादृशः सर्व-
चौर-चण्डालादिभिर्हरति । तादृशः परममहासुख एकक्षणे [94^a] संसार-
दुश्चरिताशेषं करोति । तथा —

दुक्ख दिवाअर अत्यगउ ऊवइ तरवइ सुक्क ।

ठिअ णिम्माणेणं णिम्मिअउ तेणवि मण्डल-चक्क ॥ इति ।

- 15 यथा ग्रीष्मकालदुःखदिवाकर अस्तमितो भवति तदा अत्यन्तशीतलत्वं
करोति । तारागणनायकश्चन्द्रः शुक्रश्च उत्थितो भवति । ईदृशमण्डलचक्रादि-

1. A. घंभीरद, नउ, अप्पाण ; 2. A. सहजानन्दे, -क्षणे, संवेसअ ;
4. B. स्मरणथा ; A. नपरं ; 5. A. चतुःक्षणे ; 6. A. जानामि ; ताम् for तां ; 8. A.
घोरेन्धारे, C. धोरे धारे ; 9. A. एकुखणे दुरिआशेष ; 10. A. इति यथा for
इह ; A. यादृश— ; 11. A. तादृशः ; 13. A. दुःक्ख दिवाअर अत्यवि उठ्ठ तारावइ ;
C. अत्यविउ उइ ; 14. A. विज्जा निमाणे निर्म्मिअउ ; C. ठिअ णिम्माणे
णिअउ ; A. has सो after तेणवि ; 16. B. ईदृशं ।

भावना क्रियते । येन निर्माणस्थितेन विश्वं बुद्धसंवृत्या निर्माणं निर्मिणोति ।
तत्स्वरूपमण्डलचक्रं विज्ञेयादिति भावार्थः । पुनर्यो[94^b]गिनां कर्तव्यमाह—

चित्तेहिं चित्त णिहालु वट् सञ्चल विमुच्च-कुदिट्ठि ।

परममहासुहे सोज्झ पर तसु आअत्तासिद्धि ॥ इति ।

इति चित्तेन चित्तं त्वं विचारयसि । किन्तु चित्तं अचित्तं चास्ति । 5
पूर्वोक्तन्यायादेव द्वयोर्नास्ति । तथाचाह—

चित्तमेवेह नाचित्तं हयाभावान्न किञ्चन ।

न किञ्चिन्नाम विद्येत भ्रान्त्या सर्व्वमिदं जगत् ॥

तस्मात् सर्व्वं कुट्टय्यः मुञ्चसि त्यजसि । सकलात्मजीवपुरुषपुद्गलादयः
सर्व्वं कुत्सितलोकव्यवहारसंवृतमात्ममतत् । तेन तत् तथो[95^a]क्तं । एवं 10
सर्व्वं परममहासुखेषु शोधनं कुरु । येन परमभूमिलोकोत्तरबुद्धसम्प्रतेशु प्रवेशं
करोति । तस्य परश्चेष्टसिद्धिरायता भवति । तेनेदं—

मुक्कुउ चित्तगएण्ड करु एत्थ विअप्प णु पच्छ ।

गअण गिरीणइजल पिअउ तहिं तडं वसइ सइच्छ ॥

इति मुक्तचित्तगजेन्द्रं कुरु । यथेच्छया संसारमध्येषु क्रीडनं कुरु । 15
अस्येदं विकल्पं न पृच्छसि । कुतः यतः सर्व्वं भावस्तत्त्वात्मकास्तत्त्वाश्रिताः
तत्त्वेषु निलीनाः भवन्ति । किन्तु प्राणातिपातादिक्कर्मं वर्ज्जसि । यै-

1. A. बुद्धसंस्थित्या ; B. निर्मिणोति ; 3. A. C. चित्तेहिं ; A. निहालु ; C.
णिफालु (?) C. वट् ; A. विमुच्चह दिट्ठि ; 4. A. तसुआ अत्ता सिद्धि ;
C. -सुह सेज्झ पर तेहि अत्ता ; 5. A. विचारय (असि) ; 6. A. -न्यायादेतयो- ;
7-8. HS takes it to be a *dohā* ; 9. A. मञ्जुकट्टीसुख ; 11. A. परश्चेष्टसिद्धिरासन्ना ;
13. C. म for णु ; 14. A. तहि, B. तट ; C. तड ; A. वसउ ; 16. A.
विकल्प ।

स्त्रीर्षिकादि नरकां यान्ति कारुणिकैश्च दशकुशलकर्मपथपरिपालनया सर्वं सुखं भवति । तेन गगनगिरिणा हस्तिवत् सर्वव्यापकत्वेषु नद्यां जलं पिवन्ति । यः पुरुष यतः तस्मिन् तटेषु महासुखनद्यां शोषयति । इदं महासुखेऽपि विकल्पमात्रं तस्या सङ्गमिति भावार्थः ।

- 5 विसञ्ज-गणन्दे-करे गहिञ्ज जिम मारइ पड़िहाइ ।
जोइ कवड़िआर जिम तिम तहो गिस्सरि जाइ ॥

तथा विषयगजेन्द्रेषु चक्षुरादिषु सर्व्ववस्तुषु गृहीत्वा इन्द्रियविषयादिभिः करेण ग्रहणमिव दन्तिना तदा मारणमिव प्रतिभासते । [यावत् प्रतिभास्यति तावत् कस्य विषयिणस्य च] स्वभावमेतत् तस्यैव दृश्यते । न मारणं क्रियते ।
10 नरकादिषु नीयते । ईदृशं योगेन्द्राणां कवड़ीकारादीर्यादृशं प्रतिभास्यति । तादृशमिव ततो निःसरित्वं गच्छति । सहजेषु प्रलीयते । न कवड़ीकाराद्याः तस्य बाध्यते लोकस्य प्रतिभास एवेति । [96^b] एवं भक्ष्यभक्ष्येषु न लिप्यते इति यावत् । तथाचाह—

- जो भव सो गिर्व्वाण खलु स उण मसहु असा ।
15 एक सहवे विरहिञ्ज गिम्मल मइ पड़िवस ॥ इति ।

नास्ति योगिनां विशेषाद्विशेषः संक्षेपः । यथा युगनङ्क्रमेषूक्तमार्थ-
नागार्ज्जुनपादेन भवनिर्व्वान्छादिना च इह एतदेव यत् भवनिर्व्वान्छं खलु

1. B. -परिपालनया ; 2. A. सर्व्वव्यापकैषु ; 3. A. पिवति ; A. यतोऽस्मिन्, नद्या ।
5. A. विषय गजेन्द्रे कर ; जणि for जिम ; पड़िहासइ ; 6. A. जोवि, कवाड़िआर ; C. कवड़िआरमणिञ्जह- ; A. हो गिसरि ; 7. A. विषये ; 8. A. मारण- for मारण- ; A. has व्रतिनं कुरु तावत् before प्रतिभासते- ; A. has for the portion in bracket only- तावत्कस्य विषयिणस्य ; 10. A. कौटुशं ; प्रतिभासते ; 11. A. निःसारितं, B. प्रलीयतः ; A. -काराद्याः ; 14. A. निवाण खलु भेव न मसहु पस ; C. खलतेउ ण मसहु मस । 15. A. एकसहावे, निम्मल मइ ; 16. A. योगिना ; इहापि तदेव ;

सर्वेषां हयं हयवचनेषु सविज्ञेययुगनहयं तच्च भेदमन्यं विज्ञेयादिति ।
किं तर्हि एकस्वभावेन यदहयं सर्वशास्त्रेषु सिद्धान्तं तत् तस्मादवि[97^{a-b}]रहितं
एकानेकभावं । किन्तु अहयोऽपि निर्मलः प्रतिपन्नः परमाहयमिति भावः ।
एतदेव स्पष्टार्थमाह—

घरहि म थक्कु म जाहि वणे जहि तहि मण परिआण ।

5

सअल गिरन्तर वोहि-ठिउ कहिं भव कहिं गिआण ॥

इत्यनेन स्वर्गद्वेषु स्थितिं मा कुर्वन्ति । वनान्तरमपि गमनं मा कुरु ।
किं तर्हि निश्चितं हयस्थानेषु गम्यादिकल्पं जायते । कथं क्रियते इत्युच्यते ।
यस्मिन् यस्मिन् स्थित्वा वा चक्रमणभक्षादिं कृत्वा तत्र मनस्य परिभावनं कुरु
अलोकं मनः स च विज्ञप्तिं कुरु । तच्च पूर्वैः निराकृतमसिद्धतात् । तस्मात् 10
सकलत्रैधातुकेषु निरन्तराव्यवच्छिन्नप्रवाहात् बोधिस्थितं सिद्धं । न केन-
चिदुत्पादितं स्वयम्भूत्वात् । तदिह कुधीभिः मूढत्वेन परिकल्पितं भवनिर्वाणयो-
रहयोः केनेदं न स्यात् उक्तन्यायादपि । तस्मिन् भवं तस्मिन् निर्वाणं न भवति ।
कुतः । यतः आदावेव विश्वस्थोत्पादं नास्ति तत् किमिति दृश्यते । मायावदिति
भ्रान्त्या प्रतिभासमात्रमेवेति । यथा दर्पणादिषु प्रतिविम्ब दृश्यते तद्विचारा- 15
न्नोपलभ्यते । तत् विम्बपिण्डपरमाणवत्वादिभेदेनासंभवमिति । कस्माद्
भवनिर्वाणयोरसंभवं । तथाचोक्तं—

निर्वाणञ्चैव लोकञ्च मन्यन्ते अतत्त्वदर्शिनः ।

नैव लोकं न निर्वाणं मन्यन्ते तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥

निर्वाणञ्च भवस्यैव हयमेतत् न विद्यते ।

परिज्ञानं भवस्यैव निर्वाणमिति कथ्यते ॥

1. A. हयहयवचनेषु, भेदमन्य-; 2. A. किन्तु होकस्वभावेन; B. य य शास्त्रेषु; B. 97^{a-b}
lost. 5. A. वने, तँहि; C. जाहु; 6. सअल, निरन्तर, कहि, निवाण; C. कहि; 7. A. गर्भा- for गम्या; 9. A. चक्रमण-; 16. A. पिण्डपरमाणवत्वादिभेदेनासंभव-
मिति; 17. A. -संभवः; 20. हयमेव ।

तस्मात् सिद्धं परमाद्यं बोधिरूपं स चाह—

णउ घरे णउ वणे वोहि ठिउ एहु परिआणहु भेउ ।

णिम्मलचित्त-सहावता करहु अविकल सेउ ॥

इति । इदं उपलक्षणायां न घरे न वनेषु बोधि स्थि[98^b]तं । एवं
5 भेदं परिजानासि सन्ध्याभाषान्तरेऽपि गृहं शरीरं वनं घटपटादिषु तत्र न
बोधिः । कुतः सर्वं ह्यसम्भवात् । एवं भेदं यत् दृश्यते लोकादि तत् सर्वं
उत्पन्नविनाशिनः । नेदृशो बोधिरविनष्टत्वात् च । तेनेह निर्मलचित्तस्वभावतां
कुर्वति । यैर्विकल्पना विकल्पसि समस्ता सङ्गता त्यजसीति विस्तरः । तै-
र्बोधिरूपमायाति तदाह—

10 एहु सो अप्पा एहु परु जो परिभावइ कोवि ।

तेँ विणु वन्हे वेट्टि किउ अप्प विमुक्कउ तोवि ॥ इति ।

[99^a-101^b] इदमात्मा न इदं परः येन केनचिद्विपरिभावितं तेन विना
बन्धनेन आत्मानं विटकितं विकलीकृतं मुक्तोऽपि स्वभावयातं तदा नो मुक्तः
तस्मात् स्वपरविभागं न क्रियते इति यावत् । तदिह—

15 पर अप्पाण म भन्ति करु सअल णिरन्तर वुद्ध ।

एहु से णिम्मल परमपउ चित्त सहावेँ सुद्ध ॥ इति ।

2. C. सउ ; A. वने ; परिआणउ ; 3. A. सहावउ, A. करहु,
C. करहि ; A. C. अविकल ; 4. B. उक्तलक्षणायां ; 8. A. कुर्वति ; 10. C.
स ; A. अध्या, पर, कोइ । 11. A. ते ; C. वेटि किउ, A. वन्धि किउ ;
C. विमुक्कवि ; 12. B. folia 99^a -101^b lost. 15. A. भत्ति ; C. भन्ति ; A.
निरन्तर ; 16. A. सो ; C. से ; C. सहाव ।

परश्चात्मनश्च एकस्वभावं न हयरूपेण भ्रान्तिं कुरु किन्तर्हि सकलसत्त्वधातु-
निरन्तरादावेव स्वभावेन शुद्धः तदादावेव परिभावनयानन्तकमलावृता न बुद्धात्मानं
परिभावयन्ति । एवं हयरहितेन बुद्धः सः निर्मलं परमचित्तं स्वभावतोरूपं
बोधिचित्तं स्वभावरहिततया—

अदृश चित्त-तरुश्ररहु गउ तिहश्रणेँ वित्थार ।

5

करुणा फुल्लिफल धरइ णाउ परत्त उअर ॥ इति ।

उक्ते सति परोपकारं सूचयति यदहयं चित्तं योगिनां तद्वरन्तु भवराजः ।
कल्पवृक्षमिव सर्वगतत्रिभूवनविस्तारः । सर्वं परमाह्वयमिति भावः । तस्य
करुणापुष्पफुल्लितेन तत् फुल्लं भवति । नानेन स परोपकारः । सर्वेषां सर्वासां
शुद्धत्वादि परिपूरयति । इति ते तथा ॥ सु * * *

10

[सुण तरुवर फुल्लिअउ करुणा विविह विचित्त ।

अणा भोअ परत्तफुल्ल एहु सोक्ख पर चित्त ॥

सुण तरुवर णिक्करुण जहि पुण मूल ण साह ।

तहि आल मूल जो करइ तसु पडिभज्जाइ वाह ॥

एकेखी एकेवि तरु तेँ कारणे फल एक ।

15

ए अभिणा जो मुणइ सो भवणिवाण विमुक्क ॥

5. A. अदृश ; C. अदृश ; A. तरुश्रर ; C. तरुवरह ; C. तिहुवण ;
6. A. फुल्लिअ फल ; A. णाने ; A. परजअर ; C. परत्त उअर ; 10. A.
शुद्धत्वादि, तेतया । 10. A.—the rest lost. The dohās which follow within the
brackets are preserved in C. only. 16. C. अभिणा ; सुणइ ।

जो अत्थीअण ठौअऊ सो जइ जाइ णिरास ।

खण्ड सरावेँ भिक्ख वरु च्छड्डहु ए गिहवास ॥]

- * * * [102^a] पाङ्ग्यादिति । मनसि विहाय तदा सत्त्वेषु करुणावन्तः
यस्मादायाति । यः कश्चिदर्थिनः स[ः यदि] निरासं याति मया लोकेन किञ्चित्
5 दत्तं । तदा येन किञ्चित् सिद्धं भवति । तस्मात् [त्वं] खण्डसरावेति [भि]क्षां
करोसि । न भोगासक्तं भवसि । त्यजसि वरमिदं गृहवासं । य[थाचोक्तं]—

पर ऊआर ण कीअऊ अत्थि ण दौअउ दाण ।

एहु संसारे कवण फलु वरु च्छड्डहु अप्पाण ॥ इति ।

- किन्तेन भोगेन गृहेन वा क्रियते यतः परोपकारं न भवति । अस्ति.....
10 [102^b]णादि वस्तुदानं न दीयते । तच्च तेन धनेन एवं इदं संसारे स्थितत्वात्
किं फलं भवति न भवति [याव]द् वरमिदं आत्मानं त्यजामः । कायजीवित-
निरापेक्षे न विहरिष्यामीति । [समाप्तोऽ]यं दोहाकोषस्य पञ्जिका विषम-
पदभञ्जिका । दोहा अभिभ्रष्टवचनस्येति । तेनेदं कोषिताच्छादिताः
तत्त्वं । बालजनेषु विस्मयीकृतमिति ॥*॥

- 15 कृत्वाचेयं मयाऽस्य(?) पञ्जिका चात्मबोधिनी ।
नाम्नापि सात्मवेधी च गुर्वीम्नायप्रकाशिनी ॥

अन्याश्च ईक्षपेत्वा [...स्मार्थपि कुरु ।

स्वार्थं वापि परार्थं वा साधितं मे शुभं यतः ।

तेन पुण्येन लोकोऽस्तु ज्ञान भूमिः स्वयम्भुवः ॥

- 20 समाप्तेयं दोहाकोषस्य पञ्जिका । अन्यप्रमाणमष्टशतमस्य । कृतिरियं
श्रीअष्टयवज्रपादानामिति ।]

2. C. has त्यतहु which should be corrected as च्छड्डहु ; 3. 102^{a-b} preserved in B and C only. 7. C. दौसउ दाण ; which should be corrected as दौअउ दाण । 8. C. संसारें । 8. The colophon of C. occurs after this verse as—सरहपादीअ दोहाकोसः समाप्तः । B. seems to have ended on this page. 17. The portion within brackets occur on the last page of A.

काण्हपादस्य दोहाकोषः

ॐ नमो वज्रधराय ॥

लोअह गव्व समुव्वहद् हउ परमत्थे पवीण ।

कोडिह मज्झे एक्कु जइ होइ गिरञ्जण लीण ॥१॥

अस्यायमर्थः । लोके गर्व्यं समुद्बुद्धिः । कोऽसौ गर्व्योऽहं परमार्थप्रवीण 5
इति एतच्च यावत् संभवन्तु युज्यते । ततो योगिकोटोनां मध्ये एकोऽपि यदि
भवति निरञ्जनलीन इति । निर्गतानि अञ्जनानि रागद्वेषादिक्लेशा अस्मिन्निति
निरञ्जनः सहजकायः तत्र लीनो निमग्नमना योगौन्द्रः स च मादृश इति भावः ॥

आगम-वेअ-पुराणे पण्डित्ता माण वहन्ति ।

पक्क सिरिफले अलिअ जिम वाहेरित भमन्ति ॥२॥ 10

अयमर्थः । बाह्यागमादिज्ञानेन परमार्थसत्याभिमानं पण्डिता वहन्ति ।
एवम्भूताः सन्तः कस्मिन् किं कुर्वन्तीत्याह—पक्कशीफलेष्वलयो भ्रमरा जिमु यथा
बाह्येन गन्धानुमोदेन भ्रमन्ति तथा आगमादिज्ञानेन बाह्येन याथार्थ्यं प्रतिरुद्ध-
दृष्टित्वात् गभीरतत्त्वामृततरसं न चिन्तयन्ति इत्यर्थः । तथाचोक्तं चतुर्देवीपरिपृच्छा-
महायोगतन्त्रे— 15

चतुरशीतिसाहस्रे धर्मस्कन्धे महामुने ।

तत्त्वं वै ये न जानन्ति सर्वे ते निष्फलाय वै ॥

T.-text as printed by H. P. Sastri. 3. T. परमथे पविन MS.
परमत्थे पवीन ; 4. T. कोटिह माह एक जत होइ निरञ्जन लीन, MS. कोडिह
मज्झे एक्कु जइ होइ निरञ्जन लीण । 5. T. कोशै—, HS. कोशै— । T. प्रवीण HS.
प्रवीण । 6. T. योगि- HS. योगी, । 9. T. -पुराणे ; पण्डित्त मान वहन्ति, MS.
पण्डित्ता मान वहन्ति । 10. T. भूमयन्ति ; 13. T. याथार्थ्यं प्रतिभरण दृष्टित्वात्- HS.
याथार्थ्यं प्रति रुद्धदृष्टित्वात् । 14. T. चतुरदेवी- ।

एतत् साधनमाह—

बोधिचित्तं रजभूसिद्धं अङ्गोहोहं सिद्धं ।

पोखरविद्धं सहावसुहं गिद्धं-देहहि दिद्धं ॥३॥

- अयमर्थः । बोधिचित्तं साम्प्रतस्मिन् रूपं शुद्धं रजभूषितं तत् चित्तवज्जेषांशितं ।
 5 किंभूतचित्तवज्जमित्याह पोखरो वक्ष्यमाणपद्मवत्तः अस्य बीजं सुखस्वभावेन स्थितं ।
 शुद्धं तदेवं चित्तवज्जं कुत्र दृष्टमित्याह । निजशब्देन ज्ञानाधिष्ठितो निजदेहः
 स एव सरोवरसूत्रदृष्टमवगतं । एतदेव स्पष्टयन्नाह—

गच्छन् गौरं अमिद्धाह पाँक मूलं वज्जं भाविद्धं ।

अवधूद् किञ्च मूलं लालं हंकारो वि जायते ॥४॥

- 10 अयमर्थः । महासुखरूपत्वात् गगनं नीरं अमिताभो बोधिचित्तानन्ददेवं
 पङ्कजं कृत्वा मूलं नालं प्रधानकारणं भावितं । तदेव बोधितचित्तं तेन नालपत्र-
 षण्डादिक्रमेण निष्पादयन् तदर्थमाह । अवहेलया अनाभोगेन क्लेशादिपापान्
 धुनोति इत्यवधूती । अतधूत्यवकृतं मूलं प्रधाननालं येन सा अवधूती कृतो
 मूलनालहेतुरिति शब्दाक्षरम् हंकारोऽपि वक्ष्यमानेन मकरन्दाकारेण अनाहृतं
 15 वज्जानङ्गाक्षररूपो वज्जधरो जात इत्यर्थः ॥

2. T. रजभूषि MS. रजभूसिद्धं । T. अङ्गोहोहसिद्धं MS.
 restores it from Tib: *bskyod pa gos 'gyur bas as* अङ्गोहोहं सिद्धं
 (अत्योभेन श्रितः) । 3. T. विय MS. विद्धं । T. दिद्धं MS. दिद्धं ।
 5. T. सुखा शोभावेनष्टितं, HS. सुखस्वभावेन स्थितं । 6. T. तं देहं, evidently a mistake for
 तदेवं । T. ज्ञानाधिष्ठितो HS. ज्ञानाधिष्ठितो- । 8. T. takes अवधूद् with the
 first line. T. पङ्क किञ्च मूलं विज्जं भाविद्धं- MS. पाँक मूलविज्जं
 भाविद्धं । 9. T. हंकार MS. हंकारो । 10. T. निरं, MS. नीरं । T.
 अनाभोगेण, HS. न- । 14. T. यवताक्षरं HS. शब्दाक्षरं ।

ननु अवधूतीवांश्चल्लोक्तानि षण्डमृणालपत्राणि कानीत्याह—

ललणा रसणा रविससि तुडिअ देसा वि पासे ।

पत्त-चउट्ट चउ-मूणाल ठिअ महासुह वासे ॥५॥

अयमर्थः । वामनासापुटे प्रज्ञाचन्द्रस्वभावेन ललनास्थिता । दक्षिणनासा-
पुटे उपायसूर्यस्वभावेन रसना स्थिता । द्वे षण्डे स्थिते । द्वयोः षण्डयोः वाम- 5
दक्षिणयोः [पार्श्वयोः] । तथा च हेवञ्जे—

ललना प्रज्ञास्वभावेन रसनोपायसंस्थिता ।

अवधूती मध्यदेशे तु ग्राह्यग्राहकवर्जिता ॥ इति ।

ग्राह्यं ज्ञेयं ग्राहको ज्ञानं ताभ्यां वर्जिता । तत्र इयाभिन्नमितिभावः । ज्ञेय-
ज्ञानयोर्जन्यजनकेभ्यो तयोर्विपर्ययाभावेन सत्तालाभ्युदासादित्यर्थः । शून्याति- 10
शून्य महाशून्यसर्वशून्यमिति चतुःशून्यस्वरूपेण पत्रचतुष्टयं चतुरादिस्वरूपेण
चतुर्मणालसंस्थिता । कुत्रेत्याह—महासुखं वसत्वस्मिन्निति महासुखावास
उष्णीषकमलं तत्र सर्वशून्यालयो डाकिनिजालात्मकजालंधराभिधानं मेरुगिरि-
शिखरमित्यर्थः ।

एवंकार वीअ लइअ कुसुमिअ-अरविन्द ए ।

महुअर-रूपँ सुरअ-वीर जिंघइ मअरन्द ए ॥६॥

एवं बीजं गृहीत्वा कुसुमितं अरविन्दं कमलं मधुकररूपेण चित्तवज्रप्रज्ञोपाय-
योगात् सुरतमनवच्छिन्नमहारागरूपेण विरागदमनाद्वीरः मकरन्दं पुष्परसं सुरत-

1. T. °वेङ्गूलोक्तता HS. °वोङ्गूलोक्तता । T. काणि, HS. कानि- । 2. T. वविश, HS. रविशशि । T. तुडिअ, HS. तुडिआ । 3. T. चउ पत्तर चउक्कम चउ मृणाल ; MS. पत्त-चउट्ट चउ-मुणाल ; 3. T. थिअ, MS. ठिअ । 5. T. स्वर्गयोः HS. षण्डयोः । 7. T. रशीनो, HS. रसनो- । 8. T. अवधूति, HS. अवधूती । 15. T. °काल, MS. °कार । T. लइ, MS. लइअ । कुसुमिअ, MS. °अउ । 16. T. रूप, MS. रूपँ । T. मअरन्दतए, MS. मअरन्दए ।

वीरतया च अच्युतं महारागं सुखं चित्तं वज्रोऽनुभवतीत्यर्थः । नतु स्वयं
विषयीभूय अनादिक्रमेण फलं निष्पाद्य जिघ्रन्ति । कथं दृश्यते आगमान्तरे ।
तथा च श्रीहेवज्जे—

स्वयं कर्त्ता स्वयं हर्त्ता स्वयं राजा स्वयं प्रभुरिति । स्वयं हर्त्तेति स्वयमेव
5 संहाररूपः । स्वयं प्रभुरिति सर्वाधिपत्ययुक्तवत् । विश्वरूपमणिरिव प्रकाश-
स्फुरणसंहारस्वरूपः ।

पञ्च महाभूआ विश्व लङ् सामगिण जडूअ ।

पूहवि अत्र तेअ गंधवह गअण सञ्जडूअ ॥७॥

अयमर्थः । पञ्चमहाभूतानि पृथिवी अप्तेजो वायु आकाशादिपञ्चकं बीजं
10 गृहीत्वा सामग्र्या बोलकक्कोलयोगेन तदेव दर्शयन्नाह कर्कशत्वात् कठिना पृथ्वी
द्रवत्वाज्जलं तेजोघर्षणात् हुतवहोग्निः सञ्जातः गगणात् समीरणः । सुखरूपत्वात्
गगनं । भूतपञ्चकैः परिपूर्णमिलितं शरीरमित्यर्थः । तथा च श्रीहेवज्जे—
कस्माद्भौतिकः स्कन्धः । भगवानाह—

बोलकक्कोलयोगेन स्पर्शात् काठिन्यधर्म्मणः ।

15 * * * * पृथिवी तत्र जायते ॥

बोधिचित्तं द्रवाकारादपधातोश्च सम्भवः ।

तेजो जायते घर्षणात् गमनाद्वायुः प्रकीर्त्तितं ।

सौख्यमाकाशधातुश्च पञ्चभिः परितः स्थितम् ॥

अयमर्थः । तत्रेति सहजे पृथिवीधातुरुत्पद्यते । बोल वज्र कक्कोल पञ्च
20 वज्रपद्मसंयोगेनेत्यभिप्रायः । तत्र सहजे बोधिचित्तं जायते शुक्रमुत्पद्यते । तस्य

7. T. महाभुता । 8. T. कठिन before पूहवि ; MS. अह instead of
अव । T. गंतवह which also can be retained but the comm. and Tib. have
हुतवह which MS. accepts. HS. inserts गअण after it. 10. T. कलकक्कोल-
योगेन which HS. corrects as बोलकक्कोलयोगेन । 12. T. गमणं, HS. गमणं ।

चन्द्ररूपत्वादपः-सम्भव उत्पाद इति । वर्षणात् तेजो जायते । वज्रपद्मवर्षणेन तेजोधातुवत्पद्यते । गगनात् वायुः प्रकीर्तितः चालनरूपत्वाद्वायुधातुः प्रकीर्तिता । सौख्यमाकाशधातुश्च सौख्यरूपत्वात् ।

गञ्जण समीरण सुहवासे पञ्चेहिँ परिपूषण ।

सञ्जल सुरासुर एहु उञ्जति वट्टिए एहु सो सुषण ॥८॥

5

अयमर्थः । गगनमाकाशं समीरणो वायुः तयोः सुखावासे सुखस्थाने पञ्चभिर्महाभूतैः परिपूषण इति । सकलानां मनुष्यादीनां सुरासुराणां उत्पत्तिकारणं पञ्च इति । तदेव सकल सुरासुरः किम्भूत इत्याह । एतत् ज्ञानरहितत्वात् वट्टे मूर्ख इत्यक्षरेण सम्बोधनम् । एतदेव भूतपञ्चकं स्वभावविरहात् शून्यनिस्तरङ्ग-
स्वतुर्थः सहजरूपमित्यर्थः । तथाच—

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आसाद्य कोऽपि लवणं जलमेकदेशे
क्षीराम्बुधिं सकलमेव परिच्छिनत्ति ।
भावैकरूपमवगम्य तथैकदेशे
तैधातुकं सकलमेव परिच्छिनत्ति ॥

तथापर प्रकारः ।

15

पृथिव्या इन्द्रियं नासिका तस्या विषयो गन्धः । पृथिव्यामेव गन्धो नान्यत्र । अपामिन्द्रियं रसना तस्या विषयो रसः नियमेन रसमेव गृह्णाति । तेजस इन्द्रियं चक्षुः तस्य विषयो रूपम् । वायोरिन्द्रियं त्वक् तस्य विषयः स्पर्शः भगलिङ्गादि-
स्पर्शविषयः । आकाशस्य इन्द्रियं श्रोत्रं तस्य विषयो हि शब्दः नियमेन शब्दमेव गृह्णाति नान्यत् । एतदेव स्पष्टयन्नाह—

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4. T. सुहवामहि MS. सुहवासे ।

5. T. वट्टिए, MS. वट्टिए ।

T. सुद्ध । 7. T. शाशरोवर HS. corrects सकल सुरासुर । 11. T. क्षीराम्बुधिं HS.

क्षीराम्बुधिं । 12. T. विनली HS. -च्छिनत्ति ।

खिति जल जलण पवण गअण वि माणह ।

मण्डलचक्क विसअवुद्धि लइ परिमाणह ॥६॥

एतदेव भूतपञ्चकं विषयो वज्राब्जसंयोगात् तासिन्निति या बुद्धिः सुखचित्तं सा विषयबुद्धिः तामादाय मादृगुपदेशात् पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायाकाश पर्यन्तं यावत् प्रतिपद्यस्व । एतेन तत् कीदृशं भवतीत्याह—

5

णित्तरङ्गं सम सहजरूपं सअल-कलूस-विरहिए ।

पाप-पुण-रहिए कुच्छ गाहि काण्हु फुड़ कहिए ॥१०॥

अयमर्थः । तरङ्गभावान्निस्तरङ्गं समं निर्वाणं सहजरूपं सकलकलुषविरहितं विरागादि पानैर्विरहितं परित्यक्तमित्यर्थः तथा च ओमदादिबुद्धेन—

10

विरागात् [न] परं पापं न पुण्यं सुखतः परं ।

अतोऽक्षरसुखे चित्तं निवेश्यन्तु सदा नृप ॥

ततश्च एतेन त्रैधातुकञ्च निस्तरङ्गसहजरूपं वेदितव्यं पञ्चमहाभूत-परिघटित-त्वात् । तथा च श्रीहिवज्जे—

सुखं क्खणं सुखं पीतं सुखं रत्तं सुखं सितम् ।

सुखं नीलं सुखं क्खणं सुखं सर्व्वं चराचरम् ॥

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इत्येवंभूते महासुखं सुखाभिधानेऽपि दुःखरहितावस्थिताविति पापं रागादि-दुःखं पुण्यं रागसुखं तत्रैकमपि नास्ति । तथाच श्रीसम्पुटे—

रागञ्चैव विरागञ्च वर्ज्जयित्वा पुनः स्थितः ।

स्फुटञ्च क्खणाचार्य्यकथितमेतत् [न] अन्यैः कथितमित्यर्थः । एतच्च ज्ञान

1. T. मानह ; 2. T. विषय ; 6. T. करूप, MS. कलुस ; T. विरहिते MS. विरहिए । 7. T. फुल, MS. फुड़ । T. फुल काण्ह कहिए, MS. काण्ह फुल कहिए ।

बहिर्मुखैः बहिरात्मयोजनाय । कृष्णं श्यामं कृष्णं शबलं कच्छदुःखं जातमिति
दर्शयन्नाह—

वहिष्णिक्कलिञ्चा कलिञ्चा सुष्णासुष्ण पट्ट ।

सुष्णासुष्ण वेष्णि मज्जे^१ रे वट्ट किम्पि ण दिट्ठ ॥११॥

अयमर्थः । बहिर्निर्गतसर्वभावानां शून्यत्वेनाकारचक्रमारब्ध अशून्यञ्च शरीरे 5
कल्पितयोगेन रागान्तमपि धिया प्रविश्य तदा च मूलोभूता अनयोः शून्याशून्ययो-
र्मध्ये रे मूढ किमपि तत्त्वं न दृष्टं न ज्ञातमित्यर्थः ॥ एवञ्चेत् नास्त्येव किञ्चित्तत्त्व-
मित्याह—

सहज एक्कु पर अत्थि तहि^२ फुड् काणहु परजाणइ ।

सत्यागम वहु^३ पट्टइ सुणइ वट्ट किम्पि ण जाणइ ॥१२॥ 10

अयमर्थः । सहजमेकं परं तत्त्वमस्ति । तच्च कृष्णवज्रः परं जानाति ।
शास्त्राणि तर्कादीनि आगमाः क्रियाचर्यादिकाणि बहुविधानि पठति पाठयति
शृणोति आवयति च किमपि [न जानाति] वज्रयानादिनिरुत्तरमन्त्रनयरहस्य-
बहिर्मुखत्वात्तत् पुनर्मत्सदृशः परं जानातीत्यर्थः ॥

अह ण गमइ ऊह ण जाइ ।

वेष्णि-रहिञ्च तसु णिच्चल ठाइ ॥ 15

1. T. 'योगणाय' HS. 'योजनाय । T. 'सबलं' HS. 'शबलं' । 2. T. 'दर्शयन्नाह ।

3. T. 'निकलित्ता कलिञ्चा, MS. 'निकलिञ्चा कलिञ्चा । 3. T. 'पट्टत्ता MS.

पट्टइ । 4. T. 'वेष्णी MS. 'वेष्णि । 4. T. 'माजरे वट्ट MS. 'मज्जे^१ रे

वट्ट । 4. T. 'नहि दट्ठ' MS. 'न दिट्ठ । 9. T. 'एक परअत्थे MS. 'एक्कु

पर अत्थि । 9. T. 'तहि फुल्ल काण परजइ MS. 'तहि^२ फुड् काण पर जाणइ ।

10. MS. 'वहु शत्यागम । 10. T. 'पठइ MS. 'पट्टइ । T. 'वट्ट MS. 'वट्ट ।

T. 'जानइ । 15. MS. 'अह^३ न गमइ ण ऊह^३ जाइ । 16. T. 'वेष्णि,

MS. 'वेष्णि । T. 'निच्चल ।

भणद् काण्व मण कववि ण फुट्टइ ।

णिच्चल पवण घरिणि घरे वट्टइ ॥१३॥

अधो न गच्छत्यपानवायोनिरोधात् उर्ध्वं न गच्छति प्राणवायोनिरोधात् ।
 द्वाभ्यामूर्द्धाधः प्राणापानाभ्यां रहितं परित्यक्तं तस्य तथारूपेण बोधिचित्तं निरस्य
 5 तिष्ठतीति । तदेव दर्शयन्नाह । भणति कणाचार्यः मन बोधिचित्तं कथमपि
 न स्फुटति न रुध्यति इत्यर्थः ॥ एवंभूतं बोधिचित्तं कुत्र वर्त्तत इति तदेव
 स्पष्टयन्नाह—

वरगिरिकन्दर गुहिर जगु तहिँ सअल वि तुट्टइ ।

विमल सलिल सोस जाइ कालाग्नि पइट्टइ ॥१४॥

- 10 अयमर्थः । वरः श्रेष्ठो गिरिः कङ्कालरूपो मेरुगिरिः । तथा च श्रीसम्पूटे—
 स्थितः पादतले वायुः भैरवो धनुराकृतिः ।
 स्थितोऽस्ति कटिदेशे तु त्रिकोणोद्धरणन्तथा ॥
 वर्त्तुलाकाररूपोहि वरुणस्त्रिदले स्थितः ।
 हृदये पृथिवी चैव चतुरस्रा समन्ततः ॥
 15 कङ्कालदण्डरूपोहि सुमेरुगिरिराट् तथा । इति ।

तस्य कन्दरं कुहरं तदेव पञ्चानामगोचरत्वाद् गम्भीरं तत्र किम्भवतीत्याह ।
 तत्र नैरात्मधातुः जगत् सकलमेव उत्पन्नं स्थिरोभवति । एतेन किं स्यादित्याह ।
 विमलं निवृत्त्या सुखरूपेण सलिले सांवृतशक्रद्ववाकारेण विमलरूपं समरूपं
 बोधिचित्तं शेषं यात्यधः पततीत्याह । तथा च शुक्रसिद्धौ—

- 20 पतिते बोधिचित्ते तु सर्वसिद्धिनिधानके ।
 मूर्च्छिते स्कन्धविज्ञाने कुतः सिद्धिरनिन्दिता ॥

1. T. मन । 2. T. घर वर्त्तइ MS. घरे वट्टइ । 8. T.
 कुहिर, MS. गुहिर । 8. T. तहिँ सअल चित्तं त्यइ, MS. तहिँ सअल वि
 तुट्टइ । 14. MS. जाइ ज । 14. T. कालाग्नि ।

कालाग्निधूत्ववस्था कृष्णप्रतिपत्प्रवेशकालप्रवृत्त इति कथयितम् ॥ अच्युते
महाराग-सुखमनुभवतीत्याह—

एह सो उद्धमेरु धरणिधर समविसम उत्तार ण पावइ ।

भणइ काण्ह दुल्लख दुखवाह को मणे परिभावइ ॥१५॥

अयमर्थः । एषोऽयं बालयोगो दुःखेन प्राणापाननिरोधेन सर्वथा निश्चलमनसे 5
निश्चलत्वेन नहि क्रमति चन्द्रमाः । एवं पूर्वोक्तो मेरुः तत्र समविसम इति
प्राणापानयोः प्रवेशनिष्काशाभ्यां तथा चोत्तरमूर्धमेरुशिखरं न प्राप्नोति । अतएव
भणति कृष्णः देवानामलक्षितत्वात् आकाशकामसाधारणं योगिनामगोचरं
परमं तत्त्वं दुखगाहं को मनसि व्यवलोकयति ।

जो संवेअइ मण रअण अहरह सहज फरन्त ।

10

सो पर जाणइ धम्म-गइ अस्स कि मुणइ कहन्त ॥१६॥

यः संवेत्ति मनोरत्नं कुलिशाजसंयोगात् अच्युतिरूपं बोधिचित्तं अहर्निशं
सहजस्वभावं परिस्फुटं स परमयोगीन्द्रो धर्मस्य यथाभूतगतिं जानाति नान्यो
होन्द्रियघर्षणलक्षणसुखाभिनिविष्टः इति अतएव आह—

पहं वहन्ते णिअमण वन्धस्स किअउ जेण ।

15

तिहुअण सअल विफारिआ पुणु संहारिअ तेण ॥१७॥

सन्दरूपं बोधिचित्तं स्थिरोक्तं येन योगीन्द्रेण त्रिभूवनं कायानन्दाचेत्तान-

3. T. सो उद्धर, HS. सो उद्ध [मि]र, MS. सुद्धर । MS. धरणिधर ।
T. उत्तार, उत्तार । 4. T. दुक्ख दुद्धर, MS. दुल्लख । T. मने ।
T. has परम तत्त्वे after मने which MS. omits. 10. T. संवेअण,
MS. संवेअइ । 11. T. पर, MS. पर । T. सुनइ, MS. सुनइ ।
15. T. पहवहन्ते HS. सहजानन्दे MS. पहं वहन्तेण । T. णिअमण । T.
वधन, HS. पंदन, MS. वन्धनं । T. किअउ, MS. किअउ । 16. T. सयल,
T. तेन ।

स्वरूपं सकलं निरवशेषं स्फुरितं मत्वा पुनः संहारितं सहजानन्दे प्रवेशितं
सुखाभिधाने निवेशितम् इति भावः ॥ अत आह—

काहिं तथागत लभए देवो कोह-गणहि ।

मण्डलचक्रविमुक्क अच्छुँ सहज खणेहि ॥१८॥

- 5 अयमर्थः । किमर्थम् । चित्तवज्रतथागता देवो क्रोधगणे लभ्यतेति मण्डल-
चक्रविमुक्तः सहजक्षणे तिष्ठामीति सम्बन्धः । स्तब्धधात्वायतानाद्याः कालकाय-
वाक्चित्तमण्डलदेवताश्चेत् महासुखोपदेशसमरसोभावं गताः तद्धेतुदेव महा
मण्डलं प्रतो नान्यतः पृथग्मण्डलमस्तोति तथा च गुटिकातन्त्रे—

सर्वाङ्गभावनातीतं कल्पनाकल्पवर्जितम् ।

- 10 मात्राविन्दुसमायुक्तं एतन्मण्डलमुत्तमम् ॥ इति ।

सहजे णिच्चल जेण किअ समरसे णिअमण-राअ ।

सिद्धो सो पुण तक्खणे णउ जरामरणह स भाअ ॥१९॥

- अयमर्थः । सहजे महासुखोपायेन निश्चलमस्त्वलितरूपं कायानन्दाद्येकरसी-
भावेन बोधिचित्तं ज्ञानानन्दचतुर्थं येन योगिना कृतमिति सम्बन्धः । तदभ्यास-
15 पर्यन्तेन वृत्त्यागमन[तत्]क्षणात् जरामरणं विहाय सिद्धो भवति । महामुद्रां
करोतीत्यर्थः । तथा च त्र्योसमाजे—अरुणोद्गमवेलायां सिद्ध्यन्ते नात्र संशयः ।

तमेवार्थं स्पष्टयन्नाह—

णिच्चल णिच्चिअप्प णिच्चिअर ।

उअअ-अयमण-रहिअ सुसार ॥

3. T. काहिं, MS. काहिं । 3. T. लभते, MS. लभए । T. has उ
after लभते which MS. omits : 3. T. कहगणोहि, MS. कोह° । 4.
MS. insert होह after विमुक्क । 6. T. स्तब्धधात्वा° HS. स्तब्धधात्वा° । 11. T.
11. T. येन किय, MS. जेन किअ । 11. MS. समरसे° । T. णिअमण ।
12. T. सिद्धे MS. सिद्धो । T. भाय । 13. T. °वेकलसा HS. °वेकरसी-
14. T. तदभ्यासपर्यन्तेन HS. तदभ्यासपर्यन्तेन । 18. T. णिचल MS. णिच्चल । T.
णिच्चिअप्प MS. णिच्चिअप्प ।

अइसो सो णिव्वाण भणिज्जइ ।

जहि मण माणस किमि ण किज्जइ ॥२०॥

अयमर्थः । निश्चलं सर्वसंकल्पवशुभिरचलत्वात् निर्विकल्पं सुद्वारहित्वेन निर्विकारमिन्द्रियातीतत्वात् उदयास्तं गमनरहितत्वेन शरदमलमध्याह्नसन्निभम् खसमाकारमेतन्निर्व्याणं भण्यते । यत्र यावन्मनश्चित्तं मनसा चतुरशीतिप्रकृतयो 5 न किमपि क्रियते । एतादृशः स्वपरापरसंकल्पं किञ्चिदपि न जायते । तत्र प्रभास्वरज्ञानोदयसमय इत्यर्थः ॥

एवंकार जे बुज्झिअ ते बुज्झिअ सअल असेस ।

धम्म करण्डहो सोहु रे णिअ पहुकेरो वेस ॥२१॥

अयमर्थः । एवंकार इति । शून्यताकरुणाभिन्नरूपिणी महामुद्रा इत्यं 10 एवंकारं येन प्रतीयते तेन योगीन्द्रेण स्कन्धधात्वायतनादोनां प्रतीतमिति । सैव महामुद्रा धर्मकरण्डकरुणा धर्मकायात् । अतस्तेषां करण्डकण्ठानां सैव रसं बोधनं निजप्रभोर्ध्वधरस्य वेश आभरणं अलङ्कारः शोभनमिति यावत् । तथा च श्रीहेवञ्ज—

एकाराकृति यद्विद्यं मध्ये वंकारभूषितम् ।

15

आलयः सव्वसौख्यानां बुद्धरत्नकरण्डकम् ॥

अन्यप्राप्यज्ञः—

एकारस्तु भवेत् माता वकारस्तु रताधिपः ।

विन्दुः चानाहतं ज्ञानं तज्जातान्यक्षराणि च ॥

2. T. मन, मानस, न । 5. T. चतुरसोति- । 8. MS. जे । 8. T. बुज्झिअ in both the cases MS. बुज्झिअ । 8. T. अशेष, MS. अशेस । 9. T. निच । T. पहुँ करो वेश, MS. पहुँ केरो वेश ।

जइ पवण-गमण-दुआरे दिढ़ ताला वि दिज्जइ ।

जइ तसु घोराब्धारे मण दीवहो किज्जइ ॥

जिण रअण उअरें जइ सो वर अम्बरु कुप्पइ ।

भणइ काण्ह भव भुज्जन्ते णिव्वाणो वि सिज्जइ ॥२२॥

- 6 अयमर्थः । पवनस्य गमनद्वारं तत्राहं यदिदमभेदितमभेद्यतालसंपुटीकरणं चन्द्रसूर्ययोर्मार्गनिरोधं दीयते । यदि तस्मिन् घोराब्धकारे मनोर्वृत्तिर्बोधिचित्तं तदेव महासुखप्रकाशकत्वात् दीपः क्रीयते तज्जिनरत्नं अधज्जुपन्नं वरगगणाख्य-मवधूती स्पृशति तमालिङ्गयति । एतेन किं स्यादित्याह । भणति कृष्णवज्रः तदेव भवं भुज्यमाने सति पञ्चकामगुणानुभवं कुर्वाणं निर्व्वाणं महासुद्रापदं
- 10 साक्षाद्भवति ।

एतदेव स्पष्टयन्नाह—

ओ णत्थु णिच्चल किअउ मण सो धम्मक्खर पास ।

पवणहो वज्जइ तक्खणे विसअा होन्ति णिरास ॥२३॥

- अयमर्थः । स पुरुषो वज्जाजेयोगे निश्चलीकृत्य मनो बोधिचित्तं पूर्वोक्त-
15 लक्षणाणाहताक्षर महासुद्रापार्श्वे पवनोऽपि प्राणवायुर्बध्यते । तत्क्षणं क्षणान्तरं नापेक्षित इत्यर्थः । अष्टादशधातुविकाररहितत्वात् । तथा च सरहपादाः—

ते धातवः क्षीणतरा बभूवुर्वायुः स्वतन्त्रो यत एष एव ।

सा कामिनी कामुक[क]ण्डलम्ना अद्यापि किं कायसुखं सुहृन्मे ॥

ननु धर्माक्षरमे[तत्] कुत्र ज्ञातव्यमिति ।

1. T. पवनगमन । T. दित ताला विभिज्जइ, MS. दिढ़ ताला वि दिज्जइ । 2. T. घोराब्धारे, MS. घोर अब्धारें । 2. T. दिव हो MS. दीवहो । The third line in the T. is incomplete. 3. T. उअज्जइ, MS. उअरें जइ । 3. MS. adds after this सो [वर] अम्बरं कुप्पइ । 4. T. भुज्जते MS. भुज्जन्ते । T. निव्वाणो । T. मिज्जइ । 12. T. जइ निच्चल, T. धम्मक्खर MS. धम्मक्खर । 13. T. पवन हो, T. विसअा ।

परमविरम जहिँ वेखि उएक्खइ ।

तहिँ धम्मक्खर मज्झे लक्खइ ॥

अइस उएसे जइ फुड सिज्जाइ ।

पवण घरिणि तहिँ णिच्चल वज्झइ ॥२४॥

अयमर्थः । परमविरमौ रागविरागौ कालविकालरूपौ हावुपेक्षध्वं । तत्र 5
धर्माक्षरमुक्तलक्षणं षोडशीकलारूपं मध्ये लक्षयेदिति । पूर्वोक्तज्ञानमुद्रोपदेश-
प्रतिपादनार्थमाह । ईदृशेन मन्त्रनयोपदेशेन यदि स्फूटमेतत् ज्ञानमुद्रा सिद्धयति
सम्पद्यते तदा किं भवतीत्याह । प्राणवायोर्गृहिण्याः तस्या ज्ञानमुद्रायाः शवरो-
रूपायाः स्थिरं बाध्यते निश्चलीभवतीत्यर्थः । ननु शवरो-तावत् पतिता शवरः
पुनः किंभूतः कुत्र वसतोत्याह ।

10

वरगिरि-सिहर उत्तुङ्ग मुणि सवरे जहिँ किअ वास ।

णउ सो लंघिअ पच्चाणणेहि करिवर दुरिअ आस ॥२५॥

वरगिरिः स एवं पूर्वोक्तगिरिस्थाने शिखरं शृङ्गं तदेव महासुखाधारत्वात्
उत्तुङ्गं महत् तत्र शवरेण वज्रधरेण भगवता कृतो वासः किं विशिष्ट इत्याह ।
न तल्लङ्घितो नाक्रान्तः केनेति पञ्चमण्डलात्मकं प्राणपवनं करिवरस्य चित्तगजेन्द्रस्य 15
दूरतरमिति ।

एहु सो गिरिवर कहिअ मइँ एहुसो महासुह ठाव ।

एकु रअणि सहजखण लवभइ महासुह जाव ॥२६॥

1. T. जहि, MS. जहिँ ; T. उएक्ख MS. उएक्खहि ; 2. T. तहि धम्मक्खर
MS. तहिँ धम्मक्खर ; T. मज्झे ; HS. corrects मज्झे, MS. मज्झे ;
3. T. फुल, MS. फूड ; 4. पवन ; T. निश्चल । 11. T. शिहर ; T. मुणि,
MS. मलि ; 12. T. has सो after णउ which MS. omits : 12. T.
पञ्चाननेहि, MS. पञ्चाननेहिँ ; T. करिवर ; T. मणि, MS. मंइ ; T. थाव,
MS. ठाव ; T. निसम्भ, MS. सिम्भइ ; 18. T. लवभइ, MS. लव
लवभइ ।

अयमर्थः । स एव गिरिवरः कथितो मया कृष्णवज्रेण नान्येन कथितं
महिधा अपरे कथितुं [न] समर्थ इति विवृत्या एतदेव महासुखस्थानं पूर्वोक्तमेव
स्थली एतस्मिन् । तदेव महासुखलक्षणं निर्व्वाणं कुरुत यावच्चतुर्दशभूमिश्चरो
वज्रधरपदं न लभ्यते । किम्भूतोऽसौ वज्रधर इत्याशङ्क्याह—

5 सव जगु काअ वान्न-मण मिलि विफुरइ तहिसो दूरे ।

सो एहु भट्टे महासुह णिव्वाण एकु रे ॥२७॥

अयमर्थः । सर्वे ते वैरोचनादयस्तथागता रूपादिपञ्चस्कन्धस्वरूपेण जगदा-
कारास्तेषां कायवाक्चित्तं पृथिव्यादिरूपेण वैरोचनादिदेव्याहि ताभिर्मिलितमेक-
लोलोभूतं महारागादि संबोधिलक्षणवज्रधरशरीरं क्षोरनौरन्यायेन एभिः समरसी-
10 भावः तत्रैव वज्रधरशरीरे तदेव कायवाक्चित्तादिकं जलतरङ्गन्यायेन विस्फुरति ।
अनेन त्रैधातुकं वज्रधरशरीरमित्यर्थः ॥

एकु ण किज्जइ मन्त ण तन्त ।

णिअ घरिणी लइ केलि करन्त ॥

णिअ घरे घरिणी जाव ण मज्जइ ।

15 ताव कि पञ्चवस विहरिज्जइ ॥२८॥

अस्यायमर्थः । एकमपि न क्रियते मन्त्रो न मन्त्रजापः तन्त्रो न तन्त्रपाठः
निजगृहिणी ज्ञानमुद्रा शुचित्वावभासा सद्गुरूपदेशेन तां गृहीत्वा केलि क्रीडां
कुर्वता योगिना स्थेयमिति । तथावादि च—

5. P. सवज्जभो which HS. reconstructs as स वज्जगु[र] but MS.
वन जगु ; T. मिलिष, MS. मिलि ; 5. T. विफूलइ, MS. विफूरइ ; 6. T.
निव्वाण ; T. एधूरे, MS. एकूरे । 1. एक, MS. एकू ; 13. T. धरणि ;
14. T. घर, MS. घरे ; 15. T. पञ्चवर्ण, MS. पञ्चवस ।

केचित्तस्याभासमात्रा सुमनसि जनिता दर्शविम्बोपमा वै ।
योगिन्दैः सेवनीया परमजिनसुतैः सेविता या च बुद्धैः ॥
सा ज्ञानाच्चिः प्रवृद्धा दहति सविषयं मारवृन्दं समस्तं ।
रागादिच्चापि काये दहति समसुखं योगिनां वर्षयोगात् ॥

एतस्यां भगवत्यां आसक्तेन योगिना मन्त्रतन्त्रग्रहो न कर्त्तव्यमिति । निज- 5
गृहिणी महामुद्रारूपं तत्र गृहिणी सैव ज्ञानमुद्रा यावन्न मज्जति न लीयते तावत्
किं पञ्चवर्णसंस्थानैः किं क्रियत इति । अस्या एव महामुद्रायाः फलं साधनोपायत्वं
निश्चयेन दर्शयन् पुनस्तदेवाह ।

एसो जप-होमे मण्डल-कश्चे ।
अणुदिना अच्छसि काहिउ धम्मे ॥
तो विणु तरुणि णिरन्तर येहेँ ।
वोहि कि लव्भइ एण वि देहेँ ॥२६॥

10

अनेन बाह्यभूतेन होमेन मण्डलकर्म्मणा अनुदिनं तिष्ठसि किं मृदु मनसा-
[मृ]दु [केन] प्रकारेण । कथमेतत् सर्व्वं निष्फलमिति । तथा विना सदैव
रागमयः तरुण्या महामुद्रया सह रतिरन्तरमनवच्छिन्नानुरागस्तेन विना किं 15
महामुद्रा लभ्यते अनेन मनुष्यदेहेनेति । मनुष्यदेहं विहाय देहान्तरेण बोधिर्न
स्यात् किं सत्यमेतत् । कुतः नरा वज्रधराकारा योषितो वज्रयोषितः इति
वचनात् तस्याः फलमाह ।

जैँ बुझिअ विरल सहजखण काहिँ वेअ-पुराण ।

तेँ तुडिअ विसअ-विअप्प जगु रे असेस परिमाण ॥२७॥

20

9. T. एष, MS. एसो ; 10. T. दिन ; 11. T. णिरन्तर येहे ; 12. T.
लाभइ । 19. T. बुझि अविरल सहज सुण काहि— MS. जैँ बुझिअ—
सहजखण काहिँ— ; 20. T. तेपोतोलिअ— HS. तेनो तोलिअ, MS. तेँ
तुडिअ ; T. विषय वियप्प- MS. विसअ-वियप्प ; T. अशेष ।

येन प्रतीतं सदोदितं महासुद्रास्वरूपं सहजलक्षणं पूर्वस्मात् ख्यातमागमं तेन योगिना सकलविकल्पावशेषमनो अहंकार स्फोटितमु[न्मूलितमित्य]र्थः ।

जैँ किअ णिच्चल मण-रअण णिअ घरिणौ लइ एत्थ ।

सोह वाजिर णाहु रे मयिँ वुत्त परमत्थ ॥३१॥

5 अयमर्थः । येन कृतं प्रचण्डाली चालयितुमशक्यत्वात् निश्चलं मनोरत्नं बोधिचित्तं निजगृहिणी इयमेव दिव्यसुद्रा तत्रैव एवंकारे महासुखस्थाने स एव वज्रो वज्रधरो नाथः कायवाक्चित्तप्रभुः । उक्तो मया कृष्णवज्रेण परमोऽ-
कृत्रिमोऽयमर्थः । एतस्मिन्नन्यथा नास्तीत्यर्थः । एतदेव स्पष्टयन्नाह—

जिम लोण विलिज्जइ पाणिण्हि तिम घरिणौ लइ चित्त ।

10 समरस जाइ तक्खणे जइ पुण ते सम णित्त ॥३२॥

अयमर्थः । यथा लवणं विलीयते पानीयेन तथा गृहिणी ज्ञानरूपिणी गृहित्वा चित्तं समरसमेकलोलोभावं गच्छेत् तत्क्षणं यदि पुनस्तया सुखचित्त-
रूपया गृहिण्या समं नित्यं अवस्थितो भवतीति एतेन युगनडा वज्रसत्त्वा दर्शिता इति ।

इत्याचार्य्येपादीय-दोहाकोषमेखलाटीकासमाप्ता ।

3. T. जे MS. जैँ ; T. निच्चल ; T. रयण ; T. घरणौ, T. एत्थो ; MS. एत्थ ; 4. T. सो, MS. सोहो ; T. मयो, MS. परमत्थ । 9. T. तिनिम, HS. तिम ; 10. MS. जाइँ ; 15. T. समानं । After समानं T. has शुभसंवत् [नेपाल] १०२०मिति शुभचैव शुक्र ६ शुभ वा दिने लिखितम् । शुभं भूयात् ॥

NOTES AND TRANSLATIONS.

THE DOHAKOSA OF TILLOPADA

[Text pp. 1-4 ; Text with Commentary pp. 41-51 ;
Tibetan Text—Xylograph, Narthang edition, vol. xlvii,
folia...135^a-137^a].

1. [pp. 1 ; 41], **Tib.**—

phuñ po khams dañ skye mched dbañ po rnam |
lhan cig skyes pa'i rañ bshin las |
ma lus de las byuñ shiñ de ru thim |

bhūa which is effaced in the MS. may be restored from Tib. khams—literally *dhātu*, elements. The word is also translated in the Sanskrit commentary where after the enumeration of the five *skandhas* comes that of the five *bhūtāḥ*—the five elements, earth, water, fire, air and space. The word clearly occurs in Saraha's Dohākoṣa, verse 92 (p. 21) where the first pāda is quoted verbatim—*kandha-bhūa-āaattaṇa-indī. bībandī*—the meaning of the word is not clear. It is translated in Tib. as 'thim' which literally means 'to be lost,' 'to be dissolved in' *vilīna*. In the commentary there was a lacuna which I have restored as *badhyante*.

Com.—Tillopāda is speaking of the purification, through Sahaja, of the present aggregates (*skandha*), elements (*bhūtāḥ*) etc., which themselves are the causes of the future aggregates, elements, etc. The aggregates are five in number, relating respectively to form (*rūpa*), sensation (*vedanā*), notion (*saṃjñā*), operant (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*viññāna*). The elements

are five in number relating respectively to earth, water, fire, air and space. The sense organs (*āyatana*) and the senses (*indriya*) are six in number relating to the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. All these disappear when the sahaja-nature arises. Now the question is, whether this sahaja-nature is a positive (*bhāva-svabhāva*) or a negative (*abhāva*^o) state. If it be a positive state then it would imply transmigration (*saṃsāra*) and if negative, then it would imply complete annihilation. For avoiding such a confusion sahaja is defined in the next verse.

Tr.—The aggregates, elements, sense organs and senses are all bound down by (i.e., merge in) the sahaja nature.

2. [pp. 1 ; 41], **Tib.**—

lhan skyes dños dañ dños med gtam mi 'dri |
stoñ pa sñiñ rje de ru ro mñam 'dod |

'gtam mi 'dri' would be literally *kathā na pr̥ccha*. "ro mñam" is the regular translation of the term *samarasa*. It is difficult to translate this term. M. Shahidullah translates it as "identité de jouissance." It refers to a state of mind which is free from all contradictions. The second line of the Tib. is literal translation of the text : *śūnyatā karuṇe tasmin samarase icchate*. The first line of the text also occurs almost under the same form in Saraha's *Dohākoṣa*, verse 20 (p. 12) : *Sahaja sahāba na bhāvābhāva*. For the discussion on sahaja see the introduction.

Com.—The nature of sahaja is neither positive nor negative ; it involves neither transmigration nor annihilation. The state of mind in which vacuity and compassion become identical can be defined as sahaja. It has been described to be eternal, a kind of joy and the highest bliss—not merely a proposition (*saṃkalpamātra* ?). Therefore, by attaching yourself to the state of *saṃkalpa*, do not bring the sahaja nature down to

the sphere of the phenomenal world. The means of purifying the mind when it is attached to the state of *samkalpa* is indicated as follows.

Tr.—Do not think that there are existence and non-existence in *sahaja* (i.e., do not attribute positive and negative character to *sahaja*). There is in it the vacuity, compassion and *samarasa*.

3. [pp. 1 ; 42], **Tib.**—

sems la mya ñan bañs pa rgya bal sad |
kham s gsum stoñ pa gos pa med las 'shug |

'bañs pa rgya bal' is not clear. Is it a mistake for 'bañs pa rgyug pa' which means "to run a race"? In that case *hanñā* of the text should be connected with Beng. *han-han*, an onomatopoeic meaning 'a swift movement.' In the commentary however the word is interpreted as *hatvā*, "after killing." 'mya ñan' of Tib. should have been in instrumental as in the text we have *nivvāṇe* (com. *nirvāṇena*). *Paliyā* of the text seems to be a mistake for *paśiā*, as the Tib. translation shows ; Tib. 'shug means "go, go in,"—the sense which is also preserved in the commentary—"praveśyatām." The form *paśiā*, however, is not in the imperative.

Com.—When the mind seeks to attain to the state of complete concentration it should be made absolutely inactive (*lit.* to be completely killed) through *nirvāṇa* which possesses the nature of vacuity. The mind being thus killed, the pure knowledge of the vacuity of the three worlds should be attained; that is all the sense. Otherwise, the *sahaja* knowledge being in the proximity of the illusory world may be easily disturbed. *Sahaja* is meant to be a state which may not be described (*lit.* established—*apratisthita*-).

[The commentator quotes the beginning of a verse from some other text in order to illustrate the indescribable character

of Sahaja. I have not been able to trace the quotation and the text from which it is made. In the next verse the commentator refutes the views of those who criticise the truth relating to non-cogitation (*amanasikāra*).]

Tr.—Kill the mind completely through *nirvāṇa*, [and] enter into pure vacuity of the three worlds.

4. [pp. 1 ; 42], **Tib.**—

yid la ma byed gñug ma'i rañ bshin la |
brdsun pa rnams kyis skur pa ma 'dibs śig !
rañ dbaṅ yod pa dañ ñiñ 'chiñ ma byed |

In Tib. this verse occurs before the last. The Tib. is not a literal translation of the original verse—it is merely explanatory. 'Yid la ma byed' means literally "not to act in mind," *i.e.*, "not to cogitate" (*amanskṛ*). The Tib. version may be rendered as follows :—Do not decry erroneously the mental inaction in regard to the nature of the innate (? 'gñug ma'). Freedom [from mental act, *i.e.*, *amanskāra*] does not bring in bondage ('ñiñ 'chiñ'—*anubandha*).

Com.—Not to cogitate is *amanasikāra*. It is the Sahaja knowledge which is free from all possibilities of contradictions. It should not be abused by an attempt to comprehend the nature of Sahaja. So it has been said—all the contradiction that arises in the mind should be abandoned. The mind should be purified through Sahaja knowledge and fixed on that Sahaja knowledge which is free from doubts and contradictions. How to do that is described in the next verse.

[The quotation in the Com. occurs in a more complete form in the Com. on Saraha's *Dohākoṣa* (*supra*, p. 90). But there also we do not find any mention of the source from which it is quoted. It occurs again in the Com. on the *Caryācarya-viniścaya* (Śāstrī, p. 16) where it is mentioned as a quotation from the *Apratiṣṭhānaprakāśa*. In the two other contexts the

line occurs as *Yāvān kaścidvikalpaḥ prabhavati manasi tyājya-rūpaḥ sa sarvaḥ* (*supra*, p. 90) and —*tyājya-rūpaḥ hi tāvān* (Śāstrī, p. 16). The reading *prabhavati* for *yaḥ bhavati* is evidently better.]

Tr.—Do not erroneously decry non-cogitation. Do not wish bondage for self.

5. [pp. 1 ; 42], **Tib.**—

sems ni mkha' 'da mñam pa ni bde bar shugs |
dbañ po yul rnam skyed cig rtsañ ni den |

The regular translation of *khasama* in Tib. is 'mkha' mñam' but here only *kha-* has been rendered. 'da seems to be a mistake for 'di. The first line is literally, "vacuity in the mind—in this [state of] equality joy enters."

The lacuna in the second pāda can be reconstructed from the second line of Tib. which literally means—"The least origination of sense-objects goes away" The Com. has—*tatkṣaṇe ca indriyair viṣayā na dṛśyante*. The Tib. and the Com. support the restoration *i[ndīa-visaa tahi matta] na dīśai*.

Com.—The mind by its nature wants an object of attachment (. *lit.* companion). Through *khasama*, *i.e.*, knowledge of vacuity, it enters into the state of joy which arises from the union of mind with vacuity [= *samasukha*]. At that moment, the objects are not perceived by the senses. For the removal of errors (*vikalpa*) the next verse has been introduced.

Tr.—When the mind united with vacuity enters into the [state of] joy which arises out of that communion, the objects of the senses are not at all perceived.

6. [pp. 1 ; 42], **Tib.**—

thog ma spaṅs pa shiñ 'de cu tha ma spaṅs |
bla ma mchog gi shabs kyis gñis med bstan |

The meaning of 'shiñ' in the first line is not clear. It may

be taken in the sense of *ātmā* “self” for which the regular Tib. expression is ‘*bdag ñid*.’ The second pāda of the original contains a lacuna at the end, which may be restored from Tib. ‘*gñis med bstan*’—*advayam deśitam*. The Com. has *advayam kathitam*. Hence the restoration *addaa kahia* is justified. The construction is passive ; *varaguru-pāa* is therefore in the instrumental. The normal instrumental form should be *vara-guru-pāe*.

Com. The joy that arises out of the communion (*i.e.*, *samasukha*) is without beginning, due to the absence of any permanent break. It is without end as it is indestructible. Such a joy, devoid of any dual character, has been communicated by the Guru through teaching. It cannot be explained in words.

Tr.—It is without beginning, without end—such non-dual [joy] has been communicated by the best of Gurus.

7. [pp. 1 ; 43], Tib.—

sems ni gañ du shi gyur pa |
 der ni rluñ yañ thim par 'gyur |
 rañ rig pa ni de ñid 'bras bu ni |
 su shig la ni gan gis ji ltar bstan |

The first line of Tib. is not the exact translation of *tu marai jahi* of the text. It literally means “where in the mind there is appeasement.” ‘*Yañ*’—of the second line should be taken in the sense of—‘*yañ dag*’—meaning *samyak*. It conveys to some extent the meaning of *ñirāsa* of the text. The lacuna in the second line of the text may be restored from Tib.—‘*rañ rig pa ni de ñid 'bras bu ni*’=*sva-vedyam tattvaphalam*. The Com. has—*tat svasamvedyalakṣaṇa tattvam*. The expression occurs again in verse 9 [*infra*] as *saa-samvcaṇa tattaphala* and in Frag. II of Saraha [verse 10, *supra*, p. 8] as *saa-samvithā tattaphalu*.

Com.—That the mind possessed with the knowledge of formal differentiation dies and that the [vital] wind gets dissolved—is a truth which can only be realised by one's own self ; how can it be explained to another ? That this truth is not general, *i.e.*, may not be realised by everybody, is explained in the next verse.

Tr.—Where the mind dies the [vital] wind is dissolved completely. Such an essence of truth, which can be realised by self,—how can that be told ?

8. [pp. 1 ; 43], **Tib.**—

smoṅs pa'i 'jig rten 'gro ba rnams kyi spyod yul min |
 mkhas pa rnams kyis de ñid bgrod bya min |
 gaṅ la bla ma'i shabs ni mñis pa yi |
 kyi ho gaṅ zag de yi spyod yul min |

smoṅs pa'i—is clearly a mistake for—rmoṅs pa'i—which means “a fool,” translation of *baḍha* of the text. The first two lines of Tib. may be literally rendered as—*mūrkhā-loka ! lokānām agocaram paṇḍitānām tattvam agamyañ*. The third and the fourth lines of Tib. mean “He who is favoured by the Guru—can anything remain unrealised to that individual ?” The com. has *yaḥ puṇyavān gurupāda-prasannaḥ tasya tattvaṁ gamyaṁ jñātuṁ śakyam* ; hence I have restored the lacuna in the second line of the text as *jo gurupā [apasanna taḥ ki citta agamma]* though the com. requires *tatta* instead of *citta*.

Com.—The truth which is inaccessible to the fools is equally so to the learned people who are absorbed in the study of the scriptures,—*i.e.*, the study of the scriptures does not help them at all in the realisation of truth. The truth comes only to the man of virtue, who has been blessed by the Guru.

Tr.—The truth is unattainable by the fools, by other people as well as to the learned world. Can the mind remain inaccessible to him who is blessed by the Guru ?

9. [pp. 2 ; 43], **Tib.—**

rañ rig de ñid 'bras bur ni |
 tai-lo-pa yis de skad bstan pa yin |
 yid kyi spyod yul du ni gañ gyur pa |
 de ni don dam ma yin no |

The second line of the original which is translated in Tib. as—yid kyi...yin no—is omitted in our text. The Tibetan translation may be literally rendered as—*managocarāḥ viṣayāḥ yasmin tasmin paramārthāḥ na bhavanti*. The com. has *ye mano-gocara-prāptāḥ padārthās te paramārthā na bhavanti*. The Skt. com. of the Caryā-carya-viniścaya (Śāstrī, p. 62) quotes this verse in a corrupt form :—

saa-saṃbeaṇa tantaphala tilopāe bhaṇanti |
jo maṇagoara goiā so paramatthe na honti |

It also occurs in Frag. II of Saraha, (*supra* p. 8, verse 10) almost under the same form, the only difference being that it contains the name of Sarahapā instead of that of Tilopā :

saa-saṃbīṭhā tattaphala sarahapāa bhaṇanti |
jo maṇagoare pāṭṭhai so paramattha na honti |

I have therefore restored the second line of the present verse as—*jo maṇagoara pāṭṭhai so paramattha na honti*.

Com.—Tilopāda is speaking of the truth that results from self-realisation. The objects that are within the reach of the mind are not of absolute value. That which is of spontaneous origin, that great joy which has no dual character is the [absolute] truth. Such is not the case with other objects and thoughts having dual character. In the next verse the means of dissipating this *vikalpa* is described.

Tr.—Tillopāda speaks of that essential truth which is to be fully known by the self. That which reaches the mind is not the absolute truth.

After the translation of the last verse the Tib. contains translation of a few more verses of which there is no trace either in the text or in its Sanskrit commentary. Their occurrence shows that the Dohākoṣa of Tillopāda was known in more than one version and that the number of verses was not the same in them. Tib. translation of those additional verses is the following :—

de ñid bla ma'i gsuñ gis bstan par bya ba min |
 des na slob mas go pa lta yin no |
 lhan skyes 'bras bu bdud rtse'i ro |
 de ñid su shig la ni ci shig bstan |
 gañ du yid ni shi ba dañ |
 yid dño rluñ gñis mñam par shu |
 der ni ruam par kun spañs pa la |
 kham s gsum der gnas pa yin |
 rmoñs pa gñug ma'i rañ bshin śes par gyis |
 de tsho gti mug dra ba ma ltas chad par 'gyur |

Tib. had gñes (l. 6) and gti nug (l. 10) which I have corrected respectively as gñis and gti mug. The Tib. may be rendered thus—

*tadeva guror-vācā na deśitam—tat śisycna boddhavyaṁ ;
 sahaja-phalam amṛta-rasañ tadeva kaśmai kaḥ deśati. yadā
 manasi śāntiḥ [jātā] mana-paṇau dvau samatām [prāptau].
 tadā sarvaṁ parityaktaṁ ; trīṇi bhuvanāni tasmīn vasanti.
 re mūrkhā ! sahaja-svabhāvaṁ jāñhi, mūḍhā stan-na
 paśyanti.*

The first of these verses occurs in its original form in Frag. II of Saraha (verse 9, p. 7, and also Saraha IV, p. 28,

where it is quoted from the *Kriyāsamuccaya*). There are some minor variations between the two :—

ṇau tam-vāhi guru kahai ṇau tam-bujjhai sīsa |
sahajāmiarasu saala jagu kāsū kahijjai kīsa |

10. [pp. 2 ; 43], **Tib.**—

lhan cig skyes pa'i sems ni legs par sbyoṅs |
rehe 'dir dños grub thar pa lus 'dis rñiñ |

The restoration of the lacuna in the second line of the text as—*iha jammahi siddhi [mokkha bhaṅga]*—is doubtful but *bhaṅga* is almost imposed by the rhyme. In the Com. the sense is made quite clear—*mokṣaṇca prāpsyasi anena śarīreṇa*. The Tib. *rehe 'dir.....rñiñ*—literally means—*asmin janme siddhi-mokṣam anena kāyena jñanam*. *rñiñ* means—*jñana*, i.e., old, worn out. It is evidently a mistake for *rñed* “to acquire, to discover” which agrees with the meaning of *prāpsyasi* as given in the commentary. *bhaṅga* occurs in Saraha's Dohākoṣa, verse 37 (*supra*, p. 14), and there too it rhymes with *caṅga*. The word is translated by M. Shahidullah as “diversity” (*saṁsāraha bhaṅge*—la diversité du cercle de l'existence). But the Sanskrit commentary on the Dohākoṣa explains (*supra*, p. 79) *cittarūa saṁsāraha bhaṅge* as *saṁsāra-ścittamayo vā tasya bhagno sambhavalīti*, i.e., “the phenomenal world subsists in the mind—its diverse manifestations (?) arise there ;” *bhaṅga* may therefore be taken in the sense of “the different manifestations.” *Siddhi*, i.e., spiritual success and *mokkha*, i.e., spiritual liberation, are only diverse experiences made by the Yogin in course of his march. *Siddhi* and *mokkha* are not, however, the final goal. This meaning is further brought out by the commentary.

Com.—The mind which is the source of *vikalpajñāna* should be well purified through Sahaja. The people who are *siddha*

will be *śāntika*, etc., in this very life. They will attain *mokṣa* too in this very body.

[*Śāntika* is a special kind of spiritual attainment. Cf. The *Pañcakrama* of Nāgārjuna (ed. de la Vallée Poussin, p. 38, verse 30)—

Śāntikam pauṣṭikam cāpi tathā vaśyābhicārakam |
Ākarṣaṇādi yat sarvaṃ kuryād indrāyudhopamam |

In the *Tathāgataguhyaka* (ed. B. Bhattacharyya) the nature of these attainments is described (p. 168, ll. 1-2)—

Śāntike śāntacintam (sic) tu pauṣṭike puṣṭimānasam |
Vaśyc raktaṃ manah kṛtvā krodhe kruddhaṃ prasādhayet |

also p. 64 (ll. 1-2)—

Śāntike locanākāraṃ pauṣṭike padmarajinam |
Vaśyc vaīrocanapadaṃ vajrakrodho'bhicāraṃ |

In both these cases *śāntika* is translated into Chinese (Taishō Ed. Tripit, Vol. XVIII, p. 510 and p. 484 respectively) as *si-tsaï* meaning “peace.” In the *Mahāvīyutpatti* (ed. Sakaki, Section cxviii, 4241-4244), all the four spiritual powers are enumerated—*śāntika*, *pauṣṭika*, *ābhicārika* and *vaśī-karaṇam*. The meanings in Tibetan are given respectively as—*shi-ba*—peace, peaceful ; *rgyas pa*—increase, increasing ; *drag śul spyod pa*—to have a fierce look (a mystic practice) and *dbañ du bya ba*—to control, faculty of controlling others.

Therefore when the commentary explains the second *pāda* of the text as—*iha janmaṇi siddhayaḥ hi lokāḥ śāntikādayaḥ*—the idea is that the spiritual powers like *śāntika*, *pauṣṭika*, *ābhicārika* and *vaśīkaraṇa* may be obtained in this very life. But, as is well known, these powers are supposed to be of secondary importance in relation to the highest spiritual goal. Hence the meaning of *bhaṅga* in the text as “diverse manifestations” may be justified.]

Tr.—Purify the mind well through Sahaja. There will be manifestation of success and liberation in this very life.

11. [pp. 2 ; 43], **Tib.**—

gañ du sems ni 'gro ba der |
 der ni sems med par ni ltos |
 ña bye ba med par ro mñam gnas par gyis |
 sems dañ sems med ni legs par rtshol |
 reche 'di ñid pa dños grub legs par gsal por rñed |
 sems ni gañ du shi gyur pa |
 khamś gsum po ni de ru thim |

gañ du.....ni ltos=*yatra cittaḥ yāti tatra acittaṁ paśya*. This is therefore an exact translation of the first line of the text—*jahi jāi citta tahi sañahu acitta*. The second line of the text however is not literally translated, ña bye ba med par—unless faulty, may be interpreted as *aham viśeṣa-rahitaḥ* which conveys the idea of *dvayarahita* of the commentary. ro mñam gnas par gyis—*samarasaḥ rarttate*. I have restored the lacuna in the second line of the text as *samarasa [ñimmala bhācābhāva-rahia]* on the strength of the commentary—*cram dvayarahita-samarasaḥ saiva nirmalaṁ cittaṁ svabhāvaḥ śuddhabodhi-rūpaṁ*. If the restoration stands then *acitta* of the first line should be corrected as *acia* for the sake of the rhyme.

For Tibetan reche 'di.....de ru thim—there is no original in the text. It may be rendered as—*asmin janme tattvam siddhiṁ atisaṅga prāpsyasi. cittācittaṁ suṣṭhu jñāsyasi citte. yasmin śāntiḥ sambharati tribhuvanaḥ tasmin bilīnaḥ*.

Com.—The lacuna in the first part of the commentary renders it unintelligible. The second part is the comment on the second line of the verse—The *samarasa* which has no dual character is the pure and the best [state of the] mind ;—it is by its very nature the pure *bodhi* which is free from encroachment of all objects of senses.

Tr.—Where the positive aspect of the mind merges into, the negative aspect of the mind too merges. The state of communion [of the mind with vacuity] is pure and without any positive and negative character.

12. [pp. 2 ; 44], **Tib.**—The Tibetan translation of this verse is wanting. The com. contains a lacuna but its sense can be made out.

Com.—In the present verse emphasis is laid on compassion towards others. The mind, free from dual knowledge, reaches its amplitude like the *kalpavṛkṣa* which spreads itself in the three worlds. He who thinks “This is mine, that is of others” baffles his Sahaja nature through attachment to *vikalpa*. He is not free though he is so by his nature. So no distinction should be made between self and others.

Tr.—The tree of non-dual mind has attained vastness in the three worlds. It contains the fruit and flower of compassion. There are no “mine” and “thine.”

[The verse occurs in Saraha’s Dohākoṣa (verse 107, p. 23) under more correct forms as—

addaa cittataruvaraha gau tihuraṇṭṛ vitthāra |
karuṇā phullīphala dharai ṇāu paratta ūāra |

The form *tihuraṇṭṛ* (locative) satisfies the exigencies of grammar better and *dharai* in the second line is preferably a better reading. The comparison of *citta* with tree (*taruvara*) and elephant (*gaja*, cf. com. *taruvarah*, *gajah*, etc.) is very common in the Caryās.

- Cf. 1. *kā taruvara pañca bi ḍāla |*
cañcala cē paiṭho kāla | —Luyī-pāda.
16. *mātela cīa-gaandā dhārai |* —Mahīdhara-pāda.
17. *gaavara samarasa sāndhi guṇia |* —Vīṇā-pāda.
45. *maṇa taru pañca indī tasu sāhā |*
āsā bahala pāta-phala-bāhā | —Kāñhu-pāda.

13. [pp. 2 ; 44], Tib.—

rañ gshan mñam pas sañs rgyas rje btsun 'gyur |

It is the tentative translation of the first line of the text. Literally rendered it stands thus—*nijaḥ paraśca samaḥ, buddhaḥ bhaṭṭārakaḥ bhavati*. It therefore seems to have been based on a line like—

para appāṇa sama buddha bhaṭṭāraa saala |

Instead of the translation of the second line of the text, Tib. adds three lines which cannot be traced to the original :—

sems ni namkha'i dañ du shugs nas thim |
de'i reche dbaṅ po lda dañ yul rnams dañ |
phuṅ po kham na du kham rnam soṅ |

It may be rendered as—*cittaṁ ākāśam praviśati vilīnaṅca [bhavati]. tasmin kṣaṇe pañcendriya-viṣayāḥ skandha-dhātu-āyatanāni ca tatra praviśanti*.

Com.—Both the self and others have essentially the same nature. Through Sabaja avoid all errors about it. Hence all the beings become Buddha through this very nature from the beginning.

Tr.—Do not falsely distinguish between self and non-self. All are ever Buddha. The three worlds are the best and sublime stations; mind by its nature is pure.

14. [pp. 2 ; 44], Tib.—

gañ shig brtan dañ gyo ba'i rnam pa kun |
stoṅ pa gos pa med pa ste |
'di la dbaṅ par mi bya'o |

= lit. *yadeva niścalaṁ sacalaṁ ca sarvathā
śunyaṁ nirañjanaṁ. tatra vicāraṁ mā kuru.*

Com.—*Sacalam* or that which moves is the *sattvaloka* and *niścalam* or that which is fixed is the *bhājanaloka*. The secret of the world is established as being undetermined and solely attractive with reference to the custom of the whole world. *Śūnyam* is that knowledge of truth which is free from all *vikalpa*, is pure and undisturbed by the impurity of the innumerable sufferings accompanied by desire. Do not try to comprehend it by the power of discrimination. As *cintāmaṇī*, though it has a nature of duality, contains the unattainable (?) essence of the world so also the knowledge, though vitiated by error, through discrimination, resolves the essence of the world into different categories like the sphere of merit (*punya*), etc., of the beings. In the next verse the error in the discrimination of *ātmā* (self) and *ātmīya* (of self) is spoken of.

[There are some mistakes in the commentary. l. 17—*śavā-sanakleśajālokalaukavikalam*, if corrected as ° *kalaṅkāvikalam* and l. 19 *tathāvikalpakam*-, if corrected as *tathā vikalpakam*- can give the right sense.]

Tr.—Those which are the customs of all are [either] moving or not-moving. [But] the vacuity is free from impurity. Do not judge [it].

15. [2 ; 45]. **Tib.**—

'din bdag go 'don 'gro ba'o |
gañ shig rañ rig śes par bya |
dri med sems kyi rañ bshin la |
gañ zig rañ rig śes par bya |

The last two lines of Tib. = *nirmalacittasya svabhāvanam saḥ svayam jānāti*. This translation is not therefore quite correct. The real meaning is brought out in the Skt. Com. — *nirmala-citta-svabhāvatām katham so'pi buddhyati*. Hence my restoration of the second line of the text as—*nimmala-cittasahāba so ki bujjhai*—is justified.

Com.—Whosoever takes ‘this to be the self’ and ‘that to be the world’ how can he understand the nature of the pure mind? He cannot understand the truth through the obsession of “self” and “things relating to self.” In the next verse is described the all-spreading (*i.e.*, the universal) nature of the yogins who concentrate on the truth.

Tr.—He who thinks ‘this is self,’ ‘this is world’—can he understand the nature of the pure citta?

16. [2; 45]. **Tib.**—

bdag ñid 'gro ba bdag ñid sañs rgyas te |
 bdag ñid dri med ciñ bdag ñid yid la mi byed pa |
 de la 'gro ba med ciñ gos pa med |
 = *aham eva jagat aham eva buddhaḥ* |
aham mala-rahitaḥ aham amanskāraṁ |
etad niścalaṁ nirgranthakam |

gos pa med—is doubtful. “gos” means cloth and gos med—is the usual Tib. translation of *nagnaka*, *nirgrantha*—*lit.* one who has given up worldly ties. As is evident the last line of Tib. is only an elaboration of the meaning given in the Skt. commentary as *bhavaḥ saṁsārastasya bhañjano bhañjakaḥ*. The Tib. and the commentary support my restoration of the second line as—

hau amaṇasiāra bhavabhañjana.

Com.—I myself am the universe. I am the Buddha. I myself am he who is free from impurity (*nirāñjana*) and I am the mental inaction [in person]. *Bhavaḥ* is the cycle of existence. He who destroys it is also myself—Thus does the yogin whose mind is in perfect unison with the reality think day and night that the universe is permeated by the reality.

[The quotation in the commentary also partly occurs in the **com.** on Saraha’s *Dohakoṣa* (p. 105). The source is mentioned

there as the *Hevajra*. It is in fact found in the *Hevajra Tantra*, Chap. VIII (*Srī-Hevajra-mairātmā-yoginī-cakra-mahāyoginīnām melāpakāḥ paṭalo nāma*). Though there are slight variations in readings in different MSS. of the *Tantra* which I have examined the present quotation seems to contain the most satisfactory reading.]

Tr.—I am the universe, I am the Buddha, I am [he who is] free from impurity—I am the mental inaction [in person] and I am the killer of the cycle of existence.

17. [2; 45]. **Tib.**—

yid ni rje btsun nam khar rje btsun ma |
ñin mechan du ni gañ byed lhan cig skyes la... |
= *manah bhagavān khaḥ bhagavatī* |
divārātram yat karoti sahaje [yojanām] |

In the xylograph available to me the last word is effaced. But in the Sanskrit commentary the sense is clearly brought out as—*aharniśam sahajena cittaṁ yojayitavyam*. On the strength of the Tibetan translation and the commentary I have restored the second line of the text as—*divārātti sahaje rāhiāi*. *rāhiāi* may be justified as a causative form from \sqrt{raha} -< $\sqrt{rakṣ}$ - ; \sqrt{raha} means “to remain,” “stay”—hence $\sqrt{rāha}$ = to make stay, i.e., *yojaya*—. As regards the restoration of the lacuna in the first line after *manaha* as *bhaavā* there is no difficulty. It is fully supported by Tib. *yid ni rje btsun*—and Skt. com.—*mano...bhagavān*.

Com.—The mind, i.e., *bodhicitta* is the Bhagavān, the vacuity-like, i.e., *khasama* the great joy which pervades it (the mind) is the Bhagavatī. This is why it has been said in the *Herukarāja Tantra* that Bhagavān has the form of semen and the joy arising out of its satiation is called the *kāminī*. To express the same idea in another way.....compassion (*karuṇā*) is

Bhagavān. The vacuity-like, *i.e.*, *śūnyatā* is Bhagavatī. The knowledge of the non-duality of compassion and vacuity is Bhagavatī-Bhagavān. Bhagavatī is not different. Thus should the mind be fixed day and night through *sahaja*. So it has been said in the *Samputa*.—

[The first quotation in the commentary is said to be from the *Herukarāja Tantra*. The first part of the name of the Tantra referred to was broken in the MS. I have restored it as *Śrī-Heruka* as that is the only Tantra of this particular school with the name of which—*rāja tantra* can go. I have not however been able to trace the line in the MS. of the *Heruka Tantra* in my possession. It is on the other hand found in the *Herajra Tantra* (Ch. VIII), The complete Śloka occurs there as—

śukrākāro bhared bhagavān tat sukhaṁ kāmīnī
smṛtā [var. *smṛtaṁ*] |
ekāṅka-viyogo'sau kṣaṇādekā parā ratih ||

The second quotation is said to be from the *Samputa*. The full title of the text is *Samputodbhava-kalparāja Tantra* (A.S.B. 3828, 4854). The Śloka occurs also in the *Hevajra Tantra* where it is found in Ch. VIII. The Śloka in its proper form is—

nadiśrotoprabāhena dīpajyoti prabandharat |
satatam tatrayogena sthātavyam ahorātrataḥ |

My restoration of the lacuna at the beginning of the second line as *sahaja*—is wrong. The reading *cāharniṣam* given in the quotation spoils the metre. All the MSS. of the *Hevajra Tantra* have *ahorātrataḥ*].

Tr.—Mind is the Bhagavān ; the vacuity is the Bhagavatī. It [mind] should be fixed in the Sahaja day and night.

18. [2 ; 46]. Tib.—

skye dañ 'chi ba dag las grol bar 'gyur |
gshug ma ri yid la rgyun du gnas par gyis |

grol bar 'gyur—means “is free” (*mukta*). But the text and the commentary require *bhrāntiḥ*. The Tib. in my opinion should be corrected as 'khrul bar 'gyur—meaning “is error, illusion” (*bhrāntiḥ*). The Tib. when literally rendered is—

janmaḥ maraṇaṁ ca bhrāntiḥ |
tataḥ cittaṁ nirantaraṁ tiṣṭhati |

The restoration of the second line of the text is supported by the Tib. as well as the com. which has—

tasmāt ātmīyaṁ cittaṁ nirantare sthitaṁ bhavati |

Com.—Birth, *i.e.*, coming into existence, death.....That also is complete illusion (*vikalpa*)—so error should not be committed about it. Thus it has been said—death is illusion (*vikalpa*) ; [freedom from this illusion ?] leads to the position of *khecari*. It has been further said that according to the capacity of realisation the merits of beings [are determined]. *Utpāda* (birth) exists as a fact of perception and not in any other way. So one's own mind is fixed in the *nirantara*. *Nirantaraṁ* is the state in which nothing stands between. It is a state in which vacuity and compassion are inseparable. [One] should never get detached from it.

[I have not been able to trace the two quotations in the com. to their original. The second quotation—*prañidhāna-redha-sāmarthyāt satcānām puṇya*.....occurs in the comment on verse 14 (*supra*, p. 44, ll. 19-20) under a slight altered form as a part of the commentary and not as a quotation—*prañidhāna-redhāt satcānām puṇyādhipatyādi nānābhāgena jagadārthaṁ kāroti*.]

Tr.—Do not entertain illusion about birth and death. Then one's own mind will stay in a state devoid of duality.

19. [2 ; 46]. **Tib.—**

'bab stegs dka' thub nags la ma brten cig |
bus dañ gtsaṅ sbras bde ba mi rñed do |

dka' thub nags—should be corrected as dka' thub gnas—which means *taporana* “hermitage ;” bus—should be corrected as—lus—which means *deha* “body.” Sbras—does not mean anything, if corrected as 'sbyaṅs' it would convey the sense of 'washing.' Hence gtsaṅ sbyaṅs would convey the sense that is rendered in the com. as—*jāla-snānena bāhyarūpeṇa*. Tib. would then literally mean—

tīrthan̄ taporanān̄ mā sevyaṭām |
dhaśauce śāntim̄ na prāpsyasi |

Com.—Do not go to external sacred places and hermitages. By bathing in water externally nobody shall get salvation. That is the whole meaning. The only holy place is the mahāyāna. Salvation can be attained by washing away all the impurities of illusion in the stream of knowledge arising from it. That cannot be attained by bathing at external holy places.

Tr.—Do not attach yourself to sacred places and hermitages. You will not attain peace through purity of body.

20. [3 ; 46]. **Tib.—**

chaṅs pa khyab 'jug dbaṅ phyug lha |
byaṅ chub yod bsher gsum la bkur mi bya |

Tib. has lha instead of lha which is clearly a mistake. Tib. literally means—

brahmā-viṣṇu-maheśvara-derān |
bodhisattva trayān mā sevyaṭām |

The normal translation of *bodhisattva* would be byañ chub sems dpa'. byañ chub yod bsher—literally is “one who exists in bodhi.” The com. has *brahmā viṣṇu maheśvaraśca trayo devā bodhisattvena sarvathā na namaskarttaryāḥ*. These support the restoration of the second line of the text as—*Bodhisattva ma karahu sevā*.

Com. The three gods Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara should not be worshipped by a Bodhisattva because they belong to an inferior way [of religious belief]. So it has been said in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*—one ought not to offer flowers, incense or light to other gods. Nor should he worship other gods.

[I have not been able to trace the quotation to its original. The first part of the title was broken in the MS., my restoration is hypothetical. It may be as well *Śata-sāhasrikā*.]

Tr.—*Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara*—do not worship [these] gods, oh Bodhisattva !

21. [3 ; 47]. **Tib.**—

lha rnam mehod 'bab stegs mā 'gro shig |
 lha rnam mehod kyañ thar pa grob mi 'gyur |
 = *devān mā puṣya tīrthān mā gaccha* |
devārādhanaṇa mokṣaṇa na prapṣyati |

The second line which is lost in the original, is also commented on in the com. as—*bāhyaderatārādhanaṇa tīrthasānānēnā-dhimokṣaṇa na prapṣyate*. Hence I have restored the line as—

devapujāhi na mokkha pābā.

Com. The worship of gods made of stone should not be practised. External holy places should not be visited. Spiritual liberation cannot be attained by worshipping external gods and bathing in sacred places.

Tr.—Do not worship the gods ; you should not go to holy places. You shall not attain salvation through devotion to gods.

22. [3 ; 47]. **Tib.—**

rnam par mi rtog sems kyis sañs rgyas mchod par gyis |
srid dañ mya ñan 'das la gnas par ma byed cig |

Tib. has *cag* instead of *cig*, but that is evidently a mistake. *cig* is an imperative affix. **Tib.—**

avikalpa-cittena Buddhāṃ ārādhyatām |
bhava-nirvāṇe sthitim mā kriyatām |

The com. on the second line is—*bhava saṃsāre nirvāṇe ucchede ca sthithir mā kuru*. These support the reconstruction of the second line as—*bhava-nirvāṇe ma karahu re thittē* |

Com.—The knowledge of non-duality is called *Prajñā-pāramitā*. So it has been said by Dignāgapāda—“The knowledge of *Prajñāpāramitā* is non-dual. It is *tathāgata*.” Cultivate it with mind fixed on it. Do not stay in the world of being and the world of annihilation.

[The quotation from the work of Dignāga occurs in other places too. Cf. the *Abhisamayāluṅkāra* of Haribhadra (ed. Tucci, p. 28) and *Sādhana-mālā* (ed. Bhattācharya, I, p. 321) :

Prajñāpāramitājñānam-advayin sā tathāgataḥ |
sādhyā tādarthayogena tacchabdam granthamārgayoḥ |

In *Sādhana-mālā* the beginning of the second line is misquoted as *sādhyatādarthayogena tacchabdam*. The particular work of Dignāga from which the śloka is quoted is not mentioned.]

Tr.—Worship the Buddha with unfailing mind. Do not stay in the [world of] being and the [world of] annihilation.

23. [3 ; 47]. **Tib.—**

'śes rab thabs kyī tiñ 'rjin shugs |
gañ tshe mig yo bar ni brtan par byed nus na |
ña yi chan ñams myañ 'grub par 'gyur |

ñams myaṅ—seems to be a mistake for *ñam̐s myoṅ* which means according to S. C. Das “experience,” but according to Jäschke “delight, enjoyment.” ‘*anuttara*’—the supreme knowledge is also a state of bliss, hence its translation as *ñams myoṅ* may be justified. The second line of the Tib. is, however, clear. Literally the Tib. may be rendered into Sanskrit as—

prajñopāya-samādhau lagnō bhava |
yadi tasmin (?) dṛḍhaḥ bhavitum śakyate |
ātmanaḥ mahā (?) anuttaraṁ sidhyati |

The original verse is defective in meaning as well as metre. The meaning becomes clear if we either correct *jahi* (<*yasmin*) as *jai* (<*yadi*) or take it in that sense. *jahi* and *jai* both are sometimes translated into Tibetan as *gal-te*; cf. Saraha’s *Dohakoṣa*, verse 7 (*jai naggā bia hoi*=*gcer-bus gal-te grol ’gyur na*); 77 (*-jahṛ tahṛ sama cintassa*=*gal-te yid-du oṅ nam sñam pa’i sems*). The metre still remains defective and *laggahu*, which cannot be corrected as *laggaṁ* because an imperative is wanted, does not rhyme with *siddhai*.

Com.—The union of *Prajñā* (sapience) and *upāya* (means) is the complete (*advaya*) union of vacuity and compassion. Attach yourself to it and if the mind is fixed in it, there is no doubt that the supreme knowledge of Buddha will be attained.

Tr.—Attach yourself to the union of sapience and means. When one is fixed in that, the supreme [knowledge] is attained.

24. [3 ; 47], Tib.—

ji ltar dug ni zos bar gyur pa las |
dug gis kyaṅ ni ’che bar mi ’gyur ba |
de ltar srid pa zos kyaṅ la ’byod pa |
’dod yon gyis ni ’chen bar mi ’gyur ro |

= *Yathā viṣa-bhakṣaṇāt | viṣeṇāpi mṛtyuḥ na bhavati |*
tathā bhava-bhuñjanenāpi | saṁsāra-bandhanaṁ na bhavati |

The second line of the text is commented on as : *tathā bhavaṁ saṁsārasukhaṁ viṣayādikāṁ bhuñkte yogī | na [tu tasya yo-] gino viṣayeṇa saṁsāra-bandhanāṁ bhavati*. Hence there is no difficulty in restoring the second line as—

ima bhava bhuñjai bhavahi na juttā.

Com.—Just as a man versed in the science of poison does not die even after swallowing the poison, in the same way the yogī, though he may enjoy the pleasures of the material world, does not get attached to the world. So it has been said in the *Hevajra Tantra* that the very poison by which all other beings are killed—that poison the man who is versed in its science uses for the purification of poison. By those means, by which others get attached to the world, [the yogī] becomes free from the bondage of existence. Hence in the next verse the efficacy of *karmamudrā* is established.

[The first two lines of the quotation occur also in the commentary on Saraha's *Dohākoṣa* (p. 83) ; these lines occur in the 2nd Paṭala, Part II (=12th of the Chinese Tr.) of the *Hevajra Tantra*. The chapter is called : *siddhinirmāyo nāma dvitīya-paṭalaḥ*. The second two lines of the quotation occur in the same paṭala of the *Hevajra*, but after 3 verses. A similar verse occurs in its 9th paṭala (Part I)—*Viśuddhi-paṭalaḥ*—

*Yena tu yena tu badhyati loka-stena tu tena tu
bandhanāṁ mucyate |*

The verse however is found in the *Subhāṣitasamgraha* (Bendall, pp. 37-38) as a citation from the *Cittaviśuddhi-prakaraṇa* of Āryadeva. Its first line, which has a lacuna in our MS., runs thus—

yena yena hi badhyante jantavo raudrakarmaṇā |

Similar ideas are found in *Jñānasiddhi* (I, verse 15, p. 32).

The word *paluttā* is not met with elsewhere in the *Dohās*. In Saraha's *Dohākoṣa*, verse 70, there is a word, *paluttia*. In one

of the MSS. of Saraha's text it is found under the form *paluṭṭia*. M. Shahidullah, in his glossary, gives its Sanskrit equivalent as *paryasya*. The meaning of *paluṭṭia*, in that context, is clearly that of "returning." Tib. translation is *slar yañ* (Shahidullah gives it as *slar yañ* through inadvertence). *Slar yañ* has the sense of a 'backward movement' as in *slar yañ 'gro—saṃsaraṇa* (rotation ; see S. C. Das—*Dictionary*, sub. verb.). In verse 70 of Saraha, *paluṭṭia taha bi paḍei* (Tib. *slar yañ de ru 'bab*) is explained in the commentary as *punañ tatraiva patati*. The word is connected with Bengali *pālat* which S. K. Chatterji derives from *pallata* < *paryasta* (§ 243). *Paluttā* under consideration, however, does not seem to have any connection with *paluṭṭa*. *Paluttā* may be derived from *prayukta* on the analogy of *paluṭṭia* < *paryasta*. *Prayukta* in Western Apabhraṃśa is *pautta* (Jacobi—*Bhavisatta Kaha*—Glossar). Is it then an Eastern variant of *pautta*?

Tr.—As [one] engaged in [the science of] poison swallows the poison, so does one enjoy the world [of existence] not being attached to the world.

25. [3 ; 48], **Tib.**—

bya'o rnal 'byor pas ni las la skyur ni 'debs |
 skad cig bshi dan 'gyur ba bzi ru de ru sad |
 skad cig dga' ba de yi bye brag śes par gyis |
 mtshan gshi mtshan ñid spañs dan [śes]par gyis |

In the 4th line Tib. has *spañs* which is evidently a mistake for *spañs*, "to abandon." *Mtshan gshi mehan ñid*—requires a note. S. C. Das quotes Jäschke [*Dictionary*, sub. verb.] and explains *mtshan gshi*—as the cause of a sign or symptom. *mtshan*—really means symptom, sign=*lakṣaṇa* and *gshi*=that which gives origin to a thing and hence *mūla*. Therefore *mtshan gshi*=*lakṣaṇa-mūla*. *mtshan ñid*=the sign, the essential characteristic ; *ñid* has the sense of "self," "the very" as in *ña ñid*—"I myself ;" hence *mtshan ñid*=the very sign, or

the essential sign. S. C. Das gives an illustration (*loc. cit.*) to explain the difference between the two expressions—"man is the mtshan gshi of his own mtshan ñid," i.e., one is "the cause" and the other "the caused." Therefore I think that the Tib. translator by—mtshan gshi mtshan ñid, wanted to convey the idea of *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa* which occurs in the Sanskrit Commentary.

The Tib. is explanatory and not an exact translation of the text. When literally rendered into Sanskrit it is—

yogin ! karma mā duṣyatām |
kṣaṇāni catvāraḥ bhavanti bhedāni tatra jñāyatām |
kṣaṇāṇandāḥ catvāraḥ teṣāṃ bhedāni jñātavyāni |
lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-prahāṇam jñātavyam |

The Tib. therefore does not help us much in restoring the second line of the original. I have restored it with great diffidence from the commentary which has...*catvāraḥ kṣaṇāḥ | catvāraśc-ānandās-tathaiva pariñāyante.*

Com.—Moments are four, and pleasures are similarly known to be four. [So it has been said in the *Herajra*.] How can one know the differences in the moments and differences in the pleasure without [practising] *karma-mudrā*? So *karma-mudrā* should not be slighted. The [ultimate] truth, free from 'the cause' and 'the caused' [i.e., duality] can be realised in this very person. Fix your attention on the goal—the perfect joy (*paramānanda*) in its midst.

[The long quotation is from the *Herajra*, I, *paṭala* 3, the *Sandhyābhāṣaṇo nāma paṭalaḥ*. As the name of the chapter indicates, the verses occurring in it are all garbed in symbolic language (*cf.* my paper on *Sandhyābhāṣā*, I.H.Q., Vol. VI, p. 389). The plain translation of the verses is—

“That supra-mundane which is of the shape of the letter *z*, which is adorned in the middle with the letter *vaṃ* is the seat of all kindness—the basket of Buddha's treasures. There

the pleasures come into being—are differentiated in the order of moments. These pleasures which have their source in the letter *evam* can be comprehended when the moments are perceived. In order of the four moments [these pleasures are]—*vicitra*, *vipāka*, *vimardda*, *vilakṣaṇa*—the yogins know these. *Vicitra* is of different kinds—embracing, kissing, etc. *Vipāka* is the pleasure which is of an opposite nature—the enjoyment of knowledge. *Vimardda* is excitation [? *ālocanam* of the text should be corrected as *ārocanam*]...*vilakṣaṇa* is different from the other three and is free from passion and indifference. The first *ānanda* is in *vicitra*, *paramānanda* in *vipāka*, *virāmānanda* in *vimardda* and *sahajānanda* in *vilakṣaṇa*.”

For a detailed discussion of this analysis of *ānanda* and its striking similarity with the four stages of Brahma, see the introduction.

Karmamudrā, which is said to be the means by which the four moments can be perceived and the four *ānandas* realised, is not explained either in the text or the commentary. It is referred to in the *Subhāṣitasamgraha* (Bendall, p. 64) in connection with the different signs of spiritual progress (*adhyātmanimittam*) thus—*tasmāt karmamudrā upāyatrayabhedena mṛdumadhyādhimātratayāvagantavyā*—i.e., as there are signs—*nimittas*—in different stages of the spiritual progress so *karmamudrā* should be understood in order of the differences in its method—slow, medium and extreme. The meaning seems to be that for the perception of those signs (*nimittas*) *karmamudrā* should be practised. This practice may be less intense, intense and extremely intense. For further explaining the meaning of *karmamudrā* the *Subhāṣitasamgraha* quotes a verse, attributed to *Śākyamitra*—

yathāgnir dārumadhyastho nottiṣṭhen manthanād vinā |
tathābhyāsād vinā bodhir jāyate neha-jaṇmani ||

See *Sarvasuddhi-viśuddhi-kramah* of Śākyamitra, verse 86, in *Pañcakrama* ed. Vallée Poussin, p. 31.

The implication of this verse is that *karmamudrā* = *abhyāsa* “practice.” *Karmamudrā* is further referred to as *karāṅkhyā-mudrā* in the *Pañcakrama* of Ghaṇṭāpāda quoted in the *Subhāṣita-saṃgraha* (p. 52)—

samaya-mudrā-mahāvogavidhānena vajrasyāgre maṇau bodhicitte gate yādṛṣaṃ sukham utpadyate gurūpadeśatas tat samyak samupalakṣya sthīrikṛtya tanmayatām upanītaṃ vajra-dharatvam ihaira janmani saṃjanayati niyatam evāvicāreṇeti |

dvītiyakramo’pi karāṅkhyā-mudrā-dvāreṇa pūrvavad upa-lakṣya sthīratām gataṃ bodhicittaṃ śāśvatarūpaṃ paramārtha-nirvikalpa-svabhāvaṃ jātaṃ sadvajradharatvaṃ sampādayatīti |

Hence it appears that *karma-mudrā* was that yogic practice by which the seminal fluid (*bodhicitta* or *saṃvṛti-bodhicitta*) could be carried to the topmost circle (*vajra-maṇi*) and made to attain a permanent (*śāśvata*), ultimate (*paramārtha*) and undisturbed (*nirvikalpa*) character. It seems that in course of this practice the yogi used to perceive four stages which are described as moments (*kṣaṇa*) and four kinds (probably according to the degrees of intensity) of pleasant sensations (*ānanda*). Evidently all the mystic schools did not believe in the efficacy of the practice. The *Kālacakra* school believed in the practice of *Mahāmudrā*—

*karmamudrā-parityaktaṃ jñānamudrāvivarjitaṃ |
mahāmudrā-samulpannaṃ sahajaṃ nānyayā saha ||*

(cf. *Vimalaprabhā*, extracts in *Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS.*, Govt. coll.—A. S. B. ; H. P. Śāstrī, p. 74)].

Tr.—Do not slight the karmamudra. [Through it] the different kinds of moments and pleasure may be known.

26. [3 ; 48], **Tib.—**

Kyi ho mehog daṅ dga’ bral ’di ni dbyed par bya |
bla ma mehog gi shabs la gus par gyis la legs par loṅ |
= bhoḥ ! paramānandaṃ viyogaṃ ca cīcāritaryaṃ |
vara-guru-caraṇaṃ suṣṭhu ārādhaṇa |

[The first line of the text is evidently corrupt as *lehure parama-dhīra ma biārī* does not convey any sense. We have seen from the closing lines of the commentary on the last verse that the present contains instruction about fixing the attention on the *paramānanda* amongst different kinds of *ānandas*. I would therefore correct the text as *lehure parama-birama biārī* | i.e., differentiate between (the two kinds of *ānandas*) *parama* and *virama*. In that case *ānanda-viyoga* of Tib. is to be taken in the sense of *viramānanda*.]

Tr.—Learn to differentiate between parama and virama by adoring well the feet of the worthy Guru.

27. [3 ; 48-49], **Tib.—**

gañ shig dga' ba mehog dañ dga' bral gyis |
kyi ho skad eig der ni lhan skyes rtogs par bya |

The text contains a lacuna to the extent of one leaf (13^{a-b}), hence the original of this verse is completely lost. Only a portion of the Sanskrit commentary is preserved. The Tib. literally rendered is—

yaḥ parama-ānandaṁ bhedaṁ ca [jānāti] |
tasmīn kṣaṇe saha-jān jānāti |

On the strength of this I have made a provisional restoration of the verse as—*parama ānanda bheu jo jānai | khañahi sobi sahaja bujjhai* ||

Tr.—He who knows the highest kind of spiritual bliss knows the Sahaja in a moment.

[The existing part of the commentary consists of two verses which are quoted from the *Hevajra Tantra*, II, Paṭala 4, fol. 29^b.

The verses occur there under the following form—

madanaṁ ca pābayet-tāsāṁ svayaṁ caiva pibed vratī |
yasyād-anurāgayet mudrāṁ svaparārtha-prasiddhaye ||

kakkolake bolakaṁ kṣiptā kunduru[m kuru]te vratī |
tasmin yogye samupana kapura na tyājed-budhaḥ ||

The reading is corrupt in many cases—*pābayet* for *pāyayet* is wrong ; *yaśyād* is evidently a mistake for *paścād* ; *kakkolake* instead of *kakkole* spoils the metre ; the fourth line is meaningless ; the reading in our commentary is therefore preferable. The verses are garbed in what is called in these texts *sandhābhāṣā*, i.e., symbolic language. *madanam* = *madya*, wine ; *kakkola* = *padma*, “lotus ;” *bolakaṁ* = *vajra* ; *karpuram* = *śukra*, semen virile [for these words and for *sandhābhāṣā* see my note, *I. H. Q.*, Vol. VI, p. 389 ff.]. The word *kunduru* is explained there as *dvīndriya-yogaṁ* (cf. also *dvīndriya-samāpatti*, *Tathāgataguhyaka*, p. 41) and translated into Chinese as *siang-ying*—“*Yoga, yukta*, the act of uniting.” The word is etymologically inexplicable. I think it is also a symbolic word like the others of the list. In the Brahmanical Tantras we frequently meet with words like *kuṇḍalogodbhavam* *dravyam*, etc. The word is used there almost in the same sense as *karpūram* in the verses under discussion. *Kuṇḍa* of the Brahmanical Tantras and *kunduru* of the Buddhist Tantras therefore seem to be synonymous, both meaning “the sexual act,” and by analogy the *samādhi*, i.e., the state of complete concentration.]

In Tib. there is an additional verse after verse 27.

yon tan rin chen [der ni] saṅs rgyas gnas bya ste |
 'dod pa mo yi ze 'brul ni 'di ṅid śes par bya |
 = *jñāna-ratna-bhede Buddhah vasati* | [?]

28. [3 ; 49], Tib.—

skad cig bye bral de ru lhan skyes gaṅ śes pa |
 de ni tshe 'di ṅid la rnal 'byor par brdsad do ||

The Tib. is not an exact translation of the original—

= *kṣaṇa-bhede tasmin sahaṇam yaḥ jānāti* |
iha janmani atraiva saḥ yogī bhanyate |

The Tib. omits *ānanda* (*khāṇa-ānanda bheṇ*) in the translation. But as the different grades of spiritual joy have been described in the previous verse, emphasis is placed on the different moments (*khāṇa*) in which those grades of spiritual joy (*ānanda*) are realised. The first line of the Tib. seems to have been based on an original like *khāṇa bhedaḥi sahaja jo jānai*—"he who knows of the Sahaja in the different moments."

Com.—He who realises the distinction between the moments and the joys comes to be called the Yogi even in this life on account of his acquaintance with truth and the way to its attainment.

Tr.—He who knows the difference between the moments and the joys comes to be called the Yogi in this life.

After this the Tib. adds the following, for which we have no original :—

thog ma tha ma gzuñ ba lhan [skyes] bstañs |
 bla ma mchog gi shabs gñis med bstan |
 mig yo dri med rnam par rtog pa med |
 śar ba nub pa spañs pa 'di ni sñiñ po yin |
 'di ni mya ñan 'das par rab tu brdsed |
 yid kyis rgyal gañ du chad gyur ba |

= *ādi-anta-yuktān Sahajam vivarjaya |*
varaguru-pādena advayaṁ deśitam |
cakṣuṣā nirmalam na viśeṣeṇa dṛṣṭam |
udayāstavarjitam etadeva sāram |
atra nirvāṇa-lābham kathitam |
citta-jayaṁ yat svīkṛtam |

For the first two lines see verse 6.

29. [3 ; 49], **Tib.**—

skyen dañ yon tan spañs pa 'di ni don dam mo |
 rañ rig la ni gañ yañ med |

=*doṣa-guṇa-rahitaḥ eṣaḥ paramārthaḥ* |
svasamvedane kimapi nāsti |

The Tib. renders the meaning quite correctly, but the Sanskrit commentary in its present form is defective. *Saasam-beaṇa* of the text is taken as instrumental and the second pāda is thus commented on—*svasamvedanena kenāpi nārthaḥ prayojanam*. This seems to be wrong. *Svasamvedana* is the highest state of spiritual realisation—a state which is free from duality and is absolute (*pāramārthika*). In the present verse that state is being eulogised as “free from merit and demerit” (*guṇa-dosa-rahita*) and as “the absolute” (*paramattha*). It therefore seems that *saasambeaṇa* of the text should be corrected as *saasambeaṇe*, a locative form, and the commentary should be corrected as *svasamvedane kimapi nāsti....*

Com.—This absolute [state] is free from merit and demerit ; there is no need (?) of self-realisation. Merit should not be attributed to that state. Demerit should therefore be removed from it. So has it been said—“nothing should be removed from it, nothing should be thrown into it. Elements should be seen in their proper light. He who has seen [the real nature of] the elements becomes free.”

Tr.—It is the ultimate truth, free from merit and demerit. There is nothing [*i.e.* no merit or demerit] in what is realised by the self.

30. [4 ; 49], Tib.—

sems dañ sems med rtag tu spoṅs |
 kyī ho lhan cig pa'i rañ bshin du na gnas par bya |
 =*cittam acittam ca nityam varjaya* |
bho ! sahaja-svarūpe sthitiṁ kuru |

Com.—The commentary consists of two verses quoted from the *Hevajra Tantra* (*Paṭala* II, 1, fol. 21), where it

occurs under a little different form—

sarvacitta[m] parityajya devatāmūrti-cetasā |
dīnamekam avicchinnam bhāṣayitvā parīkṣatha |
nānyopāyo'sti saṁsāre svaparārthanaprasiddhaye |
sakṛdabhyāsītā vidyā sadyahpratyayakārini |

[*bhāṣayitvā parīkṣatha* for *bhāṣayitvā parīkṣatha* is wrong; *nityam* in the first line quoted in the commentary is hypermetrical.] “By abandoning all kinds of thoughts with the mind fixed on the form of the deity and by thinking that it is one continuous day, realise [it yourself]. There is no other means in this world for one's own spiritual success or for those of others. The vidyā even once practised renders immediate success.”

Tr.—Abandon always the mind and the non-mind. Fix yourself in the very nature of Sahaja.

31. [4 ; 49-50], Tib.—

[skye ba med ciñ 'che ba med |
 rtse ba med ciñ rtse mo med ||]
 'on ba med ciñ 'gro ba med | ·
 gañ du yañ ni mi gnas so |
 bla ma'i man dag gis ni sñiñ la chuñ |

= [janma nāsti maraṇam nāsti |
 mūlam nāsti śikharam nāsti ||]
 āgamanam nāsti gamanam nāsti |
 kutrāpi na sthānam asti |
 gurūpadeśena hṛdayam praviśati |

Com.—The truth does not come from anywhere, does not go anywhere. It does not stay in any place. So it has been said in the *Aṣṭasahasrikā*—“Oh! Kulaputra, thatness (i.e., truth) neither comes nor goes. It is without any motion. In that way, oh! Kulaputra, the coming and going of the Tathāgata

never takes place," etc. Such a truth reaches the soul through the teaching of the Guru. Colourlessness of truth is described in the next verse.

Tr.—[It] does neither come nor go; [it] is not anywhere. [It] enters the soul through the instruction of the Guru.

32. [4 ; 50], **Tib.**—

kha dog sbañs śiñ rags med pa |
 snañ ba thams cad de la jogs
*varṇaḥ varjitaḥ ākṛtiḥ*ñāḥ |
sarvarūpe sa paripurnāḥ |

The second line of the Tib. does not quite agree with the original. The original—*sabbāāre so sampunṇā* means it is complete in all the forms. Snañ ba—may be taken in the sense of *rūpa* or *ākāra*—that which is manifest.

Com.—It is devoid of colour, form, etc. (?) It has been said in the *Paramārthastotra*—"colours like red, yellow and grey are not begotten by him. [He does not beget colours like] yellow, black and white. Obeisance to thee, the colourless!" Devoid of form, that is to say devoid of hands, mouth, etc. So it has been said—"Neither large nor short, neither tall nor round—with a nature that is beyond measure. Obeisance to thee, the Immeasurable." Still he is completed by all the forms.

Tr.—Colour is also abandoned [by it]. It is devoid of form; [but still] it is complete in all forms.

33. [4 ; 50], **Tib.**—

yid ni gsoḍ la sems ni rtsa ba med par gyis |
 sems kyi lhag ma zug rñu thoñ |
 'di ru sku bshi phyag rgya bshi |
 khams gsum ma lus de che dag |

manah māraya citte nirmūlaṃ |
cittasya avaśeṣaṃ duḥkhaṃ sambhūtaṃ |
atra catvāraḥ kāyāḥ catvāraḥ mudrāḥ |
tribhuvane sarve [te] mahāntaḥ |

As is evident, except the first line the Tib. does not follow the text. The MS. is so much dilapidated in this place that I have not been able to make anything out of the commentary. However, my restoration of the lacuna in the first line of the verse as *lahu citte* is supported by the Tib. and the commentary. The com. has *laghu śīghraṃ māraya*. My restoration of the second line as *ta[hṛ mahāmu]dda tihuanē nimnala* is partly supported by the Tib. and partly by the portions of the commentary—*mahāmudrāḥ prāpyante...sarve te śuddhabhāva hi*.

Tr.—Kill this mind in the citta completely without delay. In that the mahamudra is pure in the three worlds.

34. [4; 51], Tib.—

bdag dañ bgro ba khamṣ gsum stoṅ |
dri ma med pa'i lhan cig skyes pa la |
dge dañ mi dge gaṅ yaṅ med |
= ahaṃ jagat bhuvanāni trīṇi ca śūnyam |
nirmale sahaje śubhāśubhau na staḥ |

The second line of the verse has been restored from the Tib. as *nimmata sahaje ṇa pāpa ṇa puṇṇa*.

Com.—Myself is vacuity on account of its dealing with the illusory (world); the world is vacuity because it is itself illusion and the three worlds are also vacuity. The highest bliss lies in sahaja which is pure, i.e., free from impurity. Merit and demerit are not produced in it. So has it been said—the great knowledge which is without impurity lies in the

self-illuminated halo of light. Can the question of merit and demerit arise in the absence of *vikalpa*, i.e., illusion?

Tr.—Myself is vacuity, all that moves is vacuity, the three worlds are vacuity. There is no sin and merit in the pure sahaja.

35. [4 ; 51], Tib.—

yid ni gañ du 'gro ba dod pa |
 de la 'khrul par ma bya'o |
 mig ni mi rjums pa dag gis |
 bsam gtan gyis ni gnas par bya |
 slob dpon chen po Tai. lo. pas mrjad
 pa'i do. ha. mrjod ces bya ba rdsogs so |

manah tatra gacchatu yatra icchati |
atra bhrāntim mā kuru |
ālokanam udghātya |
dhyānena sthitim kartavyam |
Mahācārya-Tailopāda-bhāṣitam dohakoṣaḥ samāptaḥ

Tib. does not faithfully translate the beginning of the second line. The original *adha ughāyī ālaanē*...implies many more things than that conveyed by the Tib.

Com.—Let the mind go wherever it likes [to go]. Do not entertain any misconception about it. [Tailopāda] speaks of the way by which the mind has to go. It arises from below i.e., the *nirmāṇacakra*, and by opening, i.e., by freeing the way of the *Avadhūti* with the help of light, i.e., the meteor of the fierce fire (*caṇḍāgni*) of knowledge and by meditation gets itself seated in a position of great bliss. This is briefly the meaning here. The aim is to fix the mind in the [mahāsukha-cakra through the yogic meditation [called] *caṇḍālī* or [in other words] to make the sahaja manifest.

The commentator takes the word *āloaṇē* to mean light, *i.e.*, *āloka*. The Tib. however correctly takes it in the sense of *ālokana*, *i.e.*, eye. It is the spiritual sight that is spoken of. When this sight is attained the mind [*i.e.*, the psychic power] rises from its original seat—technically called the *nirmāṇacakra*—where it lies dormant. *Avadhūtī* is the central nerve (*nāḍī*), called *suṣumnā* in the Brahmanical Tantras. The psychic power travels upwards by this channel and by stages reaches the highest seat called the *mahāsukha-cakra* (called *sahasradala-padma* in the Brahmanical Tantras) where it attains permanent bliss.

Tr.—Let the mind go wherever it likes [to go]. Errors should not be made in this place. By opening the below with [spiritual] eyes I become fixed through dhyana.

II

THE DOHAS OF SARAHPADA

[Text pp. 5-6]

These dohās, as stated in the Introduction, are contained in one of the leaves (with the doubtful page-mark 2) of the MS. C discovered in the Darbar Library. The MS. C contained the Dohās of Saraha ; his name occurs in verses 3 and 10 (the numbering of the verses is mine): *Saraha bhanai jñagaṇa ettavi* [3] and *Saraha bhanai attattha bi sāra...*[10]. The page formed evidently part of a separate *Dohākoṣa* of Saraha, hitherto unknown. It is not found in any of the similar works of Saraha, now preserved in the Tibetan translations. This is why I have not been able to settle the text to my entire satisfaction. But the difficulties are very few as the MS. C is in an excellent condition.

[1]. As the first line is lost, the exact meaning of the verse cannot be brought out. *ñiccalan* < *niścalam* probably refers to one of the worlds of the *kāmadhātu* “the element of desire.” The same world is mentioned in verse 14 of the *Dohākoṣa* of Tillopāda—*sacala ñicala jo saalācāra*; it is explained as “*sacalam sattvalokaḥ niścalam bhājanalokaḥ*.” The first is the world of beings (*sattvaloka*) and the second the world of receptacle. That both these worlds are illusory is clearly stated in a citation contained in the *Subhāṣitasamgraha* (Part I, p. 19)—

sattvalokam atha bhājanalokam |
cittameva racayaty aticitram ||

While commenting on the expression *sthānavijñapti* “la notification d’emplacement” of *kārikā* 3 of Vasubandhu’s *Trīṃśikā* Sthiramati says that it is the same as the notification

of the disposition of the *bhājanaloka* (*bhājanalokasamīveśa-vijñaptiḥ*). This form of *vijñapti* also is not known in full consciousness because it functions with an object and an indefinite form *sā'pyaparicchin-ālamban-ākārapravṛttatvād asamviditetyucyate* [Lévi—*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 19, Part II, p. 73. Cf. also Poussin—*Siddhi*, p. 135; *Abhidharmakośa*, III, pp. 1-138]. It is called the *bhājanaloka*, the receptacle world, as it consists of the germs (*bīja*) which when matured give rise to the phenomenal world. This is probably why in the *Abhidharmakośa* it has been described to be thick, solid and not easily conquerable even by the *vajra*. The *dohās* as a practical code of *sādhana* insist on its conquest and on raising the mind to a higher level.

Tr.—Do not meditate on the inanimate. Do not wish selfhood.

[2]. *alio dhamma* = the illusory phenomena. *Dhamma* is taken here in the sense accepted in the Mahāyāna philosophy. The second line: *lavaṇo jima pāṇhi bilijjai* is taken from the classical simile used for describing the Brahma. In the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (VI. 13) Uddālaka Āruṇi asks his son Śvetaketu to throw some salt in water and to bring it to him on the morrow. On the morrow Śvetaketu brings the water to his father and does not more see the salt. On being asked to taste it Śvetaketu tastes it from all parts and replies that it is all salted. Then his father says that the being (*sat*) is also like that, it is everywhere but not perceived, that is the only reality, the *ātman*. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (II. 4. 12) the *ātman*, the ultimate reality, is described in similar words: *sa yathā saindhavakhilya udake prāpta udakamevānuliyeta*.

Tr.—The illusory phenomena enter into [i.e., disappear in] the great bliss (Mahāsuha) as salt disappears in the water.

[3]. *ettavi*—Cf. Saraha's *Dohakośa*, verse 37—*etta* and verse 61—*etavi*; *etta*, *eta* < MIA *ettia* means "so much, so many."

patthā (Western Apabhraṃśa *panthā*) < *pathin* seems to be an irregular form. It may be a copyist's mistake for *panthā*.

Tr.—Saraha says—So many are the merits of the jīna. Such is the way, such is verily the ultimate reality.

[4]. This verse is full of mystic implications ; *ṇittaraṅga cakka* literally means “the wheel which has no movement.” *Cakka* is evidently the same as referred to in *maṇḍala-cakka* ; cf. Saraha's *Dohākoṣa*, verse 24 *ṇitta punu punu cakka bi bharante* ; verse 98, *ṭhia-ṇimmāṇe ṇimmiaū tena bi maṇḍala-cakka* ; the *Dohākoṣa* of Kāṇha, verse 9, *maṇḍala-cakka bisaya-buddhi lai parimāṇaha* ; verse 18 *maṇḍala-cakka-vimukka acchaū sahaja-khaṇchi* : Miscellaneous Collection (p. 37)—*ṇau so maṇḍala-cakka bhāti suṇṇa-sahābe svaccha*. Dr. Sahidullah always translates the expression *maṇḍala-cakka* as “le cercle magique et la roue tantrique” and thinks that the real significance is that one who has taken the mind to the state of vacuity has no need of these circles and wheels (*loc. cit.*, p. 94). But that does not seem to be the correct interpretation. From the references given above it is clear that the real nature of the state of vacuity (*suṇṇa-sahāba*) is pure, it is free from all shadows of the *maṇḍala-cakka*. So at the time when the *sahaja* state is attained (*sahaja-khaṇchi*) the mind is absolutely free from the *maṇḍala-cakka*. So it indicates a lower state of the mind in its march towards the state of vacuity. The real nature of the *maṇḍala-cakka* can be determined by a thorough knowledge of the objects (*viṣaya*) and this nature is such that it persists even when the immovable region of the mind is attained (*ṭhia ṇimmāṇe ṇimmiaū tena bi maṇḍalacakka*). *Maṇḍala-cakka* then means the same thing as the *bhājana-loka* already discussed. It is immovable and though beyond the objective world is still the receptacle of the objects of knowledge (*ālambana*). The description of the *bhājana-loka* as given in the *Abhidharmakośa* (III, p. 139) helps in clearing the sense : “il est solide ... le vajra se

briserait sans que le cercle de vent soit entamé.” This “cercle de vent” is comparable to the *pavaṇa* of our text. This *pavaṇa* or *maṇopavaṇa* is often referred to in the Dohā text. It holds the mind under its firm control when the *maṇḍala-cakka* state or the world of receptacle is attained. But when the *Yogi* attains a higher state in his march the ‘circle of wind’ breaks, his mind gets rid of the *maṇḍala-cakka* and the state of absolute vacuity is reached. This seems to be the real significance of the present *Dohā*.

Tr.—The immovable circle is without success (i.e., fails). The (rush of) wind breaks down in the grasp of one’s own mind.

[5]. Even the citta disappears, the acitta comes into existence. [The real state] dawns clear through the instruction of the excellent teacher.

[6]. The tone of this and the two following verses is similar to that expressed in verses 19-21 of the Dohākośa of Tillopāda and in the opening verses of the Dohakośa of Saraha.

Mantaha is in genitive singular = *mantrasya*, *paḍila bhitti* means “the wall that has fallen down”; *paḍila* is the regular past participle form < *patita*.

Tr.—There is no peace in muttering the mantras. Can the fallen wall rise up?

[7]. *Agghāi*, cf. the western Apabhraṃśa form *agghāiya* < *āghrāta*.

Tr.—Looking at the fruit in the tree is not smelling it. Does the disease fly away at the sight of the physician.

[8]. The second line of the verse : *andhā andha kaḍāva tima beṇṇa bi kūba paḍeṇ* has a striking similarity with a line of Kabir (*Kabir-granthāvalī*, p. 2) : *andhai andhā theliā dūnyā kūpa paḍanta* (when the teacher and the disciple are both blind) it is like one blind man leading another and both falling into

the well. The simile is a popular one. *Kaḍāva* requires an explanation. It is derived with the MIA *kaḍḍhati*, *kaḍḍhi* < *karṣati*, to draw out, drag, pull, etc., cf. Bengali *kāḍā* “to snatch away.”

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF DHARMA

By

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There is no other word or term in Buddhism which is of so frequent occurrence as *dhamma* or its Sanskrit equivalent *dharma*. This term, precisely as in the Vedic texts, is used in both singular and plural forms. *Dhammatā* or *dharmatā* is coined by the Buddhists as a special term to signify the essential nature of things, the normal condition, the usual course.¹ In actual usage, however, the distinction in meaning between *dharma* and *dharmatā* is not strictly maintained. Mrs. Rhys Davids rightly points out that the word *dharma* has, in the history of Buddhist thought, undergone much elaboration, more so than in Brahmanic. Whether in its singular or plural form, it occurs only ten times in the Three Vedas; it is given no special consideration, historical or other, in a standard work like Oldenberg's *Religion des Veda*.²

Childers suggests that the word, in masculine or neuter form, conveys such meaning in English as 'nature, condition, quality, property, characteristic, function, practice, duty, object, thing, idea, phenomenon, doctrine, law, virtue, piety, justice, the law or truth of Buddha, the Buddhist scriptures, and religion.' Similar is indeed the list of meanings suggested by Monier Williams in his Sanskrit-English Dictionary. The Pāli-English Dictionary, compiled by Rhys Davids and Stede, gives a more methodical treatment of the word classifying the

¹ *Digha-nikāya*, Vol. II, pp. 12 ff., "*Dhammatā esā bhikkhave.....ayaṃ ettha dhammatā.*"

² Buddhism, revised edn., p. 62.

various meanings in which it is employed in Buddhism. But even here the treatment fails of its purpose inasmuch as it does not set forth the reason why and how the word came to comprehend such a wide range of meaning without any fear of contradiction or inconsistency on the part of those who used it. The Dhammapada-commentary suggests that the word *dhamma* has been used in Pāli in one or other or all of these four meanings (1) *guṇa* (quality, property, characteristic), (2) *desanā* (discourse, instruction), (3) *pariyatti* (worded doctrine of Buddha, scriptures), and (4) *nissatta-nijjīva-dhammā* (mental states, conditions or phenomena without involving the notion of ego or entity).³ The utmost that we here have is no definition but a bare statement or cataloguing of four different meanings in which the word or term has been employed in early Buddhism.

Some guidance is given by Mrs. Rhys Davids⁴ and Professor Stcherbatsky⁵ in the matter of understanding and appreciating the Buddhist conception of *dhamma* or *dharma*.

The definitions of the term *dhamma* or *dharma* as met with in the Buddhist and Brahmanical works are all one-sided, not to say far-fetched. We read, for instance, in the Khuddakapāṭha-commentary (p. 19) :

‘*Maggaphalanibbānāni dhammo*’ *ti eke*, ‘*bhāvitamaggānaṃ sacchikatanibbānānañ ca apāyesu apatanabhāvena āhāraṇato paramassāsavidhānato ca maggavirāgā era imasmiṃ atthe dhammo*’ *ti amhākaṃ khanti*, *Aggapasādasuttañ c’ettha sādhaṃ*. *Vuttaṃ h’etaṃ* : ‘*Yāvata bhikkave dhammā saṃkhatā, ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo tesāṃ ayyam akkhāyati.*’

“According to some authorities, *dhamma* means the efforting and fruition stages of the elect culminating in *nibbāna*. Our opinion, however, is that *dhamma* is that which ‘up-holds’ (*dhāraṇato*) in the sense that those who have cultivated the path

³ Dhammapada-commentary, Vol. I, p. 22.

⁴ Buddhism, First and Revised Editions.

⁵ I. H. Q., Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 737 foll.

and realised *nibbāna* have no longer the fear of fall into the states of woe, and no less in the sense that it provides for the highest kind of solace and ultimately transcends all need of effort. The teaching of the *Aggappasādanasutta* proves the truth of this. There it is said : As many doctrines, O Bhikkhus, have (so far) been formulated, the Noble Eightfold Path appears to be the best of them."

According to Jaimini's *Purvamīmāṃsāsūtra* (1. 1. 2) *Codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmah*.

"Dharma is that which is characterised by an urge into action fulfilling the (desired) object" :

According to Manu's Code (Ed. Jolly, p. 14) :

*Vidvadbhiḥ sevitaḥ sadbhiḥ nityamadveṣarāgibhiḥ
hrdayenābhyānujñāto yo dharmastam nibodhata.*

"Comprehend that (alone) to be *dharma* which is cultivated by the learned, the elect, the persons who are always free from hatred and passion, and which is (at the same time) readily responded to by the heart."

According to the consensus of opinion, the Brahmanical definition of *dharma* is :

*Vaidikah pratipādyorthaḥ dharmah
Vihitakriyayāsādhyo dharmah puṁsām guṇo mataḥ
Pratisiddhakriyāsādhyah sa guṇo dharmah ucyate.*

"Dharma is an end to be attained in conformity with injunctions in the Vedas."

"Dharma is to be considered a distinctive quality of men to be achieved by means of action (work, conduct) as enjoined (in the Vedas)."

Referring to Asokan use of the word, Mrs. Rhys Davids opines : "The Word *dhmma* is not 'morality' as it is unfortunately rendered in the *editio princeps*, nor is it 'law' or 'good form.' Senart's 'religion' is better, but too ambiguous. F. W.

Thomas' definition 'based on revelation and custom' and 'a sphere of conduct leading to heaven' is a better guide. But why the weighty, the lofty term for 'that which ought to be done or not done,' namely 'conscience,' is never used by translators is strange. Or if not 'conscience' then at least 'duty.' Externally considered, *dharma* is, for India, 'law ;' for Buddhism, 'worded doctrine.' As belonging to man's inner world, 'conscience' or 'duty' is more fit. It is the urge of this 'sense' that makes a man truly 'moral.' Because of that urge he (Asoka) wards his fellowman in his person and in his interest." ⁶

In Varuṇa, the Vedic sages arrived at the conception of an ordered universe where everything happens according to Law and nothing by the caprice of an arbitrary will. And in *ṛta* they reached the conception of rhythmical evolution or harmonious manifestation of the cosmos. Both of these conceptions constituted the historical or philosophical background of the later ideas of *satya* and *dharma*. In the *Taittirīya Upanishad* I. 1, *ṛta* and *satya* are introduced as two aspects of one and the same idea or reality—*pratyakṣa-Brahmān* : *Pratyakṣam Brahman vadiṣyāmi, ṛtaṁ vadiṣyāmi, satyam vadiṣyāmi*.

In another passage of the same *Upanishad* I. 9, *ṛta* and *satya* are mentioned along with *tapa*, *dama*, and the rest as different items of one and the same system of conduct or duty : " *Ṛtaṁ ca svādhyāyapracāne ca Satyaṁ ca svādhyāyapracāne ca. Tapaśca svādhyāyapracāne ca.*"

In a valedictory address in the same *Upanishad* I. 11, we read :

" *Satyaṁ vada. Dharmān cara. Svādhyāyān mā pramadaḥ. Satyān na pramaditavyam. Dharmān na pramaditavyam. Kusalān na pramaditavyam.*"

“Speak the truth. Practise *dharma*. Do not neglect the study of the Vedas. A right-minded man must not deviate from truth, from *dharma*, and from good.”

Thus in the third passage where the word *ṛta* does not occur, the word *dharma* is substituted for it ; *dharma* takes the place of *ṛta*. What is the relation either between *ṛta* and *satya*, or between *satya* and *dharma* ?

We might suggest that *satya* is that which is in conformity with *ṛta*,⁷ and *ṛta* is that which is in conformity with *satya*, and the same as to the relation between *satya* and *dharma*. Or, we might say that *ṛta* assumes the name of *satya* when its nature is stated in terms of words, and that of *dharma* when its nature is manifested in the form of practice, duty or conduct. From one point of view, the whole programme of duty arises out of the primary idea of *ṛta*, and from another point of view, the whole programme of duty is comprehended by *dharma*. For the use of *dharma* in the sense of genus and species, whole and part, in the same breath, we may cite here the Pāli gāthā :⁸

*Yass'ete caturo dhammā vānarinda yathā tava
saccam dhammo dhitī cāgo, diṭṭham so aticattati.*

“He who is armed with these four *dharma* (principles), truth, piety, forbearance and self-sacrifice, overcomes the foe.”

The relation between *satya* and *dharma*⁹ as two aspects of one and the same idea or reality is emphatically brought out in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upanishad*, I. 4.14.

*Satyaṁ vai tat. Tasmāt satyaṁ vadantaṁ āhur dharmam
vadatī ti, dharmam vā vadantaṁ satyaṁ vadatītyetaddhyevaitad
ubhayaṁ bhavati.*

⁷ *Anṛta* which is an antithesis to *satya* is that which is not in conformity with *ṛta*.

⁸ *Vānarinda Jātaka* (Fausbøll, No. 57).

⁹ For the juxtaposition of the two words *satya* and *dharma*, or *dharma* and *satya*, cf., *Chāndogya Upanishad*, VII. 2.1 : *dharmam cādharmaṁ ca, satyaṁ cānṛtaṁ ca sādhu cāsādhu ca hṛdayajñam cāhṛdayajñam ca.*

“Dharma is indeed *satya*. Therefore they say that if a man declares *satya*, he declares *dharmā*, and if he declares *Dharma*, he declares *satya*. Thus both are the same.”

In this text *dharmā* stands for ‘law,’ ‘principle of justice,’ sphere of conduct in conformity with established custom, the disregard of, or departure from which is punishable by law. For here we also read :

Sa...tacchreyorūpam atyasṛjata dharmam. Tadetat kṣatrasya kṣatram. Yad dharmas tasmād dharmāt param nāstyato abalīyām balīyām samāśamsate dharmena yathā rājñai.

“He created still further the most excellent Law (Dharma). Law is the *kṣatra* (power) of the *kṣatra*, therefore there is nothing higher than the Law. Thenceforth even a weak man rules a stronger with the help of the Law, as with the help of a king.”

The meaning of the all-important dictum *dharmah kṣatrasya kṣatraḥ* requires some amount of elaboration. Here *kṣatra* stands for both the earthly ruler and his divine prototype. When they say Dharma is the *kṣatra* of the *kṣatra*, they mean that Dharma is the guiding principle of royal administration, which is the same as to say the domination by the warrior-power has its justification or fulfilment only in the maintenance of the social order and the administration of justice. The king in his person is not above the law. It is the law that is above the king.

This conception of *dharmā* was elaborated in early Buddhism. But with the Buddha or the Buddhist *dharmā* is no mere law but something more than law ; it is the principle of righteousness in conformity with which a reigning king is to shape his conduct and guide the course of administration.

Ko pana bhante rañño...rājā ti ? Dhammo bhikkhū ti Bhagarā aroca. Idha bhikkhavo rājā cakkarattī dhammiko dhammarājā dhammam yeva nissāya dhammam sakkoronto

*dhammaṃ garukaronto dhammaṃ apacāyamāno dhammaddhajo dhammaketu dhammādhipateyyo dhammikam rakkhāvaraṇaguttim saṃvidahati artojanasmim̐khattiyesu anuyantesu (? anuyuttesu) balakāyaśmim̐ brāhmaṇagahapatikesu negamajāna-padesu samaṇabrāhmaṇesu miḡepakkhīsu.*¹⁰

“Who is, Venerable Sir, the king of the king ? Dharma, O Bhikkhus, is the king of the king, said the Blessed One. Here, O Bhikkhus, it is depending on *dharma* (the law of truth and righteousness) honouring, respecting and revering it, doing homage to it, hallowing it, being himself the standard-bearer of *dharma*, the living symbol of *dharma*, and acknowledging sovereignty of *dharma* that the king, overlord, the virtuous and rightful monarch, provides the right watch and rightful protection for his own people, for the army, for the nobles, for vassals, for Brahmins and householders, for town and countrydwellers, for the *religieux*, and for beasts and birds.”

It is characteristically observed by the translator of the *Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta* that “the whole passage in the Pāli is a striking outburst on the superiority of right over might.”¹¹

That the above idea of *dharma* recognises the superiority of right over might is beyond all doubt. But the principle of righteousness is far more than the mere sense of right or that of duty. The above idea of *dharma* implies that there should not be any right or duty which is imposed from outside. An element of fatigue, dissatisfaction or vexation of spirit is apt to be there when one is to function under such a pressure from without or such an obsession within. The idea of *dharma* is such that there should be the fulfilment of the whole duty of a man as man according to law, according to custom, according to the sense of right, good and happiness but no feeling of tedium or dissatisfaction or vexation of spirit. The whole course of human duty,

¹⁰ *Āṅguttara*, III, pp. 149-50; cf. *Dīgha*, III, p. 61.
Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. IV, p. 62, fn. 1.

to oneself, one's people, one's fellow-beings and one's fellow-creatures, is to flow spontaneously from within, out of an inner urge or innate sense without causing vexation or exasperation of spirit. It is indeed such an idea of *dharma* that Asoka has sought to inculcate in so many of his edicts, and inscriptions.

Dharma is something to take one's stand on,¹² something to adhere to, to abide by, to act in conformity with¹³ in all spheres of existence, action, expression or importance for progressive relation of all desired or desirable ends of life. It carries with it the assumption or intuition or recognition or representation of some sort of an order (*niyāmatā*), capacity to hold good (*ṭhītitā*), explicability in terms of causality (*idapanayatā*) and causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritā*). It may stand for any order or system, whether of reality or of nature, or of society, or of morality or of thought, or of faith, or of spirit. According to Buddhism, *dharma* broadly involves the conception of five orders (*niyāmas*): *utu* (caloric, chemical, physical), *bīja* (germinal, genital, biological); *kamma* (functional, socio-moral, legal, ethical); *citta* (mental, psychical, psychological); and *dhamma* or *kāraṇa* (logical, dialectical, schematic, metaphysical).¹⁴ The principle, the mode, the method, the facts, the data, the result, in short, all that go to constitute an order or system go by or come under the name of *dharma*.

It is interesting to note that in Indian literature the word *dharma* is conveniently employed together not only with *satya* (Pali *sacca*) but also with such word as *artha* (Pali *attha*), *nyāya* (Pali *naya*), *yukti* (Pali *yutti*), *tarka* (Pali *takka*), *sīla*, *sama*, *vinaya*, *paṭipadā*, or the like, evidently to represent two different aspects of one and the same idea, fact, doctrine or system. In each instance the two's are so juxtaposed as to suggest that one stands as a complement to the other. *Dharmañ ca atthañ ca*

¹² Cf. Asoka's R. E. IV : *dhammamhi tiṣṭanito*.

¹³ Cf. Asoka's P. E. VII : *dhammānupaṭipatī anupaṭipajamtu*, R. E. X : *dhammavataṇṇaṇuvidhiyatu*.

¹⁴ *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, II. 432.

anusāsi (administered justice and advantage) is an oft-recurring phrase in the Jātakas.¹⁵ *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma*, and *Mokṣa* constitute the four ends of the Brahmanical system. As for the correlation between *dharma* and *yukti* (which is but another term for *nyāya* and *tarka*), it is definitely enjoined in Raghunandana's *Prāyaścittatattva* (*Brihaspativacana* quoted) that *dharma* declines if it is judged without *yukti* (reasoning).¹⁶ Here reasoning is no more than a reasonable mode of exposition or interpretation which is in conformity with the authority, whether that authority is the Veda or the Tripiṭaka. In other words, *yukti* is just a ratiocinative means establishing a harmonious link with that which is accepted as the final authority.¹⁷ According to the traditional *yukti* of India, *dharma* is not only that which is in accordance with the established custom or the accepted authority but also that which is lawful, judicious and equitable. *Rajje patitṭhāya dhammena samena rajjam kāresi*, "Having been established in sovereignty, he governed his kingdom according to law and equity." In this Jātaka description of the way of a good king, the word *sama* stands not so much for equality as for equity. The same remarks hold true of the Pāli idiom *dhamma-cariyā sama-cariyā*, "the practice of *dhamma*, the practice of *sama*," *dhamma* and *sama* being in conformity, harmony or consistency with each other.

With regard to the correspondence between *dharma* and *śīla*, we may read in Asoka's R.E. IV: *dhammamhi sīlamhi tiṣṭānto dhammam anusāsisānti*, "taking their stand on *dharma* (principle of righteousness, law, piety and morality) and *śīla* (moral conduct) they will administer *dharma*, impart instructions in it." Here *dharma* and *śīla* are to stand in conformity with each other. To say *dhammamhi sīlamhi tiṣṭānto* is the same as to say *dhamme tṭhito*; cf. *Makhādevasutta* (*Majjhima Nikaya*, II,

¹⁵ *Jātaka*, Vol. II, 105, *Atthadhammānusāsaka*.

¹⁶ *Yuktihīna-vicāretu dharmahāniḥ prajāyate*.

¹⁷ Cf. *Netti-pakarāṇa*, *yuttihāra*, pp. 21 foll. *Yuttāyettiparikkhāhāro yuttāti Nidittṭho*.

p. 74) : *Makhādeva nāma dhammiko dhammarājā dhamme t̥hito dhammam carati brāhmaṇagahapatikesu negamesu c'eva jānopaḍesu ca uposathañ ca upavasati*. This goes to show that *dharma* itself is the basis or foundation of both *dharma* and *śīla* that are to be fulfilled in practice.

Similarly when Buddha's system as a whole is intended to be meant the term *dharma* or *śāsana* is used and where it is intended to be represented in its two aspects, theoretical and practical, we have the use of two terms *dharma* and *vinaya* (Doctrine and Discipline) instead of one—the *dharma*. *Imasmim dhamma-vinaye* is the same expression as *imasmim dhamme* or *imasmim sāsane*. As for the intended conformity or harmony between the two aspects of Buddha's system as formulated, it is definitely enjoined in the *Dīgha-Nikāya*, II, pp. 123, foll.¹⁸ that in establishing a right interpretation of Buddha's word one must test the soundness of the 'doctrine' aspect in the light of the 'discipline,' and the soundness of the 'discipline' aspect in the light of the 'doctrine.' An interpretation failing to show that one is in conformity with the other must be rejected as unacceptable. In the case of each Indian system the two aspects are taken together to be its proper representation. So one reads in the *Mahāniddeśa*, p. 287 : '*parassa ve dhammam anānujānan ti parassa dhammam diṭṭhim paṭipadam maggam anānujānanto*. According to this text, *dhamma* which is the same as *diṭṭhi* (doctrinal viewpoint) and *paṭipadā* which is the same as *maggā* (practical viewpoint) are just two sides of one and the same *dhamma*.

The *dharma* is "that which is intuited, or directly sensed or perceived." It is "that which is conceived in thought, represented to oneself, formulated for the satisfaction of the thinker himself." It is also "that which is proclaimed, publicly stated, promulgated in a particular form or fashion, or formulated in

¹⁸ Cf. *Netti-pakaraṇa*, p. 21 :—

Tāni padabyañjanāni sutte otārayitabbāni, vinaye sandassayitabbāni dhammatāyaṃ upanikkhipitabbāni. Dhammatāyaṃ-Paṭiccasamuppāde.

the interest of those for whom it is intended." "That which is intuited, or directly sensed or perceived is either of the nature of reality, or of the material world, or of the mental world, or of the physical world, or of the moral world, or of the intellectual world, or of the spiritual world." "That which is conceived in thought, represented to oneself, formulated for the satisfaction of the thinker himself is the form of solution of the problem which engaged the thinker or contemplative." And "that which is proclaimed, publicly stated, etc., is the nature of criticism of the solution of the problem or problems offered by others as well as of the new direction to all human pursuits." The *dharma* of the second kind is to be in conformity with that of the first, and that of the third is to be in conformity with that of the second, and ultimately with that of the first. Thus indeed one may appreciate the interpretation of the Mahāyāna doctrine of Trikāya, "the three modes of cognition, the successive stages of manifestation, or the three forms of expression of the nature of *dharma*—the *dharmatā*." We read in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, Vol. II, p. 25 :

Uppādā vā Tathāgatānam anuppādā vā Tathāgatānam t̥hitā va sā dhātu dhammāṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā. Tam Tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti, abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vicarati vibhajati uttānīkaroti 'paṣṣathāti' cāha.

Mrs. Rhys Davids renders this : "Whether there be an arising of Tathāgatas, or whether there be no such arising, this nature of things just stands, this causal status, this causal orderliness, the relatedness of this to that. Concerning that the Tathāgata is fully enlightened, that he fully understands. Fully enlightened, fully understanding he declares it, teaches it, reveals it, sets it forth, manifests, explains, makes it plain, saying "Behold." ¹⁹

¹⁹ The Book of the Kindred Sayings, II, p. 21.

Thitā va sā dhātu. “The element which is in itself, in its own inherent right, independently of all thought or interpretation.” This is what is called *dharmatā*, *tathatā*, *śūnyatā* or *paurāṇadharmasthititā* (as in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*).²⁰

According to Mrs. Rhys Davids, this involves the conception of “a world-cosmos, wherein cause and effect grinds its way, a cosmodicy rather than a theodicy, an infinite mechanism started none knows when, or how, or to what end.”²¹

On the same ground some of the early Buddhist schools of thought (the Pubbaseliya and the Mahisāsaka, according to Buddhaghosa) declared *paṭiccasamuppāda* to be *asaṅkhata*, uncreated by thought, the uncompounded, while the exponent of Theravāda objected to the treatment of *paṭiccasamuppāda* as *asaṅkhata*. *Nibbāna* is *asaṅkhata* with the Theravāda as with the rest of the schools. Thus to regard *paṭiccasamuppāda* as *asaṅkhata* is to admit two *saṅkhatas* which one could not reasonably do. The decision arrived at in the Mahāyāna system is that *Paṭiccasamuppāda* and *Nibbāna* are essentially one and the same reality. But is *paṭiccasamuppāda* ‘dependent origination,’ when taken in the sense of *paurāṇa-dharmasthititā*? The term *pratītyasamutpāda* is employed evidently in this very sense in the opening verse of Nāgārjuna’s *Mādhyamika-kārikā*.

Dr. E. J. Thomas observes : “Nāgārjuna begins by discussing the nature of causation as expressed in the theory of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of the causal formula. Dependent origination is said to be characterised by being (1) without cessation, (2) without origination, (3) without cutting off, (4) not eternal, (5) not one, (6) not differentiated, (7) without coming, (8) without going. Its interpretation as a series of causes and effects is entirely rejected.”²²

²⁰ *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, edited by Nanjio.

²¹ Buddhism by Mrs. Rhys Davids, revised ed., p. 87.

²² History of Buddhist Thought, p. 219.

With Dr. Barua “ Nāgārjuna’s *prattiyasamutpāda* is the element of reality²³ which is in itself, in its own inherent right, independently of all thought or interpretation. It is just a ‘novelty’ as intuited at each moment, either in immediate contiguity or at uniform intervals (*anantara*, *samanantara*), that is to say, a *khana-paccuppanna dhamma*. The novelties are introduced as causally induced factors, or even as links in a chain of dependent origination. It is thus in the sequence of novelties as noted that lies the ground of the theory of causation. The novelty is one thing, the sequence another. The sequence from the viewpoint of the observer is one thing, the causal succession of antecedents and consequents from the viewpoint of the thinker,—another. Upon the whole, the element of reality is the ultimate point of reference of each thought, without differentiation or characterisation.”

The *dharmakāya* is to *Theravāda*, and generally to *Hīnayāna*, the body of doctrine, the doctrine taught by the Buddha. We read in the *Milindapañha*, p. 73 :

‘*Dhammakāyena pana kho mahārāja sakkā Bhagavā nidassetum, dhammo hi mahārāja Bhagavatā desito.*’

“ It is possible, O king, to manifest the Master by the body of doctrine. The doctrine is taught, O king, by the Master.”

The *Dharmakāya* is to *Mahāyāna* the *dharmatā*, the *tathatā*, the *śūnyatā*, the *paurāṇadharmasthītā*, i.e., the element of reality in itself. In other words, this *dharma* or *dharmakāya* is the most essential point in all that is taught by the Buddha. Accordingly we read in the *Samyuttanikāya*, Vol. II, p. 267, Vol. V, p. 407 :

“ *te suttantā Tathāgata-bhāsītā gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā suññatapatisamvuttā.*”

²³ Cf. I. H. Q., Vol. X, No. 4, p. 758, where Prof. Stcherbatsky observes : “ the dharmas are not things but elements of things. That the conception of dharma is the basic conception of Buddhism is most clearly and pregnantly expressed by the Buddhists themselves in their old *Credo*—“ *ye dharmā hetuprabhavāḥ.*”

“Those discourses that are uttered by the Tathāgata, are profound, deep in meaning, and concerned with *suññatā*.”

Suññatā is just another term for *dhammatā*, *tathatā*, *dhammathititā*.

The *dharma* which is to be behind, before, and all along thought, action or expression is significantly characterised as *purāṇa* (the most ancient), *śāśvata*, or *sanātana* (eternal). The discovery of the nature of *dharma*, understood in this sense, is compared by the Buddha to the discovery of an old, buried and forgotten city. So we read in the Pāli *Nagara-sutta* (*Samyutta Nikāya*, II. 105-106) :

*Seyyathāpi bhikkhave puriso araññe pavane caramāno
passeyya purāṇam maggaṃ purāṇañjasam pubbakehi manussehi
anuyātam|| so tam anugaccheyya tam anugacchanto passeyya
purāṇam nagaram purāṇam rājadhāniṃ pubbakehi manussehi
ajjhāvuttham.*

“Just as if, Brethren, a man faring through the forest through the great wood should see an ancient path, an ancient road traversed by men of former days. And he should go along it, and going along it he should see an ancient city, an ancient prince’s domain, wherein dwelt men of former days.”

Next in the *Dhammapada*, *Yamakavagga* :

*Na hi verena verāni sammantīdha kudācanam,
averena ca sammanti esa dhammo sanantano.*

“Hatred does not cease by hatred. Enmity ceases by amity. This is the good old rule.”

Thirdly, in Aśoka’s M. R. E. (Siddāpur): *Esā porāṇā pakiti, dighāvuse ca esa, hevaṃ esa kaṭṭhiye.*

“Such is the most ancient nature, that which is of long standing, thus indeed (in conformity with that), this should be done.”

H’ esā pi amtevāsīsu yathāraham pavatitaviye yārisā porāṇā pakiti, yathāraham yathā iyaṃ ārokaṃ siyā (Yerraguḍi).

“ The same should also be propounded as far as possible to the resident pupils according to the good old rule, so that this (noble tradition) will remain unimpaired.”²⁴

And fourthly, in the *Bhagavadgītā*, XIV. v. 27 :

“ *Sāśvatasya ca dharmasya sukhasyaikāntikasya ca.*”

The Pāli expression corresponding to Aśoka's *porāṇā pakiti* is *porāṇiyyā-pakati*. The *pakati* or *pakiti* (Sk. *prakṛti*) is no other than another term for *dharma*. The *Sona-Nanda-Jātaka* (Fausböll, No. 532) which embodies a teaching almost literally similar to that in Asoka's Edicts contains, among others, the following two *gāthās* setting forth the ancient or eternal nature of *dharma* :

*kulavaṃsaṃ mahārāja porāṇaṃ parihāpayaṃ
adhammacārī jeṭṭhesu nirayaṃ so upapajjati.
Ye ca dhammassa kusalā porāṇassa āsampaṭi
cārittena ca sampānnā na te gacchanti duggatiṃ.*

According to the first *gātha*, the *adhammacārī* is one who abandons one's respectful duty to one's elder brothers and others in accordance with the time-honoured tradition of household life.

According to the second *gātha*, the virtuous man is he who effectually conforms to the ancient tradition,—the established custom.

The gloss adds that here *dhamma* is the *paveṇi-dhamma*, the *dharma* which has held good by continued tradition,—the precedent.

In dealing with the seven essential conditions of welfare of a nation (or of an order or institution) the Buddha definitely lays down :

*Yāvakiyaṃ ca..... appaṇṇattaṃ na paṇṇāpessanti, paṇṇattaṃ
na samucchindissanti, yathā paṇṇatte porāṇe.....dhamme vattis-
santi vuddhi yeva.....pāṭikaṅkhā no parihāṇi ti.*

²⁴ The text read and translated by B. M. Barua in I. H. Q., Vol. VII, pp. 118, 120.

“ So long the members of a nation (so of an order or institution) will not introduce that which is not established according to custom, will not destroy that which is established according to custom, and will abide by the good old rule, so long they may be expected to prosper, and not to decline.”

In explaining *porāṇe vajji-dhamme* in this text Buddhaghosa speaks of a *paveni-potthaka* (Book of Precedents) among the Vṛjis from which guidance was to be taken in deciding all cases. (Vide B. C. Law's *Some Kṣatriya Tribes of Ancient India*, p. 103 ; Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 22.)

Thus it may be shown that *purāṇa* or *sanātana* is that which has held good for a long time, that which has been adhered through many ages, that which has therefore become a normal state of things, a normal course of life. The normal implies a 'norm' (that which ought to be done or not done), as well as a normal state of the body, mind or morale of a person which enables him to respond to the norm, and to abide by it.

The normal carries with the idea of universal, that which is or may be normally expected of all under similar set of circumstances.

*Sabbek'eva piyehi manāpchi nānābhāro vinābhāro aññathābhāro 'taṃ kut' etthā...labbhā 'yaṃ taṃ jātāṃ bhūtāṃ saṅkhatam palokadhammaṃ taṃ pana nāpalujjati, n' etaṃ tṭhānaṃ vijjati.*²⁵

“ The separation, departure from, the otherness of existing relation with all who are dear and beloved (is a normal way of happening), how can it then be possible to obtain that which is born, has come-to-be, is created and of a nature to disappear will not disappear ? There is no ground for such an expectation.”

That which is the most ancient in time is the most immediate in experience.²⁶ It is something which is proved and

²⁵ *Dīgha Nikāya*, Vol. II, p. 158.

²⁶ “ Bṛhadvaiṣṇavatoṣaṇi : *Purāṇas ca pūrṇato nijaiścāryena vartamāno' pi nava eveti.*” *Śrīmadbhāgavata*, 10. 14. 23. Cf. *Bhāgavatacandrikā* : “ *Purāṇaḥ purāpi navaḥ.*”

therefore approved by the wise, and each right-minded individual is normally expected to respond to it. There is no sphere or existence of activity without *dharma*. Birth (*jāti-dhammo*), decay (*jarā-dhammo*), and the rest are phenomena that normally occur in the natural order, and there are persons or beings who are subject to them. Eating, sleeping, procreating, etc., are phenomena that normally occur in the order of life. There are *kula-dharma*, *jñatidharma*, *mitradharma*, *rājadharmā*, *stridharma*, *purusadharmā*, and the rest, each being a normal expression of human nature in the shape of duty in respect of the family, the kinsmen, friendship, kingship, and the like in the social order. So on and so forth.

But to be in *dharma* is to be in one's own element. What one's own element is depends on one's own feeling, experience, or understanding. There being certain hindrances or obstacles in the way of one's being in one's own element, there being certain other conditions helpful to one's being in one's own element, there being the possibility of removing those obstacles and inducing favourable conditions, a system of training normally involves or comes to prevail in the sphere of education, or a system of practice in the sphere of religion. To be in one's own element in the ultimate sense is to get beyond the known world of cause and effect, *Nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa* is that highest state in men's religious experience, in which, alone it is possible to be in one's element in the ultimate sense. *Nirvāṇa* or *vimokṣa* itself is a *dharma* in so far as it is an object of attainment through a life of effort.

In between that which lies behind or lies ahead is the life of effort or pursuit which too is *dharma*. To direct or regulate it there is either a system of society, or a system of education, or a system of study, or a system of conduct, or a system of mind, or a system of thought, or a system of faith and worship. It is not only the system as a whole but each part of it goes by the name of *dharma*. For instance, Buddhism as a system of religious thought is called *dharma*

or *saddharma*, and each of the thirty-seven main points or terms belonging to that system is also called a *dharma* (*sattatim-sabodhipakkhikā dhammā*).

The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* which is a Buddhist manual of psychological ethics gives an exposition of *dhammas*, classified as moral (*kusala*), immoral (*akusala*) and *avyākata* (indeterminate). These *dhammas* constitute the mental basis of character which finds its expression in conduct or action. Buddhaghosa takes them to mean those mental states which bear their own intrinsic nature (*sabhāva*).²⁷ Professor Stcherbatsky has discussed at length precisely in which sense these *dhammas* are regarded as *nissatta-nijjiva*, the intended distinction being between *nairātmya* (the theory of no-soul) and *nairātma* (the theory of non-soul).²⁸ According to the opening verse of the *Dhammapada*, mind and all things mental are *dhammas*.²⁹

The *Pātimokkha* which is a Buddhist code of monastic discipline contains various rules of conduct, each of which is called a *dhamma*: *pārājikā dhammā saṅghādisesā dhammā, aniyatā dhammā*, etc.

In the *Cūḷa-Sakuludāyi-Sutta* (*Majjhima-N.* II, p. 32) the term *dhamma* stands for the sequence of facts as experienced or the law of causation or way of happening by a way of cause as formulated :

Dhamman te desessāmi—Imasmim sati idaṃ hoti, imass' uppādā idaṃ upapajjati, etc.

Just as, on the one hand, *dharma* stands for the entire system of sequence, or the chain of dependent origination, so, on the other hand, it stands for each single factor or link, which is accordingly called a *sahetu dhamma*, *paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma*.

²⁷ *Atthasālinī*, p. 63 : *Tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānaṃ sabhāvo vā sāmāññaṃ vā lakkaṇaṃ nāma*.

²⁸ I. H. Q., Vol. X, No. 4, p. 743.

²⁹ *Dhammapada-comy.*, I, pp. 22-23, 35-36.

Similarly, it may be shown that *dhamma* stands not only for the entire system of faith, thought or doctrine but for every part or argument or point of it.

An attempt has recently been made to prove that "the term *dharma* is so devised as to comprehend real, realised and *reality*, actual, actualised and *actuality*, phenomenon, phenomenal and *phenomenality*, matter, material and *materiality*, mind, mental and *mentality*, cause, caused and *causality*, law, legal and *legality*, thought, thinking and *thinkability*, and the like ; in short, the entire universe of reality and appearance, truth and opinion, thought and expression, principle and action, in and through which all things and all individuals may realise their being, feel their existence, rise into recognition, move into action or proceed to perfection. That is to say, *dharma* is not only that which was, is or shall be in itself, in its inherent right or in its nature or characteristic form, but that which comes to happen or prevail on account of its inherent force or intrinsic merit or value.

MOUNTAINS AND RIVERS OF INDIA

(From *Epic and Paurāṇic Sources*)

By

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The two Epics and the Purāṇas have long been recognised as a rich mine of geographical information about ancient India. They contain a number of chapters giving a fairly accurate account of not only the different territorial divisions of India, but also of her rivers, mountains, forests, lakes, deserts, towns, countries and peoples. Such chapters are the *Tirtha-yātrā* and *Digvijaya* sections of the Mahābhārata, the Jambukhaṇḍa-vinirmāṇa-parvā of the same epic, and the Kiṣkindhyā-kāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa. Equally important from this point of view are the Bhuvanakoṣa, the Jambudvīpa-varṇanā and the Kūrma-vibhāga sections of the Purāṇas, as well as of the Brhatsaṃhitā, the Parāśara-tantra and the Atharvaparīśiṣṭa. The geographical accounts in the different Purāṇas are more or less identical, and the account in one is not unoften repeated word for word in another ; in certain instances a larger account is summarised into a shorter one, *e.g.*, the Paurāṇic list of rivers differs in the different Purāṇas. The list in the Vāyu, Matsya and Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇas is a long one, while that in the Viṣṇu is very short. The same list occurs in the Bhāgavata and Padma Purāṇas as well, but in them it does not follow any definite arrangement. The Paurāṇic lists of rivers, countries and peoples, etc., occur also in the Mahābhārata, sometimes in a more detailed

form. The 'particulars of the country of Bharata' (as given in the Bhīṣmaparva (Śloka 317-78) are almost the same as in the Purāṇas, and with additional information in certain instances. It is obvious that these lists are framed in pursuance of a traditional account handed down from earlier times, and that there is much mythical and fabulous element in them. But in spite of everything, it must be admitted that the accounts are substantially correct, and the fabulous element, as pointed out by Cunningham, 'is confined, as a rule, to outside lands, and their allusions to purely Indian topography are generally sober.'

The pivot of the Paurāṇic account of rivers of Bhāratavarṣa is certainly the mountain system of the country for the rivers are invariably grouped in the Purāṇas as well as the Mahābhārata according to the mountain ranges out of which they rise. Of the mountains, the Himavat or Himādri is the only *varṣa-parvata* which is placed within the geographical limit of Bhāratavarṣa.¹

According to ancient geographers, the name Himavat was applied to the entire mountain range that stretches from the Sulaiman along the west of the Punjab and whole of the northern boundary of India to the Assam and Arakan hill ranges in the east including a number of peaks and smaller mountain ranges. The author of the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa evidently knew the Himavat to have stretched from sea to sea like the 'string of a bow' (Kārmukasya yathā guṇaḥ).² The statement in the

¹ For the place and position of the Himavat among the Varṣa-parvatas, and the mountain-system of the Purāṇas, see Raychaudhuri, Studies in Indian Antiquities, pp. 94-101.

² Kailāso Himavānścaiva dakṣiṇena mahācalau |
Pūrvvapaścāyathāvetāvarṣavāntarvyavasthitau ||

(Mārka. P., 54, 24.)

etattu Bhārataṁ varṣaṁ catuṣsamethānasamsthitaṁ ||
dakṣiṇāparato hyasya pūrvveṇa ca mahodadhiḥ |
Himavānttareṇāsya Kārmukasya yathā guṇaḥ ||

(Mārka. P., 57, 59.)

Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa is supported by the Mahābhārata and Kumārasambhava.¹

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa also seems to suggest the same when it says that Bhāratavarṣa is the country that lies south of the Himādri and north of the ocean (II. 3, 1-2). Ptolemy also seems to agree with the Epic and Paurāṇic description when he says that the Imaōs (i.e., the Himavat) is the source of the Ganges and the Indus as well as of the Koa and the Souastos, identical respectively with the Kabul and the Swat river which rise from the hills to the west of the modern North-West Frontier Province.²

According to the Matsya Purāṇa, the Kailāsa range formed a part of the Himavat (121, 2), though according to the Mārkaṇḍeya it was a separate mountain. Dr. Raychaudhuri correctly observes : " There is reason to believe that some of the so-called *varṣa-parvatas* were in fact parts of the Himalayan chain" (Studies in Indian Antiquities, p. 100). He points out that according to Alberuni, Meru and Nisada, described as *varṣa-parvatas* in the Purāṇas, were connected with the Himalayan chain.

According to the Purāṇas, the rivers issuing from the Himavat are the Gaṅgā, Sarasvatī, Sindhu, Candrabhāgā, Yamunā, Śatadru, Vitastā, Irāvati, Kuhu, Gomati, Dhūtapāpā, Bāhudā, Drśadvati, Vipāsā, Devikā, Raṅkṣu, Niścira, Gaṇḍakī and Kauśikī.³

¹ Avagādhā hyubhayataḥ samudrau pūrvva-pāścimeu (Mbh., VI. 6, 3)
Astyuttarasyaṁ diśi devatātma
Himālayo nāma nagādhirājaḥ |
Pūrvvāparau toyanidhī vagāhya
Sthitāḥ prithivyā iva mānadaṇḍaḥ || (Kumār., I. 1).

² Ancient India, Ptolemy, S. N. Majumdar's Edn., p. 81.

³ Gaṅgā Sarasvatī SindhuśCandrabhāgā tathāparā ||
Yamunā ca Śatadruśca Vitasterāvatī Kuhuḥ |
Gomatī Dhūtapāpā ca Bāhudā saDrśadvati ||
Vipāsā Devikā RaṅkṣurNiścira Gaṇḍakī tathā |
Kauśikī cāpagā vipra Himavatpādaniḥṣṭāḥ ||

The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa has a separate chapter on the descent of the Ganges which is said to have issued from the foot of Nārāyaṇa, and followed her course on to Mount Meru ; then she bifurcated herself in four streams flowing east, south, west and north, the southern of which was allowed by Śiva, through the entreaties and intercession of King Bharata, to flow through India.¹

The fabulous element in the description given in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa is only too obvious to need comment ; at the same time it is evident that when the Paurāṇic author describes the 'second stream called Alakanandā flowing southwards and overflowing the Mānasa lake with a great force,' he is simply speaking of the upper course of the river when she is still on the lap of the mighty Himavat. So also when we are told that the river 'entered the southern ocean in seven streams, and in three streams on the east, inundating as a great river the south with the overflow from her stream,' we seem to read of the different tributaries of the great river and her lower streams of the south-east before she reaches the eastern seas.

The Vāyu and Matsya Purāṇas give almost the same description as the Mārkaṇḍeya of the descent of the Ganges, while the Viṣṇu, Bhāgavata and Padma Purāṇas as well as the Mahābhārata agree substantially, though their account is rather brief. The account given in the Vāyu Purāṇa is interesting.²

¹ Mār. P., 56, 1-12.

² " The capital of Brahmā is enclosed by the river Ganges, which, issuing from the foot of Viṣṇu, and washing the lunar orb, falls, here, from the skies, and after encircling the city, divides into four mighty rivers, flowing in opposite directions. These rivers are the Sitā, the Alakanandā, the Cakṣu, and the Bhadrā. The first, falling upon the tops of the inferior mountains, on the east side of the Meru, flows over their crests, and passes through the country of Bhadrāśva, to the ocean. The Alakanandā flows south, to the country of Bhārata, and dividing into seven rivers on the way, falls into the sea. The Cakṣu falls into the sea, after traversing all the western mountains, and passing through the country of Ketumāla. And the Bhadrā washes the country of the Uttarakurus, and empties itself into the northern ocean. (Wilson's trans., Bk. II, Chap. II, pp. 119-20.) Wilson points out that Bhāṣkarācārya, an author of the eleventh century, gives almost exactly the same purport of the story. Evidently he draws his account from the Purāṇas.

MOUNTAINS AND RIVERS OF INDIA

It is somewhat curious that the Gaṅgā is everywhere in the Mahābhārata as well as in the Purāṇas, qualified invariably as tripathagā or flowing in three directions, though the actual description is that, after 'issuing from the foot of Viṣṇu and washing the lunar orb, she divided herself into four mighty rivers' and flowed in four directions. Later also, in India, she is described as a river that flowed in seven streams.¹ It is only in her lower course that she is said to have entered the ocean 'in three streams on the east' (*cf.* the Mārka. P.). Is it then to be surmised that her description as tripathagā refers to these three streams? ² Which, again, are these three streams? Can they be said to be identical with the Bhāgīrathī, the Brahmaputra and the Meghnā, the three courses which mingle together before they enter the sea?

The river still survives and flows between the Jumna and the Sutlej. It must have been at one time a mighty river,³ but gradually she lost herself in the desert at a place known as Vinasana, the traditional western extremity of Āryāvarta and Madhyadeśa. (Vāsiṣṭha, 1, 8; Baudh., I, 1, 2, 9, etc.). It is a tributary of the Indus, and rises from the hills of Sirmur in the Himalayan range. In the Ṛgvedic period it was a mighty river, and flowed into the sea (Max Müller, *Ṛgveda-Samhitā*, p. 46). "It disappears for a time in the sand near the village of Chalaur and reappears at Bhavānīpur. At Bālchhāppar it again disappears, but appears again at Bara Khera; at Urnai near Pehoa, it is joined by the Mārkaṇḍa and the united stream bearing still the name of Sarasvatī ultimately joins the Ghaggar or Gharghar which was evidently the lower part of the Sarasvatī (Punjab Gazetteer, Ambala Dt., Chap. I).The Mahābhārata also says that after disappearing, the river

¹ *Cf.* the following Ṛgvedic hymn where the Sindhu with its seven streams is also said to have followed a threefold course :

" Each set of seven (streams) has followed a threefold course. The Sindhu surpasses the other rivers in impetuosity " (X, 75).

² Suttanipāta-Commentary.

³ J.A.S.B., 1886, Part II, p. 840.

appears again at three places, namely, at Chamasodbheda, Sirobheda and Nāgodbheda (Vana P., 8).''¹ The Salya Parva of the Mahābhārata seems to suggest that the name Sarasvatī was given to the seven rivers, Suprabhā, Kāñcanākṣī, Viśālā, Manoramā, Oghavatī, Sureṇu and Vimalodakā (Salya, 39, 2188-2216).

It is the river Indus. But according to Alberuni (India, I, p. 260), only her upper course, above the
Sindhu. junction with the Chenab or Chandrabhāgā, was known as Sindhu; lower that point to Aror, she was known as Pañcanad, while from Aror to where she enters the sea it was known as Mihran. In the Behistun inscription of Darius the river is referred to as Hindu, and in Vendidad as Hendu. The Chinese designations of our country, T'ien-chu, Shên-tu, Sien-tou, Hien-tou, Yin-tu, etc., are all probably derived from Sindhu, though the Chinese themselves do not agree that the name was so derived.² In any case, the river gave her name to the country through which she flowed.³ The upper course of the river along with her important tributaries gave to the country through which she flowed the name of 'the land of the five rivers (pañcanad); from this mediæval name the modern Punjab derives her name. The lower course gave to the country around the name of Sind.

The passage in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa seems to suggest
Candrabhāgā. that there were two rivers of this name. The Mahābhārata also seems to support the same contention (Bhīṣma P., 9, 322-27). But it is difficult to identify the second stream of the same name. The river Bhīma, a branch of the Kṛṣṇā, is also known by the name Candrabhāgā but obviously that river is not meant.

The Candrabhāgā is the Chenab in the Punjab, and is the R̥gvedic Asiknī identical with the Greek Akesines. Sometimes,

¹ Dey, Geographical Dictionary, pp. 180-81.

² For explanations of the Chinese designations of India, see Watters, Yuan Chwang, I, 131-40; also Bretschneider Mediaeval Researches, II, 25.

³ As to her ancient course through Sind, see J.A.S.B., 1896, II, p. 323.

the united streams of the Jhelum and the Chenab are also known by the single name Candrabhāgā, the Sandabaga or Sandabal of Ptolemy.

This famous river still bears its old name. It is mentioned as early as the Ṛgveda (X, 75) and the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (VIII, 14, 4).

It is the modern Sutlej. "In ancient times this river probably did not join the Beas, as it does now, but pursued an independent course to the confines of Sindh" (Pargiter, Mār. P., p. 291, notes).¹ The united streams of the Sutlej and the Beas are known as the Ghaggar. The Satadru is the Zaradros of Ptolemy, and the Hesydrus of Pliny.

It is the modern Jhelum, but is still called Vitastā in Kāśmīr, and is identical with Greek Bidaspes or Hydaspes. It was known to the Ṛgvedic Aryans (X, 75) by the same name as well as to the Buddhists under the name of Vitastā (Milindapañho, S.B.E., XXIV).

It is the modern Rāvi, the Greek Hydraotisor Adris or Irāvati. Rhonadis.

It is mentioned in the Vāyu (XLV, 95) and Kūrma Purāṇas (XLVII, 27) as Kuhū. The river is probably identical with the Kubhā of the Ṛgveda (X., 75, 6) and the Kophes or Kophen of the Greek geographers, the modern Kabul river. It is also probably identical with the Koa of Ptolemy which is described to have its source in the Imaḍs or Himavat. (Ptolemy, VII, i. 26; Majumdar's edn., p. 81).

It is almost certainly identical with Ṛgvedic Gomati (R. V., X., 75, 6) which is probably the modern Gomati. Gomati. Gomal, a western tributary of the Indus. The Paurāṇic passage *Gomatī Dhūtapāpa ca*² has

¹ For its early course, see, J.A.S.B., 1886, II, pp. 335 foll.

² Mār. P., op. cit., Vāyu, 45, 95; Kūrma, 47, 27; Varāha, 85.

been interpreted as ' Gomatī and Dhūtapāpā,' thus signifying two rivers, of which the latter according to Cunningham was a tributary of the Gomatī. In the *Mahābhārata*, the two words are linked together (Bhīṣma, p. 9. 25), in which case, the passage should be interpreted as " the Gomatī, the cleanser of all sins." The Paurāṇic river has also been sought to be identified with the modern Goomti which joins the Ganges below Benares, and which is described in the *Rāmāyaṇa* as situated in Ayodhyā, and as being " crowded with cattle " (Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa, 49). But as the Paurāṇic passage as well as that of the *Mahābhārata* mentions the river along with those of the Punjab, it is almost certain that the tributary of the Indus is meant. The *Skanda Purāṇa* mentions another river of the same name (Avantī Khaṇḍa, Ch. 60); evidently it flowed through Gujrat with Dvārakā on its bank. According to the *Meghadūta* (I. v. 47) a river Gomatī seems to have formed a branch of the Cambal. If the Śiva Purāṇa is to be believed, the river Godāvarī near its source where the temple Tryambaka was situated, is also known as Gomatī (I, Ch. 54).

Some have sought to identify the Dhūtapāpā as a separate river with the modern Dhopāp on the Goomti, 18 miles south-east of Sultanpur in Oudh. According to the *Skanda Purāṇa* (Kāśīkhaṇḍa, Uttara, Chap. 59), it was a tributary of the Ganges near Benares. (Dey, Dictionary, pp. 57 and 231.)

Pargiter identifies the river with the modern Rāmagaṅgā which joins the Ganges on the left near Kanauj, and Nundolal Dey with the river ' Dhavalā now called Dhumela or Burha-Rāpti, a feeder of the Rapti in Oudh.' (Pargiter, *Mārkaṇḍeya P.*, pp. 291-92 ; Dey, Dictionary, p. 16). Pargiter also points out that there was another river of this name in the Deccan (*Mbh.*, Bhīṣma P., 9, 322 ; *Anuśāsana P.*, 165, 7653 ; *Rāmāyaṇa*, Kish. K., 41, 13).

¹ The Bāhudā is, perhaps, no other sacred river than what is called Bāhukā in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 36-40.

The Mahābhārata gives an explanation of the origin of the name. R̥ṣi Likhita had his severed arm restored by bathing in this river, which was accordingly named Bāhudā (Mbh., Śānti P., 22; Harivaṃśa, 12). But the Śiva Purāṇa gives a different explanation, and says that Gaurī was turned into the river Bāhudā by the curse of her husband Prasena-jit.

The Dr̥ṣadvatī has been described as the southern and eastern boundary of what was then known as Brah̥māvarta (II, 17), while the western boundary was the Sarasvatī. According to the Mahābhārata, the river seems to have formed one of the boundaries of Kurukṣetra (Vana P., 5074). The same source tells us that the confluence of the Dr̥ṣadvatī and the Kauśikī was of peculiar sanctity. The river has been identified with the modern Citrang, Chautang or Citang, which runs parallel to the Sarasvatī (Imp. Gaz. of India, p. 26; Rapson, Ancient India, p. 51). Elphinstone and Todd sought to identify it with the Ghagar flowing through Ambala and Sind but now lost in the desert sands of Rajputānā (J. A. S. B., VI, p. 181), while Cunningham found in it the river Rakshi that flows by the south-east of Thanesar (Arch. Sur. Rep., XIV). According to the Vāmana Purāṇa, a branch of this river was known as Kauśikī (Vāmana, 34).

It is the Beas, identical with the Bipasis or Hypasis or Hyphasis of the Greeks, which is now a tributary of the Satadru or Sutlej but was, in ancient times in all probability, an independent river. The story of the origin of the name Vipāsā is told in the Mahābhārata. Vasiṣṭha, broken in heart owing to the death of his sons at the hands of Viśvāmitra, wanted to kill himself. He therefore tied himself hand and foot and threw himself into the river. But the strong current of the river unfastened him (Vi-pāsā) and saved him by throwing him on the banks.

Pargiter has sought to identify the river, since it is said to have issued from the Himalayas, with the river
 Devikā. Deeg, a tributary of the river Rāvi (Mārk. P., p. 292, note). His identification seems to be upheld by the Vāmana Purāṇa (Chaps. 81, 84, 89) as well as the Matsya Purāṇa (Ch. 113). According to the Agni Purāṇa, it flowed through the Sauvīra country (Ch. 200), and had its source, according to the Kālikā Purāṇa (Ch. 23, 137-38) in the Maināka hills in the Sewalik range. The Viṣṇudharmottara (I., 167, 15) would have the river flowing through the Madra country, and the Skanda Purāṇa (Prabhāsa Kṣetra Māhātmya, 278) would have Mūlasthāna or Multan situated on its bank.

It has also been identified with the river Devā or Devikā in U. P., which is only another name for the southern course of the Sarayū, the northern course being known as Kālinadī (Bengal and Agra Guide and Gazetteer, 1841, II, pp. 120, 252, map). According to the Kālikā Purāṇa, it flowed between the Gomatī and the Sarayū, and was distinct from them (Ch. 23), while according to the Mahābhārata (Adi. P. 29) and the Varāha Purāṇa (144), it was at the junction of the Gaṇḍak, the Devikā-Sarayū and the Gaṇḍā that the struggle between the crocodile and the elephant took place.¹

Pargiter mentions another Devikā in the Deccan which, he says, is upheld by the Rāmāyaṇa (Kish. K.,
 Rañkṣu. 41, 13). Pargiter suggests that the name is wrongly given in the Purāṇas; we should rather have it replaced by Vakṣu or Vañkṣu, and identify it with the Oxus. The reading is certainly doubtful, for the Vāyu Purāṇa (45, 96) as well as the Mahābhārata (Bhīṣma P., 9., 324) read it as Ikṣu. According to the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, Ikṣu was one of the seven holy rivers that flowed through Śākadvīpa.

¹ But the Anuśāsana Parva (Śloka 7645 and 7647) of the Mahābhārata seems to suggest that the Devikā and the Sarayū were not the one and the same river. See also Amarakoṣa, 1, 2, 8, 85.

According to the Kūrma Purāṇa, Ikṣu was an affluent of the Narmadā (II, 39).

The Varāha Purāṇa (85) reads the name as Niśvīra; other Paurāṇic readings are Niścitā, Nicitā (Viṣṇu P.), Nirvīrā (Vāyu, Matsya), Micitā or Nisṛtā (certain MSS. of Viṣṇu). In the Bhīṣma Parva list of rivers there are three similar names: Niścitā, Nicitā and Nivārā, while the Vana Parva has Nirvīrā (84, 8116-9). It is, however, difficult to say if one and the same river is meant by all these names. Anyway, a river of some such name did really exist and was in all probability connected with the Kauśikī with which it is often mentioned. According to Nundolal Dey, Niścīrā is "the river Līlājan which joins the Mohanā near Gayā, and their united stream forms the Phalgu (Agni P., 116; Mārka. P., 57). It is the Nerañjarā of the Buddhists" (Dictionary, p. 141).

It is the modern river Gaṇḍak that flows into the Ganges near Patna. The river is said to have been formed from the sweat of the cheeks of Viṣṇu who sat in penance at its source, and hence it was named Gaṇḍakī (Varāha P. 144). According to the same source it was also called Śālagrāmī and Nārāyaṇī.

It is the modern river Kuśī (Rāmāyaṇa, Ādi, 34; Varāha P., 140) which flows into the Ganges through the district of Purnea in Bihar (Dey's Geographical Dictionary, p. 97). The river seems to have largely shifted its course (Pargiter, Mārkaṇḍeya P., p. 292, note).

The Mārkaṇḍeya list of rivers issuing from the Himavat concludes thus: *Kauśikī cāpagā vipra Himavatpāda-niḥsṛtāḥ* which has been translated by Pargiter as, "and Kauśikī are the rivers which flow from the slopes of Himavat, O Brahman." The passage may as Pargiter himself shows (Mārka. P., p. 292, notes), also be rendered as "Kauśikī and the Āpaga flow from the slopes of the Himavat, etc." The Kūrma Purāṇa reads *Kauśikī Lohinī c'eti*.....instead, while the Vāyu and the Varāha (45.,

96 and 85 respectively) read *Kauṣikī Lohita c'eti*.....Still there are other Paurāṇic readings, *e.g.*, *Kauṣikī ca tṛtīyā tu* which may mean the "third Kauṣi kī" or refer to a river Tṛtīyā by name. Pargiter¹ himself suggests two more variant readings, *e.g.*, *Kauṣikī Karatoyā tu* and *Kauṣikī ca Trisrotās tu*. Trisrotā is the modern Teestā which flows into the Brahmaputra, and Karatoyā is the river of that name flowing through the district of Bogra in Bengal. Lohinī and Lohita are evidently the same as the old Lauhitya which is but another name of the Brahmaputra. A river named Tṛtīyā is mentioned in the Sabhā Parva (9., 373) of the Mahābhārata. The three Kauṣikīs are probably (i) the Kosi, (ii) the branch of the Drśadvatī in Kuruksetra and (iii) the one referred to in the Vana Parva (221. 14231) of the Mahābhārata. As for Āpagā as a river, we have reference to it as flowing through Kuruksetra in the Vanaparva (83, 6038-40) of the Mahābhārata (also see Cunningham's Arch. Sur. Rep., XIV., 88 and Plate XXVI).

Besides the one Varṣa-parvata, there were in Bhāratavarṣa seven Kulācalas,² viz., Mahendra, Malaya, Sahya, Suktimat, Rkṣaparvata, Vindhya and Pāripātra. As each of these mountains was associated with one particular country or tribe (kula), they were called Kulācalas. "Thus Mahendra is the mountain *par excellence* of the Kaliṅgas, Malaya of the Pāṇḍyas, Sahya of the Aparāntas, Suktimat of the people of Bhallāṭa, Rkṣa of the people of Māhiṣmatī, Vindhya of the Āṭavyas and other forest-folk of Central India, and Pāripātra or Pāriyātra of the Niṣādas." ³

Rājaśekhara in his Kāvya-mīmāṃsā places these seven Kulaparvatas in that region of Bhāratavarṣa which was known as

¹ Pargiter, *op. cit.*

² Mahendro Malayah Sahyaḥ Suktimān Rkṣaparvataḥ
Vindhyaśca Pāripātraśca saptaivātra kulācalāḥ |

(Mārk. 57.10.)

³ Raychaudhuri, *Studies in Indian Antiquities*, pp. 105-106 and notes. For minor hills associated with Kulācalas, see *op. cit.*, 130 ff.

Kumārī-dvīpa which refers to the Peninsular India with the Vindhya and the Pāripātra as its northern boundaries. Ptolemy evidently heard of some such traditional list of mountains when he enumerated the mountain ranges of India in the following manner : the Apokopa, Sardōnyx, Ouindion, Pōttigō, Adeisathron, Ouxenton, Oroudian, Bēpyrrhos, Maiandros, Damassa or Dobassa and Sēmanthinos. Of these, Ouindion has been identified with the Vindhyas, Bettigo with Podigei, the Tamil name of Malaya, Ouxenton with the R̥ksavant, Adeisathron with the Sahyādri, and the Oroudian with the Vaidūrya which, however, is not enumerated as a *Kulācala*.¹

It is interesting to note that Ptolemy also, like the Paurāṇic writers, groups the rivers of India according to the mountains out of which they rise. The position of the mountains, as he gives them, is owing to his erroneous views of the configuration of India, hopelessly incorrect but one can find some clue to their identification when he describes the rivers issuing from each mountain. The same method is followed also by Paurāṇic writers, and this helps us not a little to identify the seven *Kulācalas* and other mountains mentioned in the Purāṇas. In fact Ptolemy seems certainly to have come in possession of some old traditional list of Indian rivers and mountains, of countries and peoples which he made use of in his Geography and which was utilised later by Epic and Paurāṇic writers as well.

Most of the mountains have lost their ancient names, but the copious references to them in our old literature, apart from the Epics and Purāṇas as well as in epigraphic and numismatic records have enabled scholars² to identify them successfully.

¹ Ptolemy's Ancient India, Mazumdar's edn., pp. 75-81 and 204. Dr. Raychaudhuri seeks to identify (*op. cit.*, p. 105) Maiandros with Mahendra. This is a bit far-fetched, as the rivers issuing out of it are not the same as those issuing out of Mahendra.

² Foremost in this work have been Wilson, Pargiter, N. L. Dey, S. N. Majumdar, and H. C. Raychaudhuri.

The Mahendra
mountain and the
rivers issuing from it.

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa (X, 79) seems to give a very accurate description of the situation of the Mahendra range.¹ From the Paurāṇic description it appears that the Mahendrādri was thus situated between the Gaṅgāsāgarasaṅgama and Sapta-Godāvarī. Part of the Eastern Ghats near Ganjam is still called Mahindra Malei or hill of Mahendra (Wilson, Viṣṇu P., II, 3, p. 127, n.). Pargiter thinks that the name should be limited to the hills between the Mahānadī, Godāvarī and Wain-gaṅgā and may perhaps comprise only the portion of the Eastern Ghats north of the Godāvarī (Mārk. P., p. 305, note). Classical Sanskrit literature seems to agree with the description of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, and hence with the identification of Pargiter. The Raghuvamśa of Kālidāsa which refers to the hills more than once (IV, 39, 40, 43 ; VI, 54) seems to locate the range in the Kaliṅga country ; so also seems to be the indication of the Uttara Naiṣadha Carita (XII, 24). But according to the various passages of the Rāmāyaṇa, the name Mahendra seems to have been applied to the whole range of mountains extending from Ganjam to as far south as the Pāṇḍya country, to the whole of the Eastern Ghat range (Koiṣk, 41, 18-20; Kiṣk., 67; Lamkā K., 4, 92-24). There in the Tinnevely district is a small mountain which is still called Mahendragiri (Tinnevely District Gazetteer, I, p. 4). Pargiter thinks that the Mahendra hills of the Purāṇas and those of the Rāmāyaṇa were two different ranges but Dr. Raychaudhuri has argued with good reasons that the authors of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Purāṇas meant the same range of hills (Studies in Indian Antiquities, pp. 108-109). That the Mahendra hills extended as far south as Madura and joined the Malaya hills is also proved by the Caitanya-Caritāmṛta and the Harṣa Carita respectively (Harṣa-Caritam, VII). The Paurāṇic

¹ Gayāṁ gatvā pitṛṇiṣṭvā Gaṅgā-sāgara-saṅgame
upasprēya Mahendrādrau Rāmaṁ dr̥ṣṭvābhivādyā ca
Sapta Godāvarīm Veṇvām Pampām Bhīmarathīm tataḥ,

suggestion is also to the effect that it was situated in juxtaposition with Malaya and Sahya.

The Epics and Purāṇas speak of certain minor hills which may conveniently be associated with the Mahendra ranges.¹ Such are the Śrīparvata and the Puṣpagiri. According to the Agni Purāṇa, Śrīparvata seems to have been situated not far from Kāverīsaṅgama (CXIII, 3-4). The same text tells us that this hill was dedicated by Viṣṇu to Śrī for her having performed some austerities there. It is the name of a lofty rock which overhangs the river Kṛṣṇā in the Kurnool District.² According to Dr. Raychaudhuri (*op. cit.*, p. 130) it lay eight miles to the north of Cuddapah. Other minor hills noticed by Dr. Raychaudhuri which were associated with the Mahendra ranges were the Venkaṭādri, the Aruṇācala (Skanda P., Aruṇācala Māhātmya, III, 59-61 ; IV, 9, 13, 21, 37) or Sonācala and the Ṛṣabha (Bhāgavata P., X, 79 ; Mbh., III, 85-21).³

The rivers issuing from the Mahendra ranges are the Piṭṛsomā, Ṛṣikulyā, Ikṣukā, Tridivā, Lāṅgulinī and Vamśakarā.⁴

The Kūrma Purāṇa (XLVII, 36) does not, however, mention this group of rivers issuing from the Mahendra ; on the contrary,

¹ Minor hills associated with the *Kulācalas* are thus described in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* (57. 11-15) :

Teṣāṃ sahasraśāścānye bhūdhārā ye samīpagāḥ |
Vistārocchrāyīṇo ramyā vipulāścātra sānavāḥ |
Kolāhalaḥ sa Vaibhṛājō Mandarō Darddūrācalaḥ |
Vātasvano Vaidyutaśca Mainākaḥ Svarasastathā |
Tuṅgaprastho Nāgagiri Rocanaḥ Pāṇḍarācalaḥ |
Puṣpo girirdurjjayanto Raivato'rbbuda eva ca |
Ṛṣyamūkaḥ sa Gomantaḥ Kūṭṣāśailaḥ Kṛtasmarāḥ |
Śrīparvataśca Koraśca Śataśo'nye ca parvvatāḥ |

In place of Vaibhṛāja the Vāyu reads Vaihāra ; in place of Vātasvano the Vāyu reads Pātandhama ; Pargiter suggests Vaidūrya for Vaidyuta ; in place of Svarasa the Vāyu reads Sasurasa or Susarasa ; in place of Pāṇḍara the Vāyu reads Pāṇḍura ; in place of Durjjayanta the Vāyu reads Ujjayanta ; in place of Kora the Vāyu reads Ketu or Kāru.

² Pargiter, *Mārka. P.*, p. 290, notes.

³ For identifications of these mountains, see Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*

⁴ Piṭṛsomaṛṣikulyā ca Ikṣukā Tridivā ca yā |
Lāṅgulinī Vamśakarā Mahendraprabhavaḥ smṛtāḥ |

it speaks of Trisāmā, Ṛṣikā and Varṁśadhārīnī (evidently identical with Pitr̥somā, Ṛṣikulyā and Varṁśakarā respectively) as rivers that issued from the Śuktimat ranges. Besides the above six, the Matsya Purāṇa (CXIII, 31) mentions three more, the Tāmraparṇī, Śaravā and Vimalā.

The variant readings are Trisāmā (Vāyu, XLV, 106 ;
 Pitr̥somā. Bhāgavata, V. XIX, 17 ; Agni, CXVIII, 8),
 Triyāmā (Varāha, LXXXV), and Tribhāgā
 (Matsya, CXIII, 31). It cannot definitely be identified.

The Vāyu Purāṇa reads Ṛtu-kulyā (XLV, 106), evidently
 Ṛṣikulyā. incorrectly. The river still bears its old name,
 and flows past Ganjam.

The Vāyu (XLV, 106) and Varāha Purāṇas (LXXXV)
 Ikṣukā. read Ikṣulā, while the Matsya reads Ikṣudā
 (CXIII, 31). It cannot definitely be identified,
 but obviously it must have been a river like the Pitr̥somā on the
 eastern coast.

Tridivā—A Tridivā is said to have issued from the Vindhya
 in the Paurāṇic list.

Lāṅgulinī—It is the same river as the Lāṅgalī of the
 Mahābhārata (Sabhā, IX, 374). The Varāhapurāṇa variants
 are Mūlinī or Lamūlinī (LXXXV), while the Matsya reads Mūlī
 (CXIII, 31) ; certainly they are copyist's mistakes, for the river
 still bears its old name and is definitely identifiable with the
 Lāṅgulīya on which stands Chicacole, between Vizianagram and
 Kalīngapatam.

Varṁśakarā—The Varāha Purāṇa reads Varṁśa-varā
 (LXXXV) ; but the correct name seems to be Varṁśadharā
 which is given in the Vāyu Purāṇa (XLV, 106). It is evidently
 the modern Baṁsdharā, which flows past Kalīngapatam.

The Malaya hills are often mentioned in Sanskrit literature,
 but the word seems to have been derived from
 The Malaya Range
 and the rivers issuing
 from it. the Dravidian word 'mala' or 'malai' which
 means hill (Ind. Ant., 1889, 240 ff.). " From
 it are derived the designations of the country of Mo-lo-kū-t'a

(Malakūṭa) referred to by Hiuen Tsang, and the language called Malayalam spoken by the people of Malabar." (Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 111). The Malaya range of hills is the same as the Tamil Podigai or Podigai, the Bettig of Ptolemy. Pargiter correctly identifies it with "the portion of Western Ghats from the Nilgiris to Cape Comorin," for the sources of the rivers that are said to have issued from this range can all be located in this portion of the Ghats. Dr. Raychaudhuri has successfully shown that the Malaya *par excellence* is mountain of the Pāṇḍyas (*op. cit.*). According to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (X, 79), the hermitage of Agastya was situated on the summit of Malaya. The Malaya range is, therefore, sometimes referred to as Malaya-kūṭa. The mountain was also known as Śrīkhaṇḍādri or even as Candanādri (*cf.* Dhoyi's Pavanadūtam).

The minor hill associated with the Malaya range seems to have been the Dardura which Pargiter identifies with the Nilgiris or the Palni hills. The hill is associated with Cola and Pāṇḍya kings in the Mahābhārata (II, 52, 34). The hill is also mentioned elsewhere in the epics. (Mbh., XIII, 165, 32; Rām., Laṅka K., 26, 42), as well as in the Raghuvamśa (IV, 51).

The rivers issuing from the Malaya range are the Kṛtamālā, Tāmraparṇī, Puṣpajā, and Sūtpalāvatī or Utpalāvatī.¹

The Kūrma Purāṇa (XLVII, 35) reads R̥tumālā instead, while the Varāha (LXXXV) Satamālā and the Bhāgavata Katamālā (V, XIX, 17). It has been successfully identified with the modern Vaigai which flows past Madura (*cf.* Caitanya-Caritāmṛta, Ch. IX, p. 141).

This river is evidently the one bearing the same name in the Raghuvamśa (IV, 49-50), and was a sacred river according to the Mahābhārata (Vana P., LXXXVIII, 8340). Evidently it flowed through the Pāṇḍya country and is to be identified with what is locally called

¹ Kṛtamālā Tāmraparṇī Puṣpajā Sūtpalāvatī ||
Malayāḍriśamudbhūtā nadya śītaśītalāstvināḥ |

Tāmravari or with the combined stream of the latter and Chittar. It is also called Tāmravarnā (Brah. P., 49). The port of Kolkai or Korkai was once situated on its mouth which was well known for its pearl-fishery (Raghu, *op. cit.*) ; Kolkai or Kor kai is mentioned by Ptolemy.

The variants of Puṣpajā are Puṣpajāti (Vāyu, XLV, 105) and Puṣpavatī (Kūrma, XLVII, 35) ; while the variant for Sutpalāvatī is Utpalāvatī (Mahābhārata, Bhīṣma P., IX, 342) which is undoubtedly the correct reading. Another variant is Utpalā (H. V., CLXVIII, 9510-2). Many Purāṇas give the reading as Utpalāvatī. “A river Puṣpa-veṇī is mentioned (Mbh., Bhīṣma P., IX, 342) which is joined with a river Utpalāvatī.” (Pargiter, Mār. P., p. 304, notes). The two rivers are probably the Puṣpajā and Sutpalāvatī. These two rivers must be any two of the Vaippar, the Amarāvatī, the Ponani and Peri or Vedamali, the four modern rivers, besides the Kṛtamālā and Tāmraparṇi, that rise from the Malaya mountains.

The Sahya mountain or Sahyādri has been correctly identified with ‘the northern portion of the Western Ghats and as it appears from the rivers which rise in them, it extends from the river Tapti down to the Nilgiris’ (Pargiter, Mār. P., p. 285, note). In his Raghuvaṃśam (IV., 52), Kālidāsa describes it as ‘*nitamba iva medinyāḥ*’ and associates it with the people of Aparānta or western India.

The most important minor mountain associated with the Sahya is certainly the Vaidūrya, mentioned in the Mahābhārata in connection with the two rivers the Payoṣṇī and the Narmadā (III, 121, 16-19). The mountain is generally identified with the Oroudian mountain of Ptolemy which, according to him, was the source of the river of Maisólos, identifiable either with the Godāvari or the Kṛṣṇā. The Vaidūrya thus included the northernmost part of the Western Ghats, but the evidence of the Mahābhārata suggests that it included also a portion of the southern Vindhya and Satpura ranges. Another minor hill

Puṣpajā and
Sutpalāvatī.

The Sahya Range
and the rivers issuing
from it.

connected with the Sahya range is the Trikūṭa, referred to by Kālidāsa in his Raghuvamśa (IV, 59), evidently the mountain from which the Traikūṭakas derived their name. R̥ṣyamūka and Gomanta may also be associated with the Sahya mountains. Pargiter identifies the former, the scene of Rāma's meeting with Sugrīva and Hanumān, "with the range of hills which stretches from Ahmadnagar to beyond Naldurg and Kalyānī, dividing the Mañjirā and Bhīmā" (Mārk. P., p. 289, note). He identifies the Gomanta with the hills south or south-east of Nasik (*op. cit.*). But Dr. Raychaudhuri points out that to the north of Gomanta was Vanavāsī (H. V., Viṣṇu Parva, 39, 62-64), so that the hill should be placed in the Mysore region.

The rivers issuing from the Sahya mountains are the Godāvarī, Bhīma-ratha, Kṛṣṇa-veṇvā, another Veṇvā, Tuṅga-bhadṛā, Suprayoga, Vāhyā and the Kāverī.¹

A river well known in the Rāmāyaṇa which has retained its old name up to now.

The Vāyu (XLV, 104) and Varāha Purāṇas read Bhīma-rathī, while the Kūrma Bhīmarakṣī which is evidently "incorrect. It is undoubtedly the modern Bhīmā, a tributary of the modern Kṛṣṇā.

It is one of the very little known rivers of ancient India (see Pargiter, Mārk. P., p. 302, note). It survives in its modern name Kṛṣṇā.

The variant readings are Veṇa (Varāha, LXXXV), Veṇā or Varṇā (Kūrma, XLVII, 34), Vainī (Vāyu, XLV, 104), Viṇā (Mbh., Bhīṣma P., IX, 828) and Veṇṇā (Bhāgavata P., V, XIX, 17). Pargiter suggests its identification with the river Penner between the Kṛṣṇā and the Kāverī (Mark. P., p. 303, notes).

¹ Godāvarī Bhīmarathā Kṛṣṇaveṇvā tathāparā |
Tuṅgabhadṛā Suprayogā Vāhyā Kāveryathāpagā ||
Sahya-pādavinīṣkrantā ityetaḥ sariduttamāḥ |

(Mārk. P., 57, 26, 27). The reading for Sahya is Vindhya, but that is evidently by mistake. See Kūrma P., (XLVII, 34) and Vāyu P. (XLI, 104).

It is to be identified with the well-known river of that name, the famous tributary of the Kṛṣṇā.

It is also mentioned in the Mahābhārata (Bhīṣma P., IX, 328 ; Vana P., CCXXI, 14232) and though not definitely identifiable, it is as good as certain that it was one of the western tributaries of the Kṛṣṇā.

This also cannot be identified. The Agni Purāṇa, however, reads Vāradā which is to be identified with the Varada or Vedavatī, a southern tributary of the Kṛṣṇā.

The river still bears its own name, and is mentioned in the Rāmāyaṇa (Kish. K., XLI, 21 and 25), the Harivaṃśa (XXVII, 1416-22) and the Mahābhārata (Bhīṣma P., IX, 328 ; Vana P., LXXXV, 8164-5 ; CLXXXIX, 12910). The Tīrthayātrā sections of the Purāṇas and Epics invariably mention this river as very holy ; in fact it was more well-known than the Kṛṣṇā. It is *Khāberos* of Ptolemy which is said to have its source in the Adeisathron range. This range may, therefore, be identified with the southern portion of the Sahya.

In place of “*Godāvarī Bhīmarathā Kṛṣṇaveṇvā tathāparā*” the Vāyu reads “*Godāvarī Bhīmarathā Kṛṣṇaveṇvā ca Vanjūlā*” (XLV, 104) ; while the Varāha (LXXXV) and Matsya Purāṇas (CXIII, 29) add this river after Kāverī. It is obviously to be identified with the Mañjirā, a southern tributary of the Godāvarī.

There is a good deal of difference of opinion with regard to the identification of the Suktimat mountain. There is also a good deal of confusion about the rivers that are said to have issued from it, which, in fact, renders the identification really very difficult. Cunningham identified the range with the hills south of Sehoā and Kānker separating Chattisgarh from Bastar (Arch. Sur. Rep., XVII, pp. 24, 26, and map at end). Beglar places the Suktimat in the

The Suktimat range
and the rivers issuing
from it.

north of the Hazaribagh district (Arch. Sur. Rep., VIII, pp. 124-125). Pargiter, after some discussion, identified the range with the Garo, Khasi and Tipperah hills (Märk. P., pp. 285, 306 notes); while C. V. Vaidya located it in Western India and identified it with Kathiawad range (Epic. Ind., p. 276). R. C. Majumdar and H. K. Dev agreed to identify the Śuktimat with the Sulaiman range (Proc. of Second Oriental Conference, 1923, p. 609; *ibid*, p. ci; Z. D. M. G., 1922, p. 281 n). Dr. Raychaudhuri applies the name with the chain of hills that extends from Sakti in Raigarh, C. P., to the Dalma hills in Manbhum drained by the Kumārī and perhaps even to the hills in the Santal Parganas washed by the affluents of the Bāblā.¹

The rivers issuing from the Śuktimat are the Ṛṣikulyā, the Kumārī, the Mandagā, the Mandavāhinī, the Kṛpā and the Palāśinī.²

The Vāmana Purāṇa excludes this list altogether and replaces it by a new one in which figure some of the rivers known to have been issued from the Malaya (XIII, 32-33). The two new names, the Śunī and the Sudāmā, mentioned by the Vāmana are not identifiable, nor can we definitely identify the rivers mentioned in the Mārkaṇḍeya list, and for the matter of that in other Purāṇas. In the place of Ṛṣikulyā, the Vāyu reads Ṛṣikā (XLV, 70) the Varāha Ṛṣikā (LXXXV) and the Matsya Kāsikā (CXIII, 32). The Ṛṣikulyā has been often identified with the Kiyul, a tributary of the Ganges (Beglar, *op. cit.*). Kumārī has also variant readings, namely, Sukumārī (XLV, 107), Lūsati (Varāha) but the Bhīṣma Parvan list of the Mahābhārata is the same as in the Mārkaṇḍeya. The Kumārī is sought to be identified with the Kaorhari (Beglar, *op. cit.*), the Someśvarī (Pargiter, *op. cit.*), the Kumar (in the extreme north-west: Dev and

¹ Studies in Indian Antiquities, pp. 113-120, where there is an illuminating discussion on the various theories about the identification of Śuktimat.

² Ṛṣikulyā Kumārī ca Mandagā Mandavāhinī |

Kṛpā Palāśinī caiva Śuktimatprabhuvāḥsmṛtāḥ ||

(Märk. P., 29-30.)

Majumdar, *op. cit.*) and the Kumārī (in Manbhum : Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*). The variants of Mandagā and Mandavāhinī are Mandagāminī (Varāha, LXXV) and Gandhamanda-gāminī (Kūrma, XLVII, 36). This river as well as the Mandavāhinī cannot be identified, though some have suggested an obviously impossible equation with the Helmand (Dev and Majumdar, *op. cit.*). For Kṛpā, the Vāyu Purāṇa reads Kūpā (XLV, 107) and the Kūrma, Kṣiprā or Rūpā (XLVII, 36); some (for example, Dev and Majumdar, *op. cit.*), equate Kṛpā-kūpā with the Kubhā or Kabul river, others with Kapilī (Pargiter, *op. cit.*), still others, with Kopā, a tributary of the Bāblā in eastern India (Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*). The Palāsinī has been sought to be identified with the river of the same name issuing from the Junāgaḍ hills (Vaidya, *op. cit.*), with the Panjshar in the extreme north-west (Dev and Majumdar, *op. cit.*), as well as with the Parās, a tributary of the Koel in Chota-Nagpur (Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*). Dr. Raychaudhuri's identification of the Suktimat with the hills of eastern India extending from C.P. to the Santhal Parganas seems nearest the mark and his equation of the Kṛpā-kūpā-kṣiprā, the Kumārī and the Palāsinī with the Kopā, Kumārī and Parās respectively, all in eastern India; must be considered interesting and satisfactory.

The Rkṣavat and the Vindhya are Ouxenton and Ouīndon of Ptolemy, but it is not very easy to identify these two *Kulācalas* though it is generally recognised that the three *Kulācalas*, the Rkṣa, the Vindhya and the Pāripā(yā)tra are parts of the whole range of mountains now known by the common name Vindhya. This is due to the confusion of the different purāṇas as regards the sources of the rivers issuing from the Rkṣa and the Vindhya. An analysis of the lists of rivers issuing from these two mountains, as they are in the different purāṇas, will show that the rivers may conveniently be classified into two distinct groups, the Soṇa-Narmadā group and the Sīprā-Tāptī group. According

The Rkṣavat and the Vindhya Mountains and the rivers issuing from them.

to the Kūrma, Matsya, Brahmāṇḍa, Vāyu, and Vāmana Purāṇas, the Rkṣa is the source of the Sona-Narmmadā group including the Narmmadā, Soṇa, Mahānada, Mandākinī, Daśārṇā, Tamasa, Vipāsā, Śuktimati, etc., while the Śiprā-Tāptī (Tāptī) group including the Śiprā, Payoṣṇī, Nirbindhyā, Venyā, Vaitaraṇī, etc., had its source in the Vindhya. This order is completely reversed in the Mārkaṇḍeya, Viṣṇu and Brahma Purāṇas which give the Vindhya as the source of the Sona-Narmmadā group and the Rkṣa as that of the Śiprā-Tāptī group. The identification, if we have to depend on epic or Paurāṇic evidence alone, is thus almost a hopeless task.¹

Ptolemy describes Ouxenton or the Rkṣavanta as the source of the Toundis, the Dosaran and the Adamas, and the Ouīndon as that of the Namados and the Nanagouna. The Dosaran has long been identified with the Daśārṇā of the Purāṇas and the Namados and Nanagouna with the Narmmadā and Tāptī respectively. Thus Narmmadā and Tāptī had their sources not in two different mountains, but in one and the same, namely, the Vindhya. The Daśārṇā, as we have seen, is said to have issued, according to a number of Purāṇas from the Rkṣa or Ouxenton according to Ptolemy. And what Ptolemy says (VII, 1, 39-41) about the mouth of the river seems to suggest that by the Ouxenton he meant the central region of the modern Vindhya range north of the Narmmadā, while Ouīndon stands for only that portion of the Vindhya from where rise the Narmmadā and the Tāptī, i.e., the eastern part of the modern Vindhya south of the Narmmadā (cf. Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*).

Dr. Raychaudhuri cites a number of passages from the Epics, the Harivaṁśa, the Purāṇas and inscriptions to show

¹ "No conclusion regarding the relative position of Rkṣa and Vindhya can also be drawn from the constant association of the former with the Narmmadā and that of the latter with the Revā, for though the Bhāgavata and the Vāmana Purāṇas seem to distinguish between the two rivers, the Revākhaṇḍa regards them as one and the same, a fact borne out also by incidental references in the Bhāgavata itself." Raychaudhuri, *Studies in Indian Antiquities*, pp. 122-23.

that Ptolemy's indications are substantially correct (*ibid*, pp. 124-123). He concludes by saying that "ancient Hindu writers commonly regarded Vindhya and Ṛkṣa as interchangeable terms. But one fact is clear. While the name Vindhya was loosely applied to the whole chain of hills from Gujrāṭa to the Gayā district, lying on both sides of the Narmmadā, the Ṛkṣa, when referred to incidentally in literature, is invariably associated with the middle Narmmadā region of which Māhiṣmatī was the most important city, and the Daśārṇa, a notable river. The Vindhya, when distinguished from the Ṛkṣa, denotes the chain lying south of the Narmmadā as suggested by Nīlakaṇṭha (in his Commentary on the Harivaṃśa)....." (*ibid*).

The rivers issuing from the Ṛkṣa and the Vindhya are the Soṇa, Mahānada, Narmmadā, Surathā, Adrijā, Mandākinī, Daśārṇā, Citrakūṭa, Citrotpalā, Tamasā, Karamodā, Piśācikā, Pippalisoṇī, Vipāśī, Vañjulā, Sumerujā, Śuktimatī, Sakulī, Tridivā, Vegavāhini, Śiprā, Payoṣṇī, Nirbīndhyā, Tāpī (Tāptī) Nisādhlāvati, Veṇvā, Vaitaraṇī, Śivāli, Kumudvatī, Karatoyā, Mahāgaurī, Durgā and Antaḥśirā.¹

Soṇa.—It is the river Sone that has its source near the Narmmadā and drains itself into the Ganges. It was also known as Hiraṇyavāha or Hiraṇyabāhu, the Erannaboas of the Greek geographers.

Mahānada (Mahānadī)—It is probably not the same river that bears its old name and flows through Orissa but is a branch thereof that rises near the source of the Sone (see Pargiter,

¹ Soṇo Mahānadaścaiva Narmmadā Surathā Adrijā |
Mandākinī Daśārṇā ca Citrakūṭā tathāpālā ||
Citrotpalā ca Tamasā Karamodā Piśācikā |
Tathānyā Pippalār pīvoṣṇā Vāñjulā nadī ||
Sumeruś Śuktimatī Sakulī Tridivā vamaḥ |
Ṛkṣapādā prasūtā vai tathā yā vegavāhini ||
Śiprā Payoṣṇī Nirbīndhyā Tāpī sa Nisādhlāvati |
Veṇvā Vaitaraṇī caiva Śivāli Kumudvatī ||
Karatoyā Mahāgaurī Durgā cāntaḥśirā tatbā |
Vindhya-pādu-prasūtāstā nadyaḥ punyajalāḥ śubhāḥ ||

Mark. P., p. 295, note). In the *Varāha Purāṇa*, *Mahānadī* is replaced by the river named *Jyotirathā* (LXXXV), which is the same as the *Jyotirathyā* (*Mbh.*, *Vana*, LXXXV, 8150) or the *Jyotirathā* (*HV.*, CLXVIII, 9150-12), probably a southern tributary of the *Sone*.

Narmmadā—The *Namados* of *Ptolemy*, the modern *Nerbudda*, which rises near the source of the *Sone*. According to the *Matsya Purāṇa*, the place where the *Narmmadā* falls to the sea is a great place of pilgrimage (*Ch.* 193) called the *Jamadagni-tīrtha*.

Surathā and Adrijā—The variant for *Surathā* is *Surasā* (*Kūrma*, XLVII. 30 ; *Varāha*, LXXXV ; *Bhāgavata*, V, XIX. 17) ; while *Adrijā*, the next river in the list, is replaced by *Sumahādruma* or *Surahādruma* (XLV, 99), obviously a confusion of the copyist. *Adrijā* is also mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* (*Anuśāsanaparva*, CLXV, 7648).

It is not improbable that the entire line “*Soṇo Mahānadaś-caiva Narmmadā Surathādrijā*” is intended to be interpreted as *Soṇa*, *Mahānada*, and *Narmmadā* which all originated from the *Amarakaṇṭaka* hills which in fact are the sources of the *Soṇa*, the *Narmmadā* and also of the *Mahānadī*.

Mandākinī—It is undoubtedly the Modern *Mandākin* which flows into the *Paisuni* near the *Citrakūṭa* mountain (*Cunningham*, *Arch. Sur. Rep.*, XXI. 11).

Daśārṇā—It gave its name to the country through which it flowed, and is referred to by *Kālidāsa* in his *Meghadūta*. It is the modern *Dhasan* near *Saugor* flowing between the *Betwa* (*Vetravatī*) and the *Ken*.

Citrakūṭa and Citrotpalā—*Citrakūṭa* is evidently a river connected with the modern *Citrakūṭa* mountain, but the *Citrotpalā* does not yield to any identification, though it is mentioned in the *Bhīṣmaparva* list of the *Mahābhārata*.

Tamasā—The river *Tamasā* is famous for its association with the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The *Kūrma Purāṇa* gives a variant,—

Tāmastī (XLVII, 30). It is identifiable with the river Tons which flows into the Ganges below Allahabad.

Karamadā—The Vāyu (XLV, 100) and Varāha Purāṇas read Karatoyā instead. Anyway, it seems probable, as Pargiter has suggested, that the river Karmanāsā which flows into the Ganges just above the Sone is here meant.

Pisācikā and Pippaliśroni—The Pisācikā is not identifiable though it is suggested that it may be one of the southern tributaries of the Sone. In the Pippaliśroni (Vāyu: Pipyalaśroni; Varāha: Pippalā), Pargiter finds the Paisuni or Parsaroni, a tributary of the Jumna between the Ken and the Tons (*op. cit.*).

Vipāśā—It has to be distinguished from the river of the same name in the Punjab. It is the modern Bias that flows past Saugor into the Ken. In place of Vipāśā, the Varāha Purāṇa reads Viśālā which is to be identified with the Viśālā that flows through Gayā (*cf.* Mbh., Śalya. P., XXXIX, 2188-89, 2205-06).

Vaṇjūlā—The variants are Vaṇjukā (Varāha, LXXXV), Maṇjūlā (Mbh., Bhīṣma P., IX, 341; Kūrma, XLII, 31) and Jambulā (Vāyu, XLV, 100). It cannot definitely be identified.

Sumerujā—The variant readings are Siterajā (Vāyu, XLV, 101) and Virajā (Varāha, LXXXV). It cannot be identified.

Suktimatī—It is often erroneously suggested that this river issued from the 'Suktimat' mountain. In fact, its source is stated to be either the Ṛkṣavat or Vindhya. The Muktimatī of the Bhīṣmaparva list of the Mahābhārata is probably the same river. It is not unlikely that Suktimatī, the capital of the Cedis, stood on this river. There is, however, hardly any clue to its definite identification.

Śakulī and Tridivā—The variants for Śakulī are Makruṇā or Makṣanā (Vāyu, XLV, 101) and Paṅkini (Varāha, LXXXV). Pargiter identifies the Śakulī with the river Sakri which flows into the Ganges between Patna and Monghyr. The Tridivā is

mentioned also in the Bhīṣmaparva list, but it cannot successfully be identified.

Vegavāhinī—The Vāyu, Varāha and Kūrma Purāṇas read Vāluvāhinī or Ratnavāhinī (Kūrma, XLVII, 31). It cannot be identified.

Śiprā—A Śiprā is mentioned in the Paurāṇic list and it is said to have issued from the Pāripātra mountains (see below). According to the Harivaṃśa (CLXVIII, 95-99) there is a Śiprā in the southern region; it is not impossible that the southern Śiprā is here intended. The Vāyu Purāṇa reads Madra (XLV, 102), while both the Kūrma (XLVII, 32) and the Varāha (LXXXV) read Sighroda; the Matsya reads Kṣiprā instead (CXIII, 27) and the Mahābhārata (Bhīṣma P., IX, 336) Sighrā. There is evidently some doubt as to the real name of the river here intended.

Payoṣṇī—The Varāha Purāṇa reads Payolli (LXXXV) which is wrong. According to the Mahābhārata, it was a river flowing through Vidarbha (Vana P., CXX, 10289-90), and was separated from the Narmmadā by the Vaidūrya mountains (*ibid*, CXXI, 10306-7). Pargiter therefore identifies it with the modern river Pūrṇa (the tributary of the Tāptī) together with the lower part of the Tāptī into which the Pūrṇa continues (Mārk. P., p. 299, notes). But the Purāṇas would have Payoṣṇī and Tāptī distinctly as two separate rivers in the same verse; the Padma Purāṇa (Uttara., Ch. 41) even has Tāpī, Payoṣṇī and Pūrṇa in the same verse. Some have, therefore, sought to identify the Payoṣṇī with the Pain or Paingāṅgā, a branch of the Wardha in C. P.

According to the Caitanyacaritāmṛta, there was another Payoṣṇī in the extreme south, identical with the river Pūrṭi in Travancore (Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, V, p. 45).

Nirbbindhyā—The Vāyu Purāṇa reads Nirbbandhyā (XLV, 102) which is evidently wrong. This river is mentioned by Kālidāsa in his Meghadūta (I, 28-29) as lying between

Ujjain and the river Betwā or Vetravatī. It has been identified with the Kalisindh in Malwa (J. of Buddhist Text Society, V, p. 46), but as Kalisindh is probably the Sindhu of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta, the identification of the Nirbbindhyā with the 'Newuj, another tributary of the Cambal between Vetravatī and Sindh, seems to be more satisfactory (Thorton's Gazetteer, S. V. Gwalior, Bhpoal).

Tāptī—It is undoubtedly the Tāptī ; but strangely enough the river is nowhere mentioned in the Epics, not even in the Bhīṣmaparva list of the Mahābhārata.

Niṣadhāvati—The variants are Niṣadhā (Vāyu, XLV, 102) and Ṛṣabhā (Matsya, CXIII, 27); the latter apparently is a wrong reading. Naturally the river suggests an association with Niṣadha country and may be identified with one of the small tributaries of the Narmmadā or the Tāptī. The reading Mahānadi of the Kūrma Purāṇa (XLVII, 32) is impossible, for it has already been mentioned in connection with the Sone and the Narmmadā.

Veṇvā and Vaitaraṇī—The variants are Veṇvā, Vinnā, in the Purāṇas and Veṇvā and Veṇā in the Mahābhārata. Pargiter identifies it (Mārk. P., p. 300, note) with the Waingāṅgā and its continuation, the Prānhitā. The Vaitaraṇī is undoubtedly the modern river of the same name that flows through Orissa.

Sinivālī, Kumudvatī, Karatoyā, Mahāgaurī, Durgā and Antaḥsirā—These rivers are not definitely identifiable. The variants for Sinivālī are confusing and do not help us in any way to identify the river. They are Sitibāhu, Balākā, Vedipālā, Satabalā and Viśvamālā in the Purāṇas and the Mahābhārata ; none of these names can be satisfactorily identified. Nor can we identify Kumudvatī or Karatoyā which is certainly not the river that flows through northern Bengal. Mahāgaurī has been identified by Pargiter (*op. cit.*, pp. 300-301, notes) with the Brāhmaṇī that flows through Orissa, and Durgā with another smaller Brāhmaṇī that flows through the Murshidabad district

into the right bank of the Bhāgirathī. But the latter identification seems to be doubtful. The Vāyu (XLV, 103) and Kūrma Purāṇas (XLVII, 33) replace Antaḥśirā by Antaḥśilā, and the Varāha by Antyāgirā (LXXXV). The river cannot however be identified. The Varāha Purāṇa gives one more river, the Mañjālā Subhā, but does not give any clue to its identification.

The earliest mention of the Pāriyātra mountain is found in Dharmasūtra of Bodhāyana (I, 1, 25) who refers to this mountain as the southern limit of Āryāvarta. The Skanda Purāṇa also refers to it as the farthest limit of Kumārī-Khaṇḍa, the centre of Bhāratavarṣa. The mountain seems to have lent its name to the country with which it was associated; Yuan Chwang mentions a Po-li-ye-ta-lo country (Pāriyātra) ruled by a Vaiśya king. Pargiter identifies the Pāripātra (or Pāriyātra) with that portion of the modern Vindhya range which is situated west of Bhopal together with the Aravalli mountains (Pargiter, *Mārk P.*, *op. cit.*)

The rivers issuing from the Pāriyātra are the Vedasmṛti, Vedavatī, Vṛtraghnī, Sindhu, Veṇvā, Ānandinī, Sadānīrā, Mahī, Pārā, Carmaṇvatī, Nūpī, Vidiśā, Vetravatī, Sīprā and Avarṇī.¹

Vedasmṛti, Vedavatī and Vṛtraghnī—These rivers cannot be identified. Vedasmṛti is replaced by Vedasmṛtā in some of the texts (Bhīṣma P., IX, 324) and Vedavatī and Vṛtraghnī by Vadasinī or Vetasinī and Vrataghnī respectively. But none of these names gives any clue to their identification.

Sindhu—It is certain that by Sindhu is here meant the Kalisindh, a tributary of the Jumna between the Cambal and Betwa. It was on its banks that Agastya met Lopāmudrā,

¹ VedasmṛtirVedavatī Vṛtraghnī Sindhureva ca
Veṇvā ānandinī caiva Sadānīrā Mahī tathā
Pārā Carmaṇvatī Nūpī Vidiśā Vetravatyaṇi
Sīprā hyAvarṇī ca tathā Pāripātrāśrayāḥ smṛtāḥ

(*Mārk. P.*, 57, 19-20.)

daughter of the Vidarbha king and they became married (Mbh. Vana P., XCVI, XCVII ; CXXX, 10541).

Venṇā—The Mārkaṇḍeya reading seems to be a wrong one, for the majority of the Purāṇas give different readings which are nearer the mark. Thus the Vāyu (XLV, 97) and Kūrma Purāṇas (XLVII. 29) read Varṇāsā, the Kūrma also Pūrṇa and Parṇāsā. Parṇāsā and Varṇāsā are evidently the same and have been identified with the river Banās, tributary of the Cambal.

Ānandinī—The various paurāṇic readings are Sānandinī, Candanā, Bandhanā and Sabandhanā, none of which can be identified.

Sadānīrā—According to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the Sadānīrā formed the boundary between Kośala and Videha, though Sāyaṇa in his commentary wrongly identifies it with the Karatoyā. The Sadānīrā of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa has, therefore, been sought to be identified by some with the Gaṇḍak, by others with the Rāpti. But the Sadānīrā of our Paurāṇic passage cannot mean this river which is said to have issued from the Pāriyātra. The Vāyu Purāṇa reads Satīrā and Sadātīrā instead (XLV, 97).

Mahī—The variants are Mahatī (Vāyu, XLV, 97), Mahita (Mbh., Bhīṣma P., IX, 328) and Rohi (Varāha, LXXXV). It is the river Mahī which rises in Malwa and drains itself into the Gulf of Cambay.

Pārā—The Vāyu reads Parā instead. Cunningham identifies it with the Pārvatī that rises in Bhopal and falls into the Cambal (Arch. Sur. Rep., II., 308).

Carmaṇvatī—It is the well-known river Cambal, the tributary of the Jumna.

Nūpī—The Kūrma Purāṇa reads Surā and Sūryā instead (XLVII, 29), but none of them can be identified.

Vidiśā—Vidiśā, as is well known, is modern Bhilsa, and the river of this name must be connected with the Vidisa country.

Vetravatī—It is the modern Betwa that flows into the Jumna.

Siprā—The river is referred to by Kālidāsa in his *Meghadūta* (I, 31, 32). On it stood Ujjayinī.

Avarṇī—The Vāyu reads *Avantī* instead, in which case it must be a river of the *Avantī* or *Malwa* country identifiable with the river *Avantī* which rises near *Mhow* and flows into *Cambal* (*Pargiter, Mār. P.*, p. 295, notes).

The more important of the minor mountains in the *Epics* and *Purāṇas* that may be said to be associated with the *Rkṣa*, the *Vindhya* and the *Pāriyātra* are the *UrjJayanta*, the *Raivataka*, the *Arbuda*, the *Kolāhala*, the *Citrakūṭa*, the *Amarakaṇṭaka*, the *Vaibhrāja* and the *Vātasvana*. The *UrjJayanta* has long been identified with the *Girnar* mountain and the *Raivataka* with the hill opposite *Girnar*. *Arbuda* survives in the mount *Abu* (cf. the *Arbuda Khaṇḍa* of the *Skanda Purāṇa*). The *Amarakaṇṭaka* is the source of the *Sone*, the *Mahānadī* and the *Narmmadā*. The *Kolāhala* is the small range of hills in *Bundelkhand*, while *Citrakūṭa* still bears its old name and is situated not very far from *Prayāg*. *Vaibhrāja* is undoubtedly the *Vaibhāra* of the *Dīpavaṃśa* and the *Mahāvāṃśa*, one of the five hills of *Rājagṛha* in *Bihar*. *Vātasvana* has been identified by *Beglar* with *Bathan* in south *Bihar* (*Arch. Sur. Rep. VIII*, p. 46).

All the rivers issuing from the *Himavat* and the different *Kulācalas* and *Kṣudraparvatas* “possess holy merit ; all are rivers flowing into the ocean ; all are mothers of the world ; they are well known to cleanse from all sin. And other small streams, are mentioned in thousands, O, *Brahman*, those which flow only during the rainy season, and those which flow at all seasons.” (*Pargiter, Mār. P.*, pp. 306-307).¹

¹ Sarvāḥ puṇyāḥ sarasvatyaḥ sarvā Gaṅgāḥ samudragāḥ
Viśvasya mātaraḥ sarvāḥ sarvāḥ pāpaharāḥ smṛtāḥ
anyāḥ sabaśraśācoktāḥ kṣudranadyo dvijottama
Prāvṛṭkālavahāḥ santi sadākalavahāśca yāḥ.

(*Mār. P.*, p. 57, 30-32.)

BRAHMAN AND THE WORLD

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Vedānta has been rightly called the finest fruit of Indian Thought. Indian Wisdom has not produced a fairer flower than the Upaniṣads and a finer fruit than the Vedānta Philosophy. The Vedānta grows out of the teachings of the Upaniṣads and passes into various systems in the writings of Śaṅkara (C. 8th century A.D.), Bhāskara (C. 10th century A.D.), Rāmānuja ¹ (C. 11th century A.D.), Nimbārka ² (C. 11th

¹ With him may be classed Śrīkaṇṭha or Nīlakaṇṭha (C. 14th century A.D.). The only difference between Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha is that the latter replaces the former's Viṣṇu by Śiva. An earlier commentary of the Brahmasūtras belonging to the Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita school is ascribed to one other Nīlakaṇṭha, who is claimed by his followers to have preceded Śaṅkara even.

² With him may be classed the followers of Caitanya (the reputed founder of the Gauḍīya school in Bengal). Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (18th century A.D.) wrote his Govinda Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa (in which the doctrine of incomprehensible Identity-in-Difference—'Acintyabhedābhedavāda'—is established.) Some would, however, like to class him with Madhva, and tradition also supports this view. But we have reason to believe that the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavas is more indebted to the school of Nimbārka than to that of Madhva. Jīva Gosvāmin, in his Ṣaṭsāndarbha, states that the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava school is also indebted to some other older commentaries on the Brahmasūtras, viz., the Vāsanā Bhāṣya, the Hanumān Bhāṣya, etc. Some seek to identify these two commentaries with the Bhāskara Bhāṣya and the Madhya Bhāṣya respectively. But nothing definite can be said with regard to this question of identity, unless sufficient data are available.

century A.D.), Madhva¹ (C. 13th century A.D.) Vallabha² (C. 15th century A.D.)—the great founders of the Advaita, Bhedābheda, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaitādvaita and Śuddhādvaita systems of thought respectively. Most of these orthodox great commentators have written separate commentaries on the Upaniṣads also. Even now, these systems, taken together, represent the beliefs of nearly all thoughtful Hindus and attract the attention of many a great thinker in the East and the West.

The general impression among the present-day Oriental scholars is that though the Upaniṣad texts mainly favour the Monistic doctrine expounded by Śaṅkara, the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are fundamentally opposed to it on some of the most crucial points.

Almost all the scholiasts, however, are unanimous in their opinion that—

(1) The first *five* (or four according to Vallabha) topics (adhikaraṇas) of the Brahmasūtras practically exhaust the entire philosophy discussed in the Vedānta system; and,

(2) the rest of the Brahmasūtras seems, to all intents and purposes, to be pre-occupied with an elaboration of the main thesis established in the foregoing part by reference to specific doctrines of the Upaniṣads.

It is apparent, therefore, that the work of Bādarāyaṇa is susceptible of two broad divisions—

(1) the first part, being a statement of the main thesis,

¹ With him may be classed the Pāśupata Saivas and Vijñānabhikṣu (C. 16th century. A.D.) who wrote his Vijñānāmṛta Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras. While Madhva worships Viṣṇu and the Pāśupatas Śiva as the Supreme Deity, Vijñānabhikṣu transcends all sectarian bias and calls the Supreme Being Īśvara.

² An earlier exponent of the Śuddhādvaita school was Viṣṇusvāmin (C. 12th century A.D.) who is said to have written a commentary on the Brahmasūtras. But this work is not available at present. According to some, the celebrated commentator Śrīdharaśvāmin has very closely followed him in his views. It is true that Śrīdhara refers to Viṣṇusvāmin several times in his commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. But this much is also certain that Vallabha differs from Śrīdhara on some crucial points. The celebrated devotee and poet-philosopher Bilvamaṅgala Ṭhākura also belonged to the school of Viṣṇusvāmin—at least so goes the tradition.

and, (2) the second part, forming an amplification and elaboration of the same, subject, however, to occasional introduction of independent topics having only a remote bearing on the main issue. In this matter of division, however, Śaṅkara makes a departure from the usual convention by insisting upon the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* to be regarded as an essential part of the corpus of the first division and, he has made a vigorous attack upon the previous commentators for relegating it to a position of minor importance as its inclusion in the explanatory section would naturally connote. The real motive underlying the new procedure adopted by Śaṅkara is to emphasise the three essential aspects or features (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) of Brahman, which can be serially arranged in the following order :—

(1) The aspect of *Being*—unconditional and absolute (*sat*), as set forth in the first four *adhikaraṇas* ;

(2) The aspect of *Consciousness*—pure and absolute (*cit*), as established in the fifth *adhikaraṇa* ; and

(3) The aspect of *Bliss*—absolute and unqualified (*ānanda*), as brought out in the sixth *adhikaraṇa*.

It should, however, be noted, in order to avoid the charge of misrepresentation, that in the preface to the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa*, Śaṅkara openly avows it to form the beginning of the supplementary division and this would seem to contradict the position we have set forth above. But it will be obvious to a careful reader, who will look below the surface, that this statement¹ has been made in deference to the conventional interpretation (attributed to a *Vṛttikāra* by the commentators

¹ “ *Evam ekam api Brahmāpekṣitopādhisambandham nirastopādhisambandham copāśrītyatvena jñeyatvena ca vedānteṣūpadiśyate iti pradarśayitum paro grantha ārabhyate.* ”—Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* I. 1. 12. *Nirṇayasāgara* Ed., p. 177.

The above passage may be translated thus :—

“From all this it may appear that the following part of the *Śāstra* has a special object of its own, *viz.*, to show that the *Vedānta* texts teach, on the one hand, Brahman, as connected with limiting conditions and forming an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.”—*Sacred Books of the East Series*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 64.

of Saṅkara) and it would be a grave error of judgment to think it to represent the true position of Saṅkara. The conventional interpretation which Saṅkara gives in the first instance, has been emphatically repudiated by him in the concluding portion of the discourse and this reverses the position he took up in the preface as a tribute to the prevailing convention. So far as Saṅkara himself is concerned, the topic (*adhikaraṇa*) in question should be undoubtedly taken as an essential part of the main thesis and the philosophical implication, brought out by us, would only bear it out.

From the above discussion it is also evident that long before the days of Saṅkara there flourished a Vṛttikāra who had commented on the Brahmasūtras ; and though Saṅkara had occasions to differ from him on some particular points, this Vṛttikāra nevertheless was essentially a sturdy Monist in his views. We may be justified, therefore, in believing that Saṅkara had at least one predecessor in the person of this Vṛttikāra, who held the Monistic position, though not exactly identical with that of Saṅkara.

In the first division of the Brahmasūtras, referred to above, Brahman has been defined as the UNIVERSAL CAUSE—a rather accidental or functional characterisation; but for an insight into the essential nature of the Reality in and by itself we have to deduce it from the import of some aphorisms of Bādarāyaṇa as Absolute Being, Absolute Consciousness, and Absolute Bliss all blended in simple identity.

What sort of cause Brahman is, has been definitely mentioned in the second aphorism—

“(Brahman is that) from which the origin, etc. (*i.e.*, the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).¹

It is both the efficient (*nimitta*) and the substantive or material (*upādāna*) cause of the phenomenal world. This is apparent from the additive expression '*et cetera*' which stands for preser-

¹ “*Janmādyasya yataḥ*”—Br. Sū. I. 1. 2.

vation (sthiti) and universal destruction (laya). It should be noted here that in both Vedānta and Sāṅkhya there is no such thing as absolute cessation of existence or being. Destruction, therefore, in the present context should not be interpreted as cessation of existence, but as the passing from the patent, manifested state into the latent, unmanifested state. To be precise, it (destruction) only implies the re-absorption of the effect into its primitive causal state. There is, however, neither loss of being in destruction, nor any addition of the same as the word 'creation' or 'production' would ordinarily imply. Now, if we investigate the nature of the causality of Brahman, we shall see that it is both the efficient and the material cause and not alone the efficient cause. Because, destruction in the sense of re-absorption is compatible with Brahman being the *Causa Materialis* and not *Causa Efficiens*. So far as creation and preservation go, they are competent to an efficient cause, no doubt, but they are not repugnant to a material cause. About Brahman being the *Causa Efficiens*, the fashioner and preserver of the order, there is no divergence of opinion among the orthodox commentators of the Brahmasūtras. It is the nature of Brahman as material or substantive cause which has been the storm-centre of controversy and polemic. We believe that we have shown that this material or substantive causality of Brahman cannot be possibly denied without doing violence to the spirit of the text of the aphorisms as well as the philosophy of Vedānta.

Now, the question arises—what sort of material causality (upādānatā) is to be ascribed to Brahman? Leaving aside for the time being those aphorisms which expressly deal with the nature of the casual relation, to which we shall advert later on, we shall find the answer given in a rather unexpected quarter—in the very first aphorism of the second division :—

“The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on account of His qualities being declared.”¹

¹ “Antas taddharmopadeśāt”—Br. Sū. I. 1. 20.

We see in this aphorism and the dissertation upon it in the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya that the Absolute Self, which is the sole and ultimate cause of all that exists or appears, can easily appropriate to Itself the characteristics of any phenomenon, be it a human being or a divine person ; because the cause is the ground of the effect and hence can own up all that belongs to it. But the contrary is not true—the characteristics of the cause cannot be conceived to be appropriated by the effect, which is only a partial manifestation of the same. This, however, is the philosophy of what is technically called the *Vivartavāda*—the doctrine of phenomenal or illusory causality. This has been made abundantly clear by Vācaspati in the Bhāmātī.¹

Rāmānuja and others, on the other hand, consider that it is not proper to regard the world as false appearance and so they have concentrated their attacks on the fundamental position of Monistic Vedānta, viz., *Vivartavāda*. Thus while the Monists think that Brahman (the Absolute) is really destitute of all attributes and limitations and Its association with qualities is due to false imposition, Rāmānuja holds that Brahman is qualified (saguṇa) in Its essential nature.

We now propose to take up the question of Universal Causation, to examine thoroughly as to how far it is right to regard Brahman as the Universal Cause and how far does the Sūtrakāra himself lend his support to each of the inter-conflicting schools of Vedānta.

A Passing Note on the Identity of the Vṛttikāra

The Vṛttikāra, referred to in this connection by Śaṅkara, cannot be identical with Vṛttikāra Bodhāyana, to whom Rāmānuja seeks to affiliate his school,² or with Upavarṣa—the pioneer

¹ Bhāmātī under Bhāṣya on Br. Sū. I. 2. 1., N. S. Ed., p. 231. This point will be taken up later on for a detailed discussion of the appropriateness of the *Vivarta* doctrine.

² "Bhagavad-Bodhāyanakṛtām viśiṣṭāṃ Brahmasūtravṛttiṃ pūrvācāryāḥ sañcokṣipuh ; tanmatānusāreṇa sūtrākṣarāṇi vyākhyāsyante"—Śrī Bhāṣya, B. S. S., p. 1.

of the Bhedābheda school of which Bhāskara was a champion.¹ Our reason for holding this view is that the *prima facie* interpretation of this topic of discourse (Ānandamayādhikaraṇa) as offered by Saṅkara is held to be a representation of the views of the Vṛttikāra by Saṅkara's commentators, notably the author of Ratnaprabhā. This is a valuable piece of information, for it gives us a key to the philosophy of the Vṛttikāra, who is represented to regard the difference between the Absolute and the individual self as purely fictitious and unreal,² which is also the position of Saṅkara himself. The Vṛttikāra, who has advocated in no equivocal terms the idea of fictitious difference between Brahman and Jīva, can never be the authority of Rāmānuja or Bhāskara who do not admit any such tenets. In the opinion of Mahāmahopādhyāya Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī, Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa are two separate persons.³ But in the Avantisundarikathā ascribed to Daṇḍin,⁴ Vyāḍi, Indradatta and Kātyāyana are stated to be the pupils of Upavarṣa who has been named Bodhāyana also. In the Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadeva and Br̥hatkathā-mañjarī of Kṣemendra, however, those very persons and Pāpini are represented as the students of Varṣa, the elder brother of Upavarṣa. It is further stated in the Avantisundarikathā that this Upavarṣa-Bodhāyana possessed the epithet '*Kṛtakoti*,' and is said to have written a gloss (vṛtti) on the Brahmasūtras, which also passed by the same name. Perhaps on the authority of such statements, Vedāntadeśika (C. 13th century A. D.) had tried to identify Upavarṣa with Bodhāyana. Mahāmahopādhyāya

¹ "Upavarṣacāryāgamāc ca"—Bhāskara Bhāṣya, Chowkhamba S. S., p. 62.

"Upavarṣacāryasya śāstrasampradāyapravartakasya"—*Ibid*, p. 134.

² Īdṛśam ca vijñānātmaparamātmabhedaṁ āśritya 'netaro'nupapatteḥ' 'bheda-vyapadeśāc ca' ityuktam"—S. B. on Br. Sū. I. 1. 17., N. S. S., p. 181.

³ "With reference to this fictitious difference of the Highest Self and the individual Self, the two last Sūtras have been propounded."—S. B. E., Vol. XXXIV, p. 70.

⁴ MM. A. K. Śāstrī, Vedāntaparibhāṣā, second edition, pp. 230-31.

⁵ We are not referring here to the mutilated edition of the Avantisundarikathā already published, but to the MS., ready for publication under the editorship of Mr. Rama-krishna Kavi.

Prof. Kuppusvāmī Śāstrī has thoroughly discussed the point and has supported the Bodhāyana-Upavarṣa-Vṛttikāra equation.¹ It is disputable, however, whether this mere suggestion by Vedāntadeśika, unsupported as it is by any other older authoritative reference, can be pulled up to the level of an historically acceptable fact. As regards the authenticity of the Avantisundarikathā, it only remains for us to point out that the authority of the work has been questioned by the majority of oriental scholars, and it is extremely difficult to say whether we can derive from the Kathā any assurance as to identify Upavarṣa with Bodhāyana. In cases of this sort it is probably hopeless *a priori* to expect to find any conclusive evidence. In the absence of a few more significant data, which would enable us to definitely equate Bodhāyana with Upavarṣa and the Vṛttikāra, we prefer to leave the question still open.

¹ Vṛttikārasya Bodhāyanasyaiva hy Upavarṣa iti syān nāma"—Vedāntadeśika, Tattvaṭīkā Brindaban Ed., p. 506. Also—"Bodhāyana and Damaṇḍācārya, two old Vedāntins presupposed by Rāmānuja"—By MM. Prof. Kuppusvāmī Śāstrī, M.A.—Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, pp. 465-68. Also Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, First Edition, Vol. II, p. 431. The expression 'syāt' in Vedāntadeśika's passage denotes mere probability and *not* actual certainty in the matter of the aforesaid identity, which, however, is not unanimously supported.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF A UNIVERSAL CAUSE

Kapila and Rāmānuja about the doctrine of causation—a comparison

Rāmānuja holds that Prakṛti (the creative principle or matter) is the state of equilibrium of the three elemental qualities or attributes (guṇas)—purity or intelligence-stuff (sattva), activity (rajas) and inertia or matter-stuff (tamas). It is a dynamic principle constantly undergoing transformation, and is endowed with creative power (vikṣepaśakti) like the non-intelligent Primordial Matter (Pradhāna) of the Sāṅkhyas. But unlike the Sāṅkhyas (who advocate the theory of the self-evolution of Matter or Pradhāna), Rāmānuja maintains that the evolution of Prakṛti is caused and controlled by Brahman. Prakṛti—the material cause (upādāna) of the world—is considered to be the body (śarīra), attribute (viśeṣaṇa) and mode (prakāra) of Brahman.¹ And inspite of the natural differences (svarūpabheda) between the unspiritual matter-stuff (bhogya), individual selves who use that matter-stuff as the object of their spiritual activity (bhoktr) and Brahman—the ultimate guiding and controlling Spirit (preritr), they are all integrated into the unity of One Concrete Whole. This identity (aikya) of the modes (prakāra) and the substance (prakārin) is technically known as the 'inseparable existence'

¹ "Souls and matter are comprehended within the unity of Lord's essence and are related to the Supreme as attributes to a substance, as parts to a whole, or as body to the soul which animates it.....They are real and permanent, though subject to the control of the one Brahman in all their modifications and evolutions."—Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phil., Vol. I, pp. 684-85.

(apṛthaksiddhi)—the identity of non-distinction. But like Brahman, Prakṛti is never regarded as a separate cause, independent of Brahman. It is ever under the control of Brahman in all its transformations. Thus self-evolution of matter has not got the support of Rāmānuja. Though Prakṛti, in the abstract and taken by itself, may be looked upon as the cause of the world,—and Brahman, the guiding Principle, can, by the same process, be regarded as the efficient cause of the world,—yet Brahman as a Concrete Principle, with Prakṛti as Its body and Itself as the animating Principle (or śarīrin—an embodied Spirit), is regarded as the material cause (upādāna) also, as the two can never be viewed as separate principles. Thus according to Rāmānuja, Brahman has been technically designated as the efficient and material cause at once (abhinnanimittopādāna).

Patañjali and Rāmānuja

The Kāpilas or atheistic Sāṅkhyas do not admit the existence of Īśvara (i.e., a personal God), and as such they have postulated the theory of the self-evolution of matter. But the followers of Patañjali who are also called the theistic Sāṅkhyas, admitted that Prakṛti is the material cause (upādāna) of the world,—Prakṛti, entirely dependent on and controlled by God.¹

¹ "Kecit pradhānam triguṇam kāraṇam pravādanti tu |
Īśvaras tad adhiṣṭhātety āhur anye mañiṣaḥ" ||

.....Quoted in the commentary Gopālīkā (p. 4) on the Sphoṭasiddhi of Maṇḍana. The commentator points out that here the expression 'kecit' refers to the Sāṅkhyas, and the expression 'anye' refers to the followers of the Yoga philosophy. It should be observed that the theistic position attributed to the followers of Patañjali's Yoga Śāstra here is only one of the possible interpretations and developments. Patañjali's Sūtra—"Kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāṃṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa Īśvaraḥ" (Pā. Yo. Sū. I. 25) denies God's control over Prakṛti. He is only regarded as Omniscient. The same view is also supported in a passage of Saṅkara's Bhāṣya—"tatrāpi śrutivirodhena pradhānam svatantram eva kāraṇam..." (Ś.B. II 1.3). If we are to follow Patañjali strictly we cannot but admit that the God of Patañjali is rather a figurehead serving only a moral or religious purpose and has nothing to do with cosmic evolution. This is at least the interpretation of Saṅkara and other Vedāntic writers, and seems to be the position of Vyāsa and Vācaspati. Vijñānabhikṣu,

Thus the Pātañjalas had anticipated the position of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school to a very large extent. The difference between Rāmānuja and the theistic Sāṅkhyas can be summed up in the following proposition :—

(a) The Pātañjalas, like the Pāśupata Saivas, think that Prakṛti and Brahman have separate existences (prṛthaksiddha) and Brahman is considered as the efficient cause only and not as the substantive cause also ;¹ while,

(b) Rāmānuja contends that there is inseparable relationship (aprṛthaksiddhi) between Prakṛti and Brahman ; and Brahman is regarded as both the efficient and substantive cause (abhinnanimittopādāna).

The theory of the identity of efficient and substantive cause—supported in the Brahmasūtras

Rāmānuja deduces his conception of Brahman as an efficient and substantive cause in one from the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. That Brahman Itself is the substantive cause (upādāna) is supported by the aphorisms—

(i) “ (Brahman is) the substantive cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances ; ”² and,

(ii) “ (Brahman is the substantive cause) on account of

however, gives an interpretation altogether different from that of the previous commentators and the philosophy of Yoga is enunciated as a fullfledged theistic system closely analogous to that of Rāmānuja.

¹ The doctrines of the Pāśupata Saivas have been refuted in the Brahmasūtras (II. 2.37-41). It is a well known fact that their views were collected in a commentary on the Brahmasūtras by Śrīkarācārya—one of the leaders of the Ekorāma sect of the Saiva Liṅgāyet school. This Śrīkara Bhāṣya of the Pāśupatas will be published before long from Bangalore.

² “ Prakṛtiś ca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt ”—Br. Sū. I.4.23.

(the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification'' ; ¹—

which declare Brahman to be simultaneously the efficient and substantive cause, but not the efficient cause alone as the Pātañjalis and the Pāsupatas believe It to be.

In this connexion, we should also like to point out that there can be no binding rule that the effect and the efficient cause will be of similar nature (salakṣaṇa). On the other hand, such a position is generally untenable. We can cite the stock example of the potter (the efficient cause) and the pot (the effect). While the efficient cause is only a conscious subject, the effect is non-conscious. So there can be no harm if these two are essentially of different or dissimilar nature (vilakṣaṇa).

In the topic (adhikaraṇa),² beginning with the aphorism—
“(Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (*viz.*, the world) ; and its being such, (*i.e.*, different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.”³ —

the discourse opens with the contention of the rival philosophers—notably the Sāṅkhyas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas—
“how Brahman, which is of a different nature from the world, can possibly be its cause ? ” And this is met by the Sūtrakāra himself. He propounds that difference of character (vilakṣaṇatva) does not affect the relation of cause and effect, as it is found by uncontradicted experience to obtain between two dissimilar things. The examples of living organisms (such as insects) born from inorganic matter and the growth of hair and nails, inanimate in their nature, from living organisms, bear ample testimony to the heterogeneity of cause and effect. Even if the question be pressed further the fact will remain uncontested that the relation of cause and effect presupposes some amount of heterogeneity.

¹ “Ātmakṛteḥ paripāmat” — Br. Sū. I. 4. 26.

² Technically known as the ‘Na-vilakṣaṇatva adbhikaraṇa.’

³ “Na vilakṣaṇatvād asya tathātvam ca śabdāt” — Br. Sū. II. 1.4.

In this context, we are to interpret the term 'cause' as the substantive cause (upādāna) only; because the essential dissimilarity of nature between the efficient cause (nimitta) and the effect is almost an axiomatic truth, as pointed out above, and as such requires no such elaborate and knotty discussions as raised by both the parties. The real difficulty lies with the substantive cause alone. And the question whether the effect and the substantive or the material cause are homogeneous or not, is the only problem that is subjected to this elaborate disquisition.¹

The Monistic view—causation is an inexplicable appearance not amenable to a logical definition

Let us now examine the position of the Monists. Like Rāmānuja, they also admit Brahman to be the identity of the efficient and substantive cause; but they do not accept the interpretation of Rāmānuja's school, which seeks to make out the Absolute as an identity of differences, technically known as the theory of the Qualified Monism (Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda).

The Monists assert that to define the relation of Brahman with the world through the help of logical categories, is an impossibility; because no relation is possible between the real and the unreal (i.e., phenomenal).² If there be any relation at all, it would be undefinable (anirvacanīya), i.e., false or phenomenal (mithyā). The relation of cause and effect cannot be logically extended to the relation of Brahman and the phenomenal world. This is the most vital point of difference between the Monists and the followers of other schools of Indian philosophy. Accordingly the Monists have coined their own technical terms to explain their own position.

¹ To avoid all these difficulties Madhva has adopted a very ingenious method. According to him the aforesaid adhikaraṇa serves only to establish the authoritativeness of the Vedas (Vedaprāmāṇya).

² "Na hi sadasatoḥ sambandhaḥ"—Śaṅkara's commentary on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, II. 7.

Brahman—the illusory or apparent cause

The Monists affirm that Prakṛti or Māyā is the material cause which transforms itself into the world (technically called the 'pariṇāmopādāna'), while Brahman is regarded as the cause which appears to the ignorant as undergoing real modification in the world-process (technically called the 'vivartopādāna'). But in reality Brahman is only the substratum or fundamental basis (adhiṣṭhāna) over which this illusory process takes place, and its appearance to an ignorant mind becomes possible by reason of its being founded upon the real substratum, *viz.*, the Absolute Consciousness.

Thus the Advaitins come to distinguish between two types of causality :—

(i) The formative cause (pariṇāmopādāna)—the cause which undergoes substantial change while producing the effect. As for example, milk is the formative cause of curd, as the transition into the effect is made possible by a substantial change in the nature of the cause—milk.

(ii) The illusory or apparent cause (vivartopādāna)—the cause remains absolutely unmodified while the effect is apparently produced from it. In other words, the cause appears as the effect. As for instance, rope may be called the illusory cause of snake, as the appearance of the effect (snake) does not affect the nature of the cause (rope) in any way.¹

If the effect is of the same order of reality as the cause, it is said to have undergone real transformation, as the change of milk into curds; if, however, the effect (or rather, the appearance of the effect) and the cause are *not* of the same kind of reality we get a case of illusory appearance, *e.g.*, the rope appearing as the snake.

¹ "Pariṇāmo nāma upādānaśamasattākakāryāpattiḥ, vivarto nāma upādānaviṣamasattākakāryāpattiḥ"—*Yedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 111-112, MM. A. K. Śāstri's edition.

To sum up :

We have seen that the position of the Sūtrakāra Bādarāyaṇa who maintains the identity of the efficient and material cause of the world-order has received a powerful confirmation and a most rational exposition in the hands of the Monists, who have gone further to demonstrate that the opposite view, *i.e.*, the theory of divergence of efficient and material cause, is logically absurd and contrary to the teaching of the Upaniṣads.

To pursue the Advaita position further,—Brahman, as the substratum, is concealed by the veiling power (āvaraṇaśakti) of Māyā,¹ and is made to appear as the universe by virtue of its projective power (vikṣepaśakti). So, really Brahman is not the changing material cause (pariṇāmopādāna). But that does not debar us from regarding Brahman as the apparent cause (vivar-topādāna). The concept of material cause does not necessarily imply a real process of transformation in the causal stuff and can be applied with equal propriety to the illusory or apparent cause as explained before. The real pre-supposition of a material cause is that the effect produced derives its existence from the former, and it is absolutely immaterial whether the derivation of existence is real or apparent. The definition of material cause is thus given in the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha by Appaya Dīkṣita.

‘It is that which produces an effect which is non-different from itself.’²

This identity may either be illusory (kalpita) or empirical (vyāvahārika). To take the stock example of the shell and silver, the identity between the shell and silver is only illusory, as the

¹ “.....Māyā is the finitising process belonging to Brahman, and has the two properties of āvaraṇa or hiding the truth, and vikṣepa or misrepresenting it. While the first is a mere negation of Knowledge, the second is positive generation of error.....Māyā evolves a variety of names and forms, which in their totality is the jagat or the universe. It also conceals the eternal Brahman under this aggregate of names and forms. Māyā has the two functions of concealment of the real and the projection of the unreal.”—Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Phil.*, Vol II, p. 571.

² “Svābhinnakāryajanakatvam”—S.L.S., Benares Ed., p. 79.

silver itself is illusory. In the case of this phenomenal world also, the identity of the world with Brahman is equally illusory, subject to the proviso that the illusion in the latter case is of a very long duration and has got more method and consistency in it and so can be easily distinguished from cases of ordinary illusions and dreams. The recognition of this fact has been responsible for the apparent gradation and classification of existence under three heads, *viz.*, the Absolute existence, the empirical existence and the illusory existence. But to be precise and logical, the difference between the two latter kinds of existence is one of degree and not of kind. They are equally false from the stand-point of Absolute existence. The position has been made clear by Vācaspati in the *Bhāmātī*,¹ where he has fully established the imaginary non-difference between the cause and the effect. The identity is not real. Bhāskara, on the contrary, holds that difference (*bheda*) and non-difference (*abheda*) of the cause and the effect are both equally real.²

A critical estimate of Bhāskara's position

We feel it imperative that we should enter into the problem of causation and its metaphysical implications before we proceed to other problems. In fact this is a fundamental problem of all philosophical systems and the Vedānta Philosophy in particular has dedicated all its energies to the elucidation of this all-important topic and has raised its superstructure upon the results of the investigation of this problem.

Now, the relation of cause and effect can be either one of identity or of difference, and there is no half-way house between the two, as the two alternatives divide between them the whole

¹ *Bhāmātī* under Ś. B. on Br. Sū. II. 1. 14—"Tad ananyatva adhikaraṇa" II. 1. 14—20.

² "Kāryarūpeṇa nānātvaṃ abhedaḥ kāraṇātmanā"—Bhāskara's commentary. Benares Ed., p. 18. The causal state of Brahman is unity, while its evolved condition is one of multiplicity. "Things are different in their causal and generic aspects and different as effects and individuals."—Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 670.

realm of reality. Let us examine whether the relation can be one of absolute identity. It is of course undeniable that there is a homogeneity between the cause and the effect and it is this fact which distinguishes a causal relation from a mere accidental sequence. The timber is the cause of the table and not of the curtain because we fail to notice any similarity or homogeneity between them. Even the Vaiśeṣikas, who are empiricists out and out, have not failed to notice this peculiarity. On the contrary, they have postulated it as the universal condition of material causation. Now, the question arises as to what we should understand by this homogeneity or similarity. Is it identity of nature? No; in that case there can be no distinction between a cause and an effect; the two will be identical and there will remain either the cause or the effect. Then some amount of difference has to be postulated if we are to form a logical estimate of causal relation. But is this difference, then, which we have seen to be indispensable to the conception of causality, one of absolute otherness? No; in that case anything can be the cause of any other thing—the timber will be the cause of the table-cloth, as the two are quite distinct and different. Bhāskara and for the matter of that all realistic philosophers, have found in this position a hard nut to crack and they have not felt any logical scruple in declaring that the relation is neither one of identity nor of difference, but a peculiar one in which the two contradictories are found to have established a family relationship. But this is too much to believe. The position of Bhāskara here pays but scant regard to the demand of logical consistency and violates the fundamental laws of thought, *viz.*, the Law of Identity and the Law of Excluded Middle. A can be A, or not-A, but not both or neither. If you insist that it is found to be so in experience and that experience is the ultimate court of appeal in such a dispute, we shall only observe that uncritical experience, without being subjected to a logical examination, is an unsafe and unreliable guide. We see the moon to be of the

size of a small silver plate, and there is no occasion for its being invalidated by another experience, but this does not warrant the validity of the experience in question. Even the rabid empiricist, who does not hesitate to immolate our logical sense at the altar of the God of Experience, will demur to accept the verdict of experience in this instance as true and final. And why do you discredit the verdict, we ask with all humility. Certainly you must admit,—because it militates against reason. So experience cannot be believed to be antagonistic to reason, and where there is this apparent contradiction, we must conclude that there is something rotten in experience.

Now, to revert to our old problem—the problem of causation. We have seen that the relation is a peculiar one and is inconceivable without reference to identity and difference—both at the same time. But identity and difference are contradictory and so cannot be predicated of the same thing. Bhāskara calls upon us to accept this position on the strength of experience, but we have seen that this experience may be unreliable and it is so when it is opposed to reason and infringes the fundamental laws of thought. And so long as our logical sense refuses to be coaxed or coerced into the implicit acceptance of a contradictory proposition, and so long as we cannot change the constitution of our minds, we cannot accept the explanation of Bhāskara, which is only a dodge and a subterfuge to evade the logical difficulty. So identity and difference cannot both be true, but it is undeniable that they are found to be the essential characteristics of a causal relation. Without identity the causal relation cannot be distinguished from cases of mechanical or accidental sequence and without the aspect of difference the causal relation becomes an impossible phenomenon. The cause and the effect must be different and distinct; otherwise there will be either the cause or the effect but not both, which is, however, seen to be the very connotation of causal relation. Yes, this is the plain testimony of experience no doubt, but that does not invest it with a character of sanctity. An absurd position cannot be accepted

even on the testimony of the Vedas. What would be the legitimate procedure in characterising this relation? The followers of Saṅkara have not failed to rise to the height of their conviction and they declare that it is an absurdity—an illusory appearance like that of the silver on the shell and is the product of the same illusive Māyā which produces the whole show of the world-process. The identity and the difference both are false and inexplicable by logic. The fact is there no doubt, and we must bow to the inevitable and cannot deny its existence; but with this difference from Bhāskara and his ilk that we cannot accept it to be absolute truth.

We have seen that the position of Bhāskara, who postulates a real development and a real transformation in the nature of the Absolute, is fraught with self-contradiction and so cannot commend itself to any sane man, whose logical sense has not been drugged and dulled by the illogical vagaries of the so-called philosophers. But are we then to jump to the conclusion of the Nihilist that nothing exists and the whole world, subjective and objective, is but an empty show? No; such is not the position of the Vedāntic Monists and they have been far too sane and far too critical to accept this to be the case. The answer to this question has been sought and found in the analysis of any case of ordinary error and illusion. Take the notorious instance of shell-silver. The silver, declare the Vedāntic Monists, is an empty appearance no doubt, but the show is not all. It will be a height of logical inaptitude to think that the appearance is the whole of it. If we probe the situation deeper, we cannot fail to see that the appearance arises over a basic reality—even the simulation of existence is possible if there is behind it a true reality. So the world is not an unmitigated illusion, but an illusion which is founded upon a true reality, *viz.*, the Absolute Consciousness. Saṅkara has very pertinently observed that all errors are a case of confusion of real and unreal—a pairing together of a truth and a falsehood. This is the fundamental difference from the Mādhyamikas, at least a class of them whose

views we find to be expounded in the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna. We see in the world that there is continual change. But this change presupposes some identity which is to change. So identity (*abheda*) and difference (*bheda*)—continuity and change—are the fundamental keynotes of all experienced reality. But we have seen that both cannot be true at the same time, and if we are confronted with the alternative of accepting one and rejecting the other, we must reject the aspect of difference as unreal appearance, dancing upon the basic foundation of unity or non-difference ; because difference cannot arise except on the foundation of two units, which are in their nature simple unities. If one of the two units be absent, the concept of difference becomes impossible, as each of the units constitutes its foundation and pivot ; and if the foundation be lacking, how can it subsist ? But the case of unity is quite different. It is perceived in and by itself and without any reference to any other unity. Difference, however, is contingent upon unity and without unity its existence is inconceivable. And if one of them is to be discarded, we must give up the aspect of difference as false superimposition and accept the factor of unity as the basic reality ; because unity is the presupposition of difference and even if difference be accepted to be the final truth, unity will have to be accepted, as difference without unity as its basic support is a chimera. So between identity and difference we must perforce accept identity as the reality, since identity cannot be rejected as it is the constitutive factor and is the *raison d' être* even of difference.

Thus the theory of simultaneous difference and non-difference of Bhāskara has been very severely criticised by Vācaspati in the *Bhāmati* (under Ś. B. on Br. Sū. II. 1. 14) by affirming the unreality of difference and the reality of non-difference, basing his arguments on the doctrine of the three different degrees and kinds of reality—the illusory existence (*prātibhāsika-sattā*), the phenomenal existence (*vyāvahārika-sattā*) and the Ultimate Reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*)—popularly known as the doctrine of three types of reality (*sattātraividhya*—

vāda). Vācaspati challenges with unimpeachable logic the view of Bhāskara who supports the doctrine of the real evolution of the non-intelligent aspect of Brahman.¹

The point, however, is this :

As the apparent cause (vivartopādāna) also is identical with the effect, the use of the term ' prakṛti ' in the aplogism—" Prakṛtiś ca ..." (I. 4. 23), has its own justification even from the standpoint of those that regard Brahman as the illusory cause only.

The Mādhyaṃika view

The Mādhyaṃika school of Buddhists holds almost a similar position. The ' Śūnya ' of the Mādhyaṃikas is *not* an absolute void, emptiness, non-being, non-entity or non-existence as we are prompted to think of it at the very first sight. It has been described in the Mādhyaṃika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna as something which is neither real or existent, nor unreal or non-existent, nor both, nor neither.² Professors Th. Stcherbatsky and Yamakami Sogen, following the traditional exposition prevalent in China and Japan, assert that it is the fifth kind of existence—" the unique, undefinable (anirvacanīya) Essence of Being, the One-without-a-Second." (Stcherbatsky)

In the *Bhāvādvaita* doctrine,³ ascribed to the celebrated Monist teacher Avimuktātma-Bhagavān (C. 9th century A. D.)

1 " Bhāskariyās tu cidacidamśavibhaktam brahmadravyam acidamśena vikriyate."—
Sarvārthasiddhi, III. 27

2 " Śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet |
Ubhayam nobhayam ceti....." |

—Mādhyaṃikaśāstra, p. 94.

Cf. ".....Tattvam sadasadubhayānubhyātmakacatuṣkoṭivivartam śūnyam eva."—
Sarvadarśanasamgraha, A. S. S. Ed., p. 11.

3 Referred to in the Gauḍabrahmānandī (Laghucandrikā) on Advaitasiddhi, N. S. Ed., p. 885. Of course, Madhusūdana or Brahmānanda does not accept this view—" ye tu pañcamaprakārādīpakṣāḥ, te tu mānabuddhivyutpādanārthā iti."

—Advaitasiddhi, N. S. Ed., p. 885.

—the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi*,¹ the destruction or removal of nescience (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) at the time of Final Release (*Mokṣa*) is described to be of a similar type.² Like the *Sūnya* of the *Mādhyamikas*, it is beyond the limits of all categorical assertions and is of the fifth kind. While according to the interpretation of Professors Stcherbatsky and Yamakami Sogen, the *Mādhyamikas* posit the *Sūnya* (the principle of Relativity—some sort of unrestricted hyper-existence) as the Essence of this universe (if any essence could be attributed at all), the followers of the *Bhāvādvaita* doctrine assert that the destruction of ignorance (which is also a fifth kind of predication like the *Sūnya*)³ can

¹ The general idea is that the *Bhāvādvaita* doctrine belongs to Maṇḍana Miśra—the author of *Brahmasiddhi*. But the quotations found in the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* and *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha*, prove the fact to be otherwise. *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* attributes the doctrine to the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi* and others. *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha*, on the other hand, expressly states this doctrine to belong to *Anandabodhācārya*. *Citsukhī* too, maintains that this view does not belong to *Iṣṭasiddhikāra* (*vide* below).

² “*Uktaprakāracatuṣṭayottirṇā pañcamaparakāra iti .Iṣṭasiddhikārādayaḥ.*”—*Advaita-brahmasiddhi*, Bib. Ind., pp. 201-2. “*Uktaprakāracatuṣṭayottirṇā pañcamaparakārety Anandabodhācāryaḥ.*”—S. L. S., Benares Ed., p. 500 Appaya Dikṣita says that according to Maṇḍana, *avidyā-nivṛtti* is identical with *Ātman*—“*Keyam avidyā-nivṛtṭih? Ātmaiveti Brahmasiddhikārāḥ.*”—S. L. S., pp. 497-8. The actual quotation from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* is, however, found in *Citsukhī*, in which *ajñāna-nivṛtti* is identified with *Vidyā* or *Brahma-jñāna*—“*Vidyaiṣa vādvayā śāntā tadastamaya ucyate.*”—Cit. N. S. Ed., p. 381. *Citsukhī*, following Maṇḍana and *Iṣṭasiddhikāra*, identifies *ajñāna-nivṛtti* with *Ātman* when its true nature is known to the enlightened person—“*Tasmād utpannātmavijñānasya jñāta ātmaiva savilāsajñānanivṛttir iti sthitam.*”—*Ibid.* p. 383. According to *Citsukhī*'s interpretation, *Iṣṭasiddhikāra* does not hold the view that *ajñāna-nivṛtti* is of the fifth type; on the other hand, his view is that *ajñāna-nivṛtti* is equivalent to the object known or the knowledge of the object. *Citsukhī* gives the actual quotation from *Iṣṭasiddhi*—“*Jñāto'rthas tajjñaptir vā jñānānāṁ itīṣṭasiddhikārair abhidhāt.*”—*Ibid.*, p. 381. *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* holds the same view as that of *Citsukhī*—“*Caramavṛtyupalakṣitasyātmano'jñānānāṁirūpatvāt,*—*Advaitasiddhi*, N. S. Ed., p. 884.

³ As we have already seen that celebrated teachers like Maṇḍana Miśra, *Citsukhācārya*, *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* and a host of others unanimously reject this position. In their opinion, *Ātman* (*i.e.*, Brahman) with its true nature known, or *Vidyā* (*i.e.*, the Supreme Knowledge of Brahman) is identical with the removal of nescience (*avidyā-nivṛtti*). Though the author of *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* ascribes this peculiar doctrine to the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi*, the quotation from *Citsukhī* proves the fact to be otherwise. In the absence of a few more significant data, we should like to leave the question open for the present. There is yet a third view, according to which it is indefinable (*anirvācya*) or false (*mithya*) like *avidyā*

never be the character of the world. So a distinct category of existence which *appears* as the cause, has to be postulated. This is Brahman.¹

We feel, we should utter one word of caution here. So far as Nāgārjuna is concerned, it is difficult to deduce any positivistic Absolutism from his Kārikās. He, on the contrary, emphatically repudiates even the remotest suggestion of an eternal entitative category and loses all patience with those who would hypostatise the *śūnyatā* as an ultimate existence. In fact all the predicates used with reference to *śūnyatā* are of a purely negative character and can be used with equal facility of both Absolute Being and Absolute Non-Being. It is exceedingly hazardous, therefore, to postulate an Absolute of the nature of Brahman (which is undoubtedly Unrestricted Existence) on the statements of Nāgārjuna, which are purely of a non-committal character.

The difference between the Śūnya of the Mādhyamikas and the Brahman of the Advaitins, as interpreted by the two Russian and Japanese savants, lies in the fact that the Śūnya is mere unrestricted existence—‘the Essence of Being,’² while Brahman is Absolute Being-Consciousness-Bliss (Saccidānanda). It is problematic whether this unrestricted existence is of the nature of Consciousness or Self-consciousness, so to say.

The line of demarcation that has been drawn in the foregoing paragraph between the Śūnyavāda and the Monism of

¹ Brahman also is called Śūnya in *Yogasvarodaya Brāhmaṇa* and *Mahopanishad*—“Śūnyam tu saccidānandaṃ nīṣādbabrahmasābditam.”

² Prof. Stcherbatsky calls it so ; the full quotation is given above. *Vide* The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Th. Stcherbatsky, Ph. D., pp. 47-48. “The ideal state of absolute unrestrictedness”—Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, p. 202. “Unconditional, independent and absolutely unrestricted”—*Ibid.*, p. 209. It would not be out of place to point out here that one school of Mādhyamikas, however, attributes the aspect of consciousness also to the Śūnya—“Kevalam sapvidam svastham manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ.”—*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, A. S. S., p. 19, quoted from *Vivekavilāsa*, VIII. 273. “Kecit tu mādhyamikāḥ svastham jñānam āhuḥ—manyante bata madhyamāḥ kṛtadhiyaḥ svastham parām sapvidam.”—*Śāṅkarāśānasamuccaya* of Haribhadra with Guṇaratna's *Tarkarahasyadipikā*, p. 47. The same quotation is found verbatim in the *Prameyaratnakośa* of Candraprabhasūri, p. 78.

Śaṅkara, is founded upon the exposition of Professors Stcherbatsky and Yamakami Sogen. We have not given our independent judgment about the final philosophical position, which, we are tempted to believe, is rather pure negativism. Our reason for this difference of view lies in this that Nāgārjuna has not himself left any statement which can be interpreted as an evidence of a positive ontological principle. And if we are to believe Candrakīrti to have interpreted the position of Nāgārjuna correctly, we also cannot refuse to arrive at the conclusion that Nāgārjuna promulgated a philosophy of absolute negativism. Moreover, the interpretation that has been put upon the philosophy of Sūnyavāda in the orthodox schools of the Brāhmaṇas bears out the position indicated here. Śaṅkarācārya, Udayana, Vācaspati, Śrīharṣa, Vidyāranya and a host of other Brahminical writers have all along believed and represented the philosophy of Sūnyavāda as a denial of all ultimate existence, both subjective and objective, conscious and unconscious alike. Śrīharṣa successfully proved that the whole objective world was a mysterious appearance of which no logical explanation was possible, and this is known as '*Anirvacanīyavāda*'—the impossibility of logical explanation. The world-appearance, he argues, cannot be explained in terms either of aught or of naught. If the world were a pure non-entity, its appearance to a mind could not be explained, as a non-entity like a hare's horn or a barren woman's son was never seen to appear to a consciousness. Nor can it be regarded as a real entity, as it is seen to be sublated by subsequent experience just like the shell-silver. The silver is a non-entity no doubt, but subject to this important qualification that though a non-entity in and by itself, it somehow appears, which distinguishes it from pure non-entity (*alika*) like a barren woman's son. So a new term had to be coined to describe these facts, *viz.*, *mithyātra* (or falsity) as opposed to pure nonentities, which are never amenable to direct perception.¹

¹ "Yadasad bhāsamānaṃ tan mithyā ..." — Pañcadaśī, II. 70,

Srīharṣa is accused by a hypothetical or an actual opponent of preaching a philosophy of absolute negativism for his explaining away the whole world as an illogical appearance and he was ridiculed as an advocate of absolute nihilism like the Mādhyamikas. He explains the fundamental difference of Vedāntic Absolutism from the Sūnyavāda in the following terms :

The Buddhist nihilist, he observes, believes the whole order of existence including consciousness as an irrational appearance, but the Vedāntist maintains that Consciousness as an ultimate fact cannot be denied without self-contradiction.¹

Ānandapūrṇa observes that the Buddhist regards consciousness as always relative to an object and the two are inseparable and indistinguishable.² In fact the Buddhist here takes up the position of the subjective idealist who holds that awareness and its object are identical and argues that when the object of awareness is an unreal fiction, the awareness, too, cannot but be unreal, as two identical things cannot have opposed characteristics. The Vedāntist here joins issue and points out that the relation of object and awareness is not one of real identity, but of illusory identity, or rather one that cannot be described in terms of identity or of difference alike. The relation is a false relation and so the identity also is false. It would be height of unreason to argue into the falsity of Consciousness on the basis of this false identity. Vidyāranya has made a very strong case in favour of the eternal existence of Consciousness as an ultimate fact. You can deny anything, says Vidyāranya, but not Consciousness, because a successful denial of Consciousness is itself possible if you are conscious of it. So Consciousness is ultimately undeniable.³

¹ Saugatābrahmavādinor ayaṃ viśeṣo yad ādimah sarvaṃ evānirvacanīyaṃ varṇayati vijñānavyatiriktaṃ punar idam viśvaṃ sadasadbhyaṃ vilakṣaṇaṃ brahṃvādinaḥ saṅgirante....." —Srīharṣa, Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, Chowkhamba S. S., p. 125.

² " Saṃvedanaṃ ca saṃvedyavyatirekeṇa nopalabhyate, ato na svatantram asti—ityādiyauktikabuddhyā vivicyamānānāṃ jñānānāṃ jñeyānāṃ ca svarūpaṃ nāvagamya. Jñeyena jñānasya nirūpaṇāt, jñānena ca jñeyasya nirūpaṇāt naikam api paramārthaṃ " —Ānandapūrṇa, Vidyāsāgarī, Chow. S. S., p. 126.

³ " Sarvabādhē na kiñcīd ced yan na kiñcit tad eva tat | Bhāṣā evātra bhidyante nirbādhāṃ tāvad astī hi || " —Pañ. II. 311.

The Ultimate Reality is held to be of the nature of Absolute Existence, Absolute Consciousness and Absolute Bliss or Joy. It may be urged that this Ultimate Reality may be mere existence and not Consciousness. But this will lead to an absurdity. An existence which is not Consciousness has no evidence in its favour. Consciousness is independent of foreign evidence, because it is self-revealing (svaprakāśa). If the Ultimate Existence be dependent upon a Consciousness different from itself, it would be found to be on the level of the material world, which Vedānta proves to be an irrational and illogical appearance, with no logical validity in it. So the Ultimate Reality cannot be unconscious. Now, it may be further argued,—‘let it be Consciousness alone, why do you insist that it must be an existence?’ No ; if Consciousness is not an existence, it will be non-existence and hence mere void (śūnya). So the Ultimate Reality must be Existence and Consciousness both at once. And the nature of Bliss is a matter of direct experience—after all it is the dearest of all, the only thing a man cares to preserve ; and all other things are prized or hated only as they are supposed to be serviceable or hostile to one’s own Self—which is Consciousness and existent Consciousness at that. We see that the exposition of the Ultimate Category as an unrestricted existence alone is not logically sound, as an Ultimate Existence is self-contradictory unless it is held to be identical with Consciousness. We find, however, in some Jaina works (referred to before) that a class of Mādhyamikas believed the Ultimate Reality to be a self-existent Consciousness and this position is undoubtedly sounder than that of the Russian and the Japanese savants. But this, too, would be an imperfect reality without the element of joy in it and Vedānta supplies the lacuna. It is a pity that the Absolute of Vedānta has been grossly misunderstood in some quarters and people have failed to note the philosophical importance of the aspect of *ānanda* (Bliss or Joy). But for this the existence of the world would be intolerable. Nay, the Absolute would be the most miserable Being, imprisoned within Its own existence, which has, however, no charm for It.

A feelingless and unconscious existence would be preferable to this. So Vedānta declares that It is full in Itself—full of Joy, nay, Fullness of Joy—the plenum of Existence, Consciousness and Joy. Without Joy, It would fall short of Fullness and hence would not be the Absolute.

In spite of these differences, the Bauddha view, however, seems to approach very near the Advaita position. For even in this Bauddha view, this world of experience is said to be of a purely illusory nature (*sāṃvṛta*). Nāgārjuna, the author of the *Mādhyamika-kārikas*, affirms that even Lord Buddha himself did recognise two different kinds of truth—

- (a) transcendent, absolute truth (*paramārtha satya*), and
- (b) relative, conditional, conventional, empirical or pragmatic truth (*sāṃvṛta satya*).

The Advaitins, too, urge the phenomenality of the world at every step in their arguments. Had the world been a transformation of a real cause, the position of the *Mādhyamikas* would have been untenable. For then the product also would have been taken as real and not empirical. The drift of our discussion only points out that the *Vivarta* theory is forced upon the *Mādhyamikas*, if only *Sūnya* is regarded as conscious and joyful also. For it is Consciousness alone that can be concealed by the veiling power of nescience.¹ Perhaps with this object in view, one school of the *Mādhyamikas* has described the *Sūnya* as of the nature of Pure Consciousness as already referred to in the preceding pages.

The view of the Grammarians—Sphoṭa and Brahman

The doctrine of illusory or apparent creation is found to be fully discussed in the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartr̥hari, the celebrated

¹ This point will be taken up for a detailed discussion in a subsequent work, in connexion with the seven antinomies (*anupapattis*) put forward by Rāmānuja against the veiling ignorance.

exponent of the Pāṇinean school of Grammarians. These Grammarians generally advocate the theory of *Sphoṭa* or super-subtle Word-Essence. The indeterminate and indivisible essence of Word is the *Sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* (i.e., *śabda* in its ultimate and unmanifested essence) appears to be the cause of the material world (*artha*), from which it is non-different ; and out of it the entire world-process evolves.¹ In the opinion of the Grammarians, *Sphoṭa* appears to be the cause of the world. It is super-subtle like the Brahman of the Monists ; and so it cannot possibly transform itself into the form of this gross world. It is only taken to appear as the product. So the position of the Grammarians appears to be similar to that of the Vedāntic Monists, so far as the question of causation is concerned and the systems also seem to agree in their respective conceptions of Brahman and *Sphoṭa* as spiritual in nature. Bhartṛhari and his commentators emphasise the spiritual nature of *Sphoṭa*, which is also described as Brahman, eternal and imperishable. The creation of the multiform world takes place by a process of differentiation in the indivisible essence of *Śabda* Brahman into a word and a sense—though the two are one in nature. The differentiation is rather illusory so far as the identity of Brahman is concerned.²

In introducing his philosophy of *Sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari has described it as existent with the help of the expression—"without origin and annihilation," and as omnipresent by the term "*brahma*." ³ But as we have already stated above, the theory of illusory or apparent causation (*Vivartavāda*) is possible only if the veiling power of nescience is accepted. In the

1 "Anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad akṣaram |
Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ ||

—Vākyapadiya, I. 1.

By using the expression 'vivartate,' Bhartṛhari explicitly states that matter is the vivarta of the super-subtle Word-Essence.

2 ".....nirvibhāgaḥ śabdārthamayo bodhasvabhāvaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭalakṣaṇa eva vākyam."—Puṇyārāja's commentary on the Vākyapadiya, p. 71.

3 "Anādinidhanapadaniveditā vastusattā nityatvam brahmapadapratipēditam ca vyāpītvam."—Nyāyamañjarī, V.S.S., p. 531.

Monistic system, Brahman, though non-related appears to be so by the operation of the veiling power of *avidyā*, and thereby appears as the world. Again, in the opinion of the Monists, Consciousness alone can be covered up by nescience. If the Sphoṭa, on the other hand, be unconscious, it cannot be regarded as concealed and cannot, therefore, be regarded as only appearing as matter in the manner already explained. Mādhava has also regarded Sphoṭa as conscious and spiritual in nature, and the universe as an illusory appearance superimposed on it. If that be the real position of the Grammarians, there seems to be very little difference between Advaitavāda and Śabdabrahmavāda. Jayanta, too, sees no difference, if the Sphoṭa, he observes, be looked upon as a conscious principle, as found in the Upaniṣads.¹

If the interpretation of the later commentators can be accepted as truly representing the original philosophy of Bhartṛhari, then also we do not find any material difference between the two positions—Vedāntic Monism and that of the Grammarians. The question is raised,—how can there be related to Pure Consciousness (which Śabda Brahman is by Itself)—a second principle, *viz.*, ignorance? The answer is given—yes ; there can be no real relation, but one is assumed on the evidence of ego-consciousness and the like to function upon Consciousness. And in reality the cause of all effects is *avidyā* or ignorance alone.²

*Consistency of the doctrine of illusory causation from the
Monistic standpoint*

The fundamental principle of homogeneity of the cause and the effect on which the Sāṅkhya system rests, may be set forth as a stumbling block in the way of the Monists who advocate

¹ “Acetanatvena śabdasya Īśvarasyeva sraṣṭṛtvānupapattēḥ”—Nyāyamañjarī, V.S.S., p. 535. Also—“Atha vijñānam ānandaṁ bruhmety āgamavacanam anusaratā vibhūtvam iva cetanatvam api śabdabrahmaṇo varṇyate, tarhi Īśvarasyaiva śabdabrahmeti nāma kṛtaṁ syāt.....”—*Ibid.*, pp. 535-36.

² Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjūṣā of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa with the commentary Kuñjikā by Durbalācārya, Chow. S.S., p. 393.

the doctrine of illusory or apparent causation, as in the way of those who hold the theory of the real transformation of Brahman (Brahmapariṇāmavāda). In the topic of the Brahmasūtras, discussing the homogeneity of the cause and the effect,¹ the Sāṅkhyas urge that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, since the two are of different nature—the cause being conscious, the effect can never be non-conscious. The argument is directed against those who assert that in the process of creation Brahman transforms Itself into the form of the world ; and hence it might seem that the Monists, too, cannot possibly hope to escape the charge by merely calling Brahman the apparent cause. Because in the *Vivartavāda* also, as in the *Pariṇāmavāda*, some similarity of nature is essential. We may cite, for example, a concrete case of appearance. It is seen that the shell invariably appears as silver, but never as charcoal (iṅgāla), as there is some similarity between the shell and the silver, but none between the former and charcoal. So similarity of nature is the determining condition of all causality—real or illusory.

But between Consciousness and the material world there is absolutely no similarity. If we go deeper into the question, we must see that similarity is unpredicable of the Absolute Consciousness, which has neither qualities nor parts in It ; but similarity is based upon a large number of common qualities or of parts. So the world cannot be regarded as illusory superimposition also (much less a real transformation) on indivisible Pure Consciousness, and this reduces creation or false appearance of the world to an impossibility. It might be urged that similarity is not the universal condition of false appearance (adhyāsa); as the crystal vase is seen to appear as red though there is no similarity between a red and a white thing. But this is irrelevant. The superimposition of the red colour is due to the presence of a scarlet flower and is conditional (sopādhika) upon it. But no such condition can be pointed out in the case of

¹ "Na-vilakṣaṇatva adbhikaraṇa"—Br. Sū. II. 1.4-11.

the appearance of the world on the substratum of Pure Consciousness. The superimposition of such concepts, as agency (kartṛtva) and the like, may be explained by reference to the presence of egohood (ahaṅkāra) as a condition, but so far as the whole world and the physical organism are concerned, their superimposition is not contingent on such condition. The Vedāntist replies that the contention of the Sāṅkhyas is baseless. Similarity is not the universal condition of even unconditional (nirupādhika) superimposition. The snake is perceived to have a fragrance like that of the *Ketaki* flower. Here the similarity of smell is a felt fact, but it cannot be explained on the basis of common qualities or of parts. So similarity may exist between the material world and the impartite and qualityless Consciousness. We, however, make no fetish of similarity. Similarity is one of the likely causes even of unconditional superimposition. The conch-shell is perceived to be yellow. The yellowness does not belong to the conch-shell itself, and yet it appears over it, though, similarity cannot be trotted out as explanation. The cause of this false appearance is the presence of jaundice in the percipient. So we see that either similarity or the presence of a sufficient cause is necessary to make the emergence of false appearance possible, and here in the case of Brahman and the world, the presence of *avidyā* as the cause of such appearance is not lacking ;—and this explains the apparent anomaly raised by the Sāṅkhyas. We may quote here Vācaspati also in support of the position which we have adopted from the Vivaraṇa and the Tattvadīpana.¹ Vācaspati says : “ The whole world is a false appearance on the unchangeable Absolute Consciousness due to the working of beginningless false tendencies and impressions and is independent of similarity.”² So we see that the two

¹ Vivaraṇa, V.S.S., pp. 9-10, and Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha, V.S.S., p. 13, and Tattvadīpana, p. 81, MM. A. K. Shāstri's Ed.

² “ Vivartas tu prapañco'yaṁ brahmaṇo'pariṇāminah |
Anādivāsanodbhūto na sārūpyam apeksate ” ॥

Bhāmati under Br. Sū. 1.2.21. N. S. Ed., p. 257. Also vide Sarvadarśanasamgraha, A. S. S., pp. 144-45.

important schools of Sāṅkara Vedānta—Vivarāṇa and Bhāmatī—are unanimous in this respect and that they have exposed the fallacy of the Sāṅkhyas as due to partial observation and unwarranted generalisation.

Hence the proposition—‘Brahman is the *prakṛti* (substantive cause) of the material world’—may be interpreted to show that Brahman is to be regarded as manifested in the form of the universe,—that Brahman *appears* as the world, in the sense explained above. The expression ‘*prakṛti*’ would have to be taken in the sense of the apparent or illusory cause (*vivartopādāna*), and not as the really transforming or formative cause (*pariṇāmopādāna*). Brahman is thus the apparent cause; since It is hidden by *Māyā* which, again, is generally recognised by the Monists as really changing into the manifested universe.

The different schools of Advaita thinkers hold diverse opinions on this point. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the views of some of the leading schools in detail.

CHAPTER III

THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF VEDĀNTIC MONISM ON THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION

*The view of the Padārthatattvanirṇaya—twofold substantive
cause—Brahman and Māyā*

The author of the Padārthatattvanirṇaya believes that Brahman and Māyā are both material causes of the universe, since the diverse characteristics of both Brahman and Māyā (*i.e.*, both existence and insentience) can be predicated of the material world. The world is non-different from Brahman, which alone as the true Being appears to undergo transformation. The reality that is Brahman is seen to underlie this material world also. For, in all our worldly experiences, we call it existent (*sat*). Again, this universe is said to be non-different from Māyā, which is non-conscious and as such actually undergoes transformation in the shape of the world. Invariably do we represent this world of experience as non-conscious (*jaḍa*) ; and it is the insentience of Māyā that gives the stamp of non-consciousness to the universe. The conditions of material causality (*upādānatā*), *viz.*, that it must be the cause and at the same time be the substratum of the product¹—is satisfied by Brahman also. The world as a product appears in and upon Brahman, and so Brahman is the material or the substantive cause (*upādāna*). Brahman, the substratum, hidden by the power of concealment belonging to Māyā, appears

¹ The material cause is not the mere cause of product ; as this is common to the efficient cause also. It must be the substratum of the effect also. So, only a thing which produces an effect of which it is the basis, is the material or substantive cause. Cf. " Kāryā-
dhāratve sati kāryajanīhetutvam upādānatvam "—S. L. S.-Ṭikā, Benares Ed., p. 72.

as the universe, *i.e.*, Brahman is the apparent cause (vivartopādāna). Māyā, on the other hand, is itself the really changing cause of which the world is the product of transformation.

Why twofold upādāna is admitted ? The psychology of perception

The main reasons to justify the acceptance of the view of twofold material cause are these :—

In the Advaita system, only the Ultimate Consciousness (Suddhacaitanya) is regarded as self-luminous (svaprakāśa) and the Ultimate Reality is regarded as one and one only (ekam eva), and is thus opposed to all dualistic conceptions of Realistic systems of thought. But all determinate knowledge is essentially dualistic in character, and presupposes the existence and relation of two factors, *viz.*, Consciousness and the material object. Leaving apart the question of the extra-subjective existence of the objective data, even the problem of perceptual knowledge presents a difficulty, *viz.*, how can two independent entities, existing apart from each other, be brought together at all. The knowledge of a thing means that the object known and the fact of knowledge have been brought into a systematic whole. The existence of material objects is proved by virtue of such knowledge alone and not by any inherent prerogative of the objective datum. The material object being dead, inanimate, unthinking matter, cannot be supposed to illuminate itself and thus prove its existence, unless the light of knowledge be brought to bear upon it. For this, Vedāntic writers of the Advaita school have postulated a *tertium quid*, *viz.*, the inner organ or mind (antaḥkaraṇa) which by its activity, technically called *vṛtti*, brings the two poles together and makes knowledge possible. The individual or subject consciousness cannot be supposed to move out, because all motion is predicable only of material objects. So it is the mind that moves out to reach the object. In the case of auditory perception, however, the object itself reaches the subject. It

is immaterial whether the movement proceeds from the internal knower or the external object, but what is essential is that the relation must take place.

Now a question may be raised,—well, Consciousness being the only ultimate fact, how can there be any objective existence at all ? The answer is—that the existence of the objective world cannot be denied as it is directly felt in experience, although the ultimate reality of such an existence is redargued both by logic and by Sacred Revelation. So what we are concerned about in perception, is to find an explanation of the situation and cannot remain satisfied with a denial of its existence. The fact remains that though unreal the objective data somehow present themselves to Consciousness. The Monistic Vedānta holds that these objective data, though absolutely illusory, somehow exist on Pure Consciousness, and divide each into apparently water-tight compartments. So when even an empirical knowledge is supposed to take place, what happens is this : The apparent fictitious divisions are removed and the unity of Consciousness, underlying the different objective manifestations, is only revealed. So practically it can be said in the language of the poet that here—“ The Spirit greets the Spirit.” We have explained the philosophy of perception. It is, however, necessary that we should say something on the technical devices adopted in Vedānta on perception, which, however, have no other value than convenience of treatment and psychological explanation. The objective datum is not mere dead inanimate matter, but matter superimposed upon Consciousness. The pen is not mere pen, but Consciousness defined and determined by pen. Similarly the subject (jñātr) is not the mere mind, but Consciousness as determined by the mind. This is technically called the subject-consciousness (pramātrecaitanya). The object is similarly called the object-consciousness (prameyacaitanya); and the modification of the mind (vṛtti) is called the instrumental consciousness (pramāṇacaitanya or vṛtticaitanya). These are purely technical devices, but are nevertheless necessary to

explain all empirical knowledge in which the polarisation of Consciousness into a subject, object and cognitive process is a necessary condition. Unlike the Realistic systems of thought, the three poles are characterised as consciousness with the limiting objects qualifying it. The delimitations and divisions, however, are non-existent in pure transcendental Consciousness, but are felt owing to the working of *Māyā* or *avidyā*.

Let us now follow the process of perception (and particularly ocular perception) to a little more detail. As we have already stated, non-conscious material objects are not *directly* (i.e., by the right of an intrinsic prerogative) perceptible, since they are not self-luminous. Only when enlightened by something else which is self-luminous, these can be perceived by us. So we are to search for an illuminating source which is self-luminous. Advaitins called this the cognising subject (*jñātṛ*)—the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* (cognising consciousness determined by the internal organ). But this cognising subject, being situated within the body, cannot possibly illuminate the object directly, as it is situated outside. So an illuminating medium also is required. This is known as the *vr̥tti*—the modification of the internal organ.¹ It has been called the illuminating medium, since it is non-conscious and as such non-luminous. Even the internal organ itself is not self-luminous, as it is also inanimate, and as such has no power to cognise other objects. But being the most proximate to the substratum consciousness (*svādhiṣṭhāna-caitanya*) and extremely transparent (unlike other non-intelligent objects), it is the most fitted receptacle to receive the reflection of the consciousness on it. By its close relation with the consciousness which is reflected on it, it acquires the power of illuminating other less transparent objects. The opaque

¹ When the sense-organ (say the eye) is fixed on the external object, the internal organ undergoes a change and issues out through the organ (which serves the purpose of the door), goes to the object and takes its shape. This modification of the internal organ is known as *vr̥tti* (particular mental state or mode).

objects, too, though themselves unable to catch the reflection of the all-pervading Consciousness, can easily acquire the power (in a form, more or less illuminated) of reflection, when they come in contact with the transparent medium of reflection (*vr̥tti*)—the modification of the transparent internal organ. Just as the walls, being opaque, cannot themselves reflect the face ; but when splashed all over with water, they acquire some degree of transparency and serve as reflectors. Thus the internal organ serves merely as a mirror or a reflector, and its modification moves out of the body like an elongated ray of light or a stream of water, and takes the shape of the external object.

To take a more particular case, during the process of ocular perception, the eye is fixed on an external object. The internal organ modified in the form of the *vr̥tti*, shoots out like a ray of light (reflected by a mirror) and goes towards the object. Then the *vr̥tti* assumes the shape of the object ; and the object is said to be illuminated by the *vr̥tti*, which is itself enlightened by the consciousness reflected on it. The non-conscious object is thus perceived by its indirect connexion with the consciousness reflected on the *vr̥tti*, but not by its connexion with the *vr̥tti* only ; because, as we have already pointed out, the *vr̥tti* itself being non-conscious, cannot possibly illuminate another non-conscious object ; or, in other words, the veil of ignorance, covering up the form of the non-conscious object, being lifted up by its connexion with the illuminating medium (*vr̥tti*), the consciousness, particularised by the object, is reflected on it ;¹ and the non-conscious object, while reflecting the consciousness, determined by it, gets itself illuminated. For, consciousness, being self-illuminous, illumines anything that comes in contact with it, provided that it has the fitness to receive and reflect the light of consciousness. So the expression—‘ the object is perceived ’—only means that the substratum consciousness,

¹ Up till now, it had remained unreflected on account of the opaque covering of ignorance over the object. *Vr̥tti* gives the object transparency, and thus the object reflects the consciousness underlying it.

determined by the object, manifests itself by its unification with that determined by the modification of the internal organ. The identity between the consciousness particularised by the object and that belonging to the *pramāṇa*, or in other words, the appearance of the substratum consciousness as the external object is thus the defining feature of perception. As Dr. Das Gupta puts it : “ Phenomenal creations are there in this world moving about as shadowy forms on an unchanging basis of one *cit* or reality, but this basis, this light of reality can only manifest these forms when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily lifted by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification.”¹

It should be noted in this connexion that Monistic Vedānta does not hold a brief for the theory of *vṛtti* and this is evident from the fact that there have been authors who do not subscribe to this theory. After all, it is only a makeshift—a device—a mere hypothesis to explain the ultimate pre-supposition of all empirical knowledge, pre-eminently of perception, *viz.*, the pre-supposition of the identity of the subject and the object, *i.e.*, consciousness and the object. So Vedānta does not debar any other suitable hypothesis which can satisfactorily explain this fact of identification of the object and consciousness. It may not be out of place to mention here that this *vṛtti* theory of perception is advocated in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy also, and it is quite likely that Vedānta may have borrowed the theory from Sāṅkhya. The theory may appear to be crude and cumbrous, but has got to be adhered to so long as a better hypothesis does not present itself.

Now, to come to our point, we find that when with the help of the illuminating mental mould, the individual ignorance, concealing the particular object from our view, is temporarily dispersed and the identification of the object and consciousness takes place,—the particular unknown object is said to be perceived for

¹ Das Gupta, A Hist. of Ind. Phil., Vol. 1, pp. 448-51.

the first time. What is true of the individual case, can also be regarded *a posteriori* to be universally true also by the process of correct generalisation based upon the careful observation of particular facts. Hence the Advaitins admit that when Brahman (*i.e.* Self-luminous Pure Consciousness) comes to be looked upon as identified with the objective world by the power of the cosmic Māyā, It appears as the world. Thus Brahman and Māyā, operating in unison, are said to be the joint material causes of the world.

*The phenomenality of the objective world implied in the
subject-object relation in perception*

The phenomenality of the objective universe can also be brought out if we examine the relation between consciousness and the presented data. The relation between the object and knowledge, we shall see, cannot be logically explained, but has got to be accepted as an ultimate fact. The relation of sense-organs (internal or external), too, cannot shed any light on this issue, because knowledge of God and the super-sensuous perceptions of the Yogins are believed to come into play without the functioning of the senses. In the matter of the perception of external objects, the mind alone is absolutely impotent ; so the super-normal perceptions, referred to above, cannot be explained through the agency of the mind. All attempts, therefore, of the Naiyāyikas to reduce this relation to simpler physical relations are proved to be futile. In view of this difficulty the later Naiyāyikas regard this relation as a unique relation subsisting between the subject and the object. It is called the subject-object relation (*viśayatā*). But this formulation only assumes the very problem as a fact and does not make it any way simpler. The crux of the problem is—what precisely is the nature of the object itself? It cannot be something on which a special effect is produced by consciousness operating on it. What will be the nature of this effect? The Mīmāṃsists hold that it is some-

thing which makes the thing known by producing on it the effect called 'knownness' (jñatātā). This explanation is only a show and is a case of hopeless tautology. There is nothing to determine what will be known and what not. Besides, this hypothesis makes the actual existence of the object a necessary condition of knowledge. The result will be that no knowledge of past things or expectation of future possibilities will be possible.

Some, again, have sought to explain the object of knowledge as something which becomes the centre of practical behaviour consequent upon the knowledge of the object. But this seeks to shift the difficulty a step farther and leaves the problem as it is. There is nothing to determine the relation between the behaviour and the object concerned. Moreover, we are absolutely left in the dark about the meaning of 'behaviour' itself. For aught we know, it cannot be regarded as a physical behaviour, because no such behaviour is possible with regard to objects of knowledge which are non-physical in character, such as the self or thought, etc. Nor can the behaviour be regarded as something psychical ; in other words, as the object of desire, volition and the like. The object of desire or volition is as much mysterious as the object of knowledge itself. So all attempts to reduce the knowledge relation to some other ultimate relations—psychical or physical—are doomed by their very nature to inevitable futility.

Let us examine the position of the Prābhākaras. Śālikanātha says that it is a simple thing—the object is what presents itself in a particular cognition. But the problem is—is there any ultimate determinant of what will be presented and what not ? Leaving aside this ultimate problem, even the formulation on the face of it is vague. We do not know what we are to understand by this presentation *to* or *in* consciousness. Does it mean that the object is bodily taken into consciousness and integrated with it ? This is absurd. Does it mean that it becomes an object of consciousness ? If so, it is no explanation ; that is the problem we are trying to understand. Nor does the

subject-object relation become any more intelligible. There is no criterion by which we can regard consciousness as subject and anything other than consciousness as object, and why the relation should not be reversed. The situation does not become any more clear, if the object is regarded as a cause or condition of cognition. In that case the sense organs, light and other possible conditions which make knowledge possible will have to be regarded as the object of knowledge—a plainly absurd issue. It may be urged,—well, not any and every condition of knowledge is the object, but only that condition which is perceived or cognised. But it is this fact of being cognised that is the problem which is sought to be explained. So such explanations are only statements of the problem itself and are designed, we are afraid, to evade the issue. But philosophers are desperate persons and there has been no end to their speculations, however absurd these may be. So there is a theory that holds that the object is that which becomes a determinant adjective of a cognition without any other relation, and the subject is that which is the substantial factor of knowledge. In the cognition of a table, the table is the adjectival factor and the cognition or the cogniser is the substantive, and no other relation beyond this exists. But this, too, is a *hoax*. Apart from the question as to what will determine the necessity of one thing being the adjective and another the substantive, and the question as to why the relation should not be quite otherwise,—the very formulation itself is defective. There may be cases of knowledge where the adjectival part is not believed to be the object. Take for instance, the judgment—‘the knowledge of the table is inherent in me.’ Here the fact of inherence is the adjective of the knowledge ; but it is not perceived when the knowledge of the table takes place. It is, no doubt, comprehended in the subsequent judgment about the knowledge, but not in the primal perceptual cognition of the table itself, though the fact of inherence is a determinant adjective of the perceptual knowledge. If it is held that not any and every adjectival determinant can be

the object of knowledge, but only that which is felt, it leaves the problem where it was. In other words, it does not explain anything.

The failure to explain the subject-object relation need not absolutely disappoint us. The foregoing survey of the historical theories makes the conclusion irresistible that all knowledge and the subject-object relation involved in it are facts which are not amenable to any logical explanation. It might, however, be urged that the theories under review might be failures, but this is no argument that no other successful theory will become possible. This is, however, a pious hope on the part of the Realist and is bound to end in disappointment. The failure of the theories is not due to any intellectual defect, but to the very nature of the object itself. And so all theories are bound to be failures. We can dispose of this issue by a very simple dilemma. Let the relation be anything ; but it must be one which can be reduced either to a case of identity or one of non-identity and no third *term* is possible. Knowledge and the object cannot be held to be identical ; because it will be tantamount to the denial of knowledge, which means the presence of two distinct and different things—one knower and another known. Nor can it be one of non-identity either ; because not only the object in question but the whole world of things are non-identical with it. So there is nothing to determine what will be perceived and what not. If the two factors of knowledge, *viz.*, awareness and object remain absolutely distinct and different, we do not know how there can arise a case of knowledge at all. But this knowledge arises and cannot be denied. So the Vedāntist declares it to be a manifestation of the infinitely resourceful Māyā, and not a real fact. Because reality cannot be self-contradictory, which the subject-object relation transpires to be.

The only difference between the Realist and the Idealist is ultimately a question of intellectual attitude. Experience (*pratīti*) is regarded by both the schools as an ultimate fact, with this difference that the Idealist insists that this experience must

be a valid experience uncontradicted by logical canons or any other subsequent experience, whereas the Realist tries to avoid this issue when his fundamental position is jeopardised. The Idealist is a Rationalist out and out and is prepared to accept any situation that Reason may make inevitable, and in this no preconceived notion or theory stands in his way. The subject-object relation is a felt fact given in experience no doubt, but the Vedāntist refuses to accept it as true, because it is fraught with self-contradiction. The criterion of Reality, according to the Vedāntist, is that it must not contradict itself. And so only uncontradicted experience is the warrant of Truth and not any other.

The nature of avidyā and its relation to Consciousness

We think the account of the epistemology of perception will remain incomplete unless something is said on the nature of avidyā. This avidyā, the Vedāntist is never tired of emphasising, is a positive entity. In other words, it is not a mere negation of knowledge. Negation of knowledge is a judgment and not a simple experience and as such presupposes the previous knowledge of terms. Now, negation of knowledge cannot be a negation of all knowledge, as it is itself a case of knowledge. So it must be something which is *not* negation. Its existence cannot be denied, as it is directly felt in experience— ‘I do not know.’ We reserve a detailed treatment of this important topic for the future, and it will suffice, we hope, only to indicate its broad characteristics. As we have said before, negation of knowledge is not an absolute negation, as it is also a case of knowledge in itself. Nor can it be a negation of specific knowledge, as no reference to specific objects is meant or given. It is a case of simple affirmation of ignorance— ‘I do not know,’—not that ‘I do not know a particular thing.’

However may that be, a difficulty has been raised by Rāmānuja that this experience of ignorance cannot be reconciled

with the fundamental position of the Advaitins that it is liable to destruction by knowledge, though its positive character may be taken for granted. Ignorance is not an eternal fixture, and the possibility of its destruction makes final Emancipation a possible event. In that case it will have no *raison d'être* if its existence is antagonistic to Consciousness. The Advaitin here, Rāmānuja argues, is guilty of self-contradiction, when he says that ignorance is opposed to Consciousness, and still works in It. The Advaitin in reply points out that Rāmānuja here is labouring under a confusion of Consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*) and knowledge (*ṛttijñāna*). Though in essence knowledge is also Consciousness, yet it materially differs from It in that it is produced by an accredited instrument of knowledge,—whereas Pure Consciousness is an eternal Existence. It is on the evidence of experience that we have to conclude that knowledge is opposed to and destructive of ignorance, and not unmodalised Consciousness. On the contrary, the latter is its very proof and foundation. We could have no knowledge of the existence of ignorance unless we were conscious of it. Sureśvara very poignantly remarks that this is a case of unpardonable petulance, when one contends that ignorance should not exist in Consciousness. Not only ignorance, but the whole empirical world is seen to be superimposed upon It. ¹

So we see that a difference must be made between Consciousness and knowledge, and it is the latter that is opposed to ignorance. To argue that the two should be regarded as identical in function, because of their essential identity, constitutes a case of inference, invalidated by approved knowledge (*kālātyāyāpadiṣṭa hetu*)—just like the inference of coldness in fire. ²

Now, after having indulged in this digression, which we thought to be absolutely necessary for a full comprehension of the

¹ "Akṣamā bhavataḥ keyaṃ sād'akativaprakalpane |
Kiṃ na paśyasi saṃsāraṃ tattraivājñānakalpitam ||"—Br. Vār.

² "Anuṣṇas tejo'vayavī kṛtakatvūt ghaṭavat."

problem, we may be permitted to revert to the old problem of causation as viewed by the author of the Padārthatattvanirṇaya.

The substratum consciousness by itself cannot remove the individual nescience, for it manifests ignorance also. But when reflected through the modification of the internal organ, the veil of ignorance is easily lifted. As we have already pointed out that there can exist no relation (such as contact or inherence) between the object (phenomenal creations) and the subject consciousness ; for the subject and the object have one identical reality. The subject, however possesses independent reality ; and consequently the object is to be regarded as falsely superimposed on the subject.¹ In other words, the subject appears as the object, or the Ultimate Reality (*i.e.* Consciousness) is the apparent cause of the universe.

Māyā, on the other hand, is the really changing cause ; since the insentient objects of the world are but the direct modifications of the non-intelligent formative cause—Māyā.

Thus according to the author of the Padārthatattvanirṇaya a twofold material cause of the world (Brahman—the apparent cause—vivartopādāna and Māyā—the formative cause—pariṇā-mopādāna) is finally established.²

The Vivaraṇa view—Īśvara (and not Brahman)—the upādāna

The author of the Vivaraṇa opines that Personal God (Īśvara) and not the Absolute (Brahman) is the substantive cause.³ This position of the Vivaraṇa is not fundamentally different from that of the Padārthatattvanirṇaya (given above), inasmuch as Īśvara is not represented to undergo any constitutional change in the process. If we analyse the entity—

¹ Citsukhī, N.S.S., pp. 44-47.

² "Atrābuj padārthatattvanirṇayakārāḥ—brahma māyā cety ubhayam upādānam..... tatra brahma vivartamānatayā upādānam, avidyā pariṇāmanatayā.—S.L.S., Ben. Ed., p. 72.

³ "Vivaraṇānusāriṇas tu.....māyāśabalam Īśvararūpam eva brahma upādānam."—S.L.S., p. 59.

Īśvara (which is regarded as *Bimbacaitanya*—original Consciousness, and *not* the *pratibimba*—reflection, as the author of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* thinks), we find Him to be Pure Consciousness associated with *Māyā*. Only the limiting adjunct *Māyā* changes into the form of the world, while Pure Consciousness undergoes no transformation whatsoever, but only appears to have changed into the world. While *Padārthatattvanirṇayakāra* follows the analytical process, *Vivaraṇakāra* adopts the synthetical one.

Dr. Das Gupta's interpretation of the Vivaraṇa view

Dr. Das Gupta, however, is of opinion that “*Prakāśātman Akhaṇḍānanda and Mādhava hold that Brahman in association with Māyā, i.e., the Māyā-reflected form of Brahman as Īśvara should be regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or pariṇāma of the Māyā as located in Īśvara, whereas Īśvara (God) is the vivarta causal matter.*¹”

We are afraid that this position is not in consonance with the original position of the *Vivaraṇa*. In the *Vivaraṇa* the original Consciousness (*Bimbacaitanya*) as opposed to the reflected one (*pratibimbacaitanya*) is said to be the cause. And this ultimate Consciousness, as the original counterpart of reflection, is *Īśvara*, *i.e.*, Consciousness as associated with *Māyā* as an adjunct. According to the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, the original Consciousness is the Pure Absolute, and its reflection in the *Māyā* is held to be the Personal God or *Īśvara*. It is the Pure Absolute that is held to be the substantive cause and not *Īśvara*, who is rather a productive of *Māyā*.²

The position, therefore comes to this :

¹ Dasgupta, A Hist. of Ind. Phil., Vol. I, pp. 468-9.

² “*Ajñānopahitaṃ bimbacaitanyam Īśvaraḥ; antaḥkaraṇatatsamskārāvaccchinā-jñānapratibimbitaṃ caitanyam jīva iti Vivaraṇakārāḥ.*”—*Siddhāntabindu*, 109.

“*Ajñānapratibimbitaṃ caitanyam Īśvaraḥ; buddhipratibimbitaṃ caitanyam jīvaḥ; ajñānopahitaṃ bimbacaitanyam śuddham iti Samkṣepaśārīrakakārāḥ.*”—*Ibid*, 110.

According to the Vivaraṇa—

(a) *Īśvara*, i.e., Brahman in association with *Māyā* (*māyā-śābalam*) and not its reflection, is the *Causa Materialis*; ¹

(b) *Māyā* is always located in pure self-luminous Consciousness, and never in *Īśvara*, who is rather a concrete whole having Pure Consciousness and *Māyā* as His constituent factors; ²

(c) the entire entity *Īśvara* is not the apparent cause; the associated *Māyā* is the formative cause, while Consciousness alone appears as the world.

According to the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*—

Pure Absolute, which is the final objective and goal of philosophical enquiry, is the original and is regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. Of course, at first sight, this position seems to contradict the position of the Vivaraṇa. But a compromise may be somehow effected, inasmuch as the causality attributed to *Īśvara* is capable of being extended to the Pure Consciousness forming His background, the associated *Māyā* serving only as an indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*).³

Samkṣepaśārīraka view—pure Brahman—the *upādāna*

The view of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* thus deserves our attention next. In it Brahman Itself has been described as the substantive cause, and *Māyā* is regarded as a cause by courtesy only because it serves as the medium.⁴ The service of *Māyā* is

¹ “*Māyāśābalam Īśvararūpam eva brahma upādānam*”—S.L.S.

“*Māyopādhinirūpitabimbatraviśiṣṭam sarvajñatvādiguṇayuktam ca yad Īśvararūpam brahmācāitanyam*”—S.L.S.-Tīkā, p. 59.

² “*Nāpi svāśrayacitprakāśena virudhyate 'jñānam*”—Vivaraṇa, Viz.S.S., p. 43.
“*Svayamprakāśasyāvīdyaśrayatvam upapannam ity uktam*”—*Ibid.*, p. 46.

³ “*Īśvaragatam api kāraṇatvam tadānugatam akhaṇḍacāitanyam śākhācandramasam iva tatāsthatayopalakṣayitum śaknoti iti tasya jñeyabrahmalakṣaṇatvoktir iti*”—S.L.S., p. 63.

⁴ “*Samkṣepaśārīrakakṛtas tu brahmaiva upādānam, kūṣasthasya kāraṇatvānupapatteḥ; māyā dvārakāraṇam*”—S. L. S., pp. 75-6. “*Atra Samkṣepaśārīrakānusāriṇaḥ kecid āhuḥ—śuddham evopādānam*”—*Ibid.*, p. 58.

postulated, as Pure Consciousness in and by Itself is not susceptible of any change, which is made possible by Māyā serving as an auxiliary.

The insentience of the world : How does it come in ?

Here the question naturally arises, if Brahman alone is the material cause, wherefrom then does the insentience (jādatā) of the world come in ? The effect derives its characteristics from the material cause alone and not from any other conditions. But the difficulty is only apparent, as it is not at all an unusual occurrence that the effect may derive some of its characteristics from even what is only a helping condition. This is seen to be the fact in the case of a pot produced from clay. The clay is made smooth and glossy by a particular process of kneading and these adventitious attributes are seen to be produced in the pot made of such seasoned clay, though the original attributes of the clay cannot be believed to be the cause. So the world may derive its character of insentience from Māyā, though it is merely a helping condition.¹

Vācaspati's view

Vācaspati, the author of the Bhāmātī, also feels very strongly against calling Māyā the material cause of the world. According to him, Brahman is the apparent cause of the world. Māyā, on the other hand, is regarded as the instrumental cause (sahakāri) only, but never as the material cause proper.²

Vācaspati postulates two different types of Māyā or Avidyā.³ The first is called the original or causal Māyā (kāraṇarūpā), and the second is the totality of the memory-impressions of previous

1 "Akāraṇam api dvāraṇaṁ kārye'nugacchati"—S. L. S., p. 76. The commentator explains—"akāraṇam api" as "anupādānam api"—S. L. S.-Tīkā, p. 76.

2 "Vācaspatimīśrās tu jīvāśritamāyāviśayikṛtaṁ brahma svata eva jādyāśrayaprapaṇcākāreṇa vivartamānatayopādānam iti māyā saha-kārimātram"—S. L. S., p. 77.

3 "Anirvācya-vidyādvitayasacivasya prabhavato..."—Bhāmātī, introductory verse 1.

illusions (vāsanā) possessed of the power of creating the appearance of the multifarious entities.¹ These individual vāsanās exist as potentialities in the causal Avidyā, and by an inherent energy are actualised in the perceived illusions. The causal Māyā is an identity existing from the beginningless time in the individual self. It has got a double function. In the first place, it functions as the repository of the vāsanās; and in the second place, it screens the Reality from our view.

Vācaspati explains the insentience of the world

The question of insentience of the world may be raised here also. Vācaspati thinks that the insentience of the world is not derived from the material cause, but is an attribute natural with the effect. So there is absolutely no need to bring in Māyā as the material cause of the world to justify the insentience found in the product.²

Prof. Radhakrishnan, however, observes in this connexion :—
“ The insentience (jaḍatā) of the world must be due to something else than Brahman pure and simple, and it is perhaps better to say that the world with its finite-infinite nature is to be traced to Brahman-māyā.”³

A critical examination of Vācaspati's position

Prof. Radhakrishnan seems to think that Vācaspati has failed to explain the origination of the material world from Pure

¹ “ Svakāraṇe'nirvācyāyām avidyāyām līnāḥ sūkṣmeṇa śaktirūpeṇa karmavikṣepakā-vidyāvāsanābhīḥ sahāvatiṣṭhanta eva...”—*Ibid*, under I. 3. 20, N. S. Ed., p. 333. Also—
“ Kāraṇabhūtayā layalakṣaṇayāvidyayā prāksargopacitena ca vikṣepasāṃskāreṇa...”—*Ibid*, under II. 2.2, N. S. S., p. 494.

² “ Jagaty anugataṃ jādyaṃ na kāraṇaguṇaḥ, kintu jagata eva svābhāvikaṃ; atas tatsiddhaye māyāyā upādānatvaṃ kāryānugatadvārakāraṇatvaṃ vā na kalpanīyam ”—S. L. S. -Tikā, pp. 76-77.

³ Ind. Phil., Vol. II, pp. 552-53. In making this statement, Prof. Radhakrishnan seems to prefer the solution given by the author of Padārthatattvanirṇaya to that of Vācaspati.

Absolute Consciousness (Brahman), and for this he believes that the service of a cosmic Māyā, existing in Brahman, must necessarily be requisitioned. We, on the other hand, are inclined to think that Vācaspati's explanation of the insentient world as an appearance over Brahman through the instrumentality of the twofold Māyā is neither inadequate, nor logically inconsistent. It may, however, be and has actually been attacked on other grounds which we are stating below.

Many an eminent writer of Vedānta has lent his support to this view of Vācaspati. Thus Acyutakṛṣṇānandatīrtha, in his commentary of the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, while introducing the view of Vācaspati, explicitly states that the insentience of the world is not to be traced to its ultimate cause, but is a natural attribute of the product.

This view of Vācaspati derives its final support from Bādarāyaṇa himself. Because, the objection raised by the Sāṅkhyas (in the 'Na-vilakṣaṇatva adhikaraṇa') that the effect must be of the same nature as the *causa materialis*—sounds consistent from this point of view only. According to the Bhāmatī, the cause (*i. e.*, Brahman) is intelligent, but the effect (*i. e.*, the world) is non-intelligent. The objection raised by the Sāṅkhyas can, therefore, be urged against this position of the Bhāmatī with the greatest force.

The answer given by the Bhāmatī is also very cogent; for the Bhāmatī states that every attribute of the product cannot possibly be traced to its material cause. In that case the difference between the cause and the effect would be indiscernible. The insentience of the world, for example, is not to be deduced from the material cause (Brahman), but is natural with the effect itself (the world). The Sūtrakāra, too, supports this answer in the aphorism— 'But it is seen,'¹—where he declares that the objection of the Sāṅkhyas is without any force; since the homogeneity of the cause and the effect is

¹ " Drśyate tu "—Br. Sū., II. 1.6.

not an essential condition of causality.¹ It is often seen that animate objects such as scorpions, etc., are produced from inanimate matter such as cowdung, etc. Thus a non-intelligent material cause (Māyā) need not be dragged in to explain the insentience of the world. On the other hand, those that assume a non-intelligent cause merely on the ground of explaining the insentience of the world, would not be able to make their position consistent with that of the Sūtrakāra. The objections raised by the Sāṅkhyas and the refutation of the same by the Sūtrakāra would be utterly meaningless from their viewpoint. For the reply given by the Sūtrakāra to the Sāṅkhya objection distinctly points out that the homogeneity of the cause and the effect is not necessary at all. So it is the Bhāmatī only that has been able to grasp the true spirit of the Brahmasūtras,—while others, who insist on a non-intelligent cause (Māyā) to account for the insentience in the effect, would find it extremely difficult to reconcile their positions with the doctrine set forth by Bādarāyaṇa in connexion with this topic.

It is for this reason that Vācaspati contends that the individual self (jīva) is the locus of Māyā. He finds no reason to associate Māyā with Brahman and to trace the causality to Brahman-Māyā, as almost other schools of Vedantic Monism and Qualified Monism have endeavoured.

Other charges against Vācaspati

According to Vācaspati, ignorance rests on the individual self, because all our actual experiences of ignorance are of the form—‘I am ignorant’ (aham ajñāḥ). On an analysis of the judgment it is found that it is consciousness as determined by the ego-sense that is the locative of ignorance. There can be no steadfast rule that the locus and the object of covering should

¹ This principle is adopted on all hands by all subschools of the Advaita system and by Rāmānuja as well—in fact by all who have tried to refute the objection raised in this connexion by the Sāṅkhyas.

be self-identical. Ignorance situated in *jīva*, therefore, can easily cover Brahman as its object, though the latter is distinct and different from the former (of course, from the empirical standpoint, where alone the question of covering by ignorance can rise at all). The authors of the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Samkṣepasārīraka*, however, controvert this view saying that Brahman must be the locus and object of *Māyā*, since there is no incompatibility in the object and the substratum of a covering being identical and coincident. This is seen to be the fact in the case of external darkness. Darkness covers the very place in which it exists, and *avidyā* or ignorance is nothing but internal darkness and should have the same incidence. But *Vācaspati* contends that just as in ordinary illusions, the individual ignorance located in *jīva* covers up the consciousness particularised by the shell which is situated outside, so in the case of the original ultimate *Avidyā*, too, the object and the locus should be different.

The entire dispute turns on the interpretation of the common experience of ignorance expressed in the proposition—‘I am ignorant.’ *Vācaspati*, we have pointed out, holds that the subject of ignorance is not unqualified Consciousness, but consciousness as determined and delimited by the ego-sense (*ahantāviśiṣṭaṃ caitanyam*). Ignorance is seen to be predicated of this limited consciousness or self. It will be wrong to hold, *Vācaspati* contends, that ignorance is predicated of Consciousness pure and simple. Because this interpretation runs counter to the unmistakable evidence of experience. *Prakāśātman*, however, does not accept the analysis of the illusory experience as offered by *Vācaspati*. He holds that the predicate in the judgment—‘I am ignorant’—is not ignorance only, but also the ego-sense. The two adjectives ‘ignorance’ and ‘ego-sense’ are simultaneously predicated of Pure Consciousness as the subject and the judgment follows as a matter of course (*‘Ekatra dvayam iti rītyā jāyamānam viśiṣṭajñānam’*). *Mādhava*, however, tries to reconcile the view of *Vācaspati* with that of the *Vivaraṇa*. He thinks that the difference between the two views is not fundamental. Though

the individualised consciousness as *jīva* is regarded as the substratum of ignorance, still the real locus is Pure Consciousness which forms the background of the *jīva*hood. *Acyutakṛṣṇānanda* also lends support to this view. He says that Consciousness is the locus of ignorance and the individuality of the *jīva* only serves to determine the incidence of ignorance and certainly does not enter as a factor into the locus of ignorance.¹ So there is ultimately no difference between the two schools in the matter of Consciousness alone being the locus of ignorance. There is, however, a very material difference, *viz.*, that *Vācaspati* does not subscribe to the existence of one cosmic ignorance or *Māyā* existing outside the individuated selves as an adjunct of the Absolute,—which is the position of the *Vivaraṇa*. The result is that Personal God becomes a matter of individual illusion and thus has no independent existence outside the individual minds. He becomes as much a product of individual ignorance as the phenomenal world—an apparent anomaly in which we have a man-made God instead of a God-made man,—the protests of *Kalpataru* notwithstanding.

Now, it has been urged against *Vācaspati*'s conception of *avidyā* as residing only in the individual selves, the fallacy of logical 'see-saw' (*anyonyāśraya*) or mutual dependence. *Vācaspati* thinks *avidyā* is responsible for the defects of ignorance and as these cannot be conceived to exist in the Absolute, *avidyā* is incompatible with It. Its existence in the individual is, however, indisputable; so the individual self is regarded as its locus. But here also a difficulty arises. There is no denying the fact that Brahman is the only Reality and the existence of the multiform world and the multiplicity of *jīvas* or individuals is a false appearance due to the influence of *avidyā*. So *avidyā* must have a prior existence in order that the existence of *jīvas* may be possible. *Avidyā* is the cause of individuation and to make this *avidyā* dependent upon individuated selves is to put the cart

¹ "Cinmātrāśritam ajñānarp jīvapakṣapātītīvāt jīvāśritam ucyate"—*Vivaraṇapramaya-saṃgraha*.

before the horse. Individual selves are dependent upon avidyā ; and to make this avidyā, again, dependent upon the individuals for its very existence and functioning, is clearly a case of arguing in a vicious circle.

Followers of Vācaspati contend in reply that there is a case of reciprocal dependence in the very connotation of jīva. But this reciprocity does not involve any logical absurdity. Only those cases of reciprocity are vicious which make the independent origination or cognition of the things in reciprocal relation an impossibility. In other words, where a particular thing *A* can come into existence in dependence upon another thing *B*, and this *B*, again, is supposed to owe its existence to *A*, or the cognition of *A* is made possible by *B* and the cognition of *B* by that of *A*,—it gives rise to a logical fallacy. The implication is that this fallacy arises where the relation in question is one of causality. But in the present case, the relation of avidyā and the individual is not one of causality, but one of co-existence. And such co-existence of two factors, though mutually determined is not logically absurd, as it is attested in uncontradicted experience. To take a concrete example, there is such mutual dependence between a thing being a substance and being a substratum of attributes. Now, the possession of attributes determines a thing to be a thing and *vice versa*. Or, as in a triangle, the attributes of triangularity and threesidedness are found to be co-existent and mutually determined without any question of priority or posterity. But this is not open to logical objection, as the relation, though one of mutual implication, is not one of causality. The existence of one is not brought about by the existence of another as a condition precedent. The two factors are co-existent as a matter of logical necessity. Had this relation been one between an antecedent and a consequent, it would have been a case of logical see-saw. The existence of the individual implies the existence of avidyā, and this implication is logical and not causal. The two factors are really aspects of the same thing, involved by an equal logical necessity in the very meaning of it. Avidyā and

individuality are thus two co-existent facts logically involved in a self-identical situation, and no question of priority or posterity, therefore, arises.

Another objection is advanced against the position of Vācaspati regarding the causality of Brahman. Now, Brahman is regarded as the substantive cause of the world-appearance by all schools of Śāṅkara Vedānta, and this is held to be possible by the existence of a quasi-real principle, *viz.*, Māyā in and upon Brahman. In fact, as we have made it clear, the world is but the effect of Māyā, and is regarded as the effect of Brahman because Māyā and Brahman are co-associated. According to Vācaspati, Māyā or avidyā exists in jīva, and so the world as the effect of this avidyā should be regarded as the effect of jīva-cum-māyā.

But this will be in direct opposition to the accepted position of Vedānta. Vācaspati in reply contends that the location of Māyā is immaterial. It is the substratum of the world-appearance that should be regarded as the material cause. Māyā, though located in jīva, operates upon the substratum or Brahman and focuses the world-appearance upon It. Vācaspati thus succeeds in bringing his position into line with the accepted doctrine of the causality of Brahman; but that has been possible only by virtue of a forced interpretation of the concept of material causality (upādānatā). A material cause is defined as not only the substratum of the effect, but one that is possessed of productive efficiency. In Vācaspati's view, the productive efficiency cannot be predicated of Brahman. So one important factor is lacking. In this view, moreover, we are left no means or criterion by which to distinguish between what should be a material cause proper and a mere locus. For example, the ground surface, on which a table rests, is a mere locus and not the cause. But in Vācaspati's interpretation, the locus should be regarded as the material cause which is absurd.¹

¹ Compare and contrast the position of Vijñānabhikṣu who advocates the doctrine of locative causation (*vide*, Chap. V).

And the fatal objection is that Vācaspati reduces Vedānta Philosophy to pure Subjectivism, and Solipsism is but one step farther from it. The objective world may have an ontological foundation in Brahman which rather serves as the silver screen of the cinema show, but it has no extra-subjective status. For consistency's sake, Vācaspati cannot believe in the existence of the world when the individual ceases to perceive it,—“*Cessante causa cessat effectus*”—the cause having ceased to act, the effect ceases also. Belief in the existence of other thinking subjects does not improve matters. This would at most make the world inter-subjective, and so far as the objectivity of the world and its independent laws of existence and function are concerned, it is only a blank. The Idealism of Vācaspati is perilously near to the Subjective Idealism of the Vijñānavādins and of Berkeley and is thus exposed to all the consequences of their philosophy. It should, however, be noted in fairness to Vācaspati that his metaphysics is entirely different from the metaphysics of the Buddhists and of Berkeley in more than one fundamental respect. To be brief, Vācaspati is a Monist; the individual selves are a creation of eternal avidyā and they have no independent existence and are ultimately merged in the Absolute; whereas the Subjectivistic schools maintain the existence of a plurality of selves. Another momentous difference from the Buddhistic Idealism lies in the nature of the objective world. Though according to Vācaspati the world is but a manifestation of avidyā inherent in the individual, this manifestation is made possible only because the Absolute serves as its background. In the Buddhist account, the world is but an unfounded illusion. Vācaspati, therefore, insists that though a creation of the individual's ignorance, the world-appearance should be affiliated to the Absolute Consciousness as its cause, as it cannot emerge without such a substratum.¹ The individual and his ignorance rather

¹ Cf. “Niradhiṣṭhānavibhrānter abhāvād ātmano'stitā |
 Śūnyasyāpi sasākṣitvād anyathā noktir aya te ||”

serve as an occasion and as a condition only ; but the world-appearance becomes possible only because it is supported on the Absolute. It would have been a purely subjective creation, if the world could come into existence without the assistance of the substratum. The causality of Brahman, therefore stands unshaken, as without it the individual avidyā or vāsanās are absolutely impotent to bring the world into existence.¹

Before bringing this review of Vācaspati's philosophy to a conclusion, we feel it imperative in view of the paramount position it occupies in the history of Vedānta that we should go deeper into the meaning of material causation. Of course, Īśvara, *i.e.*, Brahman, endowed with a cosmic Energy in the shape of Māyā, is regarded as the material cause of the world in other schools of Monistic Vedānta, pre-eminently the Vivaraṇa school. And this conception of Brahman as creating the world from Its own Self serving at the same time as its background, makes the causality of Brahman more intelligible to our understanding than the conception of Brahman acting only as its substratum, as Vācaspati maintains. But though this interpretation holds good of personalised Brahman, it is absolutely inapplicable with regard to the Impersonal Absolute. The Vivaraṇa cannot deny the causality of the Impersonal Absolute. But this causality can be possible only in the sense of Its merely being the substratum of the world-appearance. If it is maintained, as is really done by Appaya Dikṣita in his Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, that Impersonal Absolute, divested of all relation with the cosmic Energy, is not yet an accomplished fact, but would emerge only after the exhaustion of the world-process with the emancipation of all the individual jīvas,—the view would be open to the charge of another extremism. Vācaspati may be ridiculed for making Personal God contingent upon the individual ; but the other view makes the situation worse in making the Impersonal Absolute a future contingency. In other words, Brahman,

¹ Bhāmāṭī, under Jagadvācitra adbhikarāṇa—Br. Sū. I. 4. 16-18.

according to this view, would be an imperfect, rather a less perfect, Being than the Impersonal Absolute, whom alone we can conceive as the most perfect existence. Had the Personal God been a perfect existence we would have no warrant to postulate the existence of another Ultimate Impersonal Absolute.

Kalpataru's support to Vācaspati's position

Amalānanda, the author of the *Kalpataru*, in his endeavour to save Vācaspati from the charge of Subjective Idealism, seeks to dispose of the theory of the conjunct causality of the *jīva-cum-māyā* ;¹ and in doing so he evidently takes his stand on the theory of many souls (*Anekajīvavāda*) and not on the theory of one single soul (*Eka-jīvavāda*).

In order to do full justice to the view mentioned above, we must first possess some acquaintance with the outline of the doctrine of one soul. According to this theory, the individual soul has three states of existence :

(a) The real *jīva* (*pāramārthika*)—which is Pure Consciousness, destitute of all adjuncts.

(b) The empirical *jīva* (*vyāvahārika*)—which is consciousness limited by the adjunct *avidyā*—only *one* in number.

(c) The illusory *jīva* (*prātibhāsika*). These are mere semblances of individuals—reflections or limitations of the empirical *jīvas* in or by the internal organ. All the creatures of this world are, therefore, *prātibhāsika jīvas*.

The empirical *jīva* of this view can be equated with *Īśvara* of the *Vivaraṇa*. As according to the latter work, Personal God is the substantive cause, so here the empirical *jīva* (*i.e.*,

¹ " Yaj jagatkartṛtvam avagatatap tasya ca Brahmano'nyatrāsambhavād ity arthaḥ.

Jagatkartṛtvam anyatra Brahmano neti ghuṣyati ।

Vācaspatān upālambham avālocyocire pare ॥

—' Jīvā j jagte jagat sarvaṃ sakāraṇam iti bruvan ।

Kṣīpan samanvayaṃ jīve na leje Vākpatiḥ katham ? ' ॥ iti "

Adhiṣṭhānaṃ hi Brahma na jīvaḥ. Adhiṣṭhāne ca samanvaya ity anavadyam."—*Kalpataru*, N. S. Ed., pp. 403-11.

its substratum consciousness) appears to undergo the change, while the limiting adjunct *Māyā* is the real material cause.

So we see that if the theory of one soul is resorted to, the attempt made by the author of the *Kalpataru* to save *Vācaspati* from the charge of Subjectivism, becomes futile. Even if the theory of many souls is adhered to, the charge of pure Subjectivism may somehow be subjected to the criticism put forward by the author of the *Kalpataru*. But ultimately the causality of Brahman is reduced only to a question of Its being the substratum or background of the world-appearance. And hence our criticism of *Vācaspati* stands unshaken, for all practical purposes.

The view of the Siddhāntamuktāvalī: Brahman—no upādāna at all: Māyā—the only material cause

The author of the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* resents the very idea of attributing any kind of causal relation to Brahman, and affirms that *Māyā* alone is the material cause. Brahman is really no substantive cause at all. When Brahman is screened by *Māyā*, it becomes extremely difficult to differentiate the one from the other; and so Brahman is popularly recognised as the substantive cause.¹ The material causality attributed to Brahman is, therefore, only secondary, as It is the locus of *Māyā* which is the real material cause of the world. This view, however, is closely analogous to the position of *Vācaspati*, as both are agreed on the question of Brahman serving as the substratum of the world-appearance. There is, however, a difference with regard to the relation of *Māyā*, which is an adjunct of Brahman in the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, whereas Brahman is only the object according to *Vācaspati*. Another difference lies in the nature of *Māyā*, which is an adjunct of individuals in *Vācaspati*'s view, whereas in the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* it is an adjunct of Brahman,

1 "Siddhāntamuktāvalīkṛtas tu...māyāsaktir eva upādānam, na Brahma...jagadupādāna-māyādhiṣṭhānatvena upacārād upādānam." S. L. S., p. 78.

and so cosmic in character. But the most fundamental difference seems to be that Brahman is here regarded as the substratum of the world-appearance only through the medium of *Māyā*, whereas in Vācaspati's view It is directly the substratum, the *Māyā* having no *locus standi* in Brahman, being only an adjunct of the individual self. The consequence becomes a serious difference in outlook—Brahman is the real cause, being the immediate substratum according to Vācaspati. But the causality of Brahman, according to the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* is only metaphorical and secondary, as it places the entire emphasis on the causality of *Māyā*.

The author of the *Muktāvalī* seems to take his stand on the *Vārtika* of Sureśvara,¹ whose view the author of the *Advaita-brahmasiddhi* puts very clearly in the following manner :

‘It is true that Brahman is not the cause ; but It has been called the cause by mere courtesy ; because It is the substratum of *Māyā*, which is really the material cause of the world.’²

These thinkers seem to feel that causality is a category that can be applied to relative order only and cannot be attributed to Brahman the Absolute.

¹ “ *Asya dvaitendrajālasya yad upādānakāraṇam | —
Ajñānam, tad upāśritya Brahma kāraṇam iṣyate ||* ”

—Br. Vār., I. 4. 871.

² “Jagatkāraṇādhiṣṭhānatvena kāraṇatvopacūrāt ; tad uktam—

*Brahmājñānūj jagajjanma Brahmano'kāraṇatvataḥ |
Adhiṣṭhānatvamātreṇa kāraṇam Brahma gīyate ||* ”

—*Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, Bib. Ind., p. 177.

CHAPTER IV

THE DOCTRINE OF EMANCIPATION ATTENDANT ON THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION

*The question of individual release : The attainment of the
state of Īśvara—Appaya Dikṣita's view*

It would not be altogether irrelevant, we think, to refer to the interesting theory of Appaya Dikṣita (which we have already hinted at while reviewing Vācaspati's position), which he has been at great pains to establish in the concluding pages of the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha. Appaya Dikṣita maintains that Īśvara or qualified Brahman is virtually the only ultimate Reality existing up till now and the Transcendental Absolute (Nirguṇa Brahman) is yet an abstraction.¹ So the problem of causality has absolutely no reference to this Transcendental Entity and can be explained only by reference to this Personal God. The Impersonal Absolute, though not an object of pious hope is, however, to all intents and purposes, simply non-existent. Appaya Dikṣita, however, holds out an assurance that the Transcendental Absolute will emerge after the exhaustion of the world-process with the redemption of all personal selves.¹ So long, however, a single soul is in bondage, the Rulership of the Personal God will continue. This theory is too closely analogous to the theory of Alexander, the famous English Philosopher, who in his '*Space, Time and Deity*' maintains the thesis that God is not yet in being, but will emerge after the perfection

¹ "Pratibimbo jīvaḥ, bimbasthāniya Īśvaraḥ, ubhayānusyūtaṃ śuddhacaitanyam iti pakṣe tu muktasya yāvat sarvamukti sarvajñatvasarvakartṛtvasarveśvaratvasatyakāmatvādiguṇaparamēśvarabhāvāpattir iṣyate—S. L. S., pp. 514-15.

of the world-process. Alexander, however, does not believe in the present Rulership of Personal God like Appaya Dīkṣita. However may that be, Appaya Dīkṣita maintains consistently with his theory that the emancipated individual soul finds its unity with the Personal God and not with the Impersonal Absolute, which is yet a potential existence. We shall not go into a detailed examination of the aphorisms and other texts on which he bases his precious theory. It may only suffice to say that those aphorisms and texts are capable of an altogether different interpretation with equal if not greater consistency, as has been actually done by Acyutakṛṣṇānanda, the commentator of Appaya Dīkṣita himself. It should be noted in this connection that Appaya Dīkṣita seems to follow the position of the Vivaraṇa in believing that Personal God is only the prototypal Consciousness (Bimbacaitanya) and that there exists an infinite plurality of souls. We have, however, very honest doubts whether the position adopted by Appaya Dīkṣita can be really fathered upon the author of the Vivaraṇa. It is hard for us to resist the impression that Appaya Dīkṣita in this matter has been very profoundly influenced by the Sāivādvāita Philosophy of which also he was a celebrated exponent.¹

Apart from the merits of his logical interpretation of the texts, this curious theory of Appaya Dīkṣita leads to certain logical difficulties. In the first place, it involves an invidious distinction in the nature of Salvation attained by the different individuals in course of time. The Emancipation of the last individual will consist in establishing complete identity with the Transcendental Absolute, and salvation of his predecessors will be only an enjoyment of the sovereign rights and prerogatives of the Personal God, identified as they will be with the Personal Deity in the state of liberation. Another objection follows as a corollary from this position. The individuals will be emancipated

¹ Our conjecture is confirmed by a reference to the *Sivādvaitanirṇaya*, sections 3.2351 to 3.2355,—quoted in 'The Bhāmatī Catuṣṣūtrī' (T. P. H. Oriental Series)—

in succession and not all at once, and so the period of their Īśvarahood will vary in length of time. The earliest of them will have to pass the greatest length of time in Īśvarahood, and the penultimate individual will have the shortest enjoyment of this exalted position. Again, if the position that the emancipated soul becomes identified with Personal Godhead, is accepted, it will be open to damaging objections. It is the special prerogative of Īśvara that He can assume any number of incarnated forms to satisfy the demands of His worshippers. The emancipated soul having no independent status apart from that of Īśvara, will then be subject to this contingency which is, however, expressly prohibited in the Upaniṣads. The emancipated soul has no association with a body, and as such is free from both pleasure and pain. It may, however, be maintained that such incarnations are only illusory creations and as such do not become a source of worry. Even if it is so amended it will go against the verdict of logic and scriptural texts alike. The Upaniṣad denies the subject-object relation in the state of Pure Consciousness attained by an emancipated soul.¹

The entire issue can be clinched by the following dilemma :

Does the emancipated individual feel his continuity with his previous unblessed condition or not ? The first alternative is impossible ; because the emancipated individual has lost all touch with his previous existence along with the disappearance of his individualising *upādhis*. The individualisation was the result of those limitations (*upādhis*) and the historic continuity of personal identity is possible so long as the conditions responsible for personalisation persist. The emancipated self has lost all relation with his past history along with the loss of his personality. The second alternative that the emancipated self does not recognise his identity with his previous condition of bondage virtually amounts to an admission of failure. This would mean that the emancipated soul will remain ignorant of his past

¹ " Yatra tvasya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kam paśyet....." Br. Up. IV. 5. 15.

history and so will not share the Omniscience of Godhood. In other words, the emancipated soul will be identified with God only so far as His essential nature as Pure Unqualified Consciousness is concerned. In that case, the emancipated condition will be in no way different from the individual's identity with Pure Consciousness, which is the position of those who maintain that in emancipation the individual becomes one with the Transcendental Absolute, which is above the condition of *Īśvarahood*.

About the contention of Appaya Dīkṣita that his theory of Emancipation represents the position of Śaṅkara himself, it will be sufficient, we hope, only to note that Śaṅkara emphatically denies all distinctions and gradations in the state of Final Salvation, attained by the saving Knowledge of the identity of Brahman and the individual. Gradations there are only in those relative forms of salvation which are open to the worshippers of Personal Godhood (*Saguna-Brahmopāsanā*). But such distinctions are absolutely absurd with regard to the individual who has received the Supreme Illumination. The contentions of Appaya Dīkṣita, therefore, lack consistency and logic alike. It may tickle the philosophic imagination as an ingenious curiosity, but it cannot give the metaphysical satisfaction which all our aspirations demand. Perhaps the Saiva influence is responsible for this aberration on the part of so profound a Philosopher as Appaya Dīkṣita was.

The postulation of *Īśvarahood* is only a question of religious necessity. We are going to take this point for a fuller discussion.

Bādarāyaṇa's views about the nature of Final Release

Let us examine Bādarāyaṇa's views about the nature of Final Emancipation. He quotes two opinions of Jaimini ¹

¹ "Brāhmaṇa Jaiminir upanyāsādibhyaḥ"—Br. Sū., IV. 4. 5, which may be translated as—

"By (a nature) like that of Brahman (the soul manifests itself); (thus) Jaimini (opines); on account of reference and the rest."

and of Auḍulomi,¹ the former holding that the jīva becomes invested with the highest attributes belonging to Īśvara, and the latter, on the contrary, maintaining that it is a state of Pure Consciousness unqualified by any attributes which are purely fictitious. Each of the two Masters (Ācāryas), however, regards the views of the other to be absolutely incompatible with his own. If the jīva takes the form of Brahman (endowed with the exalted qualities), it cannot be Pure Consciousness at the same time ; and if it becomes Pure Consciousness, it cannot possess any qualities. Bādarāyaṇa² comes forward with the olive branch in his hand and effects an easy compromise between the two extreme views of Jaimini and Auḍulomi. He regards that the exalted qualities are not purely fictitious, but are superimposed on the Absolute by the individuated selves as a matter of religious necessity. Auḍulomi declines to accept this position, since according to him Pure Consciousness can never be the substratum of ignorance,—the two (Consciousness and ignorance) being by their very nature opposed to each other. Now, to come to the point, we may very naturally ask how Bādarāyaṇa reconciles these two conflicting views. Bādarāyaṇa assures us that Pure Consciousness can be accepted as the substratum of ignorance, inasmuch as it is the consciousness as reflected in *vṛtti* only that is opposed to ignorance, but not so the Pure Consciousness, as we have already shown.

*Difference between Appaya Dīkṣita and Rāmānuja regarding
the question of individual release*

Thus we find that both Appaya Dīkṣita and Rāmānuja hold that the attainment of the state of Īśvara is the state of individual release. While the former is of opinion that all the exalted

¹ "Cititanmātreṇa tadātınakatvād ity Auḍulomih"—Br. Sū. IV. 4. 6.—"By the sole nature of intelligence (the soul manifests itself), as that is its Self ; thus Auḍulomi (opines)."

² "Evam apy upanyāsāt pūrvabhāvād avirodhaṃ Bādarāyaṇaḥ"—Br. Sū. IV. 4. 7—"Thus also, on account of the existence of the former (qualities), (admitted) owing to reference and so on, there is absence of contradiction, (as) Bādarāyaṇa (thinks)."

qualities (including even the power to create and dissolve the universe) accrue to him in this state, since the individual soul then attains the state of Brahman endowed with all the exalted qualities (*vide* the view of Jaimini),—the latter differs from him in stating that the released soul exists inseparably connected with Īśvara (as a part of His Body) and possesses all His qualities excepting the special prerogative of creating and destroying the universe. Thus while Rāmānuja takes the aphorism—

“ With the exception of world-business (the released possess all lordly power), (the Lord) being the topic (where world-business is referred to), and the souls not being near (to such business),”¹—to refer to the state of Ultimate Release,—Appaya Dīkṣita, in conformity with Śaṅkara’s position, insists that the limitations spoken of have reference to the state of relative liberation (*i.e.*, attainment of Īśvarahood together with the internal organ) invariably attained by the worshippers of the qualified Brahman, as Śaṅkara himself has explicitly stated.² The question of Final Release, according to Śaṅkara, is discussed in the aphorisms—Br. Sū. IV. 4. 1-7; and he further thinks that the topic of the prohibition of the world-business (Br. Sū. IV. 4. 17) has no connection with it, since the latter topic deals with the question of a lower order of release (*saguṇa-mukti*) only.

Which of these two views retains the spirit of Jaimini ?

As regards the question, whether the released soul, according to Jaimini, will possess all the qualities of Brahman (attributed to It on account of Its association with Māyā), Appaya

¹ “ Jagadvyāpāravarjam prakaraṇād asannihitatvāc ca ”—Br. Sū. IV. 4. 17.

² “ Ye saguṇaBrahmopadeśāt sahaiva manasū Īśvaraśāyujyam vrajanti, kiṃ teṣāṃ niravagraham aiśvaryaṃ bhavati, āhosvit sāvagraham iti samśayaḥ.....evam prāpte paṭhati —jagadvyāpāravarjam iti.....”—Śaṅ. Bh. under Br. Sū. IV. 4. 17.

Dīkṣita thinks that there is no positive proof that Jaimini seeks to exclude a few special prerogatives (such as those of Creatorship, etc.) from accruing to the released soul. That this is the opinion of Bādarāyaṇa admits of no doubt. Rāmānuja, however, seeks to father the doctrine of limitations in salvation upon Jaimini also. For this he takes the particular Sūtra (IV. 4.17) out of its context and reads it with the Sūtra dealing with Jaimini's view. But this is an altogether unwarranted procedure, as it is obvious that the Sūtra (IV. 4.17) opens a different discourse, and he will be a bold man who will read in it a backward reference. If this had been the intention of Bādarāyaṇa himself, he could have easily read the Sūtra in question in the context of Jaimini's view.¹

To conclude, we find that the Sūtrakāra is fully in favour with the Advaita position that Brahman, as the substratum of Māyā, is the substantive cause of the world; and that the identity of the individual self with the Impersonal Absolute is the state of Ultimate Release, though the Īśvarahood may be ascribed to it by the rest of the jīvas in bondage. But we should advert to the necessity of caution in this connection.

The postulation of Īśvarahood is only a question of religious necessity. It is rather in the nature of a concession to weaker souls who cannot receive the highest Spiritual Illumination. The theistic bias of Rāmānuja is responsible for the confusion of a religious issue with a purely philosophical one. Personal Godhead has its necessity no doubt, and its justification in what

¹ Here Thibaut questions in his 'Introduction to the Translation of Saṅkara's commentary' (S. B. E., Vol. XXXIV, p. xix) on the Brahmasūtras that if Bādarāyaṇa cites Jaimini and Auḍulomi as his authority on this topic, why does Saṅkara represent him as criticising their views elsewhere (i.e., in the Sūtras—I. 4. 21, IV. 3. 12 etc.)? The reply of the Advaitins to the above query would be that even if a portion of one doctrine be supported in one context, other portions of the same doctrine may be repudiated by the same author elsewhere in a different context. There can be no binding rule that because Bādarāyaṇa has given a partial support to Jaimini's view in one of his Sūtras (i.e., IV. 4. 5), he should have to stick to this support of Jaimini regarding other topics also. It is for this reason that we find Jaimini's views refuted in several of Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras (viz., III. 2. 40; III. 4. 2; III. 4. 18; etc.). To be precise, even in the present context, Bādarāyaṇa does not subscribe to the position of Jaimini or Auḍulomi, but holds that they contain only half truths.

has been called by Kant "*Practical Reason*," though in "*Pure Reason*" it has no *raison d'être*. Śaṅkara's logical mind has never allowed him to confound these two issues, which the muddled logic of Theists has failed to keep apart.

*Different types and stages of Emancipation in Śaṅkara's
school of Vedānta*

The conception of Emancipation can be broadly classified under two heads,—regard being had to the question of ways and means :

(a) In the first place, the relative forms of emancipation which are attained by means of devotion to Personal Godhead.

(b) Secondly, the form of Emancipation achieved by trans-empirical Knowledge.

The first kind is again capable of being subdivided into three different types of salvation, the variations arising from the nature of the object of worship :

(a) In the first place, there are worshippers of Hiranyagarbha, the Demiurge, occupying a lower status than the Supreme Creator Īśvara. The powers of this Demiurge are rather of a delegated nature, and in the hierarchy of created beings, he is regarded as the first-born and the most exalted person. Now those who successfully follow the path of his worship, as prescribed in the Upaniṣads, are translated into the abode of Hiranyagarbha by a graduated course of journey through a hierarchy of blessed worlds as detailed in the Upaniṣads. Now, the question arises whether these blessed souls who reach the highest heaven are liable to a reversion to the cycle of transmigration. The answer to this question is not found on the surface. There is of course a definite statement of Bādarāyaṇa, based on the text of the Upaniṣads that these blessed souls reach their final union with the Highest Absolute after the cessation of the particular cycle of creation along with Hiranyagarbha

when his term of office expires.¹ But Ānandagiri explicitly states that this holds good in the case of those spirits who worship the Highest Personal God, technically called the Causal Brahman (Kāraṇa Brahman), *in and through* His manifestation as the Hiranyagarbha, technically known as the Effected Absolute (Kārya Brahman).

(b) Those who worship only Hiranyagarbha without any reference to his Causal Background in Īśvara are, however, liable to revert to the world-order after the cessation of the existing cycle of creation.² This state of blessed existence cannot be strictly speaking called 'salvation' in any sense. It is practically on a par with the periodic residence in lower heavens attained by the worshippers of the particular rulers of these minor regions. The reason for this difference of fate lies in the fact that Ultimate Salvation can be achieved only through the Supreme Knowledge of the identity of the self with the Absolute. Now, the worshipper of Īśvara under the form of Hiranyagarbha has reached a state of spiritual progress which makes the dawn of the saving Knowledge a matter of natural sequence,—while his less blessed companions revert to the world-order for their spiritual deficiency, and failure to realise the unity of Hiranyagarbha with Īśvara.

(c) There is another category of blessed souls who worship the Highest Personal God directly and without reference to His lower forms of manifestation. Now, these persons, according to Saṅkara, find union (though not *oneness*) with Īśvara, and as a consequence equally share with Him in all His glories and blessedness, except the special prerogative of the world-business (*i.e.*, creation and the like), which exclusively belongs to Īśvara.³ Now, though it is the highest station in an individual's life,

¹ "Kāryātyaye tadadhyakṣeṇa sahātaḥ param abhidhānāt"—"On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahman) (the souls go) together with the ruler of that (world) to what is higher than that; on account of scriptural declaration."—Br. Sū., IV. 3. 10.

² "Imam iti viśeṣaṇāt anāvṛttir asmin kalpe. Kalpāntare tvāvṛttir iti sūcyate"—Ānandagiri, Ch. Up. Bh.-Tīkā, IV. 15. 5. A.S.S., pp. 236-37.

³ "Jagadvyāpāravarjaṁ prakaraṇād asaṁnihitatvāc ca"—IV. 4. 17.

consistent with the manifestation of his individuality, it is not the supremest form of Salvation, which is possible only in the merger of the individual into the Absolute Impersonal God. This Supreme Salvation is open only to those who have received the highest Spiritual Light and realised their unqualified unity with the Absolute. But the worshippers of Personal Godhead have got this privilege that they will reach beatitude in Final Release as a matter of course.¹ They have not to pass through the different heavens (which serve as different stations on the way to the world of Hiranyagarbha) like the worshippers of Hiranyagarbha, and also they are not limited within the jurisdiction of Hiranyagarbha, and are not in any way dependent upon the fate of Hiranyagarbha for their release. So the worshippers of Īśvara reach a level of existence much higher and much more perfect than those of Hiranyagarbha. But still it is a lower state of perfection in comparison with the Final Release which means absolute identity with Unqualified Brahman in whom Māyā the principle of limitation has no existence at all.

We have fully discussed the theory of Salvation propounded by Appaya Dikṣita, and we have found that according to him the highest form of practical salvation is the attainment of unqualified identity with Personal Godhead. And the Supremest State of Salvation implied in the identity with Impersonal Absolute is not within the access of individuals so long as the world-order is not exhausted. This Final Release can be reached only with the Emancipation of the last individual self. We have already subjected this theory to a critical examination and found it to be riddled with inconsistencies. But the most damaging drawback of this theory is that it makes the attainment of the Highest Salvation a mere matter of chance over which neither Īśvara nor, for that matter, the individual self identified with Him, has any

¹ "Samyagdarśanaavidhvastatamasāṃ tu nityasiddhanirvāṇaparāyaṇāṃ siddhaivānavṛttiḥ. Tadaśrayeṇaiva hi saṃśayaśaraṇāṃ apy anāvṛttisiddhir iti"—Śaṅ. Bh. under the Sūtra—"Anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt"—Br. Sū. IV. 4. 22.

ontrol. The last soul is the luckiest of all ; because, he reaches the Highest Salvation instantaneously, and he owes his good fortune to mere accident.

This attainment of unqualified *Īśvarahood*, Appaya Dikṣita thinks, is accessible only to those who have received the highest Spiritual Illumination. About the *saguṇa* worshippers of *Īśvara*, he is in thorough agreement with *Saṅkara* that their salvation consists in the attainment of the glories and powers of God minus His Cosmic Activities.¹

Thus it is evident that the aphorism—

“ And on account of the indications of equality of enjoyment only,”²—

refer to a lower form of relative salvation only and not to the Supreme Form of Emancipation ; because, the individual soul, in the state of Ultimate Release, does not retain its character as a knowing subject. The knowledge of self (*ahambuddhi*) disappears, since the limiting condition (*i.e.*, the internal organ which is a product of the *avidyā* belonging to each individual self) is also destroyed.

But according to *Rāmānuja* and other sectarian commentators, these *Sūtras* unmistakably point to the state of Final Emancipation ; and they affirm that the individual soul, as a part of Brahman, retains its self-sense even in the released condition.

The basis of this fundamental difference lies in the acceptance and non-acceptance of the reality of the individual selves. The Advaitins regard the individual souls as unreal, as the limiting condition (*i.e.*, *antaḥkaraṇa*—the internal organ) is false, being but a product of individual nescience. The followers of *Rāmānuja*, on the other hand, posit the *jīvas* as real—retaining their self-consciousness.

¹ “...tesāṃ Parameśvareṇa bhogasūmye'pi...sakalajagatsrṣṭisamphārādīsvātantryalakṣaṇaṃ na niravagraham aiśvaryaṃ, muktānāṃ tu niḥsandhibandham *Īśvarabhāvaṃ* prāptānāṃ tat sarvaṃ iti mahato viśeṣasya sadbhāvat ”—S. L. S., pp. 514-17.

² “*Bhogamātrasāmyalingāc ca*”—Br. Sū. IV. 4. 21,

The doctrine of causation in the Śruti

The Sūtrakāra, while aphorising—

“(Brahman is that) from which the origin, etc. (*i.e.*, the subsistence, and dissolution), of this (world proceed),¹—
and—

“(Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances,²—

lays much stress on the Upaniṣad passages—

“That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death,—try to know that. That is Brahman...From Bliss these beings are born; by Bliss, when born, they live; into Bliss they enter at their death,³—

and,—

“As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (*i.e.*, the effect—the thing made of clay) being a name merely, which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely,”⁴—

which clearly indicate the nature and characteristics of the Universal Cause—Brahman.

The first passage declares the cause to be the Almighty Being whose essential nature is eternal Bliss. Other passages also may be adduced which declare this cause to be One whose

¹ “Janmādyasya yataḥ”—*Ibid.*, I. 1. 2.

² “Prakṛtiś ca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt”—*Br. Sū.* I. 4. 23.

³ “Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti.....ānandaṁ Brahmeti vyañāt, ānandāddhyeva khalv imāni bhūtāni jāyante, ānandena jātāni jīvanti, ānandaṁ prayanty abhisamviśanti”—*Tai. Up.* III. 1-6.

⁴ “Yathā somyaikena mṛtpinḍeṇa sarvaṁ mṛmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syād vacārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam...sa ādeśo bhavātīti”—*Ch. Up.* VI. I. 4-6. This passage calls clay, iron, etc., to be true. But this does not clash with the Advaita position of the doctrine of Illusory Causation. The reality of clay, iron, etc., by way of illustration, only implies the reality of the material cause and the falsity of the effects.

essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom. That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from It being shown that It is the cause of the world. The Upaniṣads have declared It to be so (*i.e.*, of the nature of Consciousness) for hundreds of times. And to confirm this conclusion, the Sūtra-kāra, too, continues as follows :—

“(The omniscience of Brahman follows) from Its being the source of Scripture.”¹

The origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is generally seen that the person, from whom some special body of doctrine referring to a particular branch of knowledge only originates (*e.g.*, Grammar from Pāṇini), possesses a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be. What idea, then, shall we have to form of the Supreme Omniscience and Omnipotence of the Great Being, Which in sport, as it were, easily as a man breathes, has produced the vast mass of the sacred texts, known as the Vedas, the mine of all knowledge.² Thus from the Upaniṣads, Brahman, the Universal Cause, is known to be the plenum of Joy-Existence-Consciousness (Sac-cid-ānanda).

The second passage (Chāndogya Upaniṣad)—“as clay they are true”—asserts the cause only to be true, while the phrase “having its origin in speech” declares the unreality of all effects. The plain meaning of the passage is that if the true nature of a lump of clay is known, there are known thereby all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pots, etc., all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. These modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as these are individual effects distinguished by names they are untrue. In so far as these are clay they are true. This

¹ “Sāstrayonitvāt”—Br. Sū. I. 1. 3.

² Śaṅ. Bh. under Br. Sū. I. 1.3. N.S. Ed., pp. 95-99.

parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman; applying the expression "having its origin in speech" to the case illustrated by the instance quoted, we understand that the entire body of effects has no real existence apart from Brahman, the Universal Cause, the only Ultimate Reality.¹ Hence from the Upaniṣads, Brahman is known to be the apparent or illusory cause of the world-appearance.

Let us now go back to an earlier period to see whether the Vedic Samhitās give us any light on the topic. This interesting topic is discussed in the celebrated 'Nāsadiya' hymn of the Rgveda (X. 129), also quoted in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa (II.8.9). "We find in this hymn a representation of the most advanced theory of creation. First of all there was no existent or non-existent. The existent in its manifested aspect was not then. We cannot on that account call it the non-existent, for it is positive being from which the whole existence arrives. The first line brings out the inadequency of our categories. The absolute reality which is at the back of the whole world cannot be characterised by us as either existent or non-existent. We cannot express what it is except that it is. Such is the primal unconditioned groundwork of all being."²

In this hymn the origin of creation is sought after in the form of a riddle and its answer :—

"Whence (*i.e.*, from what efficient cause) (it) has been produced, whence (*i.e.*, from what material cause) is this manifold creation?"³

The answer is that there was 'Darkness' in the beginning—

"In the beginning (of creation) Darkness was there,

¹ Śaṅ Bb. under Br. Sū. II. 1. 14. N. S. Ed., pp. 454-57.

² Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phil., Vol I, p. 101, First edition.

³ "Kuta ājātā kuta iyaṃ viśvaṣṭiḥ"—RV. X. 129 ḍ.

(the whole world) was hidden by Darkness—indistinguishable (*i.e.*, unmanifested as it was in the form of a germ)."¹

Darkness (Tamas) is to be explained here as the internal darkness of ignorance (*i.e.*, Māyā or Avidyā), endowed with the power of concealment. Thus the Nāsadiya hymn, while hinting at the solution of the riddle put forward by itself, only justifies the position of Sureśvara's Vārtika and that of the Siddhānta-muktāvalī, which hold that the causality ascribed to Brahman is only secondary (aupacārika), while that of Māyā is primary. In the above Saṃhitā text we get the following passage :—

“ All that was on all sides (the entire created world) was covered with (the Darkness) which was unreal (*i.e.*, neither existent nor non-existent—false) ; (from it) that (world) evolved through the power of thinking (about the creation) (on the part of the Supreme Being), ”²—

which clearly states that Brahman was the one Ultimate Reality covered by the darkness of ignorance which is unreal (tuccha), and from which the world-order evolved through the power of thinking (or desire) on the part of the intelligent Reality. Hence Māyā is primarily the material cause of the world and Brahman is secondarily so, as It is the substratum of Māyā.

But there is yet another passage in the same hymn, which seems to controvert the position stated above :—

“ The objective world (together with its material cause Māyā) is of a lower order, and the (Conscious) Guiding Principle (*i.e.*, the Absolute) is of a higher order. ”³

¹ “ Tama āsit tamasā gūḥam agre'praketaṃ ”—*Ibid.*, X. 129.3. Cf. Manusamhitā—

“ Asid idam tamobhūtaṃ aprajñātaṃ alakṣaṇam |

Apratarkyam anirdeśyam prasuptam iva sarvataḥ || ”—I.5.

² Tucchyenābhv apihitaṃ yad āsit

Tapasas tan mahinājyataikam ”—RV. X. 126.3.

The Tait. Br. reads—“ Tamasas tan mahinā..... ”—which means that Brahman was the only fundamental unity covered by Tamas which was unreal (tuccha), and from it the world evolved.

³ “ Svadhā avastāt prayatiḥ parastāt ”—RV. X. 129.5.

This passage declares that both *Māyā* (*Svadhā*) and Brahman (*Prayati*) are the material causes of the world. Of the two, *Māyā* is to be regarded as the lower (*i.e.*, secondary) cause ; Brahman is the higher (*i.e.*, primary) cause. Almost all the Advaita sub-schools¹ are not very particular about ascribing the primary causality to Brahman, as they are only eager to establish It as the plenum of Joy, Existence and Consciousness, which are Its essential features (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*).

In winding up this discussion, we think it necessary to observe that the question of primacy or subordination is only a matter of emphasis. The undeniable fact remains that even in the Vedic speculations the necessity of co-operation between two factors, *viz.*, Spirit and Energy, is regarded as indispensable for all creation. It is noteworthy that the element of Energy which is characterised as Non-Being or Darkness (*Tamas*) is expressly stated to be an unsubstantial adjunct (*tuccha*). We shall not perhaps be making a too bold assumption if we are inclined to hold that this characterisation of the non-spiritual factor in creation as an unsubstantial fiction is perhaps the precursor of the celebrated Doctrine of *Māyā* as developed in Śaṅkara's Philosophy of Vedāntic Monism.

¹ Excepting the Bhāmātī school which denies *Māyā* to be the real material cause, Vācaspati emphasizes the point of making Brahman Itself the primary substantive cause, as he contends that Pure Consciousness can never be the object of knowledge and that the Absolute cannot be intuitively known by means of *śabda* only (*Advaitasiddhi—jagatvani-rukti*). He asserts that the Śāstras teach us about the lower Brahman, associated with *Māyā* or *ṛtti*. So according to him, Brahman concealed by *Māyā*, is the material cause of the world, as also the cause of *jīva*'s bondage. When *Māyā* is dispersed by *ṛtti*, which takes the place of the former, Brahman, determined by *ṛtti* (*Brahmākārā ṛtti*), becomes the cause of release.

CHAPTER V

THE CONCEPTION OF THE CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN IN THE SISTER SCHOOLS of VEDĀNTA

Advaitins and Vijñānabhikṣu

The position of the Advaitins, as interpreted in the Vārtika of Sureśvara and in the Siddhāntamuktāvalī, appears to be analogous to the position of Vijñānabhikṣu, who also regards Brahman to be the substantive cause, as It is the locative of the product. This position of the Monists differs fundamentally, however, from that of Vijñānabhikṣu, inasmuch as Bhikṣu never questions the reality of the effect anywhere. But the author of the Vārtika or of the Muktāvalī, in calling Brahman the substantive cause (as It is the substratum of Māyā), only asserts the phenomenal character of the product. We should like to point out in this connection that if Bhikṣu would only admit the phenomenality of the world and the function of concealment belonging to Prakṛti, his view would become closely analogous to, if not identical with, the view of the Monists. This point we are going to take up for a detailed discussion later on.

Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita

This view of the Monists seems to approach very near the view of Rāmānuja also, with the exception that like Rāmānuja the Monists never regard Brahman as subject to transformation either by Itself or through Its association with Māyā, and they never deny Māyā its veiling power. Now the question is to be considered whether Māyā is to be admitted as co-eternal with

God in the capacity of His body or is to be regarded as indefinable (anirvacanīya) or false (mithyā) possessing the function of concealment. Rāmānuja depends on the former view, while Śaṅkara adopts the latter. Rāmānuja thinks that Māyā cannot conceal Brahman which is self-luminous Pure Consciousness, while Śaṅkara is emphatic on this possibility. We had occasion to touch this question in connexion with our discussion of the epistemology of perception.

Thus, unlike Rāmānuja, the majority of the Advaitins (excepting the authors of the Vārtika and the Siddhāntamuktāvalī) holds that Brahman is primarily the apparent or illusory cause (vivartopādāna).

The position is this :

In both the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita systems Brahman is regarded as the identity of the efficient and the material cause (abhinnanimittopādāna). But while Rāmānuja holds that Brahman is the substantive cause, because Its body (Prakṛti) is the primary material cause—Śaṅkara thinks that Brahman Itself is independently the illusory or apparent cause.

The position of Bhāskara

Bhāskara, on the contrary, after establishing Brahman as the identity of the efficient and the material cause, affirms that Brahman is Itself the really changing material cause. Prakṛti denotes the energy (śakti) of Brahman. Bhāskara is of opinion¹ that Brahman in creation spreads out Its creative power (māyā-śakti), and this radiation of energy is looked upon as the transformation of Brahman, though Its integrity ever remains unaffected. According to Bhāskara, Brahman is possessed of a

¹ Bhāskara declares himself to be a follower of Upaśarṇa :—"Kaḥ punar atra śabdo' bhūpretah? Varṇātmako lokaprasiddher Upaśarṇācāryāgamāc ca"—Bhāṣ. Bh., Ben. Ed., p. 62. "Prathamapāde pratyakṣādiprāmāṇyanirūpaṇaṁ codanāprāmāṇyasiddhyartham yat tad udake viśirṇaṁ syad, Upaśarṇācāryasya śāstrasampradāyapravartakasyānuvaicitryam kṛtaṁ evaṁ vijñānavaicitryam"—*Ibid.*, p. 124.

twofold energy, viz., (i) the spiritual energy (bhoktrśakti), which is transformed into individual souls as cognising subjects; (ii) the material energy (bhogyaśakti), which is transformed into cognisable objects as Space and the like.¹

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, holds that Prakṛti is independently transformed and Brahman, too (as an organic whole consisting of the souls and matter in inseparable association), is regarded to have undergone the change, as the changing Prakṛti is the body of the changeless Brahman. Since the body cannot be separated from the spirit, the two are regarded as one identity and so the change is predicated of the whole and as such of Brahman.

Kumārila, in his Ślokavārtika,² seems to repudiate the view of Upavarṣa about the transformation of Pure Eternal Consciousness into the impermanent material world, on the ground of its breach of the law of homogeneity between cause and effect. Bhāskara, however, takes his stand on the authority of the Śruti and holds Brahman to be both eternal and at the same time the changing material cause.³ Kumārila's views, too, cannot be said to be final on the point; since he contradicts himself saying that change and permanence are not conflicting, if the underlying unity is not destroyed.⁴ Though the Self undergoes occasional changes partially, the central unity

1

"Apracyutasavarūpasya śaktivikṣepalakṣaṇaḥ |

Paripāmo yathā tantunābhasya paṭatantuvat ||" *Ibid.*, p. 98.

"Tadananyatvam ity atra cāsmābhir uktam śaktivikṣepalakṣaṇaḥ paripāma iti; Īvarasya dve śakti bhavato—bhogyaśaktir ekā bhoktrśaktiś cāparā; bhogyaśakteś ca śākāśādirūpeṇ cetanaparipāmapatter bhoktrśaktiḥ sū cetanā jīvarūpeṇāvatigṛhate"—*Ibid.*, p. 105.

² "Puruṣasya ca śuddhasya nāśuddhā vikṛtir bhavet"—Ślokavārtika, Benares Ed., p. 662, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, verse 82.

3

"Śrutes tu śabdāmūlatvāt"—Br. Sū. II. 1.27, Bhās. Bh.

4

"Nānityasabdavācyaṭvam ātmano vinivāryate |
Vikriyāmatravācivitve na hy ucchedo'sya tīvātā ||
Syātām atyantāśe'sya kṛtanāśā'kṛtāgaman |
Na tvavasthāntaraprāptau loka bālayuvādivat ||"

—Śi. Vār. Ātmavāda, śls. 22-31, pp. 604-96.

ever remains undisturbed ; and hence there is no fear of its total extinction (uccheda).

In the same way, too, Bhāskara justifies his own position. On the authority of the Revealed Text and the aphorism¹ where Brahman is expressly stated as undergoing change (pariṇāma), he holds that Brahman is at once changing and eternal. And the examples of clay and the like, which are really changing substances, are in his favour. Dr. Ghate observes : “ The illustrations of clay and its product are distinctly in favour of the pariṇāmavāda (and makes it difficult to deduce the vivarta-vāda). ”²

The reply of the Advaitins to the above also deserves our attention. The Monists contend that the term ‘ clay ’ in the illustration (cited in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad passage) stands for the *cause in general*, but *not* for the formative cause alone. The reason for such a contention is this : The Śruti text, in stating—‘ the clay alone is real ’—emphasises the reality of the material cause only ; and this is possible only from the view-point of illusory causation, since in the doctrine of formative causation both the cause and the effect are regarded as equally real. Hence Śaṅkara bases his doctrine of apparent causation on the authoritative statements of the Śruti ; and his doctrine alone is really in accordance with the central doctrine of the Upaniṣads, as Thibaut has very clearly shown.³

Bhāskara and Śaṅkara

The main difference between Bhāskara and Śaṅkara is this : Brahman Itself is the substantive cause⁴ in both the systems. While Bhāskara regards It as the cause that really undergoes change, Śaṅkara posits It as a cause that does not really transform, but only appears to change.

¹ “Ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt ”—Br. Sū. I. 4.26.

² Ghate, *The Vedānta*, p. 81.

³ S. B. E., Vol. XXXIV, p. cxxvi.

⁴ The term ‘ upādāna ’ is common to both ‘ pariṇāmopādāna ’ and ‘ vivartopādāna. ’

The position of Nimbārka.

Nimbārka, who likewise advocates the theory of the transformation of Brahman, has practically adopted the same view as that of Bhāskara. The followers of the Nimbārka school admit that mere arguments can never convince anybody of this apparently self-contradictory conclusion that Brahman undergoes a real change and at the same time Its permanent character remains unimpaired. It is entirely on the Śruti texts and the aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa (already referred to above) that they base their conclusions.¹ The transformation of Brahman does not imply the change of Its nature, but merely the radiation of Its power.² Keśava Kāśmīrin, in his Vedāntakaustubhaphrābhā, clearly distinguishes between two different kinds of transformation :

(a) Transformation consisting of a real change of nature (svarūpapariṇāma), and

(b) transformation implying a change brought about by the radiation of energy (śaktivikṣepalakṣaṇapariṇāma). The first kind of transformation is accepted by the Sāṅkhyas as their conclusion, since they advocate the self-evolution of an independent Prakṛti, not controlled by Brahman. The second kind of transformation is admitted by the followers of the 'Aupaniṣada' (Vedānta) Philosophy.³ According to them, Brahman (*i. e.*, Śrī Puruṣottama) transforms His own Self in the shape of this world

¹ "Na tāvat tarkabalenāsmākaṃ Brahmapariṇāmābhyupagamaḥ; api tu 'svayam ātmānam akuruta' 'ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt' ityādiśrutinyāyābhyāp iti" —Devacārya, Siddhāntajāhnavī, Ben. Ed., p. 115.

² "...Brahma svaśaktivikṣepeṇa jagadākāraṃ svātmānaṃ pariṇamayya avyākṛteṇa svarūpeṇa śaktimatā kṛtimatā pariṇataṃ eva bhavati" —Nimbārka, Vedāntaparijātasaurābha, Brind. Ed., p. 356. "...sarvajñaḥ sarvasaktir apracyutasvarūpaḥ paramātmā svātmakasvādhiṣṭhitanijaśaktivikṣepeṇa jagadākāraṃ svātmānaṃ pariṇamayati" —Śrīnivāsa-cārya, Vedāntakaustubha, same ed., p. 357. "...vśetutas tu śaktivikṣepasya pariṇāmasābdena vivakṣitasya Brahmasvarūpapariṇāmānabhyupagamān na nityaśrutivirodhagāndhō'pi" —Siddhāntajāhnavī, p. 116. "Pariṇāmāḥ śaktivikṣepa eva" —*Ibid.*, p. 117.

³ By the term 'Aupaniṣada,' evidently Keśava Kāśmīrin refers to his own school, since this doctrine is not unanimously accepted by all schools of Vedānta.

by the radiation of His own natural power which is co-eternal with Him, and is ever present in Him. But in course of the radiation of His energy, His real nature remains unimpaired (apracyutasvarūpa, nirvikāra). The Śruti text is the only authority on this point.¹

This radiation of Divine Energy is elsewhere described as agitation (kṣobha) in the nature of the Supreme Being. Prof. Radhakrishnan has very clearly defined it: "The Śakti of Brahman is the material cause of the world, and the changes of Śakti do not touch the integrity of Brahman."² Devācārya has explained it further clearly—transformation is but the manifestation of its subtle natural powers and the products contained in them in their subtler forms; or in other words, we call Brahman the material cause in the sense that It enables Its natural powers or energies (śaktis, viz., cit and acit in their subtle forms) to be manifested in their gross forms.³ Brahman, again, is the efficient cause, inasmuch as It is instrumental in bringing about the union of the conscious individual selves (possessing the attribute of contracted knowledge) with the fruits of their actions and the means of enjoying these fruits of actions (body, etc.). Thus the creation of the universe is nothing more than the manifestation in gross forms of what previously existed in subtle forms, and that is eventually a sort of transformation.⁴ Brahman, therefore, is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.⁵

¹ Keśava Kāśmīrin, Vedāntakaustubhaprabhā, Brind. Ed., pp. 358-59.

² Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phil., Vol. II, p. 759.

³ "Tatropādānatvaṃ nāma parāparakṣetarakṣetrajñādīpadārthabbhūtasvābhāvīkīnāṃ sūkṣmāsvasthāpannānāṃ śaktīnāṃ tattadgatasaḍrūpakāryāṇāṃ sthūlatayā prakāśakatvaṃ"—Si. Jā., p. 121.

⁴ "Nimittatvaṃ ca svasvānādikarmasamśkāraśābhitātāntasaṅkucitabhogasmaraṇānarchājñānadharmāṇāṃ cetanānāṃ karmaphalabhogārhañjānāprakāśena tattatkarmaphalatattadbhogasādhanaṣṭiḥ saha yojayitṛtvam"—*Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁵ "Prakṛtir upādānakāraṇaṃ cakārān nimittakāraṇaṃ ca Paramātmāiva."—Nim. Bh., p. 314. "...nimittatvaṃ upādānatvaṃ ca Brahmanā āmnānād Brahmai vibhaya rūpam"—*Ibid.*, p. 355. "Brahmaiva nimittam upādānaṃ ca"—*Ibid.*, p. 356; also, *vide*, pages 345-46 and 348-60. "Tat siddhaṃ jagadabhinnanimittopādānatvaṃ Brahmanā lakṣaṇam"—Si. Jā., p. 117.

Bhāskara and Nimbārka

Both Bhāskara and Nimbārka agree on this fundamental point that Brahman is the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause ; but they differ in some other important details :

(i) Like the Monists, Bhāskara holds that though the individual self is by nature (svābhāvika) extensive (vyāpaka) in size (since by nature it is non-different from Brahman), it has the atomic size due to its limitations (upādhis, i.e., body, etc.).¹ Nimbārka, on the other hand, follows Rāmānuja in assuming the reality of its atomic size only.²

(ii) According to Bhāskara, the non-difference alone is natural, but the difference is due to the limiting adjuncts. In this respect, Bhāskara's view seems to be at first sight analogous to the view of the Advaitins. But while the Advaitins hold that the non-difference alone is real and the difference is false (because the limitations are false),—Bhāskara maintains that both the difference and the non-difference are equally real (because, according to him, the limiting adjuncts are not unreal). But though real, the limitations are not natural ; and consequently the difference, due to limitations, is liable to dispersion at the time of salvation.³ Nimbārka, on the contrary, asserts that both the difference and the non-difference are natural and equally real.⁴

¹ "Tad idam aupādhikam aṇutvaṃ jīvasyāto draṣṭavyam...jyāyastvaṃ tu nijaṃ rūpaṃ"

—Bhas. Bh., pp. 135-37.

² "Jñānasvarūpaṃ ca harer adhīnaṃ śārīrasamyogaviyogayogyam |

Aṇuṃ hi jīvaṃ pratidehābhinnam jñātṛtvavantaṃ yad anantaṃ āhuḥ" ||

—Quoted in Si. Jā., pp. 56-57.

³ "Jīvaparaśo ca svābhāviko'bhedaḥ. aupādhikas tu bhedaḥ, sa tannivṛttau nivatate"—Bhas. Bh., p. 243. "Upādhikṛtabhedas tu so'bhedābhāvanāyāpanīyate, agnisamparkeṇa kanakagatamāśasya"—*Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁴ "...varīyastvaṃ svābhāvikaḥ bhedaḥ bheda matasyaiva lāghavāt"—Si. Jā., p. 44. Also *vide* the com. on—"atha kim prakāraṃ tad brahma...aupādhikaḥ bhedaśrayaṃ vā, jagadatyantābhinnam vā, tadatyantābhinnam vā, cetanā cetanaśārīrakatvena tadviśiṣṭam vā, svābhāvikaḥ bhedaḥ bhedaḥ dhikaraṇam vā"—*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30. In these pages (29-43), Devācārya criticises the views of Śaṅkara (Māyāvādin), Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. The difference is not incompatible with non-difference. Brahman is the controller and the world is the

(iii) Again, while Bhāskara considers the co-ordination of knowledge and action as the essential means of liberation, Nimbārka disagrees saying that the knowledge of Brahman alone can lead us to salvation.¹

Nimbārka and Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja holds that the relation between Brahman and the world is the same as the relation between the soul and the body. Nimbārka differs and characterises the relation as that existing between the governor and the governed. In regarding the world as an attribute of Brahman, Rāmānuja accepts more the principle of identity than that of difference, though according to him this identity is not absolute but is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*). But Nimbārka claims an independent viewpoint. To him the identity and the difference are equally real. If there be no difference between the attributes (both conscious and non-conscious) and their possessor—as also among the attributes themselves, there is every possible chance of intermixture of the three. Brahman, the governing—guiding—principle, is, therefore, independently existent (*svatantrasattva*), while the world has no such independent existence (*tattāntrasattva*). Herein lies the secret of simultaneous difference and non-difference.²

Vijñānabhikṣu's position

Vijñānabhikṣu, the celebrated author of the *Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya* of the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*

controlled. So they are different in their respective nature and attributes—"Brahmapas cetanācetanayoś ca svarūpeṇa bhedaḥ, itaretarātyantavilakṣaṇatvāt . evam eva tasya tayōś ca sarvātmatvasarvaniyantrītvasarvavyāpakatvasva'antrasattvasarvādhāratvādiyogena Brahmāt-makatvatanniya'nyatvatadvyāpyatvatattāntrasattvapārādheyatvādiyogena cābbhedaḥ"—Si. Jā., p. 44.

¹ "Brahmajñānasya ca niratīśayānantaphalakatvanīśayāt"—*Ibid.*, p. 18. Also *vide* Bhās. Bh., p. 2.

² "...api ca cetanācetanāBrahmādvaitābhyupagame'pi Brahmapas cetanācetanābhyāṃ bhedaḥ. tayōś ca parasparabhedaḥ svābhāviko'bhyupagantavyaḥ...anyathā svābhāvasāu-karyaprasaktiḥ ; evaṃ bhedaṃ apy āngīkṛtya punar viśiṣṭāṅgikārātmakagauravād varī-yastvaṃ svābhāvikaḥbhedaḥbhedaṃmatasyaiva lāghavāt"—Si. Jā., pp. 43-44.

of the Sāṅkhyasūtras, strikes out a wonderfully original path in commenting on the Brahmasūtras. He calls Brahman—the locative cause (ādhārakāraṇa); and in the capacity of a locus Brahman is the substantive cause of the world. Accordingly he points out that practically there can exist no such system as would reasonably admit Brahman to be the efficient cause alone.

Brahman—the locative cause of the universe

Bhikṣu observes that like the changing material cause even the locative cause also should be regarded as the cause of the effect. Now, what are the characteristics and functions of this locative cause? The answer is that the locus of the changing material is a locative cause, inasmuch as the changing material cause exists, before the process of differentiation commences, in an undifferentiated condition in the locus, and also because it is supported and grounded in it. The material cause can work only because it has its support in the locus. So Brahman being the locus of Prakṛti (Primordial Matter) is the locative cause of the world-process, because It is the ground and support of Prakṛti all throughout, no matter whether It undergoes differentiation or exists in Its undifferentiated state.¹ Now, non-distinction or non-separation of Prakṛti from Brahman is a relation *sui generis*² like the relation which exists between a thing and its character of being a locus, etc. Such relations are practically speaking one-termed. To take a concrete case, 'a red rose' is a proposition in which the relation between the attribute and the substantive is one of inherence. But the rose as a thing-in-itself and in

¹ " Kim punar adhiṣṭhānakāraṇatvam ? ucyate—tad evādhiṣṭhānakāraṇam yatrāvi-bhaktam yenopaṣṭabdham ca sad upādānakāraṇam kāryākāreṇa pariṇamate, yathā sargādeu jalāvibhaktāḥ pārthivasūkṣmāpās tanmātrākhyāḥ jalauvopaṣṭambhāt prthivyāskāreṇa pariṇamanta ity ato jalam mahāprthivya adhiṣṭhānakāraṇam "—Vij. Bh., Ben. Ed., p. 32.

² " Saubandhāntareṇa viśiṣṭapratītijananayogyatvam "—Nyāyakoṣa. Svarūpasam-bandha (or the relation *sui generis*) has been very properly defined as—the relation which must be held to exist in a case where determinate knowledge or judgment (viśiṣṭajñāna) could not be effected by any other relation (samavāya or saṃyoga).

its character as a substantive is not a self-identical concept, though the difference is not numerical. In such cases where numerical difference is lacking and still the concept of a relation arises, the relation is regarded as one of numerical identity. The rose in itself is not anything different from its being a substantive so far as the question of numerical identity is concerned. But still the difference is discernible and so the relation is posited. The relation of Brahman and Prakṛti ultimately will transpire to be of this nature. It is of the nature of extreme non-differentiation due to an absolutely inseparable association of the two, and is responsible for the perception of unity between two distinct things (say, for example, milk and water). So though the effect can be affiliated to the locus as its cause, still the locus cannot be regarded as the changing material cause of the same. The material cause, properly speaking, is that in which the effect inheres. In other words, the inherent cause is the transforming material, and the locative cause is looked upon as a cause only by virtue of the peculiar relation existing between the locus and the inherent material. The thing is this: When the non-differentiation of the product is due to the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) between the cause and the effect, we find a case of the formative cause (*pariṇāmopādāna*). A piece of cloth is perceived to be non-different from the mass of threads that make it up. Here the relation between the threads and the cloth is one of inherence. Hence the mass of threads is to be regarded as the changing material cause or formative cause of the piece of cloth. But when the non-differentiation is due to the mere non-separation of the real material cause from the apparent cause at hand, we get a case of the locative cause only. Thus according to Bhikṣu, water is said to be the cause of the earth in this sense. Properly speaking, we cannot logically call water the real material cause of the earth in the same sense as clay is said to be the material cause of the jar. The question arises—then how can it be called an *upādāna* at all? Bhikṣu's answer is rather curious. Fine particles of the super-subtle

element (tanmātra) constituting the earth existed in an undivided form in water at the time of the creation of the earth. These fine particles of *Pṛthivītanmātra* gradually transformed themselves into this gross element—earth. The relation that existed between these fine particles of subtle earth and water was not one of inherence, but one of non-separation merely. Hence we can easily justify the purport of the Upaniṣad passage—‘Out of water originated the earth.’ Of course, water cannot be the immediate cause of the earth; since the Śruti states that the subtler elements are the causes of the grosser elements; and the argument that the heterogeneity of nature is detrimental to causal relation, adds a greater force to this Śruti passage. In this way it is assumed that the elements sky, etc., are the causes of the elements air, etc., in the capacity of being locatives only. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the Vaiśeṣikas are not justified in making a futile dispute with the Sāṅkhyas when unanimity between the two systems can be thus very easily achieved regarding the doctrine of cosmogony. He points out that such a kind of causality is forced upon the Vaiśeṣikas also; but it is a case of perversity on their part to regard this locative cause as the efficient cause only. He would, therefore, admit a fourth kind of cause which is quite distinct from the inherent (samavāyi), non-inherent (asamavāyi) and the efficient (nimitta) causes. It is the *Ādhāra-kāraṇa* or the locative cause. Thus Bhikṣu rejects the views of the direct transformation or the appearance of Brahman as the world. He concludes that at the time of creation, Prakṛti, which was located in Brahman in an undivided form, transformed itself into this world; and thus Brahman comes to be regarded as the locative cause of the world.

Saṅkara, Bhāskara and Bhikṣu

Bhikṣu's position is fundamentally different from that of Bhāskara who advocates the theory of the transformation of Brahman,—and also from that of Saṅkara who regards Brahman

to be the substantive cause inasmuch as It is the substratum of the world. While Sāṅkara holds that the world is phenomenal, Bhāṣaka and Bhikṣu would make it real.

But however much Bhikṣu may try to bridge over the gulf between the Sāṅkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas, as mentioned above, he may only succeed in so far as the unity in words is concerned. The real difference in their respective positions ultimately remains the same.

An original line of interpretation of the Brahmasūtras—an attempt at compromise between Vedānta and Sāṅkhya-Yoga

Let us now examine the view of Bhikṣu in some detail. His main aim is to represent the Sāṅkhya system as non-conflicting with the Vedānta. Here arises a formidable difficulty. For the Sūtrakāra denounces in unmistakable terms the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system in the aphorisms—

“ If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smṛtis, we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Smṛtis,¹”—

and,—

“ Thereby the Yoga (Smṛti) is refuted,”²—
respectively.

Bhikṣu champions the cause of Sāṅkhya-Yoga in the following way :

The Smṛti of Kapila (Sāṅkhya Philosophy) is authoritative, since it must have its scope. The denial of a Personal God in the Kāpila Sāṅkhya system is nothing but a *prima facie* proposition, borrowed from the doctrine of the wicked atheistic

¹ “ Smṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅga iti cen nānyasmṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅgāt ”—Br. Sū. II. 1. 1.

² “ Etena Yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ ”—*Ibid.*, II. 1. 3.

Mimāṃsakas as a temporary concession to their views. That this is not the ultimate position of the Sāṅkhyas will be quite evident from the fact that the view of these Mimāṃsakas also has subsequently been refuted by the followers of Kapila.¹

So the denial of a Personal God or Īśvara is not the final conclusion of the Sāṅkhya system. To be a little more precise, it is absolutely foreign to the Sāṅkhya system. But the Sāṅkhyas have chosen to temporarily adopt it in order to avoid for the time being an unnecessary fracas with the vicious, aggressive Mimāṃsakas, who are the real atheists.² Even the Sāṅkhya aphorisms appearing to preach atheism glaringly and in unmistakable terms, do but quote the sophistic chain of arguments invented by the godless thinkers referred to above. It is really an extravagant claim (*prauḍhivāda*)—a chain of reasoning adopted for a temporary compromise with the atheists.³

In making this bold statement, Bhikṣu contends that the real Sāṅkhya theory has neither been represented nor repudiated in the Brahmasūtras. As he himself very clearly says :

So this division of the Sāṅkhya system into theistic and atheistic schools has for its basis the final and concessionary views of the Sāṅkhyas ; or let the atheistic school be regarded as unauthoritative.⁴

Even he does not hesitate to call in question the authority of the Brahmasūtras in those places where *Pradhāna* (Primordial Matter) is denied the ultimate reality.⁵

1 " Nanv evaṃ Kāpilasmṛteḥ kim aprāmāṇyam eva...na sāvakaśātvāt, paścānnirākar-tavyakumīmāṃsakānām Īśvarapratīṣedhasyābhyupagamavādena Kāpilasmṛtyupapatteḥ "—Vij. Bh., p. 268.

2 " He also regards atheism as an unnecessarily extravagant claim (*prauḍhivāda*) to show that the system does not stand in need of a theistic hypothesis."—Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phil., Vol. II, p. 319.

3 " Īśvarapratīṣedhakutarkā api parakīyā eva, ' tuṣyatu durjana ' iti nyāyena prauḍhyā sāṅkhyair anūdyante "—Vij. Bh., p. 266.

4 " Etena paramārthavādābhyupagamavādābhyāṃ seśvaranirīśvaravibhāgaprasiddhiḥ sāṅkhyānām vyākhyātā, atha vā Kāpilaikadeśasya aprāmāṇyam astu "—Vij. Bh., p. 267.

5 " Brahmasūtre pradhānādinirākarapam apasiddhāntatvād upekṣaṇīyam "—*Ibid.*, p. 268.

The same is his attitude towards the refutation of the Yoga system in the Vedāntasūtras ; the self-evolution of Prakṛti and the denial of material causality to Īśvara and other allied hypotheses of the Yoga system, which go against the conclusions of the Vedānta system, are represented by Bhikṣu as *prima facie* views held in concession to the supposed antagonists.¹

So according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the Sūtrakāra has only demolished some misrepresented or spurious Sāṅkhya-Yoga theories. But the real Sāṅkhya-Yoga system has been left untarnished.

Now may arise the question that if the pseudo-Sāṅkhya-Yoga views only are refuted in the Brahmasūtras, how are we to account for the objection raised by the Sāṅkhyas in the next topic (*i.e.*, Na-vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa) that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, since the homogeneity of nature between the cause and the effect is essential. The answer given by Bhikṣu is necessarily the same. This objection is not raised by the real Sāṅkhya school; but it was originally raised by the *Kumīmāṃsakas* and temporarily adopted by the Sāṅkhyas as a *prima facie* view.²

Thus we find that Vijñānabhikṣu makes desperate attempts to reconcile Sāṅkhya views with those of Vedānta. He has tried mainly to show that the Sāṅkhyas also admit Brahman to be the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause of the world. The hypothesis sounds paradoxical, inasmuch as it is contrary to all received and accepted opinions about the Sāṅkhya system, and is in direct conflict with the current Sāṅkhya view, according to which Prakṛti alone is the independent material cause of the world. The current system of Sāṅkhya Philosophy does not even tolerate the existence of God, not to speak of calling Him the cause. But Bhikṣu has forcibly thrust in a God in the

¹ "Atrāpy abhyupagamavādena yogāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ parihartavyaḥ"—*Ibid.*, p. 272.

² "Idānīṃ sāṅkhyayogayor abhyupagamavādasya mūlabhūtaṃ kumīmāṃsakānām Īśvare tadupādānatāyāṃ ca bādhakam vedānteṣu kutarkajātam apākaroti pādasamāptim yāvat"—*Vij. Bh.*, p. 273.

Sāṅkhya system and calls Him the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause, since He is the locative of the world really born out of Pradhāna.

Now, we may raise the question that if Brahman be regarded as the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause on account of Its being in reality the locative cause only, what would be the necessity of raising the objection (in the Na-vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa) that Brahman cannot be the cause as It is of a different nature from the effect ? Bhikṣu's ready reply to this is that the *Pūrvapakṣa* represented in this section is not at all consistent with the real Sāṅkhya view. Similarity of nature between the locative and the effect is not regarded as essential by any school whatsoever. Elsewhere Bhikṣu cleverly shifts his ground saying that the expression ' *prakṛti* ' (in the aphorism— " *Prakṛtiś ca...* ") stands for the power of God, and Brahman Itself is not the material cause of the world. From this standpoint also the topic (adhikaraṇa) becomes inconsistent.¹ Vijñānabhikṣu seems to contradict himself while commenting on the aphorism—

"Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts."²—

where he accepts the possibility of the transformation of Brahman."³

Bhikṣu's interpretation of the adhikaraṇas which serve as the support of the theory of abhinna-nimittopādāna

It is a well-known fact that all the schools that profess to represent Brahman as the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause, base their arguments on the *adhikaraṇas*

¹ "Sūkṣmā Brahmano jagatprakṛtitvam api nāśya sūtrasyārthaḥ: asmin pāde śakter eva prakṛtatvāt"—Vij. Bh., p. 259. Also—"Svabhāvākhyā prakṛtir antaraṅgaśaktiḥ"—*Ibid.*, p. 258.

² "Kṛtenaprasaktir niravayavatvasābdakopo vā"—Br. Sū. II. 1. 26.

³ "Naou Brahma cet pariṇamate tadā tat kim apśabhedānavacchinnaṃ utāpśāvacchinnaṃ pariṇamate"—Vij. Bh., p. 293. Also—"...yathā devā...pariṇamante tathaiva Brahma ity arthaḥ"—*Ibid.*, p. 292.

(Tadananyatva—II.1.14-20, Kṛtsnaprasakti—II.1.26-29). Our curiosity to examine how Bhikṣu explains these two topics would be, therefore, very natural.

First of all, let us take up the 'Tadananyatva' section. Bhikṣu holds that jīva retains its individuality as the enjoying self (bhoktr̥) even at the time of emancipation and universal dissolution, since the Śruti states that even at the time of the transmigration of soul after death, knowledge and *karman* follow him together.¹ This is altogether a new line of interpretation—a complete departure from the traditional line of interpretation of the section. This interpretation is as original as it is curious. From the above, it would be evident to all intelligent students of Indian Philosophy, that the peculiar Sāṅkhya view, followed in Bhikṣu's commentry, is not at all supported by the Sūtrakāra himself. Bhikṣu, on the other hand, contends that the so-called pseudo-Sāṅkhya-Yoga system, as represented in the Brahma-sūtras, is not the original Sāṅkhya-Yoga view, as adumbrated by him elsewhere.

In the 'Kṛtsnaprasakti' section, as we have already pointed out above, Bhikṣu seems to admit some kind of transformation on the part of Brahman, contrary to his accepted views.

Madhva's position

Madhva regards Brahman as the efficient cause only, and so his position differs fundamentally from all those commentators who posit It as the identity of the efficient and the material cause. So it would be needless to add that he differs from Bhikṣu also. But he agrees with Bhikṣu only on one point, *viz.*, that this section (Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa) does not discuss the passage of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad—² 'The thing being a name only

¹ "Tasya bhoktuḥ sopakaraṇasya prakṛtaBrahmānanyatvaṃ kāraṇe Brahmani nadināp samudra iva avibhāgaḥ...na tu bhoktur atyantam Brahmātmatvaṃ paralayādāv abhāvo vā, kuta etad avagamyaṭe? Ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ; ārambhaṇaśrutis tāvat—' tam vidyā-karmanāṃ samanvārabbhe pūrvapra;ñā ca iti.'—Vij. Bh., p. 279.

² "Vācārambhaṇam....."—Ch. Up. VI. 1.4.

which has its origin in speech...' But for that reason his interpretation does not agree in detail with that of Bhikṣu either. He explains that the expression '*tadananyatvam*' does not really mean the non-difference of the effect from the cause, but that Brahman was without a second at the time of creation. He takes the phrase '*ananya*' in the sense of *asakāya* (i.e., without a second helping hand, without any other assistant). Brahman took the help of no foreign material in evolving this universe.¹ "According to him the question is whether Brahman wants the help of *Karaṇas* or instruments like ordinary agents in this world. The reply is that Īśvara creates the world without the help of any other instrument (*ananyatvam*) as is seen from R̥gveda X. 81.2, in which all instruments, etc., are denied. And if there had been any such instruments they might have been known or demonstrated in the Vedas, but as a matter of fact they are not."² The authoritative Śruti passage on this point is—

"What was the station? What was the material? How was (it done)?"—(i.e., Īśvara did not take the help of *śīte*, matter or implements in creating this universe).³

So Madhva differs from the rest of the commentators⁴ (including Vijñānabhikṣu also) and sides with the Pāśupatas in holding Brahman to be the efficient cause only. Accordingly he invents a new method of interpretation of the aphorisms—"Prakṛtiś ca." and "Ātmakṛteḥ..." In the entire quarter (pāda,

1 "Svatantrabahuśādhanaḥ sṛṣṭir loke dṛṣṭā; naivaṃ Brahmanah; svarūpasāmarthyād eva tasya sṛṣṭiḥ.....

Paratantraḥ hyapekṣeta svatantraḥ kim apekṣate |

Sādhanaśāp sādhanaṭvaṃ yataḥ kim tasya sādhanaḥ " ||

—Mādhva Bhāṣya under Br. Sū. II. 1. 14.

2 Ghate, The Vedānta, p. 81.

3 "Kim eviḍ āsīd adhiṣṭhānam ārambhaṇaṃ katamat svit kathāsīt"—RV. X. 81. 2.

4 Even Baladeva, the commentator of the Brahmasūtras belonging to the Gauḍīya school, does not follow Madhva in interpreting this section. The Gauḍīya school is known as an offshoot of the Mādhva school. But about this particular point, even the branch seeks to differ from the original root. Govindabhāṣya gives the traditional explanation that the effect (world) is non-different from the substantive cause (Brahman).

i.e., fourth quarter of the first chapter), containing these two aphorisms, Madhva only finds an opportunity to demonstrate that all words like 'avyakta,' 'prakṛti,' 'śūnya,' 'abhāva,' etc., without exception, ultimately refer to Viṣṇu. In fact these words have been carefully derived in such a way as to denote Lord Viṣṇu and Viṣṇu alone. Of course, to the impartial students of Indian Philosophy, these derivations would appear as specimens of philological curiosity only.¹

In the 'Kṛtsnaprasakti' section also, he explains the aphorisms to refer to the doctrine of transformation. The objection raised in the aphorism (II. 1. 26-27, according to Madhva) would be valid if jīva is regarded as the creator. So he explains the aphorisms in the following way :

If jīva is the maker, either he should exert his whole power in every little thing ; but this is not seen ; or he should exert a part of his strength (which is more reasonable); but that again would contradict the statement of the Śruti that jīva is without parts. So jīva cannot be an independent creator. But Īśvara can be so. His Creatorship is unquestionable, being established in the Śruti.²

Thus Madhva is unwilling to call Brahman the identity of the efficient and the material cause. Though he favours the doctrine of transformation, he regards Prakṛti as the formative cause. Brahman is merely the efficient cause; but It guides Prakṛti in all her transformations.³

¹ Śūnya—"śaṃ ūnaṃ kurute asaṃ śūnyaḥ"—He who makes the pleasure (of others) inferior (to his own). Prakṛti—"prakarṣeṇa karoti prakṛtiḥ"—He who performs well. Abhāva—"naiva bhāvayitum yogaḥ ato'bhāvaṃ vadaṁty enam"—He is not capable of being meditated upon, and hence is called Abhāva.

² Mādḥva Bh., under Br. Sū. II. 1. 27-28.

³ "Prakṛtāv anupraviśya tāṃ pariṇāmya tatpariṇāmaniyāmakatvena tatra sthitvā ātmano bahudhākaraṇāt.....

Avikāro'pi paramaḥ prakṛtiṃ tu vikāriṇi
Anupraviśya Govindaḥ prakṛtiś cābhidhiyate " ||

—Mādḥva Bh., under Br. Sū., I. 4. 27.

The position of the Gaudīya school

The Gaudīya school, which professes its allegiance to the Mādhva school, seeks to differ from the latter about the doctrine of causation. Baladeva, the Gaudīya commentator, declines to accept Brahman as the efficient cause only, on the following grounds :

The Śruti establishes the proposition—‘ If the *one* is known, *all* are known.’ This proposition can be regarded as true, if we interpret the expression ‘ *one* ’ as the substantive cause, and the word ‘ *all* ’ as the variety of effects produced therefrom ; since the knowledge of the substantive cause alone involves a knowledge of the products also. But a knowledge of the products is not possible, if only the efficient cause is known. The jar remains as unknown as ever, even if the potter be intimately known. Brahman, therefore, has to be accepted as the substantive cause of this world also. In the aphorism—‘ Prakṛtiś ca...’ (I. 4. 23), the word ‘ *prakṛti* ’ means the substantive cause (upādāna); and by the expletive ‘ *ca* ’ (and) it is regarded as the efficient cause also. So the Gaudīya school also regards Brahman as the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause.¹

Brahman—the formative cause—Gaudīya view

Brahman is both the efficient and the substantive cause ; and It is the changing cause also. According to the explicit statement of the Śruti, Brahman is endowed with *three* different kinds of Powers or Energies—the Energy as revealed by the Lord’s own nature (Viṣṇuśakti), the energy as manifested

1 “—avicitryasāktikāt svayaṃkartrādirūpād upādānarūpāo ca”—Gov. Bh. I. 1. 2. “Brahmaiva jagataḥ prakṛtir upādānam.....” “—upādānavijñānāt kāryavijñānaviśayas tatraiva śrutaḥ ; sa ca nimittamātratābhyupagame na sambhavet ; na hi kulāle vijñāte ghaṭo vijñāyate ; tadanuparodbhād viśvasyopādānam caśabdān nimittam ca Brahmaiveti”—*Ibid.*, under I. 4. 23.

through the individual selves (Kṣetrajñasakti) and the material energy as displayed in the workings of Avidyā (Māyāsakti). Viṣṇusakti is technically known as the most exalted form of Energy (Parā Sakti). Kṣetrajñasakti is a rather lower form of energy (aparā śakti). Māyāsakti is the principle of activity, and is technically called *karmasakti*. The Viṣṇupurāṇa elucidates the point further. Through the medium of His Primal Energy (Parā Sakti), the Lord becomes the efficient cause; and through the instrumentality of the two other forms of energy, He comes to be recognised as the formative cause also. Thus as the efficient cause, He is changeless, but as the formative cause He undergoes real transformation. To be a little more precise, this change really affects the energies, since there is the well known dictum—‘any injunction or prohibition regarding the possessor of an attribute applies directly to the attribute, and indirectly to the possessor of the attribute.’

The prescription of change applied to the Lord (in the capacity of the possessor of the energies in question) does only affect the energies directly ; or in other words, the Lord is said to undergo transformation in revealing His peculiar manifold powers, i.e., in the act of radiating His threefold energies. This transformation is, therefore, something materially different from that which is ordinarily understood by the usual connotation of the term.¹

We should, however, note one point in this connexion. Baladeva, while rejecting the view of Madhva regarding the doctrine of causation, approaches very near the Nimbārka point of view, in postulating the transformation of Brahman as the radiation of its energies. Thus he seeks to avoid the charge that Brahman, in undergoing change, would become impermanent.

¹ “Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva...iti śrutes trīsakti Brahms...tasya nimittatvam upādānat-
vam ca abhidhiyate; tatśrādyam parāśhyasaktimadrūpeṇa, dvitīyam tu tadanyaśaktidīṇyadvā
raiva...evam ca nimittam kūṣaṣṭham upādānam tu pariṇāmīti sūksamaprakṛtikam kartṛ sthūla-
prakṛtikam karma ity ekasya tadubhayatvam siddham”—Gov. Bh. under Br. Śū. I.4. 26

The position of Vallabha

Vallabha, the celebrated commentator of the *Suddhādvaita* school, also upholds that Brahman is to be regarded as the identity of the efficient and the substantative cause. In his opinion, Pure Brahman is the substantive cause which transforms Itself in the form of the universe, without the medium of a body (as Rāmānuja asserts) or energy (as Bhāskara, Nimbārka and Baladeva hold). He successfully meets the objection of the Sāṅkhyas—Pradhāna (and not Brahman) must be the material cause of the world, inasmuch as the product (world) is similar (*i.e.*, insentient) to it in nature; whereas Brahman is only the efficient cause. He points out that the knowledge of the inherent material cause alone makes all products known also. It is stated in the *Śruti* that Brahman, being known, nothing else remains unknown.¹ So Brahman must be the inherent material cause of the universe. Like a lump of gold, It undergoes transformation, leaving Its integrity untouched. It is changeless, and at the same time changing. This may appear to be contradictory to all logical arguments; but this is the peculiarity of the nature of Brahman. This peculiarity is absent in any other object of the universe. The only authority on this point is *Śruti*, as Vallabha shows in his commentary on the aphorism—

‘But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).’² This view of Vallabha is known as the doctrine of the transformation of Pure Brahman (*Suddhabrahmapariṇāmavāda*).

¹ “...samavāyikāraṇajñāne hi kāryajñānam.....tasmiṁ Brahmaiva samavāyikāraṇam, na prakṛtiḥ”—*Val. Bh.*, under *Br. Su. I. 4. 23*. “Tadātmānam svayam akutūṭa itī svasya-iva karmakartṛbhāvāt; sukṛtavacanāc ca alaukikatvam...pariṇāmate kāryākāreṇa itī; avikṛtam eva pariṇāmate suvarṇam....vakṣyati ca ‘śruteḥ tu śabdāmūlatvāt’ itī”—*Ibid.*, under *Br. Su. I. 4. 26*.

² “Śruteḥ tu śabdāmūlatvāt”—*Br. Su. II. 1. 27*.

Two main divisions of the commentators of the Brahmasūtras accepting Brahman as the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause

Thus it is evident that excepting Madhva and the Pāśupata Saivas, the rest of the principal commentators on the Brahmasūtras are unanimous in regarding Brahman as both the efficient and the substantive cause. But this identity of the efficient and the substantive cause, as interpreted by Vijñānabhikṣu, is something fundamentally different from that as admitted by Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha,¹ Nimbārka and Vallabha. The latter are unanimous in their opinion that Bādarāyaṇa positively refutes the theory that God is merely the efficient cause of the world in the section (adhikaraṇa), beginning with the aphorism—

‘The Lord (cannot be the operative cause of the world only) on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine).’²

In this particular section the Sūtrakāra applies himself to the refutation of the doctrine according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as He is the general Ruler. In the previous sections of the work, the Sūtrakāra himself has proved that the Lord is the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause. Hence, if the present section were meant to impugn the doctrine of Lord’s Rulership in general, the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory, and Bādarāyaṇa would be guilty of the fault of self-contradiction. It should be assumed, therefore, that the purport of the section is to refute the doctrine of those who maintain that God is not the material cause, but merely the Ruler—the operative cause of the world.

¹ Śrīkaṇṭha does not follow Pāśupata Saivism (which maintains that the Lord is the operative cause only), refuted in the Brahmasūtras (II. 2. 37-41). He closely follows Rāmānuja with simple adaptations wherever necessary, and has merely substituted Siva in place of Rāmānuja’s Viṣṇu.

² “*Patyur asāmanājasyāt*” and the following three sūtras, constituting the adhikaraṇa, II. 2. 37-41.

Bhikṣu, on the other hand, comments on the above section in the following way :

God should not be regarded as an object of mere inference.¹ His existence may be proved by inference based on Śruti only. This proposition has already been established in the aphorism—

‘(The omniscience of Brahman) follows from Its being the source of Scripture.’²

Hence it is clear that the Śruti alone is the independent means of proof about the existence of God, and inference based on Śruti is also regarded as a secondary means of proof.

If, however, any doubt arises as to why this section was incorporated at all in the body of the work of Bādarāyaṇa, the answer is that it is included only to make the position clearer.

*The particular sections of the Brahmasūtras dealing with
the doctrine of causation*

It would be clear from the foregoing discussions that the five adhikaraṇas, viz.,

- (a) Janmādy adhikaraṇa (Br. Sū. I. 1. 2),
- (b) Prakṛty adhikaraṇa (*Ibid.*, I. 4. 23-27),
- (c) Na-vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa (*Ibid.*, II. 1.4-11),
- (d) Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa (*Ibid.*, II. 1.14-20),
- (e) Kṛtsnaprasakty adhikaraṇa (*Ibid.*, II. 2. 26-29),

are the mainstay of the doctrine that Brahman is the identity of the efficient and the substantive cause of the world (jagadabhinanimittopādāna).

We are now in a position to enquire into the question as to which of the schools of Vedānta gives us the most faithful representation of the view of Bādarāyaṇa regarding the nature of

¹ “Na patyur Īśvarasyānumānam sambhavati”—Vij. Bh., p. 318.

² “Śāstrayonitvāt”—Br. Sū. I. 1.3.

“śāstram yonir mūlapramāṇam yasminn iti śāstrayoni.....atra śāstrād iti vaktavye śāstrayonitvād ity uktam śāstrāviroddhānumānādinām grahaṇīya”—Vij. Bh., p. 69.

causality attributed to Brahman. In doing so we shall be required to take into account the consistency of the *five* sections (adhikaraṇas) mentioned above, with regard to the different schools of Vedānta already referred to. And it may be observed without any attempt to anticipate the result of our findings that the interpretation of Brahman's causality, as offered by Śaṅkara, gives the greatest satisfaction to the demands of logic, and this has been sufficiently made clear, we hope, in the section where Śaṅkara's interpretation of causality has been discussed by us. The unreality of causality is a conclusion which irresistibly follows from both the texts of the Upaniṣads and logical consistency.

KINSHIP AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF THE PURUM KUKIS OF MANIPUR ¹

BY

TARAKCHANDRA DAS, M.A.

The Purums form a branch of the Tibeto-Burman-speaking peoples of Assam. Sir George Grierson has placed them in the Old Kuki group. According to the last Census operations they number only 305 persons, who live in four small villages, namely Purum Khulen, Purum Chumbang, Purum Changlong and Purum Tampak. These villages are situated near Palel on the eastern boundary of Manipur State in Assam. The Purums practise a migratory form of hill cultivation locally known as *jhum*. Now-a-days they have also taken to wet cultivation in the plains. Rice is their staple food and *zu* (fermented rice) the most important drink. The latter is also endowed with ceremonial significance. The tribe has imbibed various elements of culture from the dwellers of the valley of Manipur.

This article is mostly based on information supplied by Chauba of Purum Tampak. He was about fifty years old and practised as *māipā* of the village. A new immigrant to Purum Tampak, he was formerly an inhabitant of another Purum village where he served the village community in various official capacities rising up to the position of the *khullākpa*.² I found him fairly

¹ Read before the Anthropology Section of the 21st Session of the Indian Science Congress, held in Bombay in January, 1934.

² Headman of the village.

truthful and communicative. Moreover, his information has been tested and verified in most cases unless otherwise stated. But, inspite of all these facts, it would have been much better if we could have collected our information on this important topic from each of the other three Purum villages. That would have brought out the local differences and thereby decreased the chances of error. But the interest of the subject is so great that I am unable to resist the temptation of placing it before the scholars till I can pay a second visit to the tribe. However, with all the limitations of a single source I shall make an attempt to give a preliminary survey of some of their interesting social institutions.

According to the last Census operations the Purums number only 305 persons, both male and female. Inspite of this very small number they still possess the consciousness of a tribe to the fullest extent. It is an endogamous body and marriage with the other branches of the Old Kuki group even, *e.g.*, Aimol, Lamgang, Anal, Chiru, etc., is prohibited. Their marriage rules show that this prohibition is as old as the tribe itself and is not of recent growth. Neither 'is it merely theoretical. In practical life every Purum, male or female, conducts his or her marital relations according to this rule. But, now-a-days society has become lax, perhaps owing to the disintegration of tribal authority, and Purum boys and girls may theoretically marry in other tribes of the Old Kuki group or even of other groups without any fear of excommunication. Such pairs are now allowed to live within the village and partake of the ordinary life of the other Purum villagers. The children of such mixed marriages are allowed to espouse the hands of pure Purum boys and girls and are in course of time absorbed without any trace. But inspite of this theoretical possibility we did not meet with any actual instance of mixed marriage.

The Purums are very nearly related to the Chauthes of Chauthe near Bishenpore on the western bank of the Logtak

lake. In fact, they are two branches of the same tribe and still practise intermarriage according to my informants. The traditional tale of origin and migrations of the Purums which each village officer recites on the occasion of the worship of Sābuhong (Foumikoubā in Manipuri) refers to this intimate relation of the Purums and Chauthes. In this tale it is stated that in course of their wanderings in and outside the State of Manipur, the Purums settled for some time near Bishenpore but later on they moved again. At that time a section of the tribe decided to remain on the spot and came to be known as Chauthes while the main body left the place in search of a new home. The Chauthes are divided into five exogamous clans according to Shakespeare, all of which except one (the Iring) are found among the Purums. Moreover, the general principle on which selection of bridegroom and bride depends is practically the same in both the tribes. Thus it seems that the Purum story of migration is not a mere myth but contains some amount of truth.

The Purums are primarily divided into six exogamous clans—the males and females of each of which may not marry into the same clan. The six clans are—

- (1) Mākān.
- (2) Mārrim.
- (3) Pārpā.
- (4) Khyeng.
- (5) Thāo.
- (6) Julhung.

A Mākān boy may marry a girl from any of the remaining clans except Thāo but a Mākān girl can only marry a Thāo boy and may not marry a boy from any of the remaining clans. A Mārrim boy may only marry a Thāo girl while a Mārrim girl may espouse the hands of either a Pārpā or Mākān boy. The following Table shows the possible marital relations among the Purum clans.

Table of Marital Relations among Purum Clans

| Boys | | Girls | | Girls | | Boys |
|---------|---|--------------------|--|---------|---|-------------------------------|
| | | Marrim | | Makan | = | Thao |
| | | Parpa | | | | |
| Makan | = | Khyeng | | | | |
| | | Julhung | | | | |
| Marrim | = | Thao | | Marrim | = | { Parpa Makan |
| Parpa | = | { Marrim Khyeng | | Parpa | = | { Makan Thao |
| Khyeng | | Thao | | Khyeng | = | { Makan Parpa |
| Thao | = | { Makan Parpa | | Thao | = | { Marrim Khyeng Julhung |
| Julhung | = | Thao | | Julhung | = | Makan |

A perusal of the above table brings out several interesting features of Purum social organisation. In the first place we see that in the matter of marriages each Purum family acknowledges the existence of only three groups, *viz.*, (1) the group to which it itself belongs, (2) the group in which its sons marry and (3) the group in which its daughters marry, or in other words a man's own clan, his mother's clan and his sister's

husband's clan (or perhaps his mother's mother's clan sometimes). In marital relations the other clans are of no use to it. Mrs. Seligman in an article in the J. R. A. I. (Vol. LVIII) has shown that this type of tri-clan arrangement is due to asymmetry in descent. She writes : " Descent may be said to be asymmetrical when one form works in a submerged manner while the dominant form only is responsible for clan organisation (or any other form of grouping). In this form of descent the dominant form is recognised by both sexes but..... the submerged form is recognized by one sex only. Thus, with dominantly matrilineal descent men and women both recognize matrilineal descent, but men also recognize patrilineal descent, while women do not. Again, with dominantly patrilineal descent both men and women recognize patrilineal descent, while women also recognize matrilineal descent and men do not " (J. R. A. I., Vol. LVIII, p. 536). It has further been contended that the recognized mode of tracing descent reacts upon the prevalent idea of incest which again formulates marriage prohibitions. The Purum clans are dominantly patrilineal and so both the males and the females avoid marrying into the clan of the father but the girls at the same time avoid their mother's clan while the boys do not. In fact in some of the clans, *e.g.*, Marrim, Khyeng and Julhung, the boys have no alternative but to marry in the clan of their mothers. The girls, on the other hand, always avoid the clans of both the parents. Thus the males observe unilateral (patrilineal) while the females observe bilateral descent—one being submerged. The necessary effect of reckoning such a type of descent, which Mrs. Seligman worked out from Ambrym and Pentecost data, is also observed among the Purums. In the first instance they too practise one kind of cross-cousin marriage instead of two, *viz.*, that of a man marrying his mother's brother's daughter and not his father's sister's daughter while for a woman marriage is allowed with the father's sister's son but not with the mother's brother's son. Secondly, among the Purums also a

brother and a sister cannot marry a sister and a brother. Though this fact has not been independently collected it is sufficiently clear from the nature of marriage rules and the prevailing social organisation.

In addition to the five clans referred to before which are perhaps the original and traditional ones, we find three more similar groups, *viz.*, Pilling, Ingte and Teyu. They are spoken of as branches of Marrim, Khyeng and Thao respectively, from which they have originated. A fourth one is also referred to, namely, Aihung, but the necessary details are not available. Perhaps the group has already become extinct. These groups also observe similar rules of marriage as are found among traditional clans. The following table shows the marital relations of the three groups mentioned above :—

| Boys | | Girls | | Girls | | Boys |
|---------|---|-----------|--|---------|---|----------|
| | | { Pilling | | Ingte | = | Makan |
| | | { Thao | | | | |
| Ingte | = | { Parpa | | | | |
| | | { Teyu | | | | |
| Pilling | = | { Khyeng | | | | |
| | | { Thao | | Pilling | = | Parpa |
| Teyu | = | { Parpa | | | | |
| | | { Makan | | Teyu | = | { Ingte |
| | | | | | | { Khyeng |

Why these groups originated, it is difficult to say. The fact that, both Pilling and Ingte are branches of two such clans each of which can take girls from one and only one clan is rather suggestive. From these two cases it appears that branches were formed in order to widen the field of choice for males of these

two clans or, may be, these branches were the result of irregular unions of the males of Marrim and Khyeng clans who were forced by the limited scope of their choice. But this explanation does not hold good in the case of Teyu.

My informant Chauba while explaining why Ingte and Marrim cannot intermarry, incidentally exposed the submerged matrilineal tendency of the tribe in course of his reasoning. Thus he says, "Ingte lads and Marrim lads marry Thao girls. So they are born of mothers of the same clan and have the same blood. So Ingte and Marrim lads and girls are like brothers and sisters. Therefore they cannot marry one another." Chauba here unconsciously puts stress on the maternal side, relegating the father to the background and utilises the maternal connection as a ground for prohibiting marriage. I think here we find direct trace of the submerged matrilineal tendency in descent, which Mrs. Seligman infers from other sources.

Further analysis of the marriage rules shows that marriage of daughters move in a cyclic order among Purum clans.* Thus a Purum girl always marries into the clan of one of her female ascendants through the female line. The particular ascendant into whose clan a girl is to marry ordinarily depends on the number of clans comprised in the tribe. This is due to asymmetrical descent and consequent tri-clan arrangement. Thus in a tribe with three clans only, having the necessary type of social organisation, a girl is always married into the clan of her mother's mother. The Kachins of Burma illustrate this principle in a beautiful manner.¹ The Purums, who have six clans instead of three, presents a more complicated form of this trait. Among them, a girl is in many cases married into her mother's mother's clan but not always so. She may have to espouse the hands of a man who belongs to the clan of a more remote female ascendant. The following diagrams illustrate the principle.

¹ I am indebted to Mr. J. K. Bose, M.A., of the Calcutta University for this reference.

Diagram A shows a marriage-cycle in a tribe with three clans A, B and C. The direction of the arrows point to the clan of the bridegroom, *e.g.*, "A" girls marry "B" boys, "B" girls marry "C" boys, "C" girls marry "A" boys and so on.




Diagram A.




Diagram B.

Diagram B shows one of the Purum marriage-cycles in which a girl marries into the clan of her mother's mother. The direction of the arrows points to the clans of the bridegrooms, *e.g.*, Mekan girls marry Thao boys, Thao girls marry Julhung boys, Julhung girls marry Mekan boys and so on.




Diagram C.

Diagram C shows another Purum marriage-cycle in which some of the girls marry into the mother's mother's mother's clan while others marry into the clans of more remote female ascendants in the female line. The direction of the arrows points to the clans of the bridegrooms.




Diagram D.

Diagram D shows a Purum marriage-cycle with four clans as suggested by us. MKJ here refers to the original generalised clan out of which the three present clans, *viz.*, Marrim, Khyeng and Julhung were formed. (See page 10.)

Some of the six traditional clans of the Purums show similar characters. Thus, both Marrim and Khyeng have to marry in the same clans, *i.e.*, both Marrim and Khyeng boys marry Thao girls while their girls marry in Makan and Parpa clans. The Julhung clan also partially participates in this trait. The Julhung boys marry Thao girls while Julhung girls marry only Makan boys, the Parpa being avoided by them. Thus, as far as marital necessities are concerned Marrim and Khyeng have no ground for independent existence. The case of Julhung, though slightly different from the previous two, should not be separated from them as the nature of the difference does not preclude its unity with Marrim and Khyeng clans. If regulation of marriage be the only or at least the most important function of clan organisation then Marrim, Khyeng and Julhung lose all the grounds for their independent and separate existence. In other words, we may think of a time when they were not divided. Taking this to be a working hypothesis it now remains to be seen how this originally one group divided into three and why? One plausible ground that may be suggested, under the circumstances, is the existence in the past of some functional privileges associated with certain family groups, which brought about the separation in the ranks of an otherwise united group. It has been stated that the post of Khullakpa (headman of the village) at Purumkhulen, the oldest and in fact the parent village of the Purums, was ere long a monopoly of the Marrim clan. Among the Chirus, who also have a similar social organisation, this trait is more prominently developed. Not only the posts of Khullakpa and Luplakpa (deputy headman) but also that of the Thempu (priest of the village) are attached to particular clans. The Purum evidence is not so complete yet Marrim's monopoly may possibly be regarded as a clue to the origin of division in the rank of the originally united group out of which the present Marrim, Khyeng and Julhung clans were formed. But this is nothing more than a suggestion as our data on the point are very meagre. Further

investigation on this line in the field may throw some light on our hypothesis.

Though dual organisation is found in some other branches of the Old Kuki group, *e.g.*, Aimols, Anals and Lamgangs, we do not meet with it among the Purums. But certain peculiar customs and terms of relationship probably point towards the existence of such an institution in the past. As for example, the word *māksā* indicates the husbands of the daughters of a family of all generations possible. Similarly the wives of the *māksās* are known as *ningans*. These two group appellations, applied without any distinction of generation, perhaps indicate the complementary groups of a dual division. Both the *māksās* and the *ningans* of a family are required to play important parts in the more important social and religious ceremonies of the family. As for example, at the time of marriage the *māksās* and *ningans* go to the house of the bride's father to bring the bride to her husband's father's house. No other person from the side of the bridegroom may accompany them on this occasion. Moreover, they have to carry *shinsu* (meat-curry) and *zu* (fermented liquor) supplied by the bridegroom's father to the house of the bride's father on this occasion. Now, these two articles are tabooed to all persons belonging to the clan of the bridegroom as well as to all the female members (it seems they are daughters of the clan and not the wives) of the clan of the bride including the bride herself. Unfortunately it has not been definitely enquired whether all the wives of the family of the bride may partake of it though it is clearly stated that the mother of the bride is served with these next to the father. If so, it gives us a society with two exogamous moities wherein the wives of each moiety have to observe certain customs along with their husbands while the daughters instead of observing the customs of their moiety of origin pursue the customs of the complementary moiety wherein they will soon be married. We cannot explain the restrictions relating to the abovementioned *shinsu* and *zu* except with the help of some such hypothesis.

The part played by the *māksās* in the disposal of the dead body is very significant in this connection. To mention only a few of these activities, the *māksās* wash the corpse, carry it to the burial ground, and put it into the family burial vault. From the data at our disposal it appears that in the disposal of a dead body among the Purums the nearest patrilineal agnatic relatives of the deceased have nothing to do except witnessing the different acts as mere spectators. Among the Tlingit and the Iroquois tribes of North America a similar custom exists. These two tribes are organised on dual basis, each having two exogamous moieties with matrilineal descent. Among them reciprocal burial by the moieties is the custom, i.e., the members of one moiety dispose the dead bodies of the other moiety of the tribe. The group of *māksās* among the Purums is perhaps reminiscent of the opposite moiety in a dual division, as among the Tlingit and the Iroquois tribes. Another possible explanation lies in the previous existence of matrilineal descent and matrilineal residence among this tribe. In a matrilineal and matrilineal community it is the duty of the sister, primarily, to look after the disposal of the earthly remains of her brother, who has gone over to live in a separate family, with his wife (cf. the Khasi custom according to which the members of a man's *kur*—matrilineal clan—take precedence over his children in applying fire to his funeral pyre). She may be naturally expected to render this duty through her husband. When in course of time matrilineality and matrilineal residence disappeared through the impact of patrilineality and patrilineal residence this old funeral custom persisted as a relic of the past.

Another interesting feature of Purum social organisation is found in the mutual use of specific terms of address by members of different clans and sexes. Some of these are given below:—

| | | | |
|---------------|-------------------------|-----------|---------|
| A Mekan boy | addresses a Marrim girl | as | kāndunu |
| „ „ | „ | Thao „ „ | kātunu |
| „ Marrim girl | „ | Mekan boy | as kupā |
| „ Thao | „ | Mekan „ „ | kāpu |

These terms seem to have been borrowed from the terms of relationship now in use among the tribe. People who are not related to each other in any way always use these terms in their conversation. The four terms in general use now are *kānāunu*, *kupā*, *kātunu*, and *kāpu* as indicated in the table given above. Each of these terms indicate a number of relatives when used as a term of relationship. Though it is possible to find out the primary meaning of each one of them from the data at our disposal I shall not attempt that here, but shall confine myself to an explanation of their significance as clan-terms of address. Two of these terms, *viz.*, *kātunu* and *kānāunu* are used by the males in respect of females of other clans while the remaining two, *viz.*, *kāpu* and *kupā* are used by the females in addressing males of clans other than those of their own. Thus a man uses the term *kātunu* in respect of those girls only whom he cannot marry owing to clan restrictions of marriage while he uses the term *kānāunu* in respect of those girls only who are his potential mates. Similarly the girls use the term *kāpu* in addressing such persons whom they cannot marry and the term *kupā* in respect of such persons whom they can marry. Thus for each individual in Purum society the members of the other sex are divided into two broad divisions—those who can be married and those who cannot be married. Is this recognition of two groups reminiscent of former dual organisation? It is not possible at this stage of our knowledge to answer this question. Another possible explanation may be offered. These clan-terms of address might have originated in an attempt to simplify the complicated laws governing inter-clan unions and providing the people with an easy means of avoiding the tabooed and selecting the suitable persons for purposes of love-life.

Over and above the four terms of address referred to above there are others which are used between persons of the same sex. The age factor is also recognised which has necessitated the use of other terms. But all of them harmoniously group

round the original four terms, viz., *kānāunu*, *kupā*, *kātunu*, and *kāpu*.¹

The present tri-clan arrangement of the tribe has probably been brought about by the intermixture of a matrilineal people with a patrilineal people with dual organisation. This seems to explain the occurrence of dual organisation and tri-clan division among so nearly related branches of the Old Kuki group. But this conclusion is based on so very slender grounds that it should not be regarded as anything more than a working hypothesis.

¹ A detailed description of all these features will be attempted in my proposed monograph on the Purums.

SOME FRIENDS OF JOHN KEATS

BY

JAYANTAKUMAR DASGUPTA, M.A., PH.D. (LONDON).

I

Biographers of John Keats are at variance regarding the relations that existed between the poet and his friends. Sidney Colvin says, "The days of the years of his life, were few and evil, but above his grave the double aureole of poetry and friendship shines immortally." Amy Lowell takes an entirely different view and remarks, "Yet it is a melancholy fact that, warm and kindly as many of his friends were, in no single instance did he get back as good as he gave." (John Keats, Vol. I, p. 509.) Lord Houghton notes the series of honourable friendships associated with a poet's fame. (Life and Letters of Keats, Everyman's Library Edition, p. 60.) Yet even Miss Lowell is not wholly unmindful of the influence of his friends over Keats. She says, "Apart from the obviously unusual men like Hazlitt, and Hunt, and Haydon, there was a high degree of interest in literary affairs, and much critical acumen, displayed by all the group." (Vol. II, p. 114.)

I

Although Keats had several distinguished friends like Hunt, Haydon, Cowden, Clarke and Severn, the place of honour has been accorded to John Hamilton Reynolds (1794-1852). Middleton Murry says, "Reynolds was one of the best and most gifted friends Keats ever had." (Studies in Keats, 1930, p. 6.) Another writer observes that his best friend seems to have been J. H. Reynolds. (H. C. Shelley, Literary By-paths in Old England, p. 221.) Reynolds

was born at Shrewsbury and was the son of a Master of Christ's Hospital. He was educated at St. Paul's and entered a Life Insurance Office. Subsequently he became a lawyer and at the time of his death at Newport (Isle of Wight) was Clerk to the County Court.

The Reynolds family was a cultured one. Charlotte Reynolds (1761-1848), mother of John Hamilton, wrote a modest volume "Mrs. Leslie and her Grandchildren : A Tale" (1827) under the pseudonym of Mrs. Hamerton. The authoress wrote in the preface, "It is with quaking ruffles and a panting stomacher that the Authoress of this little work submits it to a reading Public. She could not, without some flutterings, lay it before even a 'reading fly.' A first appearance in print is an awful matter; and she can quite sympathize with the feeling of those gentlemen who fancy in publicly delivering their sentiments that they have attracted 'the eyes of all Europe.'"

About this book Charles Lamb wrote to Thomas Hood, "We have all been pleased with Mrs. Leslie : I speak it most sincerely. There is much manly 'sense with a feminine expression, which is my definition of ladies' writing.'" (H. C. Shelley, p. 327.) Of the three sisters of Reynolds, Mariane became Mrs. Green and was the mother of two notable artists, Jane married Tom Hood and Charlotte remained single. Keats was on very friendly terms with these sisters. Buxton Forman writes, "Miss Charlotte Reynolds tells me that he was passionately fond of music, and would sit for hours while she played the piano to him. It was to a Spanish air which she used to play that the song 'Hush, hush! tread softly!' was composed; and so sensitive was he to proper execution, that, when a wrong note has been played in a public performance, he has been known to say that he would like to 'go down into the orchestra and smash all the fiddles.'" (Poetical Works and other Writings of Keats, 1883, London, Preface, pp. xxix-xxx.)

Reynolds met Keats at Leigh Hunt's house in 1816. Before that he had begun to write. In 1814 his first volume of poetry "Safie, an Eastern Tale" came out and was dedicated to Lord Byron. On receipt of a copy of it Byron wrote to Reynolds, "The poem itself as the work of a youngman is highly creditable to your talents, and promises better for future efforts than any which I can now recollect. Whether you intend to pursue your poetical career I do not know and can have no right to enquire, but in whatever channel your abilities are directed, I think it will be your own fault if they do not eventually lead to distinction. Happiness must of course depend upon conduct, but even fame itself would be but poor compensation for self-reproach." (V. H. Collins, Lord Byron in his Letters, p. 117.) Byron also wrote to Francis Hodgson to review it and this was done in the September (1814) issue of the *Monthly Review* (pp. 60 ff.). "The Eden of Imagination" (1814), another volume of poems by Reynolds was dedicated to John Freeman Milwood Dovaston, Esq., of West Felton, Shropshire "as a slight but sincere token of the pleasure" of their long friendship and from the dedication one gathers that the author regarded this gentleman as one on whose judgment he could rely as to the poetical merits of the book. "The Naiad: a Tale" with other Poems was published in 1816 by Taylor and Hessey who later became also the publishers of Keats. The volume was dedicated to Benjamin Robert Haydon. Wordsworth criticised the poetry of Reynolds and wrote to him, "Your fancy is too luxuriant, and riots too much upon its own creations." (H. C. Shelley, p. 223.)

One of the best services that Reynolds did to Keats was to introduce him to James Rice, Charles Armitage Brown and C. W. Dilke. In 1818 Taylor and Hessey published Keats' "Endymion." The bitter criticism that was directed against it by the *Quarterly Review* is too well known to be reproduced here. Like a true friend Reynolds defended Keats in

the "*Alfred*," an Exeter newspaper, in the course of which he said, "Two things have struck us on the perusal of this singular poem. The first is, that Mr. Keats excels, in what Milton excelled the power of putting a spirit of life and novelty into the Heathen mythology. The second is, that in the structure of his verse, and the sinewy quality of his thoughts, Mr. Keats greatly resembles old Chapman, the nervous translator of Homer. His mind has 'thews and limbs like to its ancestors.' Mr. Gifford, who knows something of the old dramatists, ought to have paused before he sanctioned the abuse of a spirit kindred with them. If he could not feel, he ought to know better." (October 6, 1818.) Leigh Hunt reprinted this defence in his paper, the "*Examiner*," on the 11th October, 1818. (Buxton Forman, *Collected Works*, 1883, Vol. III.)

An intimacy had already sprung up between these two kindred minds and that Reynolds cherished an optimistic view regarding his friend's future will be evident from the following poem, dated the 27th February, 1817, written on reading the sonnet which Keats wrote on the blank space at the end of Chaucer's Tale of 'The Flowre and Lefe':—

Thy thoughts, dear Keats, are like fresh-gathered leaves,
 Or white flowers pluck'd from some sweet lily bed;
 They set the heart a-breathing, and they shed
 The glow of meadows, mornings, and spring eves,
 Over the excited soul. Thy genius weaves
 Songs that shall make the age be nature-led,
 And win that coronal for thy young head
 Which Time's strange hand of freshness ne'er bereaves.
 Go on! and keep thee to thy own green way,
 Singing in that same key which Chaucer sung;—
 Be thou Companion of the Summer day,
 Roaming the fields, and olden woods among:—
 So shall thy Muse be ever in her May;
 And thy luxuriant Spirit ever young.

(Keats: *Poetry and Prose*, Buxton Forman, 1890, p. 45.)

On another occasion he wrote, " I am confident, Keats, that the Pot of Basil hath that simplicity and quiet pathos, which are of sure sovereignty over all hearts." (Amy Lowell, Vol. II, p. 105 ff.)

The best period of the literary activity of Reynolds was that during which he was in the Keats group. In 1819 he wrote a burlesque, " Peter Bell, a Lyrical Ballad " under the pen-name of W. W. In the preface he wrote, "Of Peter Bell I have only thus much to say : it completes the simple system of natural narrative, which I began so early as 1798. It is written in that pure unlaboured style, which can only be met with among labourers ;—and I can safely say, that while its imaginations spring beyond the reach of the most imaginative, its occasional meaning occasionally falls far below the meanest capacity. As these are the days of counterfeits, I am compelled to caution my readers against them, ' for such are abroad.' However, I here declare this to be the true Peter ; this to be the old original Bell. I commit my Ballad confidently to posterity. I love to read my own poetry : it does my heart good." He returned to the subject again in a poem called " Peter Bell versus Peter Bell " in another work, " The Fancy," published in 1820. About " Peter Bell " Coleridge wrote to Taylor and Hessey, " When a man can imitate even stupidly the blunders of Dogberry so as to render them, as Shakespeare does, the vehicles of the most exquisite sense—that is indeed wit ! But be the verses what they may, they are all mostly fair, and the preface and notes are very droll and clever " (H. C. Shelley, p. 243). Hood said of Reynolds that he was good " at a comic verse or a serious stanza—smart at a repartee, sharp at a retort—and not averse to a bit of mischief " (Walter Jerrold, Thomas Hood and Charles Lamb, p. 121).

But certain circumstances had entered his life which made him gradually drift away from poetry. In the " Farewell to the Muses " (1818) written on the flyleaf of the Shakespeare

volume which Reynolds gave to Keats he regarded himself as one "banished from the rolls of honouring men that keep a temperate eye on airy fame." (This poem is in MS. in the Hampstead Public Library—see *The Keats Letters, Papers, and other Relics*, Ed. G. C. Williamson, 1914.) In some of the sonnets in "The Fancy" (1820) published under the initials P. C. (Peter Corcoran) there are references to this effect.

In one poem he wrote,

" Silent, I look at fame: I cannot climb
To where her temple is—Not mine the might:
I have some glimmering of what is sublime—
But, ah! it is a most inconstant light."

In another he said,

" Magnificent and mental images
Have visited me oftentimes, and given
My mind to proud delights—but now it sees
Those visions going like the lights of even:"

John Masefield regards part of "The Fancy" as autobiographical (Introduction to "The Fancy," 1905). But another critic thinks that there is no contemporary evidence to substantiate the view that Peter Corcoran was a self-portraiture. (G. L. Marsh—John Hamilton Reynolds: Poetry and Prose, 1928.) In Edmund Blunden's "Sketches in the Life of John Clare by Himself" (1931) we read about Reynolds, "He is one of the best fellows living, and ought to be a poet of the first order. Himself is his only hindrance at present" (p. 117). But although Clare speaks very highly of Reynolds one finds no clue whatsoever to what the hindrance was except that he paid more attention to the present and that he carried none of the author about him (Blunden, p. 109 ff.).

In the dedication to "The Garden of Florence and other Poems" (1821), published under the name of John Hamilton

there are clear indications that Reynolds was drifting more to the legal profession. He wrote,

“as the time increases,
I give up drawing verse for drawing leases.”

And in another place,

“ Shakespeare gives place to Blackstone’s Commentaries
And Burns’s Poems usher in Burns’ Justice.”

Keats and Reynolds had jointly projected a volume of metrical versions from Boccaccio (Letters of Keats, M. B. Forman, 1931, Vol. I, p. 149). But this scheme did not materialise on account of Keats’ illness. The work, however, was launched by Reynolds alone who wrote in the advertisement to the book, “ The Stories from Boccaccio (The Garden of Florence, and the Ladye of Provence) were to have been associated with tales from the same source, intended to have been written by a friend ;—but illness on his part, and distracting engagements on mine, prevented us from accomplishing our plan at the time; and Death now, to my deep sorrow, has frustrated it for ever. He who is gone, was one of the very kindest friends I possessed, and yet he was not kinder perhaps to me than to others. His intense mind and powerful feeling would, I truly believe, have done the world some service, had his life been spared—but he was of too sensitive a nature—and thus he was destroyed.” While composing some lines of the poem, “ Romance of Youth,” written in Spenserian stanzas Reynolds might have had Keats in mind. There are direct references to musing over Psyche and dreaming of young Endymion in Stanzas XIX and XX. A writer, however, suggests that the “youngster boy” is Reynolds himself although he admits that the probable allusion to Keats was mentioned by a contemporary reviewer (J. H. Reynolds: Poetry and Prose, p. 111). Reynolds had already tried his

hand at the Spenserian stanza (Letters of Keats, Vol. I, M. B. Forman, p. 152).

After the death of Keats, Reynolds became associated with Lamb, Hazlitt, Allan Cunningham, Barry Cornwall, George Darley, Tom Hood and others. With Hood he participated anonymously in "Odes and Addresses to Great People" (1825) which elicited from Sir Walter Scott appreciation for its "inoffensive and humorous satire." (W. Jerrold, p. 133). Prior to this he had written under the name of Edward Herbert a witty article entitled "The Literary Police Office, Bow Street" in the *London Magazine*, February, 1823. But his admiration for Keats never abated. In 1846 he wrote to Richard Moncton Milnes (afterwards Lord Houghton) about Keats, "He was hunted in his youth,—before he had strength to escape his bandages! He had the greatest power of poetry in him, of any one since Shakespeare!—He was the sincerest Friend,—the most loveable associate,—the deepest listener to the griefs and disappointments of all around him 'that ever lived in the side of times.' "

Reynolds probably has not received his due from his contemporaries. After his death "*The Athenaeum*" (27th November, 1852, p. 1296) in an obituary notice opined that neither in law nor in literature he could shine as his interests were divided. Writing in the "Notes and Queries" a correspondent said, "He indeed played the old game of fast and loose between law and literature, pleasure and study" (1856, p. 275). But it is not too much to regard him as "a real personality in his time, even among men far greater than himself." John Masefield's encomium is decidedly the best tribute that has been paid to him :

"One thinks of him as a person delighting in life...He loved poetry, but he loved life and nature more; and nearly all that he wrote he wrote, perhaps a little petulantly, feeling that the best of it was less precious than the flowers in the hedge, and the ragged wanderer upon the road. Better than anything

he loved his comrades. His wit, and charm, and vivid sense of beauty, were gifts held in trust for the half-dozen friends who lived his life, and shared his vision of life." Among these friends John Keats stands first and nearest.

II

The name of Benjamin Robert Haydon (1786-1846) is a familiar one to all students of Keats' poetry. Now Haydon though gifted in many ways was a peculiar man. He was always in debt and often asking his friends to lend him money. Even Keats who was not a rich person lent him thirty pounds. (Colvin, Keats, 1917, p. 337.) Haydon first met Keats at Leigh Hunt's place in 1816, and "was amazingly interested by his pre maturity of intellectual and poetical power." Keats sent to Haydon his sonnet "Great spirits now on earth are sojourning" with a letter. (See Correspondence and Table Talk of Haydon, 2 vols., Ed. F. W. Haydon, 1876, for Haydon's letters to Keats.) In 1817 Keats wrote a sonnet "On Seeing the Elgin Marbles" and sent it to Haydon. Even in 1817 Keats was feeling death and in this poem he wrote:

" My spirit is too weak ; mortality
Weighs heavily on me like unwilling sleep,
And each imagin'd pinnacle and steep
Of godlike hardship tells me I must die
Like a sick eagle looking at the sky."

Haydon reviewed the first volume of Keats' poems in the "*Champion*" (March 9, 1817) and he was one of the very first to discern the good promise of Keats. But Haydon's was not a blind admiration. He pointed out the defects in this work such as the use of compound epithets, over-wrought descriptions and the faultiness of measure at times. "The best poets of the day might not blush to own it" was Haydon's opinion. This review was first discovered and published in

the publications of the Modern Language Society of America (Vol. XL, No. 1) by Miss Roberta Cornelius. Mr. Middleton Murry has also reprinted it in "Studies in Keats." There are certain passages in it which show Haydon as an excellent critic ; " At a time when nothing is talked of but the power and passion of Lord Byron, and the playful and elegant fancy of Moore, the correctness of Rogers, and the sublimity of Campbell (these terms we should conceive are ready composed in Edinburgh Review-shop) a youngman starts suddenly before us, with a genius that is likely to eclipse them all..... Mr. Keats is fated, or ' we have no judgment in an honest face ;' to look at natural objects with his mind, as Shakespeare and Chaucer did, and not merely with his eye as nearly all modern poets do ;—to clothe his poetry with a grand intellectual light, and to lap his name in the lay of immortality." In a letter to Keats Haydon wrote, " I have read your ' Sleep ' and ' Poetry.' It is a flash of lightning that will rouse men from their occupations, and keep them trembling for the crash of thunder that will follow."

In his " Autobiography " Haydon has made a note about a party on 28th December, 1817, in his studio when Lamb, Wordsworth, Keats, Monkhouse and Ritchie were present : " It was indeed an immortal evening. Wordsworth's fine intonation as he quoted Milton and Virgil, Keats' eager inspired look, Lamb's quaint sparkle of lambent humour, so speeded the stream of conversation, that in my life I never passed a more delightful time. All our fun was within bounds. Not a word passed that an apostle might not have listened to. It was a night worthy of the Elizabethan age, and my solemn Jerusalem flashing up by flame of fire, with Christ hanging over us like a vision, all made up a picture which will long glow upon

that inward eye
which is the bliss of solitude " (p. 362).

In March 1818, Haydon and Keats who was then at Teignmouth were corresponding. Keats in one of his letters wrote, "It has yet been a mystery to me how and where Wordsworth went. I can't help thinking he has returned to his shell, with his beautiful wife and his enchanting sister." It is a great pity that people by associating themselves with the finest things spoil them. Hunt has damned Hampstead with masks and sonnets and Italian tales; Wordsworth has damned the Lakes; Milman has damned the old dramatists; West has damned wholesale; Peacock has damned satire; Hazlitt has damned the bigoted and the blue-stockinged; how darest the man? " (Correspondence and Table Talk, Vol. II, p. 6 ff.; M. B. Forman, Letters of Keats, Vol. I, p. 128, the wordings are slightly different.) In an undated letter Keats wrote from Wentworth Place to Haydon, "I have been writing a little now and then lately, but nothing to speak of, being discontented and, as it were, moulting.....I smoke more and more my own insufficiency, I see by little and little more of what is to be done, and how it is to be done, should I ever be able to do it. On my soul, there should be some reward for that continual "agonie ennuyense." (Correspondence and Table Talk, Vol. II, p. 13.) From the same place in December, 1818, Keats wrote to Haydon about himself, "My general life in society is silence. I feel in myself all the vices of poet-irritability, love of effect and admiration; and influenced by such devils I may at times say more ridiculous things than I am aware of, but I will put a stop to that in a manner I have long resolved upon.....I am certainly more for greatness in a shade than in the open day. I am speaking as a mortal. I should say, I value more the privilege of seeing great things in loneliness, than the fame of a prophet.....I have a little money that may enable me to study, and to travel for three or four years. I never expect to get anything by my books, and, moreover, I wish to avoid publishing. I admire human nature, but I do not like men." (Buxton Forman, Letters of Keats, pp. 232-33.)

That for some reason or other Keats was disgusted with his friends is evident from the letters he wrote to Fanny Brawne before leaving for Italy: "My friends have behaved well to me in every instance but one, and there they have become tattlers, and inquisitors into my conduct: spying upon a secret I would rather die than share it with anybody's confidence. For this I cannot wish them well, I care not to see any of them again. If I am the Theme, I, will not be the Friend of idle Gossips. Good Gods what a shame it is our Loves should be so put into the microscope of a Coterie." (Buxton Forman, *Letters of Keats to Fanny Brawne*, 1878, No. XXXVI.) Also in another letter to Miss Brawne we read, "I shall never be able any more to endure the society of any of those who used to meet at Elm Cottage and Wentworth Place.....I hate men, and women more." (*Ibid*, No. XXXVII.) Allowance must be made for the sick and nervous state of Keats' mind when he wrote such unkind words about his friends. Some of them might have been mean in their dealings with him but that is no reason why he should have fallen foul upon the whole set. They were not infallible or perfect, but a few of them were true to him till his death and even after it. A French biographer of Keats thinks that Haydon was not careful in his relations with Keats during the last days and he was too petty. (A. Erlande, *Life of John Keats*, English Translation by M. Robinson, 1929.) That all was not well with their friendship in 1819 is suggested by George Paston in "B. R. Haydon and his Friends" (1905) who quotes Keats writing to his brother George: "I shall perhaps still be acquainted with him; but for friendship, that is at an end." (P. 101.) Yet Wordsworth writing to Haydon in 1820 enquired, "How is Keats? he is a youth of promise, too great for the sorry company he keeps." (*Correspondence and Table Talk*, Vol. II, p. 35.) As to this "sorry company" which Wordsworth mentions Haydon himself said, "The greatest calamity for Keats was his

being brought before the world by a set who had so much the habit of puffing each other that every one connected with it suffered in public estimation." (Autobiography, p. 335.) In this "puffing each other" business then Haydon personally was involved! One is reminded in this connection of what Sir Walter Scott wrote to H. H. Milman, "I think any complimentary intercourse betwixt men of our craft is very apt to degenerate into a commercial treaty for mutual flattery." (The Letters of Sir Walter Scott, Ed. H. J. C. Grierson, Centenary Edition, Vol. VI, p. 172.)

Haydon was of opinion that Keats died a victim to mistakes on all hands, alike on the part of enemies and friends. (Autobiography, p. 337.) If such is his own verdict then he himself must have been one of those persons responsible for such a catastrophe. Haydon further speaks of the connection of Keats with the "*Examiner*" clique and the unjust aversion against him brought about by it. But the real fact was that he did not like Leigh Hunt and did not pull on well with Reynolds either. Hence he is not fair towards his other friends. After Keats' death Haydon wrote in his Journal, "A genius more purely poetical never existed. In fireside conversation he was weak and inconsequent, but he was in his glory in the fields. He was the most unselfish of human creatures; unadapted to the world,.....he had a kind heart, and would have shared his fortune with any one who wanted it...Poor dear Keats...May your kind and gentle spirit be now mingling with those of Shakespeare and Milton before whose minds you have so often bowed." (Life of B. R. Haydon from his Autobiography and Journals, Edited and compiled by Tom Taylor, 1853, pp. 8-10, Vol. II.) Blunden in the Epilogue to Haydon's Autobiography (1927) remarks, "There is no questioning the warmth of Haydon's friendship for Keats, despite his misunderstandings." The famous Nightingale Ode of Keats was recited first to Haydon and given on his suggestion for publication to the "*Annals of Fine Arts*" which his friend

Jámes Elmes edited. (Keats Memorial Volume, Ed. G. O. Williamson, 1921, article by Sidney Colvin—A Morning's Work in a Hampstead Garden.)

It would not be out of place to note here that Haydon introduced Lamb to Keats though they did not become friends in the sense that Haydon and Keats were. (E. V. Lucas, *The Life of Charles Lamb*, 1921, p. 482 ff., Vol. I.) Keats referred to Lamb's jokes in a letter to his brother George (M. B. Forman, Vol. II, p. 468, Letter dated 17th September, 1819.) In another letter to his brothers he spoke about Lamb getting tipsy. (*Ibid*, Vol. I, pp. 80-81.) Lamb always admired Keats' poetry. (*Gentleman's Magazine*, May, 1838, p. 464, Review of T. N. Talfourd's *Letters of Charles Lamb* by Rev. John Mitford.) Water Jerrold thinks that it is not improbable that Lamb wrote the brief notice of Keats' death which appeared in the "*London Magazine*" under the signature "L." (Thomas Hood and Charles Lamb, pp. 143-44.) This obituary notice is an appreciative one :

"Mr. Keats was, in the truest sense of the word, a poet. There is but a small portion of the public acquainted with the writings of this youngman ; yet they were full of high imagination and delicate fancy, and his images were beautiful and more entirely his own, perhaps, than those of any living writer whatever. He had a fine ear, a tender heart, and at times great force and originality of expression : and notwithstanding all this, he has been suffered to rise and pass away almost without a notice : the laurel has been awarded (for the present) to other brows : the bolder aspirants have been allowed to take their station on the slippery steps of the temple of fame, while he has been nearly hidden among the crowd during his life, and has at last died, solitary and in sorrow, in foreign land." (P. 426, *London Magazine*, April, 1821.) Bertram Dobell on the other hand was of opinion that this might have been written by Bryan Waller Procter. (*Sidelights of Charles Lamb*, 1908, p. 192.) But there is not much

reason to think like that. Lamb was sufficiently generous to be capable of writing in such a vein about a fellow man of letters.

III

Leigh Hunt (1784-1859) was one of the literary luminaries of his own days and Keats was introduced to him by Cowden Clarke. (Clarke, *Recollections of Writers*, 1878, p. 132 ff.) In 1815 Keats had written a sonnet in admiration of Hunt before he actually met him. The Poems of 1817 were dedicated to Hunt in the sonnet "Glory and Loveliness have passed away." Hunt replied in a sonnet to John Keats. (Pp. 36-37, B. Miller Leigh Hunt's Relations with Byron, Shelley and Keats, 1920.) In Hunt's "Foliage" (1818) there are four sonnets addressed to Keats, one of which begins with "Young Keats a flowering laurel on your brow." (Buxton Forman, *Poetical Works of Keats*, Vol. I, Appendix.) Leigh Hunt wrote a very fine sonnet on Keats in 1817 on flyleaf of a copy of Keats' Poems of 1817, now in possession of Mr. H. B. Smith of America :

"Keats, I admire thine upward daring soul,
Thine eager grasp at immortality
I deem within thy reach; rejoic'd I see
Thee spurn, with brow serene, the gross control
Of circumstance; while o'er thee visions roll
In radiant pomp of lovely poesy.
She points to blest abodes where spirits free
Feed on her smiles and her great men extol.
Still shall the pure flame bright within thee burn
While Nature's voice alone directs thy mind;
Who bids thy speculation inward turn
Assuring thee her transcript thou shalt find.
Live hers—live freedom's friend; so round thine urn
The oak shall with thy laurels be entwin'd."

(Bulletin of the Keats-Shelley
Memorial, Rome, Ed. Sir R. Rodd and
H. N. Gay. No. 2, p. 26, 1913; also

“ Note on Some Volumes now in
America once owned by Keats,” by
R. U. Johnson, p. 11.)

Keats was an ardent admirer of Hunt. In several of his sonnets there are enough indications of this. In the sonnet written on the day that Hunt left prison Keats wrote :

“ In Spenser’s halls he stray’d, and bowers fair,
Culling enchanted flowers ; and he flew
With daring Milton through the fields of air :
To regions of his own genius true
Took happy flights.”

In a sonnet to Haydon Hunt is referred to as “ he of the rose, the violet, the spring, the social smile, the chain for Freedom’s sake.” In 1817 Keats wrote a poem on Hunt’s “ Story of Rimini.” Hunt in 1820 dedicated his translation of Tasso’s “ Amyntas ” to Keats.

Keats lived with Leigh Hunt in Hampstead for some time and Hunt has recorded his impressions of Keats’ personal appearance in “ Lord Byron and Some of his Contemporaries ” (1828) : “ He was under the middle height ; and his lower limbs were small in comparison with the upper, but neat and well turned. His shoulders were very broad for his size ; he had a face in which energy and sensibility were remarkably mixed up ; an eager power, checked and made patient by ill-health. Every feature was at once strongly cut, and delicately alive. If there was any faulty expression, it was in the mouth, which was not without something of a character of pugnacity. His face was rather long than otherwise ; the upper lip projected a little over the under ; the chin was bold, the cheeks sunken ; the eyes mellow and flowing ; large, dark, and sensitive. At the recital of a noble action, or a beautiful thought, they would suffuse with tears, and his mouth trembled. In this, there was ill-health as well as imagination, for he had great moral courage.....His hair, of a brown colour, was fine, and hung in natural ringlets. The

head was a puzzle for the phrenologists, being remarkably small in the skull : a singularity which he had in common with Byron and Shelley, whose hats I could not get on " (pp. 246-47).

When Keats left England Hunt addressed to him a message of farewell which was published in the "*Indicator*" (20th September, 1820) : "Thou hast 'a mighty soul in a little body ;' and the kind cares of the former for all about thee shall no longer subject the latter to the chance of impressions which it scorns ; and the soft skies of Italy shall breathe balm upon it ; and thou shalt return with thy friend the nightingale, and make all thy other friends as happy with thy voice as they are sorrowful to miss ●. The little cage thou didst sometime share with us, looks as deficient without thee, as thy present one may do without us ;—but—farewell for a while : thy heart is in our fields ; and thou wilt soon be back rejoined to it." (Buxton Forman, *Collected Works*, Vol. IV ; also Blunden, Leigh Hunt's "*Examiner*" examined, 1928, p. 158.)

After the departure for Italy Hunt did not cease to take interest in Keats. In a letter to Joseph Severn early in 1821 Hunt wrote, "Tell him—tell that great poet and noble-hearted man—that we shall all bear his memory in the most-precious part of our hearts, and that the world shall bow their heads to it, as our loves do.....Tell him he is only before us on the road, as he is in everything else ; or, whether you tell him the latter or no, tell him the former, and that we are coming after him. The tears are again in my eyes, and I must not afford to shed them." (The *Correspondence of Leigh Hunt*, Edited by Thornton Hunt, 1862, Vol. I, p. 108.) It was Leigh Hunt who made Shelley take an interest in Keats. Shelley in a letter from Pisa in November, 1820, to Marianne Hunt wrote, "Where is Keats now ? I am anxiously expecting him in Italy, when I shall take care to bestow every possible attention on him. I consider his a most valuable life, and I am deeply interested in his safety. I intend to be the physician

both of his body and of his soul, to keep the one warm, and to teach the other Greek and Spanish. I am aware, indeed, in part, that I am nourishing a rival who will far surpass me ; and this is an additional motive and will be an added pleasure." (*Ibid*, p. 159.)

But Hunt was not always particular if he wronged his friend for in a letter to Shelley (1st March, 1821) he spoke of Keats as "fearfully sensitive." (*Ibid*, p. 163.) His own admission is, "I could not love him as deeply as I did Shelley. That was impossible. But my affection was only second to the one which I entertained for that heart of hearts. Keats, like Shelley himself, enjoyed the usual privilege of greatness with all whom he knew, rendering it delightful to be obliged by him, and an equal, but not greater, delight to oblige. It was a pleasure to his friends to have him in their houses, and he did not grudge it." (Autobiography of Leigh Hunt, p. 331, 1928 Edition, originally published in 1850.) During the formative period of the poetical career of Keats Leigh Hunt was of assistance to him and it would not be unreasonable to think that he stimulated to some extent the genius of Keats in the production of poetry.

IV

Three persons who should be placed in one group were extremely friendly to Keats. These were John Taylor (1781-1864), James Augustus Hessey (1785-1870), and Richard Woodhouse (1788 or 1789-1834). John Taylor was a partner of the firm of the publishers, Taylor and Hessey. He was of Scottish descent and son of James Taylor, a publisher at Retford. He was the originator of the theory that Sir Philip Francis wrote the letter of Junius in his book "Junius Identified." He and his partner Hessey lived at Fleet Street till the latter married and to their residence Lamb, Hazlitt, Keats, Reynolds and others were visitors. In 1821 Taylor became editor of the

London Magazine with Hood as sub-editor. In 1825 Taylor and Hessey dissolved their partnership and two years later Taylor became publisher to the University of London. Taylor spent his last days at Kensington and lies buried at Gamston near Retford. Both Taylor and Hessey were very good friends to Keats. They advanced him money and had high admiration for his poetic powers. The relationship that existed between Keats and his publishers was above the ordinary cordiality that often exists between an author and his publishers and can be said to have been very intimate.

Taylor was really interested in Keats as will be evident from some of his letters. In a letter dated 15th May, 1818 Taylor wrote, "I have been calling this Morning on Mr. Gifford, and am happy in having secured an Acquaintance which I should never have suffered to decline had I been wise. He seems satisfied with the Identity of Junius—but what I principally wanted to see him for was to speak a Word or two in Favour of Keats. I had heard that he is writing an Article on Leigh Hunt, Shelley and Keats. I wished him to understand that Keats was a young Man of great Promise, whom it would be cruel to sacrifice on the sole account of his Connexion with Hunt, a Connexion which would doubtless soon be Dissolved by the Differences of their Characters. He heard and assented to all I said, but I fear it is too late to be of much Service, for he pointed to an Article in which they are noticed, then lying on his Table, and I fear it will not experience any alteration from my Appeal." (*London Mercury*, p. 258, 1825.) Two years later Taylor wrote, "Next week Keats's new Volume of Poems will be published, and if it does not sell well I think nothing will ever sell again, I am sure of this, that for poetic Genius there is not his equal living, and I would compare him against anyone with either Milton or Shakespeare for his Beauties" (*Ibid*, p. 259). In a letter, dated August 10, 1820, to his brother, Taylor referred to the bad financial position of Keats as his brother

George had borrowed all his money and of his own desire to advance him so much as will carry him to Rome and back again. Through Taylor's efforts a certain amount of money was clubbed by mutual friends.

Taylor wrote the introductions to John Clare's "Poems descriptive of Rural Life and Scenery" (1820) and "The Village Minstrel and other Poems" (1821) and these were published by his own company. In many of Taylor's letters to Clare written between 1820 and 1837 there are references to Keats, Reynolds, Woodhouse, Hessey, Lamb, and others (*London Mercury*, 1921). His faith in Keats was very great and in the letters to Clare he affirmed it again and again (*ibid*, pp. 141, 142, 146). On the 26th March, 1821, Taylor wrote to Clare, "The life of poor Keats is ended at last: he died at the age of 25.—He used to say he should effect nothing upon which he would rest his fame till he was 30, and all our hopes are over at 25. But he has left enough though he did not think so and if his Biographer cannot do him Justice the advocate is in Fault, and not the cause" (p. 145). In Clare's "The Village Minstrel and other Poems" there is a poem to the memory of Keats and it was written obviously on the request of Taylor:

"The world, its hopes, and fears, have pass'd away;
 No more its trifling thou shalt feel or see;
 Thy hopes are ripening in a brighter day,
 While these left buds thy monument shall be.
 When Rancour's aims have passed in nought away,
 Enlarging specks discern'd in more than thee,
 And beauties' minishing which few display,—
 When these are past, true child of Poesy,
 Thou shalt survive—Ah, while a being dwells,
 With soul, in Nature's joys, to warm like thine,
 With eye to view her fascinating spells,
 And dream entranced o'er each form divine,
 Thy worth, Enthusiast, shall be cherish'd here,—
 Thy name with him shall linger, and be dear." (Vol. II, p. 207.)

Clare has left an interesting pen-picture of Taylor from which it can be gathered that he was "a man of very pleasant address," "a very pleasant talker," "a clever fellow and a man of Genius." (Blunden, *Sketches in the Life of John Clare by Himself*, pp. 117-19.) After 1825 Taylor did not see much of his old friends and in some of his letters between 1826 and 1830 there is a sad note. The *London Magazine* group had become dismembered and Taylor had also given up publishing. (See Blunden, *New Sidelights on Keats, Lamb and others from Letters to J. Clare*, *London Mercury*, June, 1921; Also Blunden, *Shelley and Keats as they struck their Contemporaries*, 1925.)

Taylor was a man of character and learning. No wonder that to him Keats confided at times his best thoughts. In February, 1818, Keats wrote, "I think Poetry should surprise by a fine excess and not by Singularity—it should strike the Reader as a wording of his own highest thoughts, and appear almost a Remembrance. Its touches of Beauty should never be half way thereby making the reader breathless instead of content: the rise, the progress, the setting of imagery should like the sun come natural to him—shine over him and set soberly although in magnificence leaving him in the Luxury of twilight." (Letters of Keats, M. B. Forman, Vol. I, p. 116.) In another letter Keats expressed his desire of finding enjoyment through "continual drinking of knowledge." (*Ibid*, p. 146.) In a subsequent letter Keats spoke of rather reading Chaucer than Ariosto. (*Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 481.) Keats was singularly fortunate in securing the good services of publishers like these who not only appreciated his merit but also stood by him in financial straits.

James Augustus Hessey played the second fiddle to Taylor. Before he became a partner of Taylor he was with a firm called Lackington & Co. of Finsbury Square, London, which Taylor had also served for some years. Probably because Taylor was the senior and naturally more important of the

two, Hessey preferred to remain in the background. Yet that he was a man of discernment can be judged from Keats' letter to him, "The Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a man : It cannot be matured by law and precept, but by a sensation and watchfulness in itself. That which is creative must create itself." (Letters of Keats, M. B. Forman, Vol. I, p. 243.) Hessey had profound regard for Keats. In a letter to a friend he wrote about the 1820 volume of Poems, "For my part, I think no single volume of Poems ever gave me more real delight on the whole than I have received from this." (*London Mercury*, Vol. IV, 1921, p. 143.) On another occasion he wrote, "Hyperion is full of the most sublime poetical Images, and the small Poems delight me very much." (*Ibid.*) After their partnership was dissolved Hessey was for some time a Book and Print auctioneer and later on became a school master in Hampstead. To this school came the nephews of his former partner Taylor.

Taylor's account of Hessey is quite interesting. "James Augustus Hessey is thin, dresses principally in black, his face is round and good-humoured when he does not frown—when he does, it has the contrary expression. He is about 22, but retains a boyish appearance about the head. His application is good—his Conversation and manners, lively. He has a readiness of droll quotation, and humorous allusion—is somewhat witty but had rather be considered a man of strong sense. His enunciation is not very distinct, but rapid, and when he wishes to utter his opinion in a serious manner, he hesitates or stutters a little, as if in doubt what words to select next. He can speak with propriety on all subjects because his good sense teaches him how far he is qualified to speak. He is a great favourite wherever he goes, particularly with young Ladies, who like him for his cheerfulness, and because he sings a little, plays a little, and dances as well.....In a word he has wit and accomplishment sufficient to please everybody, and Sense enough to make them the subordinate

parts of his character." (*London Mercury*, Vol. XII, 1925, pp. 164-65.)

Richard Woodhouse belonged to an old Hertfordshire family. His father lived at Bath. He was educated at Eton and knew French, Spanish and Italian. Though interested in literature Woodhouse did not publish anything. He was a solicitor and a sort of literary adviser to Taylor and Hessey. Woodhouse wrote a friendly letter to Keats after the Blackwood and Quarterly's attack. (Amy Lowell, *John Keats*, Vol. II, pp. 97 ff.) Previous to this he had written a sonnet to Apollo which was inspired by Keats' *Poems of 1817*. (Amy Lowell, Vol. I, p. 281.) In the course of his reply to Woodhouse Keats wrote, "A Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because he has no Identity—he is continually in for and filling some other Body—The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women who are creatures of impulse are poetical and have about them an unchangeable attribute—the poet has none; no identity—he is certainly the most unpoetical of all God's Creatures." (M. B. Forman, Vol. I, p. 245.) In the same letter Keats wrote, "I am ambitious of doing the world some good: if I should be spared that may be the work of maturer years—in the interval I will assay to reach as high a summit in Poetry as the nerve bestowed upon me will suffer." (*Ibid*, p. 246.) In a letter to his cousin Woodhouse remarked about Keats, "Such a genius, I verily believe, has not appeared since Shakespeare and Milton." (Amy Lowell, Vol. II, p. 187; also *Times Literary Supplement*, April 16, 1914).

But Keats knew his limitations better than his friends. In September, 1819, he sent the "Ode to Autumn" and some lines from "Hyperion" to Woodhouse in the course of a letter from Winchester in which he truly expressed opinions about his own poems. "The Pot of Basil" Keats thought as "too smokable." (M. B. Forman, Vol. II, p. 425.) His own criticism of it was, "Isabella is what I should call were

I a reviewer 'A weak-sided Poem' with an amusing sober-sadness about it." (*Ibid*, p. 426.) Yet Woodhouse hoped, "His faults will wear away—his fire will be chastened—and then eyes will do homage to his brilliancy. But genius is wayward, trembling, easily daunted. And shall we not excuse the errors, the luxuriancy of youth? He had the faith that Keats during his life would "rank on a level with the best of the last or present generation: and after his death will take his place at their head." (Colvin, Keats, 1917, p. 368.) Before Keats left England Woodhouse wrote to him, "God bless you!—Take care of yourself,—if it be only for your friends' sake. Above all, keep your mind at ease. There are many who take more than a brotherly Interest in your welfare." (Amy Lowell, Vol. II, p. 462.) With Haslam he accompanied Keats as far as Gravesend on his way to Italy, one of the last friendly acts that he could do.

His special claim to remembrance is due to the fact that he was a sort of editor of Keats' works in as much as he collected and copied all kinds of writings by Keats which otherwise would have been lost. Woodhouse was an excellent classic, had a turn for poetry and possessed a great deal of humanity. (*London Mercury*, 1925, p. 165, for Taylor's impressions of Woodhouse.) About 1830 he was attacked with consumption and went abroad for the improvement of his health. He did not recover. His friends now and then visited him and before he died in September, 1834, he left all his MS. papers containing unpublished poems of Keats and various other matter relating to him with Taylor who wrote in this connection to a friend, "I don't know when it would be possible for me to do anything with them. I should like to print a complete Edition of Keats's Poems, with several of his Letters. but the world cares nothing for him—I fear that even 250 copies would not sell." (*London Mercury*, June, 1921, p. 146.) Woodhouse had done his duty, but Taylor was probably thinking here as a publisher and reckoning the

uccess of such an enterprise. Yet we cannot blame him too much if we consider that Keats had not even then begun to be very much appreciated in England.

V

In 1817 Keats first came to know Charles Wentworth Dilke (1789-1864) and Charles Armitage Brown (1786-1842) when the Keats brothers were living in Well Walk, Hampstead. Dilke and Brown were friends of Hunt and had been school-fellows. Brown had been in business, while Dilke was in the Civil Service. They shared a house or rather a joint block of two houses called Wentworth Place. In December, 1818, Keats came to live at this place with Brown after the death of Tom Keats. His life at Wentworth Place was eventful. It was at this place that he came to know Fanny Brawne. On occasions he was away from town either to see friends of Dilke in Hampshire or to the Isle of Wight to see James Rice. At the latter place Brown joined him. Some of his best poems were written during his stay at Brown's residence. In Brown's lodging Keats began "Hyperion" which was published as a fragment. It is probably through the efforts of Brown that the Nightingale Ode was preserved. Lord Houghton says, "Mr. Brown saw him thrusting them away, as waste paper, behind some books, and had considerable difficulty in putting together and arranging the stanzas of the Ode. Other poems as literally 'fugitive' were rescued in much the same way—for he permitted Mr. Brown to copy whatever he could pick up, and sometimes assisted him." (Life and Letters of Keats, p. 175.) Cowden Clarke rightly observes, "Keats never had a more zealous, a finer, or more practical friend and adviser than Armitage Brown." (Recollections of Writers, p. 146.)

Brown in spite of his having been a business man took considerable interest in letters. He had some share in the tragedy "Otho the Great," on which Keats was engaged at Winchester and Shanklin in 1819. In 1814 Brown had published a comic opera "Narensky." It was performed in the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, London, in June, 1814. In the preface Brown wrote, "This Opera was written nearly five years ago. The plot was founded on an event which occurred in Russia, during my residence there." In 1829 Brown went to Italy and there he helped Edward Trelawny with "The Adventures of a Younger Son." From Italy Brown came to England to migrate soon to New Zealand with his family. But before he left England he handed over all the materials about Keats in his possession to Moncton Milnes. In 1842 he died at New Plymouth, New Zealand. In 1878 John George Cooke, friend of Trelawny, wrote to Walter Severn about Brown, "He was buried outside the churchyard at Taranaki (New Plymouth). His son and myself were his mourners, and there, under the beautiful shadow of our glorious mountain Taranaki, after life's fitful fever, let us hope he sleeps well." (*Life and Letters of Joseph Severn—William Sharp, 1892, p. 265.*)

That Brown was in earnest about writing a memoir of Keats will be evident from a letter he wrote to Fanny Brawne from Florence in 1829 in which he asked for permission to use Keats' poems addressed to her and some of his letters to her: "As his love for you formed so great a part of him, we may be doing him an injustice in being silent on it: Indeed something must be said especially as Hunt has said something." (*The Keats Letters, Papers, and other Relics, Ed. G. C. Williamson.*) Hunt's indiscretion referred to in this letter had its origin in a talk with Keats that he recorded in "Lord Byron and some of his Contemporaries" (p. 267) in which he hinted at Keats' suspicion that Fanny Brawne was flirting with Brown. But whatever might have been Keats'

fault in this matter Brown himself has said, "He possessed the noble virtues of friendship and generosity to excess; and they, in this world, may chance to spoil a man of independent feeling, till he is destitute." Hunt was not within his rights in betraying a secret confided to him in a moment of mental agony. The scheme of Brown did not materialise on account of circumstances over which probably he had no control. But he did a very judicious thing in entrusting Monoton Milnes with the literary remains of Keats. (See Lord Houghton's Aldine Edition of Keats' Poems, 1876, for Brown's notes on some works of Keats). The other version of *Hyperion* which Brown entrusted to Milnes was published by him in the *Miscellanies* of the Philobiblion Society. (London, 1856-57, Vol. III.) In a note Milnes says, "Is it the original sketch out of which the earlier part of the printed poem was composed, or is it the commencement of a reconstruction of the whole? I have no external evidence to decide this question; but it seems to me that, in either case, this fragment well deserves preservation."

During the last days of Keats as during the earlier days of his illness Brown was constantly with him. "Mr. Brown is just the man to be happy with," wrote a friend of Severn. (*Life and Letters of Severn*, p. 142.) Keats' last letter from Italy was to Brown. About him Severn wrote in a letter, "He is not only a man of genius but of most beautiful taste." (*Ibid*, p. 139.) Brown was a writer of tales and also of miscellaneous descriptive and critical papers. He once intended to write the reminiscences of men of letters and artists he knew. Sometimes he devoted himself to serious literary work. In 1838 was published Brown's "*Shakespeare's Autobiographical Poems*"—a study of his Sonnets. In a dedication to W. S. Lander the author said: "To you I first communicated at Florence my explanation of Shakespeare's Sonnets. The interest you felt, and your desire that I should publish the discovery, have induced me, though after a lapse of ten years,

to enter on the serious, and, perhaps unpardonable task, of solving a literary difficulty." In an advertisement at the end of this volume there was an announcement to the effect that Brown was preparing for the press an edition of Shakespeare's Poems. But what became of this is unknown. People have forgotten his explanation of the Sonnets of Shakespeare or his serio-comic opera. But his friendship for Keats is still remembered. William Sharp writes: "The only rival of Severn in the minds of those who revere the genius of Keats, is Charles Armitage Brown.....The prevalent impression seems to be that Brown was merely a man of independent means and literary tastes; but he was, in truth, and of necessity, much more a professional man of letters than were most of the minor members of the Keats circle, certainly not less, for instance, than was John Hamilton Reynolds, though Reynolds had a finer native talent and a more distinctive expression... ..he was at once a shrewd man of the world and an impulsive enthusiast, loyal and unselfish in his affections, bitter and often unreasonable in his dislikes, at all times ready to resent an affront, real or imaginary, or to smoke the pipe of peace whether as forgiver or as the forgiven." (Life and Letters of Joseph Severn, Preface, pp. vii-viii.)

Charles Wentworth Dilke was in the Navy Pay office. He edited a continuation of Dodsley's "Old Plays" about 1815, wrote till 1830 in various monthly and quarterly journals. For some years he edited "the Athenæum." His earliest friends were J. H. Reynolds, Thomas Hood, Keats and Charles Brown. In 1816 he came to know Keats. In June 1818, Keats and Brown went on a tour in north England and Scotland. Keats was at that time in far from good health. On receiving the news of a worse turn in his brother's illness Keats returned to London all on a sudden and Mrs. Dilke made a note of this incident. "John Keats arrived here last night, as brown and as shabby as you can imagine; scarcely any shoes left, his jacket all torn at

the back, a fur cap, a great plaid, and his knapsack. I cannot tell what he looked like." (The Papers of a Critic, in two volumes, 1875, by C. W. Dilke with a biographical sketch by his grandson Sir C. W. Dilke, Kt., M.P., p. 5.) In the month of September of that year Keats wrote a letter to Dilke shortly after an attack upon him by the *Blackwoods' Magazine*. In January 1819, when Keats and Brown went for another trip Mrs. Dilke introduced him to her father-in-law: "You will find him a very odd young man, but good-tempered, and good-hearted, and very clever indeed." (*Ibid*, p. 6.) Both from Shanklin and Winchester Keats was in correspondence with Dilke. In 1820 Mrs. Dilke wrote to her father-in-law: "I am anxious to learn what success Keats' new poems have. I do not promise myself a great victory. If the public cry him up as a great poet, I will henceforth be their humble servant; if not, the devil take the public." (*Ibid*, p. 11.) Keats in the same year wrote a letter to Dilke intimating his desire of taking up surgeon's work in a ship.

Dilke also helped Lord Houghton in his Life of Keats. In 1859 Joseph Severn came to England to raise the question of a new monument to Keats at Rome and had a long correspondence with Dilke, who wrote to Moncton Milnes: "If you are of opinion that a monument should be erected to Keats whether in Rome or in London, I shall be most happy to subscribe, but to destroy the existing monument, and erect another on its site, seems to me very like falsifying history. If, as Mr. Severn says, this unseemly stone was erected when Keats's memory was cherished by few, and his genius known to fewer; and if Keats was so embittered by discouragement that he desired those words to mark his grave, then the unseemly stone tells the story of his life. If the fame of Keats be now world-wide the anomaly is another fact, and I for one am willing to join in recording it on another monument. As to the proposed inscription, it is certainly not to my taste; but

if you approve I will waive my objections, and will hope you are right." (*Ibid*, p. 12.) This project was never carried out. (For some letters of Keats to Dilke and for a letter from Severn to Dilke respecting a monument to Keats, see *The Keats Letters, Papers, and other Relics*, Ed. Williamson ; for the Dilke bequests in the Hampstead Public Library, see W. E. Doubleday—*Hand-book on the Dilke Bequest*, 1914.) Regarding Dilke Keats once wrote to his brother George : " Dilke will never come at a truth as long as he lives ; because he is always trying at it. He is a Godwin-Methodist." (*Letters M.B. Forman*, Vol. II, p. 466.)

These were some of the more intimate friends that Keats had. It should not, however, be supposed that they were his only friends. There were others with whom at one time or another he had been friendly. Among these was George Felton Mathew whom Mr. Middleton Murry calls " an elegant, Pure and Aerial mind." (*Studies in Keats*.) Keats met him at the house of a family of well-to-do tradespeople named the Mathews through his brother George. Mathew addressed a poem to Keats which was published in the "*European Magazine*" in October, 1816. In May 1817, he reviewed Keats' poems in the same periodical : " Religion and the love of virtue are not inconsistent with the character of a poet ; they should shine like the moon upon his thoughts, direct the course of his enquiries, and illuminate his reflections upon mankind. We consider that the specimens here presented to our readers, will establish our opinion of Mr. Keats's poetical imagination ; but mere luxuries of imagination, more especially in the possession of the proud egoist of diseased feelings and perverted principles, may become the ruin of a people—inculcate the falsest and most dangerous ideas of the condition of humanity and refine us into the degeneracy of butterflies that perish in the deceitful glories of a destructive taper. These observations might be considered impertinent, were they applied to one who had discovered any incapacity

for loftier flights—to one who could not appreciate the energies of Milton or of Shakespeare—to one who could not soar to the heights of poesy,—and ultimately hope to bind his brows with the glorious sunbeams of immortality.” Murray regards this review as “pretentious turgidity.” Felton Mathew dropped away when Cowden Clarke came to London and introduced Keats to Leigh Hunt and his circle. Lord Houghton spoke of Mathew as “a gentleman of high literary merit.” (*Life, Letters and Literary Remains of Keats*, 1848, p. 14.) He added that this friend had introduced Keats to agreeable society, both of books and men.

A friend worth mentioning was James Rice to whom Keats addressed the sonnet, “O that a week could be an age,” etc. (*Amy Lowell*, Vol. I, p. 617.) Buxton Forman thinks that this was addressed to Reynolds. (*Complete Works of Keats*, 1900-01, Vol. II, p. 199.) Another friend was Thomas Richards. About Rice, Reynolds and Richards Keats on one occasion wrote to his sister-in-law Georgiana, “Rice is the wisest, Reynolds the playfullest, Richards the out-o’-the-wayest. The first makes you laugh and think, the second makes you laugh and not think, the third puzzles your head. I admire the first, I enjoy the second, I stare at the third.” Another friend whom Keats came to know through Reynolds was Benjamin Bailey. Keats stayed with him at Oxford and visited Stratford-on-Avon in his company. Bailey became a clergyman. He also wrote an appreciation of Wordsworth. Keats regarded him as “one of the noblest men alive.” Yet Amy Lowell calls him a pedant and a prig. (*Keats*, Vol. I, p. 253.) There is something wrong in Amy Lowell’s judgment of the friends of Keats. Professor Garrod has justly criticised her “proximity of imagination” in his lectures delivered from the Chair of Poetry at Oxford in 1925. (*Keats*, Clarendon Press, 1926.) She has made too much out of too little and she is unduly severe upon almost all friends of Keats excepting

Woodhouse. It should be said in drawing this study to a close that Keats was singularly fortunate in drawing round him a number of sincere friends and it is to their credit as well as to that of the man himself that most of them remained true to his memory even long after he was dead.

JAYADEVA THE POET AND MYSTIC ¹

BY

MAKHANLAL MUKHERJI, M.A.

Contemporary opinion seems to be in favour of the view that the Gītagovinda as a work of art has a significance not very consistent with what is clearly its religious appeal. Apparently viewed the work, though recognised as a masterpiece of Sanskrit literature, jars on modern taste by its vehement eroticism,—however much one would transmute it into the love divine. But as a matter of fact, if we are not forgetful of our traditions, the work which ravished the heart of Śrī Gaurāṅgadeva, the purest of mortals,—the work which has poured and is still pouring the balm of Gilead on the lacerated hearts of thousands of pious souls cannot be simply brushed aside by such an exoteric standard. Indeed like the famous Song of Songs of Solomon, which, as reconstructed in the form of a drama by Monsieur Renan, is almost unsurpassed in the whole range of mystical literature in the West, the Gītagovinda has a unique standard of its own as being the maturest product of one who combined in his wonderful genius the truest poet and the supreme mystic. It will be our endeavour in this paper to deal with the Gītagovinda not only as a work of art, but as a representative work of mysticism, and to point out in this connection the relation between art and religion. We shall also try to bring

¹ A part of this paper appeared in a modified form in the *Presidency College Magazine*, January, 1931.

out a justification of the fact so apparent in all mystical writings, *viz.*, the vehemence of sensuous appeal, and lastly we shall point out the differences from such standard Vaiṣṇava literature as the Bhāgavata and the Harivaṃśa, which Jayadeva has introduced in order to emphasize the mystical note.

Now to do at least a partial justice to the claims of the Gītagovinda as a work of art, we must dive down into the first principles to consider for ourselves what it is that we mean by art and, incidentally, a work of art. In this we shall try the path indicated by one of the greatest of modern philosophers, Benedetto Croce, in his remarkable work, "The History of Aesthetics."

After distinguishing between intuitive and logical knowledge, Croce characterises the former as being that which is obtained through imagination, of individual things (and not of their relations) and finally as being productive of images. So that the distinction between reality and non-reality is extraneous, secondary to the true nature of intuition, where all is real, nothing is real. Again, intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge. To intuit is to express; and nothing else (nothing more but nothing less) than to express.

The true critical attitude with regard to a work of art is to ask if it be expressive and what it expresses, whether it speaks or stammers or is altogether silent and not to ask if it obey the law of an epic or a tragedy, of historical painting or landscape. For in aesthetic analysis it is impossible to separate subjective from objective, lyric from epic, the image of feeling from that of things.

The true artist, in fact, finds himself big with his theme, he knows not how; he feels the moment of birth drawing near, but he cannot will it or not will it. Thus, while making a verbal pretence of agreeing or yielding a feigned obedience, artists have, however, really always disregarded the so-called

laws of artistic and literary kinds. Every true work of art has violated some established kind and upset the ideas of the critics, who have thus been obliged to broaden kinds, until finally even the broadened kind has proved too narrow owing to the appearance of new works of art. Every true work of art is a standard by itself.

Art, then, is independent both of science and of the useful or the moral. There should be no fear lest frivolous or cold art should thus be justified, since what is truly frivolous or cold is so because it has not been raised to expression, or in other words, frivolity and frigidity come always from the form of the aesthetic treatment, from failure to grasp a content, not from the material qualities of the content itself.

But this attitude should not be misunderstood. It is not scientifically incorrect to talk of tragedies, comedies, dramas, romances, pictures of everyday life, battle-pieces, landscapes, sea-scapes, poems, versicles, lyrics and the like, and to draw attention to certain groups of works in general and approximately to which, for one reason or another, it is desired to draw attention. But here from aesthetes that we were, we have changed into logicians; from contemplators of expression into reasoners.

Lastly, it follows as a corollary to what we have said above that all translations are impossible in so far as they pretend to effect the remoulding of one expression into another. And one great characteristic of a true work of art is the fact of its being un-translatable.

Now religion or dharma as we better understand it, dharma—the substance, the self-ness of things and of men,—is the inherent or intuitive expression of practical aspirations and ideals. It is not something that is forced upon us from the outside, neither a sort of acquired habit; but it is something that is immanent in our constitution as human beings; we cannot have it or not have it, according to our sweet will. Every man as such is more or less religious-minded. It is

this religious-mindedness that guides us in our conduct and circumstances and largely accounts for the difference in conduct in men even under the same circumstances. One man in affluent circumstances gives away everything for the mitigation of human suffering; another, under as much affluence becomes the more stingy to get his bank-amounts doubled and trebled. This religious sense is never extinct; and it must not be confused with the so-called morality. But if we take morality to be fundamentally the expression of humanity as a whole through the individual, it merges into dharma as we have conceived it. Every true poet and artist possesses either consciously or unconsciously this religious sense in a high degree. The birth-pangs of creation that they feel cannot but arouse in them the highest religious feeling like the pain of child-birth of the mother.

Especially so was the case with the poets and artists of India, and medieval Europe. As sister Nivedita in her searchingly synthetic essay very beautifully puts it: "There was a mood when we held in our hands an old book, an old picture, an old jewel, or even things as a padlock, a piece of brass-work, or a fragment of embroidery. It was a mood of leisure and simplicity, to which the work in hand at the moment was the whole aim of life. The craftsman was concentrated upon his labour. The whole of Dharma lay in the beauty he was bringing forth. His craft was for the moment or for that moment in the existence of humanity that we call a man's life—his religion." It is of this religion as a feeling and not merely as knowledge that we shall speak.

This religiousness is purely individualistic. And if it starts from the Divine nature, rather than from man and his surroundings, if it does not develop in an ethical reference, it transcends into mysticism, where the dominant note, as St. Augustine sounds it, is—"I believe, therefore do I speak. Say unto my soul, I am thy salvation. Speak it out that I may hear thee. Behold, the ears of my heart are before thee,

O Lord, open them and say unto my soul, I am thy Salvation. O Lord, to whom being and living are not several things, because both to be and to live in the highest degree is of thy very essence. Whatsoever I speak, or write, or read, or number, let all serve thee, O God, Thou Light of my soul, Thou Bread of the eternal mouth of my soul, and Thou Firmest Knot, marrying my soul and the bosom of my thoughts together." Mysticism thus maintains the possibility of direct intercourse with this Being of Beings—intercourse by a species of ecstatic transfusion or identification, in which the individual becomes in very truth "partaker of the divine nature." God ceases to be an object to him and becomes an experience; and what may be called the symbolism of religious feeling remains not simply a speculation but comes to be literally or metaphysically true as an endeavour after the realization of an ineffable union. And "it is a marked characteristic," as Evelyn Underhill says, "of mystical literature that the great contemplatives, in their effort to convey to us the nature of this communion with the Super-Sensuous are inevitably drawn to employ some form of sensuous imagery; and their fearless employment of homely and physical symbols—often startling and even revolting to the unaccustomed taste—is in direct proportion to the exaltation of their spiritual life." With the mystics the mind is as it were the sixth sense (सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितम् as we have it) and they alone can speak of hearing with the eye, seeing with the ear and so on, which will sound to us extremely absurd and paradoxical. But does not our talk of light and colour sound as absurd to a man born-blind? "Between Nature and ourselves—more, between ourselves and our own consciousness—hangs a veil, a veil dense and opaque for normal men, but then almost transparent, for the artist, the poet and the mystic."

To those who still have the incongruity between art and religion lurking in their minds the following words of a recent writer, Mr. W. G. Raffe may commend themselves: "Every

human need is ended by the satisfaction of union with the object desired. Religion is the process of the attainment of the final satisfaction and religious teaching in every land is the story of the attainment of union. Consequently the symbols of art, which is inspired from the same supernal force, have union as their main subject. All art is the teaching of religion, and the very form of religion itself is created as a work of art by a supreme artist. Each body of teaching is made for its own time and place, addressed to its own people, but all taken from the same origin. But each in its own way stresses the act of union and each uses as symbols the facts of the lower world, and even lower modes of union, as types of the higher."

This general and somewhat abstract outline is drawn, as is apparent, with an eye to the subject in hand, *viz.*, the Gītagovinda of Jayadeva. The Gītagovinda is the only work, as far we know, by Jayadeva. It is a whole life-time's fruition under the mild-dewed touch of religion; an ardent mind has burst forth into songs, a mind that has always lost itself in identification with its lover even as Rādhā is described as having been. Nothing tells so strongly clearly in a piece of work as its motive. And what, one wonders, is the motive of the Gītagovinda, so diligent a piece of work? Its motive is to reveal the joy of self-expression of the mystic, and in every rippling dance of the music of his songs we feel the heart-beats of the poet within our heart of hearts and every page of the work is like a petal of his heart unfolded. This song-offering has been his only life-long worship to his lover, the Eternal Flute-player. The work has been his life of life, his religion and it has the supreme honour of creating or at least foreshadowing a religion that was to have its day some centuries later.

It now only remains to fill in this outline. The first thing, as we have stated above, would be to ask what the Gītagovinda tries to express and that with what success. This can be done in no better way than by taking a synopsis of the whole work, by going through every canto of the work,

in an appreciative and critical manner. But this is much more than what our space will permit and we shall have to rest content with only a rapid and helpful analysis.

In the first place, there is the “*मेवैमेदुर*” śloka over the significance of which a great deal of controversial breath has been expended. But obviously with the reading of the stanza over again after we have finished the work once, we have our first vague idea confirmed that it expresses and embodies within itself the meaning of the whole book. Kṛṣṇa asks Rādhā to get for him a shelter and what more fitting shelter can Rādhā give than her own heart when their perfect union is effected in the twelfth canto; it is thus that a man finds himself bound within the life of a householder in the love of his own beloved.¹ The stanza has thus a twofold significance. It gives the meaning of the whole work in a nutshell as well as introduces us into the religious atmosphere of the poem. Then follows in three stanzas an account of the poet himself as also of his contemporaries and the class of readers for whom the work is meant. Now the line “*यदि हरिकरणे सरसं मनो यदि विलासकलासु कुतूहलम्,*” with its apparently contradictory tone at once reveals the mystic, who like Kavir, does not see with approval prescriptions of dry mortifications for spiritual uplift and well-being, and who, conscious of the divinity of all things, delights in arts as a means of service at the feet of his God and Beloved. Then comes very appropriately the first song, singing the glory of God, as भगवान् with superhuman faculties, and not as the supreme soul, running closely parallel in thought with the—

यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्भवति भारत ।

अभ्युत्थानमधर्मस्य तदात्मानं सृजाम्यहम् ॥

verse of the Gītā. But after an intervention of one śloka we come to the second song which in general harps on the deeds

¹ Compare the Com. *Rasikapriyā*, *ad. loc.*

of the Kṛṣṇa-incarnation alone—and we may add, of the Gopāla-Kṛṣṇa as distinguished from the Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa, in which the main note is that he comes not only for the deliverance of mankind but also to realise himself infinitely through his activities. As Dr. S. N. Das Gupta puts it : “The episodes of Kṛṣṇa’s life are often conceived to happen on a non-physical plane, where both Kṛṣṇa and his partners are thought to play their parts of love and friendship in non-physical bodies. Thus, they are not regarded as particular events that took place at specific points of time in the life of a particular man, Kṛṣṇa. They are interpreted as the eternal, timeless, spaceless play of God with His own associates and his energies, with whom He eternally realises Himself in love and friendship.”

The mystico-philosophical significance that the above excerpt sees into the Kṛṣṇa episodes has been in another way stated in the Gopāla-tāpanī Upaniṣad, which may be conveniently taken notice of at this place. The Gopāla-tāpanī is a curious mixture of Upaniṣadic thought with Tāntric rituals and observances. Be this as it may, it adopts the Upaniṣadic view that Gopāla Kṛṣṇa is nothing but the परमात्मन् (Supreme soul) and गोपीs his मायाशक्ति (the manifestations of power) that through नाम and रूप conceals from the Jivātman (the individual Soul) his true identity which consists in the realisation of तत्त्वमसि (Thou art That). The play of Kṛṣṇa with Rādhā, the chief of the गोपीs, is the eternal play of मायोपहितब्रह्म or better ईश्वर in his desire for self-realisation (स ऐक्षत एकोऽहं बहु स्वां प्रजायेय) ; and the ever-flowing cosmos dances in the music of eternal श्रोत्रम्—music that finds its echo in the devout heart of the bhakta, whose mind is the holy वृन्दावन and whose ecstatic tears the flow of the sacred कालिन्दी. This may be true so far as it goes, but it smacks too much of abstract philosophy to be in the spirit of a mystic with a keen and profound poetic temperament. As a poet-mystic Jayadeva had no contempt for the physical, which he has taken as the vehicle of his

mystic communication. For his mystic vision all aspects of the world possessed equal authority and really the first love of a maiden for a youth is the intensest and purest kind of love that the earth has to offer. And his soul as a maiden felt the same yearning for Kṛṣṇa, the most Divine Youth, which his Rādhā has exhibited. Again, he as a *bhakta* has every claim to the love of Kṛṣṇa, who himself is shown to pine for the love of Rādhā, that is to say, for the love of the *bhakta*, the most triumphant utterance in this connexion being what is placed in the mouth of Kṛṣṇa—**अरगरसखण्डनं मम शिरसि मण्डनं देहि पद-पञ्चवसुदारम् ।** What soul in the highest devotional mood has not been weary of the delay of His approach, in a fit of divine jealousy thinking Him to be tarrying with others more fortunate than himself! This conception very easily explains how it was possible for Kṛṣṇa to be dallying with so many maidens at the same moment. He is the **एको देवो नित्यलीलानुरक्तो भक्त्यापी भक्तद्वयन्तरात्मा**, and as such he remains the lover of every soul that yearns. The **अप्राकृतनायकत्व** explanation will not do, for the śloka of the **भगवद्गीता**, **यद् यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तदेवेतरो जनः । स यत् प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्त्तते ॥** stands as a real and formidable barrier. Nor the philosophical explanation based on the Upaniṣadic text, **“इहा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाहृत्यनम्रवन्त्योऽभिचाकरोति ॥”** meaning that the **परमात्मन्** stands as a mere spectator without feeling anything the worse for any kind of enjoyment, for nothing can touch it, while it is the individual soul, the *Jīvātman*, that reaps the fruits of its own enjoyments. This really takes its stand on absolute monism, for the **परमात्मन्** being **एकमेवाद्वितीयम्**, holding the whole universe within its bosom, whom will it enjoy or seek? But the mystic conception of God is essentially dualistic, if not pantheistic. *Bhakta* is as much necessary for **भगवान्** as the latter is necessary for the former.

It is very significant that Jayadeva omits from his poem the episode of **वेणुवादन** or blowing the lute prior to the **रासलीला**

scape, nor is there the suggestion of the गोपों having left their husbands and relations and other household duties of the time, drawn away by its music; although there is always the mention of singing the lute as associated with Kṛṣṇa. The episode of the श्रीमद्भागवत is omitted and omitted on purpose. Jayadeva seems not to be a supporter of the cult of परकीया रति, which was held up as the highest type of love in later Vaiṣṇavism, as evinced, for example, in many places of चेतन्यचरितामृत. Jayadeva did not concern himself with this episode, because Jayadeva took the whole Kṛṣṇa legend in his own way, which wears altogether a different outlook. His own treatment bears this out, as will be shown presently. What we mean by our mystical interpretation may be clear if we remember the very deep-toned, familiar song of Rabindranath “से ये पाशे ऐसे बसेछिल तबु जागिनि” and many others, for example, “आर नाइरे बेला नाम्ल छाया धरयोते। चलरे घाटे कलसखानि भरे’ निते ॥” etc. But we must not forget that inspite of their almost similar mystical outlook there is a vital distinction between Rabindranath and Jayadeva as mystics. Rabindranath, like his favourite Kāvīr, escapes the excessive emotionalism, the tendency to an exclusively anthropomorphic devotion, which results from an unrestricted cult of divine personality, especially under an incarnational form, while Jayadeva accepts such an incarnational form, and goes frequently to emotional raptures, more particularly in his songs and it is this anthropomorphic devotion that accounts for the portrayal of the character of Kṛṣṇa as we have it in his work.

But we were on our way to an analytical orientation of the poem and we have far strayed away from our path. After the ‘यदि हरिस्मरणे सरसं मनः’ śloka, we have again a benedictory stanza which indicates that the main रस in this work is the सञ्योगशृङ्गार. Now this second song more than the first supplies us with the other incidents of Kṛṣṇa’s life, incidents which place him in the light of सत्य and शिव; and

it prepares us for his **पानन्द** and **सुन्दर** side and points out unmistakably the fact that Kṛṣṇa to be depicted here, will be on a line with the words of the श्रुति, 'रसो वै सः ।'

Then begins the first Canto proper with an introductory stanza, which reveals the whole situation at a glance. Rādhā has been in the fruitless search for Kṛṣṇa, who is sporting with other गोपīs, but the pangs of separation of Rādhā are because before that, she has been, she thinks, the sole recipient of his love (so we gather from many places later on), which is now turned to others, leaving her unceremoniously behind. Now Rādhā is addressed by her maid in song, which describes in the most exquisitely idyllic poetry and with an almost colour-laden brush, the sporting scene, which is quite in the vein of श्रीमद्भागवत, हरिवंश and विष्णुपुराण. This is familiarly known as रासलीला, which Jayadeva describes in one place as रासोक्तास and in another as रसोक्तास, and रासोक्तास is रसोक्तास.

In this Canto as in others, it is remarkable that first there are one or two introductory stanzas, giving the whole outline of the scene, followed by songs, and then there are ślokas again, which are a clear and rather conscious (so invariable the links are) repetition of the ideas of the songs. This phenomenon has proved a veritable enigma for critics and, more than anything else, has given food to the suspicion which has found expression in many bold and sweeping conjectures as to their authorship. This shows that we have neglected the significance of hints like श्रीजयदेवभणितमिदम् अधिकं यदि मनसा नटनौयम्, showing at once that the songs are there because they may more easily be retained, or rather may be given a congenial place, in their memory by men of kindred feeling or रसिकजन as they are frequently called. It is this practical religious consideration that has made him compose the songs ; but to satisfy the taste of his orthodox critics, he had to render those thoughts in ślokas also. But this should not imply that the songs can be taken out of the book without

consideration for the ślokas. For, the ślokas, many of them, are essential to the thorough understanding of the songs in their proper situations. The songs and the ślokas are complementary to one another and it is wonderful how artistically they are interwoven. The whole first canto ought to prove a thing of constant study by the discerning critics. The latest pronouncement of Dr. Keith in this respect, *vis.*, that "in inserting such songs, he doubtless foresaw the use that would be made of them both in the temples and at festivals," does not sound plausible. And in the case of राधा and कृष्ण, though not so directly of दूतों, another explanation of the song element may be offered and it is this that, as we have in the भागवत 'उपगायन्' and 'गीयमानः', both कृष्ण as प्रबुद्ध (the उज्ज्वलनीलमणि has, however, धीरोदात्त) नायक, and राधा as प्रगल्भा नायिका have been traditionally endowed with highest proficiency in dancing and music and the hoary antiquity of this tradition may be seen in the fact that mention is made of the हल्लीश dance in Bhāsa's drama, the Bālacarita.

There is another very significant aspect of the first Canto. The second song begins with deeds of Kṛṣṇa which are enumerated in श्रीमद्भागवत and हरिवंश. Now scientifically speaking and not aesthetically—a distinction noted very clearly above—it fulfils very accurately one great epic condition, *vis.*, that the hero must be of a धीरोदात्त type and his exploits must be taken from some well-known source. The 'rasa' consideration offers another reason why the incidents are treated more like episodes than as dramatic action. Throughout, the शङ्कर रस is presented to an ecstacy and the whole situation of सख्योग is described with all artistic details, and with the perfect self-possession. This is strictly forbidden in any Sanskrit drama and so the songs ought not to be taken as so many dramatic monologues. Thus the epic form is very well justified.

Now let us pursue the thread of the narrative further.

The second Canto begins with the song of Rādhā. After the song there occurs this significant śloka :—

गणयति गुणग्रामं भामं भ्रमादपि नैहते
वहति च परीतोषं दोषं विमुञ्चति दूरतः ।
युवतिषु वलसुषु क्लृप्ते विहारिणि मां विना
पुनरपि मनो वामं कामं करोति करोमि किम् ॥

This is verily the गुणमाहात्म्यासक्ति, the first of the ten दशाभावस mentioned in the नारदभक्तिसूत्र. Of these ten, we have रूपासक्ति, पूजासक्ति (हरिरिति हरिरिति जपति सकामम्, etc.), स्मरणासक्ति, काम्नासक्ति, आत्मनिवेदनासक्ति—(प्रतिपदमिदमपि निगदति माधव तव चरणे पतिताऽहम्), तन्मयासक्ति,—(भावनया त्वयि लोना; सुहृद्वलोकितमण्डनलीला, मधुरिपुरहमिति भावनशीला) and परमविरहासक्ति, these दशाभावस manifested here. We have spoken before of the गोपालतापनी उपनिषद् and how mystical attitude is distinct from philosophical attitude. Now in the fifth Canto there is a śloka which very clearly points out this distinction :—

पूर्वं यत्र सप्तं त्वया रतिपतेरासादिताः सिद्धय
स्तस्मिन्नेव निकुञ्जमन्मथमहातोर्थे पुनर्माधवः ।
ध्यायंस्वामनिशं जपन्नपि तवेवालापमन्त्रावलीं
भूयस्वत्कुञ्चकुम्भनिर्भरपरीरभामृतं वाञ्छति ॥

Now in the गोपालतापनी we have an account of the तीर्थस (with which evidently the मन्मथमहातोर्थ is contrasted), an account of the मन्त्रस (to which आलापमन्त्रावली is presented as a contrast), and the अमृतत्व referred to there (सोऽमृतो भवति, etc.) is contrasted with this परीरभामृतत्व. Indeed Jayadeva, as here, fearlessly and freely associates terms of high religious significance with love terms. Let us notice a few more instances. We have तस्मात् लम्बसमाधिः; कुसुमविशिखशरतल्पमनस्य-विलासकलाकमनीयम् । व्रतमिव तव परीरभसुखाय करोति कुसुमशयनीयम्—there is the comment of कुम्भराज, अन्योऽपि सुखेधौ व्रतमाचरति, etc. It may be noticed in passing, that from the artistic point of view, the poet shows a thorough familiarity with the canons

of **भरत's नाट्यशास्त्र** and **वात्सायन's कामसूत्र** as the various parallels quoted in the commentaries tend to testify.

Then comes another song of Rādhā as **उत्कण्ठिता नायिका** addressed to the **सखी** which begins thus : 'निभृतनिकुञ्जगृहं गतया निशि रहसि निलीय वसन्तम्.' As we find later on, the whole situation, as the poet leads us into, is like this :—Rādhā discovers Kṛṣṇa one spring morning engaged in revels with the cow-herdresses since the night before, when he secretly departed for them leaving Rādhā behind. Then Kṛṣṇa suddenly remembers Rādhā (this 'राधामाधाय हृदये' bears quite a different meaning in the **गीतगोविन्द** from the **भागवत** where these very same words occur and mean, placing Rādhā on his breast), Kṛṣṇa sees also how Rādhā has angrily departed and he feels penitent. Then there are mutual **विरह** utterances, which occupy the whole day and with the fall of evening the spring-time is gone and then looms large the rainy season atmosphere and the **सखी** of Rādhā advises her to **अभिसार**, which Rādhā in her love-lorn condition cannot do to the finish. So the Sixth Canto ends with the evening thickening all around—'**गोविन्दस्य जयन्ति सायमतिथिप्राशस्त्यगर्भा गिरः**,' and the Seventh Canto begins with the moonlight diffused through the sky—'**हृन्दावनान्तर-मदीपयदंशुजालैर्दिक्सुन्दरीवदनचन्दनविन्दुरिन्दुः**.' There in a bower Rādhā spends the long dreary night saying, 'He cometh not, he cometh not' and the Eighth Canto opens with the morning, '**अथ कथमपि यामिनो विनोय स्मरशरज्ज्वरिता सा प्रभाते**.' Then throughout the whole day there goes on the **अभिसार** of Kṛṣṇa, who reaches his lady-love in the Tenth Canto after the day is over. Thus : '**सब्रौडमौचितसखीवदना दिनान्ते सानन्दगदगदपदं हरिरित्युवाच**.' The Eleventh Canto opens with the song of a **सखी** of Rādhā in the fall of evening (**दृष्टिमोषे प्रदोषे**). Then in the night the long-wished-for union comes about. Thus the incidents of the whole poem occupy two consecutive days and nights. This detailed time-analysis is not without its benefit. The treatment of the natural atmosphere is striking. We see this spring-time beauty smiling in the morning flowers

and singing in the hum of bees, holding its sway over the whole day, being suddenly replaced with the fall of evening by the rainy clouds and showers. This is not a mere poetic device, but a common experience in Bengal, especially in that part of Bengal of which the poet is said to have been an inhabitant. This is a valuable piece of internal evidence confirming that he was a native of Bengal, and not of Orissa, as some suppose.

On the other hand, this time-analysis discloses how different the whole arrangement is from the भागवत, the हरिदंश, etc. For the sake of evidence let us enumerate these differences here. Thus :—

1. { भागवत—शरत्कथाश्रियः ।
गौतमोविन्द—वसन्त ।
2. { भागवत—One night, that is extended by योगमाया.
गौतमोविन्द—it is two days and nights.
3. { भागवत—it is पूर्णिमास्नानी though घोररूपा because of dense forests, etc.;
गौतमोविन्द—it is वर्षा अभिसार ;
4. { भागवत—कृष्ण is शिशु or किशोर and through योगमाया he is transformed into a never-fading blooming youth ;
गौतमोविन्द—he is naturally shown as a youth.

The first cause of such differences has been indicated above, viz., Jayadeva's mystical outlook. They also speak eloquently of the large and lofty artistic sense of the poet. They show how rigidly he keeps to the best tradition of the classics. It is also very significant that he totally omits the 'योगमाया' element of the भागवत and in its stead shows us Kṛṣṇa as the eternal youth. In this respect his precedent is followed by all later poets like Caṇḍidāsa and Vidyāpati. This has considerably heightened the effect of the poems, the power to

strip the mind with the sense of an absolute truth, which shows the amplitude and intensity of realisation as also the perfection of art.

--- The essay is already long. But it will be abrupt to close it without some mention of its artistic beauty. We quote from Dr. Keith, "If to be untranslatable is a proof of the attainment of the highest poetry, Jayadeva has certainly claim to that rank. The poem has all the perfection of the miniature word-pictures which are so common in Sanskrit poetry with the beauty which arises, as Aristotle asserts, from magnitude and arrangement." Let us take some instances. His similes are Kālidāśian in point of beauty and appropriateness—they are pictures in miniature :—

“उरसि मुरारिरुपहितहारे घन इव तरलवलाके ।
तद्धृदिव पीते रतिविपरीते राजसि सुकृतविपाके ॥”
“त्यजति न पाणितलेन कपोलम् ।
बालशशिनमिव सायमलोलम् ॥”
“विशेषामनुरञ्जनेन जनयमानन्दमिन्दोवर—
श्रेणीश्यामलकोमलैरुपनयकङ्क्रेरनङ्गोत्सवम् ।
स्रच्छन्दं ब्रजसुन्दरोभिरभितः प्रत्यङ्गमालिङ्गितः
शृङ्गारः सखि मूर्त्तिमानमिव मधौ सुग्धो हरिः क्रीडति ॥”

We have said before, “Every true work of art has violated some established kind,” and the whole Sanskrit literature affords no better example than the Gitagovinda, unique in conception, unique in execution, unique in itself. And what shall we say of his songs ? They flow out and shape themselves so spontaneously and with so careless an ease, into so many pictures, with light and shade, colour and smell, sounds and sensations, so sensuous and yet not sensual, so intense and yet not fatiguing, that we feel saturated with the music of his verse, which rings sweet and unknown sensations into

our ears. And with legitimate pride, born of intense self-consciousness, he says :—

“यद्गान्धर्वकलासु कौशलमनुध्यानं च यद् वैष्णवं
 यच्छृङ्गारविवेकतत्त्वरचनाकाव्येषु लीलायितम् ।
 तत् सर्व्वं जयदेवपण्डितकवेः क्षणोक्तानामनः
 सानन्दाः परिशोधयन्तु सुधियः श्रीगीतगोविन्दतः ॥”

To all this we say, Amen. His poem, like the immortal Song of Songs, will be an unfailing source of joy and inspiration to kindred spirits, and Jayadeva will always live in their hearts, as he wished to live.
